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When states look at cyberspace, they do not necessarily see the same as 
most end users do. Sure, they see the massive added value in terms of the 
digital economy and, like their citizens, they have difficulties imagining life 
without the constant interactions and communication that is the bedrock 
of modern digital society. However, many parts of the government see 
cyberspace increasingly as a source of threat, insecurity, and instability. 
Where states looked at the early stages of the development of cyberspace 
with a certain degree of “benign neglect,” it became much more of a gov-
ernment interest when the digital economy started off in earnest. Now, 
states increasingly view cyberspace through a lens of security. Not just 
in terms of cybercrime but more and more in terms of the high politics of 
international security (Klimburg 2017; Segal 2016; DeNardis 2014; Deib-
ert 2013; Betz and Stevens 2011). Many states have formally declared the 
cyber domain to be the fifth domain of warfare—after land, sea, air, and 
space—and  increasingly states conduct intelligence and pseudo-military 
operations in the cyber domain that fall short of “cyber war” but do create 
a permanent state of “unpeace” (Kello 2017; see also Boeke and Broeders 
2018). The increase in cyber-attacks among states, or at least those that come 
out into the open, seem to be intensifying in terms of damage and impact, 
and provoke reactions from states and corporations. Cyber operations like 
WannaCry and NotPetya, politically attributed to North Korea and Russia, 
respectively, were both damaging and indiscriminate, which added to the 
feeling of vulnerability in the digital domain. However, even with NotPetya, 
of which the global damages have been estimated at roughly $10 billion 
(Greenberg 2018), no state was willing to say this operation was in violation 
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of international law. More in general, all public attributions of cyberattacks 
to states have not invoked international law other than in the most general 
terms possible (Efrony and Shany 2018).
In cyberspace, a state of unpeace is heating up and although most states 
agree in principle that international law applies in cyberspace as it does 
in the analogue world, they do not seem to be able to agree on specifics. 
Furthermore, “the” regulation of “the” Internet does not exist. Nye (2014) 
has shown that the Internet is regulated through an elaborate cyber regime 
complex that has pockets of dense regulation in some subject areas as well 
as patches that are largely unregulated. Moreover, there are many aspects 
on which states are still struggling to find an effective governance structure 
to address the issues at hand (see also Klimburg and Faesen 2020 in this 
volume). Moreover, some elements of governance are firmly in the hands of 
private parties (companies, the technical community), whereas others—for 
example, military, intelligence, and diplomatic—are firmly in the hands of 
states. The mix between public and private actors in Internet governance 
is called “multistakeholder governance,” a concept that is embraced by 
Western liberal states (at least in theory) but is disputed by states that favor 
a much stronger role for sovereign states in the regulation and governance 
of cyberspace. States like Russia and China would like to bring “Internet 
governance” into a multilateral setting where sovereign states, rather 
than a wide array of stakeholders, steer the direction of cyberspace. This 
archetypical divide between multistakeholderism and multilateralism when 
talking about cybersecurity and Internet governance structures is connecting 
with rising geopolitical tensions between the major global powers. The global 
strife between the United States and China and Russia—with the European 
Union somewhere in the middle of the mix—works as a force multiplier 
for tensions in both interstate behavior—cyber operations among states—
and positions in diplomatic negotiations on “responsible state behavior” 
in cyberspace (Broeders, Adamson, and Creemers 2019). In this volume, 
Klimburg and Faesen (2020) search for ways to square the circle the between 
classic balance of power politics and the complicated governance structures 
that are needed to regulate cyberspace.
OF LAWS AND NORMS
The possible negative effects of the use of ICTs for international peace 
and security were flagged by Russia in 1998 when it submitted a resolution 
on “Developments in the field of Information and Telecommunications in 
the context of International Security” to the UN’s First Committee, which 
deals with disarmament and international security (UNGA 1999). While 
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recognizing that the Internet brought many good things, Moscow feared an 
arms race in this new domain and aimed for the negotiation of a treaty that 
would ban the use of information weapons in order to prevent information 
wars. To some extent, Russia feared in 1998 what many now consider Mos-
cow to be the best at: information operations and the spread of disinforma-
tion. Russia was aiming for a new treaty specifically for cyberspace but ran 
into Western resistance to the notion that cyberspace needed lex specialis. 
Western states, in this field often loosely assembled under the heading of 
the “like-minded” states, depart from the notion that international law, 
including International Humanitarian Law, applies in the digital domain as 
it does in the “real world.” The UN Group of Governmental Experts (UN 
GGE) process was started in 2004 to create a venue at the UN level for 
deliberation of the issue without going down the road of a treaty. Out of five 
iterations of the process the group of experts produced a consensus report 
three times, with as main yields the principle that international law applies 
in cyberspace in 2013 and the formulation of a number of nonbinding norms 
for responsible state behavior in the 2015 consensus report (UN General 
Assembly 2010, 2013, 2015). After the 2017 round of the UN GGE failed 
to achieve consensus, there were many reports of the “death of the norms 
process” (see, e.g., Grigsby 2017), but in November 2018, the UN General 
Assembly voted on two parallel and competing resolutions. The first was 
submitted by the United States and supported by the “like-minded” states 
calling for a new round of the GGE. The second was submitted by Russia 
and called for an Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) to discuss roughly 
the same issues. Both were voted through by the General Assembly in sub-
stantial and significantly overlapping numbers, and the twin processes have 
started in 2019.
In a parallel trajectory to the diplomatic processes at the UN and regional 
organizations, international legal scholars embarked on a project to flesh 
out how exactly international law applies in cyberspace. This project under 
the sponsorship of the NATO CCDCOE—which does not make it a NATO 
project—resulted in the Tallinn Manual (2013) and the Tallinn Manual 2.0 
in 2017 (Schmitt et al. 2013, 2017). Both are academic, nonbinding studies 
on how international law applies to cyber conflicts and cyber warfare and on 
many issues contain majority and minority opinions. The first manual focuses 
on the jus ad bellum and International Humanitarian Law and the second 
focuses on cyber operations that are “below the threshold” of armed conflict, 
or “peacetime operations.” The Tallinn manuals are the most comprehensive 
analyses of International Humanitarian Law and cyberspace available and 
serve as an important reference point. However, and as indicated before, 
states are reluctant to refer to (specific principles of) international law when 
they publicly address cyber operations and conflict, leading Efrony and 
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Shany (2018) to refer to the manual as “a rulebook on the shelf.” Many legal 
scholars in this fieldwork on different aspects of international law and how 
these relate to state operations in the cyber domain. In this volume, Roguski 
(2020) analyses the principle of territorial sovereignty in cyberspace through 
a lens of an “intrusion-based approach” and Tsagourias (2020) looks at cyber 
interference with election processes in light of the legal principle of non-
intervention. Principle-by-principle and case-by-case legal scholars are add-
ing to the growing literature on the application of international law to state 
behavior in cyberspace.
The limited diplomatic progress on the application of international law to 
cyberspace also led to what is called the cyber-norms process, both in diplo-
matic practice as in academia. The 2015 UN GGE consensus report included 
a section on “general non-binding, voluntary norms, rules and principles for 
responsible behaviour of states.” This section contained eleven “new” recom-
mendations for norms and gave an impetus to the international debate about 
cyber norms. These norms are often juxtaposed with international law. The 
states that participate in the GGE process went the route of norms, in part 
because achieving agreement on the question of how exactly international law 
applies to cyberspace proved a size too big for the negotiations. However, it 
is also misleading to set norms and international law totally apart from each 
other in this domain. In this volume, Adamson (2020) highlights the fact 
that many of the norms in the 2015 UN GGE report actually reflect existing 
international law. Norms and international law can and do mutually reinforce 
each other and should not be seen as two completely different and parallel 
discourses.
International law and international norms—as well as Confidence Build-
ing Measures (CBMs), which are also part of the GGE process—all serve 
the same basic function in the context of cyberspace. They are all meant 
to make state behavior more predictable—especially in times of conflict—
when operating in a context that is unpredictable and where actions are 
easy to obfuscate and misinterpret. Norms and international law serve to 
set benchmarks against which we can measure and evaluate state behavior 
and call actors out on bad behavior. International law would be the gold 
standard for this but is problematic for two reasons. Firstly, because it has 
proven hard to get substantial agreement on the question of how specific 
principles of international law apply in cyberspace. Secondly, because 
many of the cyber operations that have states worried are below-the-
threshold operations and, moreover, they are usually executed by intel-
ligence agencies and proxy actors, which are not meaningfully regulated 
by international law in the first place (Boeke and Broeders 2018; Maurer 
2018). In order to make some progress, academics and states have gone 
down the route of norms.
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THE CYBER-NORMS DISCOURSE
Norms have been a part of the academic debate for far longer than the rise 
to fame of the cyber-prefix. In international relations theory, Peter Kat-
zenstein’s definition of a norm is often the point of departure. According 
to him, a norm in international politics is “a collective expectation for the 
proper behaviour of actors with a given identity” (Katzenstein 1996, 5). This 
implies that there is some sort of community that has—or develops—an idea 
of what appropriate behavior is. And even though there is no enforcement 
mechanism in place, the community expects its members to behave a cer-
tain, appropriate, way. In the cyber-norms discourse that community is often 
equated with states, especially in the diplomatic, state-led norms debate, 
even though many other public and private actors populate the cyber domain 
and even dominate important aspects of Internet governance. Finnemore and 
Sikkink (1998) argue that norms are often championed by a norms entre-
preneur and when successful the norm they champion goes through a norms 
cycle. This cycle starts with “norms emergence,” in which the role of the 
norms entrepreneur(s) to propagate the norm is vital. If their advocacy for 
the norm is successful, the community to which the norm should apply may 
reach a tipping point which leads to the second stage, labeled the “norms cas-
cade.” During this phase, the pioneering work of the norms entrepreneur gets 
taken over by many other actors within the community who see the norms 
as central to their identity and propagate its spread. In the last stage, actors 
“internalize” the norm into their everyday behavior and the norms effec-
tively come to serve as a benchmark for appropriate behavior. Finnemore 
and Hollis (2016) have taken this classic approach to norms creation into the 
cyber domain and highlighted the dynamic and interdependent character of 
cyber norms. They also found that much of the debate about norms in this 
domain was (too) centered on norms as an end goal and not enough on the 
value of the process itself. Kurowska (2019) takes that argument further and 
emphasizes that the classic model of the norms cycle—perhaps especially 
in the cyber-norms debate—often has a teleological character and does not 
take norms contestation into account as an important part of the model. This 
blind spot has consequences not only for the empirical analysis of the norms 
process but also for the legitimacy of the norms process as a political and 
a policy process: “a norm that cannot be contested, cannot be legitimate” 
(Kurowska 2019, 8).
Cyber norms as they stand today are highly contested among governments, 
despite the efforts of diplomats over the last decades. Moreover, the com-
munity to which the norms apply—and who feel part of it as norm entrepre-
neurs—is by no means convincingly demarcated. States consider themselves 
to be the core community, but civil society and corporations are increasingly 
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vocal about their place and role in this normative and regulatory domain and 
engage with the norms debate on their own accord. In this volume, Eggen-
schwiler and Kulesza (2020) analyze the role of a number of civil society and 
corporate initiatives that engage with, and shape the norms debate. Gorwa 
and Peez (2020) and Hurel and Lobato (2020), both also in this volume, ana-
lyze the role, goals, and strategies of Microsoft that has put itself forward as 
a major actor in the international cyber-norms debate.
However, the diplomatic track does not easily open up to “outside” actors 
even when it has failed to make much substantial progress on the issue. The 
2015 UN GGE norms may be agreed upon but are in the words of Maurer 
(2019) “considered voluntary, defined vaguely, and internalized weakly.” 
After the attacks on the Ukrainian grid in December 2015, many wondered 
why this was not called out as a violation of the norm that states do not attack 
critical infrastructures in peacetime as formulated in the 2015 UN GGE con-
sensus report.1 Now that the stalemate that came into being after the 2017 
round of the UN GGE failed to produce consensus has been replaced with the 
political surprise of the creation of two UN processes in 2018, states bear a 
great responsibility for moving the process forward. If they do not, the UN is 
unlikely to remain the focal point for discussion. And while the United States 
is heavily invested in the GGE as a format and Russia is heavily invested in 
the OEWG, and more generally in the idea of a multilateral approach, the 
differences of opinion remain substantial.
Meanwhile, cyber norms are also emerging through state practice rather 
than diplomatic agreement. States engage in certain behavior in cyberspace: 
they conduct cyber operations, develop (military) cyber doctrine, change 
cybersecurity policies and thus create new facts on the digital ground. States 
also draw red lines that are either respected or violated. When violated, some 
are met with consequences and some are not. All of this is norm-setting 
behavior. Actual state behavior shapes normative behavior but is “implicit, 
poorly understood, and cloaked in secrecy” (Maurer 2019). A good example 
of that is the norm-setting behavior of intelligence agencies that is analyzed 
by Georgieva (2020b) in this volume (see also Georgieva 2020a). Power rela-
tions and actual state behavior go a long way in explaining how state relations 
in cyberspace develop.
POWER AND NORMS
One complicating factor of state relations is the Orwellian notion that all 
states are equal, but some are more equal than others. Even the UN, an 
organization founded on the principle of the equality of sovereign states, 
acknowledges this through the mechanism of the five permanent members of 
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the Security Council that hold a veto. As “cyber” rose to the top of the inter-
national and national security agenda, geopolitics and strategic considerations 
became more prominent in the debate about responsible state behavior in 
cyberspace. States may agree that cyberspace is a source of threats to national 
security, but simultaneously it is also a possible strategic military advantage, 
especially to the top-tier cyber powers. Powerful states are usually reluctant 
to give up capabilities, especially when it is uncertain that others will do the 
same (Broeders 2017). Countries like the United States, China, Russia, the 
United Kingdom and Israel, but also Iran and North Korea, have invested 
heavily in military and foreign intelligence capacity to operate in cyberspace. 
Other countries have followed suit in different degrees creating a landscape 
in which operational cyber capacity and cyber power are unequally divided 
among states.
Moreover, in recent years, the global balance of power has been shift-
ing. American global dominance is challenged by the rising star of China. 
While China’s cyber power is still mostly focused on (economic) espionage 
and control on the domestic information sphere, rather than all-out military 
cyber power, China is also asserting itself as a tech developer and vendor 
at the global level as one of the underpinnings of its status as an economic 
superpower (Inkster 2016). Russia is trying to reassert itself in terms of being 
a key player in international cyber peace and security. In cyberspace it does 
so by—allegedly—being one of the most active cyber powers operating 
below the threshold of armed conflict in the networks of a great number of 
countries, as well as by being one of the leading countries in the diplomatic 
processes on responsible state behavior in cyberspace (see Kurowska 2020 in 
this volume). China and Russia are also formally and informally aligned on 
a number of foreign policy objectives, including in the cyber domain. They 
present a seemingly united front to the world, largely aimed at countering US 
hegemony, but underneath the façade of unity there are also structural dif-
ferences that may put cracks into Sino-Russian cooperation in the longer run 
(Broeders, Adamson, and Creemers 2019).
As a general principle, all states want other states to be bound by a frame-
work of rules while retaining as much room to maneuver for themselves. 
Great powers like strategic ambiguity in military affairs (Taddeo 2017) and 
exceptionalism in political affairs. To global powers, like the United States, 
China, and Russia, the latter is almost an informal doctrine: they all apply a 
sense of exceptionalism to themselves. China and Russia have clear, explicit, 
and extensive rules and regulations with regard to cyberspace for their own 
territories, and (global) companies wishing to do business there must comply 
or else face the consequences. In this volume, Hoffman (2020) analyses the 
ways in which China has dealt with US pushback on freedom of expression 
surrounding Google’s entry into the Chinese market.
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Russia and China both rally around the idea of “cyber sovereignty” as 
one of the main organizing principles for interstate relations in cyberspace 
(see Creemers 2020 and Kurowksa 2020 in this volume). To these coun-
tries, cyber sovereignty means control over the domestic information sphere 
internally, and strict adherence to the principle of non-intervention and self-
determination externally. Both China and Russia see information operations 
in their nation’s information sphere as the greatest ICT-related threat. Ironi-
cally, what Moscow fears most is what it is generally considered to be best 
at: information operations and the spread of mis- and disinformation. More 
in general, “sovereignty” is a bone of contention between Western states and 
authoritarian states. In this volume, Creemers (2020) highlights that tension 
in the Chinese case: “China’s definition of sovereignty primarily concerns the 
integrity of its political structure, while Western states consider this a defence 
of exactly those abuses that the more conditional, post-Cold War reading of 
sovereignty sought to curtail” (Creemers 2020, 112). Moreover, for countries 
like China and Russia, sovereignty is not the same for all states: the sover-
eignty of great states is of a different order than those of smaller states. Great 
power status is paired with exceptionalism. In the eyes of both Russia and 
China, the Pax Americana was built on American exceptionalism—“do as I 
say, don’t do as I do.” Their (rise to) great power status will likewise be built 
on the idea of exceptionalism, which in turn will influence their views and 
role in disrupting, reforming, and building the future world order (Broeders, 
Adamson, and Creemers 2019). The cyber order will be shaped by great 
power politics, which is currently and for the foreseeable future in flux.
It is also interesting to see how less powerful states seek to navigate the 
power divides in cyberspace, aligning themselves with one power block on 
some issues, while choosing to align themselves with a competing power 
block on others. In this volume, Shires (2020) looks at states in the Middle 
East—a complex region with multiple allegiances on different issues—
and shows how “their regulations, laws, and participation in international 
institutions places them with Russia, China, and other proponents of cyber 
sovereignty; on the other, their private sector cybersecurity collaborations, 
intelligence relationships, and offensive cyber operations are closely aligned 
with the USA and Europe” (Shires 2020, 205–206). For many countries then 
determining their position on security, international law, and norms is often 
an undertaking characterized by a degree of ambiguity.
In the practice of everyday cyber diplomacy, the inequality between sove-
reign states often means that smaller states favor and support the development 
of a rules-based order, engaging, for example, in cyber-norms entrepreneur-
ship (Adamson and Homburger 2019), while larger states engage with these 
processes but allow themselves at least a certain degree of strategic ambigu-
ity. Russia and the United States may be the primary instigators of the UN 
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processes that seek to define how international law applies in cyberspace and 
which cyber norms could help shape state behavior, they are also the states 
that shift the posts on these issues through their actual behavior and advances 
in national (military) doctrine and operations. In terms of espionage (NSA 
mass surveillance, Chinese economic espionage, Russian digital sabotage), 
the “militarization” of cyberspace (building up military cyber commands) 
and the return of information operations (Russian influence operations, most 
notably interference with the 2016 US presidential election) it has been state 
practice, not laws and rules, that set the tone. Development in military cyber 
doctrine in some of the top-tier countries also points in the direction of a 
more aggressive posture in cyberspace. For example, the US Department of 
Defence (DoD) cyber strategy states that US cyber forces are in “persistent 
engagement” with their adversaries and, therefore, need to “defend forward” 
and “continuously contest” those adversaries, creating more possibilities for 
escalation of cyber conflict, even though the intention may be the opposite 
(Healey 2019). States interpreting the actions and intentions of other states 
erroneously is a classic source of instability as it can lead to the unintended 
escalation of conflict, a dynamic captured by the idea of the classic security 
dilemma (Jervis 1978). As Buchanan (2016) has shown, cyberspace provides 
an excellent context for what he calls a cybersecurity dilemma, highlighting 
how misinterpretation and escalation of conflict in cyberspace may emerge 
easily. Therefore, stability in cyberspace may be best served by consciously 
preparing for the moment that states wrongly interpret the actions of their 
adversaries. In addition to international law and cyber norms, the world also 
needs Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) as the third part of the triptych 
to avoid (unwanted) escalation of conflict in cyberspace (Kavanagh and Cre-
spo 2019). Even though they are widely considered to be vital, CBMs mainly 
play a useful role when the escalation of (cyber) conflict is un-intentional 
(Pawlak 2016, 135). When states intentionally seek to escalate a conflict, 
CBMs are useless: in that case the red phone may ring, but will not be picked 
up. In spite of the realities of power politics, a rules-based order—interna-
tional law foremost and to certain degree norms—is still the most promising 
route to stability in cyberspace. International law does not always prevent 
hostilities; however, states but it does provide a benchmark by which to judge 
and call out state behavior that is in breach of laws and norms.
NEGOTIATING CHANGE
Finding a framework that applies to the problems at hand in cyberspace is not 
easy, however. Even though cyberspace does not change the world beyond 
recognition, it does present severe challenges for international governance. 
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The regional level has gained in importance when it comes to issues of 
international peace and security in relation to cyberspace. The ASEAN 
Regional Forum (ASF) has been an active player in the international debate 
about cyber stability and norms (Heinl 2018) and announced in November 
2019 the start of an ASEAN working group on the implementation of the UN 
cyber norms. Likewise, the work done in the Organisation for Security and 
Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)—especially in the field of CBMs—and the 
Organisation of American States (OAS) has been valuable in and of itself, 
but also as a means to continue the conversation about international cyber 
stability when the UN GGE process ground to a temporary halt in 2017 (Ott 
and Osula 2019). As a military alliance that spans the Atlantic, NATO’s role 
in the cyber domain is more complicated. There is no clear mandate for the 
organization itself on the operational level, even though the alliance does 
recognize the importance of cyberspace as an operational domain of warfare. 
Operational cyber power rests with the member states and the differences 
within the alliance in terms of operational capacity are vast. NATO houses 
both top-tier cyber powers like the United States and the United Kingdom 
as well as states that have hardly developed any military or foreign intel-
ligence capacity to operate in cyberspace. At the Wales summit in 2014, 
NATO declared cyber defense a core part of collective defense, meaning 
that a cyberattack could trigger Article 5, the collective defense clause, of 
the treaty. In this volume, Hill and Marsan (2020) sketch how NATO as a 
multilateral organization is charting a course to help its member states build 
their cyber defense capabilities, both individually and collectively, and also 
seeks to contribute to building a legal and normative framework in which 
cyber capabilities can be deployed and contested.
Cyberspace may have been named the fifth domain of warfare by states 
but the actual day-to-day operation of that domain is only to a very limited 
amount a state affair. Cyberspace’s rise to global dominance was to a very 
large extent a private affair driven by businesses and the technical commu-
nity laying the groundwork of the logical and technical infrastructure. Most 
states regarded its development with a benign neglect until cyberspace also 
became a foundational value for the national economy and society (Mueller 
2010; DeNardis 2014; Broeders 2015). With the growth of cyberspace, the 
stakes of states have risen, but so did the stakes of the private sector and 
the technical community. Both “communities”—whose interests sometimes 
overlap and align but who also frequently find themselves at opposite ends 
of Internet governance debates—have massive interests in how cyberspace 
develops both in a technical sense as well as in a socioeconomic and political 
sense. Whether cyberspace is seen as a domain of warfare, whether notions of 
sovereignty are overlaid on a global system of information exchange, whether 
privacy regulations have extraterritorial effects, and whether governments are 
going to expect, request, and/or direct Internet companies and ISPs to enforce 
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national policies matters a great deal to globally operating tech companies. 
Both in terms of their business models and opportunities and in terms of their 
(corporate) identities. Some companies have been seeking ways to insert 
themselves into the political debates about global Internet governance, espe-
cially into the field of international security which is traditionally closed to 
all actors other than states.
In this volume, Eggenschwiler and Kulesza (2020) analyze a number of 
corporate and multistakeholder initiatives that aim to influence the global 
debate about responsible behavior of states in cyberspace. Private initiatives 
coming from, for example, Microsoft and Siemens and global fora such 
as the Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace, which recently 
published its final report (GCSC 2019), aim to influence state and corporate 
behavior in cyberspace. Two chapters in this volume, Hurel and Lobato 
(2020) and Gorwa and Peez (2020), dive deeper into Microsoft’s role as a 
norms entrepreneur. Microsoft has been at the forefront of corporate involved 
in the cyber-norms process which has for now culminated in its (informal) 
co-authorship of the French government initiative of the Paris Call for Trust 
and Security in Cyberspace which was launched in November 2018 and its 
sponsorship of the recently founded Cyber Peace Institute.2 Hurel and Lobato 
(2020) analyze Microsoft’s internal structures and complexities to gain 
insight in the how and why of Microsoft’s engagement with the international 
norms processes. They also raise an interesting question with regard to where 
a global corporation’s allegiance lies (in addition to its shareholders). How 
does Microsoft balance the interest of its global user base with the interest 
of the United States, its home country? When push comes to shove—and it 
might very well in these times of geopolitical strife—what will carry more 
weight: its global user base or the interest of its home government? Gorwa 
and Peez (2020) make an in-depth analysis of the Microsoft-led initiative of 
the Cyber Security Tech Accord (CTA). The CTA is focused on corporate 
self-regulation—partly in response to government pushback to Microsoft’s 
earlier high-profile “Digital Geneva Convention” initiative—and has been 
backed by over 120 companies. They argue that Microsoft’s CTA initiative 
served to brush up their reputation on data protection after the damage done 
by the Snowden revelations about their involvement with the NSA surveil-
lance. The success of the accord in terms of the growing body of signatories 
is at least partially explained by their assessment that “the Accord offers all 
the PR potential and heavyweight legitimacy and very little of the normative 
obligation of the international legal language” (Gorwa and Peez 2020, 277). 
However, their characterization of Microsoft as a “quasi-diplomatic entity” 
(based on Hurel and Lobato 2018) ultimately points back into the direction of 
the diplomatic tables where the seats are taken by states.
The reports of the GGE’s death in 2017 seem to have been greatly exag-
gerated given that the sixth round of the process has started in December 
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2019. The fact that twenty-five UN member states will again meet to discuss 
the application of international law to the cyber domain and cyber norms 
is in itself not a guarantee for success, although sources say that the 2017 
round found quite a lot of common ground, in addition to the disputes that 
eventually blocked consensus. As the General Assembly of the UN thickened 
the diplomatic cyber plot by also voting through the Russian resolution that 
called for the installation of an Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG), the 
revival of the UN GGE is in no way “business as usual.” Russia has claimed 
the moral high ground and played the card of international political legiti-
macy. The Russian delegation built its case for the OEWG on the principle 
that it is open to the participation of all states and renounced the UN GGE as 
“the practice of club agreements that should be sent into the annals of history” 
(cited in Kurowska 2019). As one of the permanent members of the Security 
Council, Russia is assured of a seat in that club, but given their sponsorship 
of the OEWG resolution the stakes are high. The parallel tracks have ushered 
in a state of Mutually Assured Diplomacy: it is more than likely that either 
both processes yield a result or that both will fail (Broeders 2019). If one fails 
on account of one political camp, the other camp is likely to respond in kind 
and derail the other process. This will complicate an already difficult process. 
Getting agreement on how existing international law applies to cyberspace—
generally agreed to be the stumbling block of the 2017 GGE round—now 
has to be navigated in two processes that are at once separate and joined at 
the hip. Add in the new geopolitics of technical Internet governance and ris-
ing tensions about the permanent state of “unpeace” in cyberspace and those 
working on the diplomatic challenges of cyberspace stability and Internet 
governance have their work cut out for them.
NOTES
1. Article 13 F of UNGA 2015: “A State should not conduct or knowingly sup-
port ICT activity contrary to its obligations under international law that intentionally 
damages critical infrastructure or otherwise impairs the use and operation of critical 
infrastructure to provide services to the public.”
2. See also: https://cyberpeaceinstitute.org/
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The international community has recognized the need for “rules of the road” 
in cyberspace not only for individuals and private sector actors but also for 
states. The issue of responsible state behavior in the context of international 
peace and security was raised by the Russian Federation already in 1998 
when it called for an international dialogue under the auspices of the United 
Nations (UN) (UNGA 1998; UNGA 1999). Over the past two decades that 
regulatory discussion pertaining to cyberspace has evolved from a possible 
multilateral treaty to application of existing international law, and to the 
development and application of cyber norms.
Norms of responsible state behavior in cyberspace, or more commonly 
noted as cyber norms, have developed into a very broad research focus that can 
be part of various different discourses in the realm of cybersecurity. Norms, 
in general, can be found everywhere, from everyday interactions to norms that 
have been codified as law. Yet, in the interactions between states as well as in 
the academic discourse cyber norms and international law are often perceived 
as two different tracks of regulatory approaches. Mainly inspired by the work 
of the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in 
the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of Interna-
tional Security (hereinafter UN GGE), norms in cyberspace are increasingly 
approached as nonbinding and voluntary in nature. The latter aspect is often 
interpreted as being a pathway to easier consensus in a challenging realm. At 
the same time, international law is portrayed as a binding source of normative 
behavior, application of which often leads to contestation among states.1
This chapter argues that norms and international law are not detached from 
each other. Instead, they are mutually reinforcing and ought to not be seen 
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as two completely different parallel discourses. At the same time, not all 
norms are to be seen as international laws. Instead, norms of responsible state 
behavior ought to be seen in terms of continuums. A first continuum focuses 
on the spectrum from nonbinding norms to hard law. A second continuum 
emphasizes the specificity of norms.
Thus, the article first elaborates on the move to international law in the 
cybersecurity and state behavior discourse from a historical perspective. Sec-
ond, the article then explains the origins of the cyber-norms discourse and 
how the norms discourse was and is seen as an easier avenue to achieve con-
sensus on after the contesting approaches to application of international law. 
However, the opaque nature of the concept of nonbinding, voluntary norms 
in the context of cybersecurity can hamper the implementation of said norms. 
Furthermore, one could argue that cyber norms now mean everything and 
nothing at all. Last, the article argues that the binary dialogue of international 
law versus norms could be undermining the whole discourse. Instead, norms 
and international law ought to be seen as building on each other.
RULES OF THE ROAD: THE MOVE FROM 
INTERNATIONAL LAW TO CYBER NORMS
The origins of the cyber-norms discourse can be found in a proposal for an 
United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution by Russian Federa-
tion to the UN First Committee—the Disarmament and Security Commit-
tee, which later was adopted as the first resolution in the series pertaining 
to “Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the 
context of international security” (UNGA 1999). In 1998, Russia claimed that 
the world had entered through the development and application of new infor-
mation technologies and means of telecommunication qualitatively a new 
stage of scientific and technological revolution. While this revolution had 
brought about many positive developments, it was essential to consider, even 
if at the time only potential in nature, the threats that such rapid growth of 
dependency on information and telecommunications technologies (hereinaf-
ter ICTs) could present. Russia put forth that ICTs could be used for purposes 
incompatible with the objectives of maintaining international peace and secu-
rity and such technologies could breach several established international law 
principles, such as nonuse of force, non-intervention, and respect for human 
rights and freedoms. Thus, Russian foreign minister Igor Ivanov concluded 
that “such a threat requires that preventive measures be taken today” (UNGA 
1998). The international community could not permit the emergence of a 
“fundamentally new area of international confrontation, which may lead to an 
escalation of the arms race based on the latest developments of the scientific 
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and technological revolution” (UNGA 1998). Carried by the possible arms 
race and conflict mind-set, the proposal called for a ban on information 
weapons to prevent information wars, as information weapons could have the 
destructive effect comparable to weapons of mass destruction (UNGA 1998). 
Hence, the issue of international regulation of ICTs was raised in the context 
of possible future conflicts among states,2 and Russia was the first country to 
link international law and information security in the context of international 
peace and security.
Even though the 1998 Russian proposal to discuss information security-
related issues in an international setting had merit, the rest of the inter-
national community was not immediately drawn to the idea to deliberate 
the regulation of ICTs. The Russian proposal was perceived as an invita-
tion to negotiate a potential multilateral treaty to stop the proliferation of 
information weapons and prevent information wars.3 The United States, a 
historically technologically powerful country, entered the republican Bush 
administration era in 2001. Due to different policy priorities in the early 
2000s and the skepticism toward Russian proposals, considerations for 
responsible state behavior were deadlocked. The West was not interested in 
discussing a possible treaty to regulate behavior or curtailing developments 
in cyberspace. It was only six years later, in 2004, when the resolution 
served as a basis for convening the first session of the UN GGE under the 
chair of Russia. The task for the expert group was to consider existing and 
potential threats in the sphere of information security and possible coopera-
tive measures to address them. Even though it was the first UN GGE con-
vened under the aegis of the 1998 “Russian” resolution, it yielded no real 
outcome (UNGA 2005).
The Catalyst
A broader discussion on the regulation of cyberspace started a little over a 
decade ago. The catalyst for a deeper regulatory discussion was the denial-
of-service (hereinafter DoS) and distributed-denial-of-service (hereinafter 
DDoS) attacks against the Estonian government, e-services and financial 
sector in April–May 2007 (Tikk et al. 2010, 14–35). This incident made it 
visible to the international community how vulnerable ICT-reliant states can 
be (Aaviksoo 2010). Although there was no physical damage to the servers, 
systems, and X-road infrastructure,4 the DoS and DDoS attacks halted the 
functioning of several governmental vital services, which at the very least 
caused financial damage, but more importantly showed where digital states 
are vulnerable. Moreover, due to the supposed involvement of a neighboring 
government, this was also the first time tensions between states moved to a 
completely new realm of actions.5 If the attacks had been attributed to Russia 
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as a state, it would have been a clear indication that cyber operations have 
moved qualitatively to a different level and have become politicized. The 
2007 Estonia attacks showed that there is a new possible domain for interstate 
conflict, which was promptly proven during the 2008 Georgia–Russia war. 
A rise in state-sponsored offensive activity in cyberspace led to calls for a 
secure and stable cyberspace in multiple avenues.6
Besides the diplomatic process among states under the aegis of the UN, the 
Estonian incident in 2007 and Iranian Stuxnet incident in 2010 also led to the 
start of the Tallinn Manual process.7 It was one of the first academic initia-
tives and focused on putting forth an interpretation of existing international 
law pertaining to conflict and laws of war (jus ad bellum and jus in bello). 
The focus on conflict was understandable due to the catastrophic picture that 
was painted by policy makers and academics alike of the effects that cyber 
incidents could have.8 Stuxnet had after all signified another qualitative leap 
from politically motivated operations to offensive state-sponsored cyber 
operations. It also raised questions of low-intensity conflict (Buchan 2012; 
O’Connell 2012) and assured the academics working on the normative frame-
work for cyber operations and laws of armed conflict. Even though Stuxnet 
was never attributed to a state, the technical analysis left no doubt that at the 
very least, the offensive operation was backed by a nation-state (De Falco 
2012), which once again emphasized the necessity to address the application 
of international law in cyberspace. The Tallinn Manual project was spear-
headed by then newly created NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of 
Excellence, a NATO-accredited cyber defence hub, established in Tallinn, 
Estonia, in 2008. Ever since, the NATO CCD COE has become one of the 
strongest academic voices in the discussion revolving around the application 
of international law to cyberspace and operations.
After 2007, the conflict-focused regulatory discourse rebooted the UN 
GGE process, which convened after a five-year hiatus for their 2009–2010 
session under the chair of Russia. Even though the United States, Russia’s 
strategic contestant and another cyber power, still did not want to discuss 
the negotiation of a cybersecurity treaty, the new Obama administration 
broke the deadlock in discussions and shifted conversation from a possible 
multilateral treaty to responsible state behavior. Since 2009, the Obama 
administration advocated a general approach that favored the development of 
multilateral norms for responsible state behavior in cyberspace. The Cyber-
space Policy adopted in 2009 emphasized that the “United States cannot suc-
ceed in securing cyberspace if it works in isolation” (The White House 2009, 
iv), which was a contrast to the policy of Obama’s predecessor. The policy 
continued stating that “international norms are critical to establishing a secure 
and thriving digital infrastructure” (The White House 2009, 20). The Obama 
administration adopted an outward-looking and “norms-based” approach to 
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international regulation of cyberspace, which paved the way for a cyber-
norms discourse, including in the framework of the UN GGE.
The UN GGE has been a high-level diplomatic avenue for the discussion 
of responsible state behavior in cyberspace, where the strategic contestants 
United States and Russia among others are pushing forward their views and 
value systems. More than half of the world’s countries—115 as of 2018—
have sponsored the 1998 Russian resolution,9 which indicates their support 
for and prioritization of the issue. However, the original resolution also asks 
states to provide the committee with their views pertaining to the develop-
ments in the field of ICTs in the context of international security. This call 
is reiterated annually. Here, less than half of the world’s countries—seventy 
states as of 2018 have replied to this call.10 In the face of criticism pertaining 
to the representation issues and the fact that the UN GGE is a closed process 
with limited outcome,11 the UN GGE has adopted three reports, in 2010, 
2013, and 2015, which are considered cumulative in their recommendations.
The Progress
The task for the 2009/2010 UN GGE was identical to the previous UN GGE 
in 2004/2005: to study both the threats in the sphere of information security 
as well as suggest cooperative measures to strengthen the security of global 
information and communication systems. This time the UN GGE identified 
several motives for disruption, sources of threats as well as objectives. The 
2009/2010 session resulted in a consensus report outlining the main threats 
stemming from the development and use of ICTs to international peace and 
security, such as the terrorist use of ICTs, ICTs as instruments of warfare and 
intelligence, attribution issues, use of proxies, protection of critical infrastruc-
tures, ICT supply chain security, and ICT capacity and security differences 
among states (UNGA 2010). Ever since, the UN GGE has become one of 
the most important avenues for regulatory discussion pertaining to the main-
tenance of international peace and security and the development and use of 
ICTs.12 Bringing together strategic contestants, agile tech adopters and devel-
oping countries, the UN GGE has offered a venue to discuss which threats 
result from the development and the use of ICTs to international peace and 
security and how to prevent and mitigate such threats through the application 
of norms, international law, confidence-building measures13 and capacity-
building measures.14
During the hiatus year of the UN GGE, Russian Federation attempted 
to propose another opportunity for a negotiation of a cybersecurity treaty. 
Namely, in 2011, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs put forth a Draft 
Convention on International Information Security (The Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of the Russian Federation 2011). The general values and ideas of the 
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convention were the same as in the original 1998 resolution proposal. The 
overall aim of the convention was to prevent “possible uses of information 
and communication technology for purposes not compatible with ensuring 
international stability and security” (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
Russian Federation 2011). With a heavy focus on sovereignty and the gov-
ernance of a “sovereign information space,” the convention did not find sup-
port among the like-minded Western allies. The Obama administration was 
still focusing on international norms and application of international law for 
responsible state behavior in cyberspace.
The following 2013 UN GGE report was heralded as a qualitative leap for-
ward in regulating state behavior in cyberspace (Wolter 2013). Its major con-
tribution lies in the fact that the group was able to conclude that international 
law, and in particular the UN Charter, applies to cyberspace and the activities 
therein (UNGA 2013, para. 19). The year 2013 was also the first time when 
the UN GGE included a section in its report on “Recommendations on norms, 
rules and principles of responsible behavior by States,” which were seen 
as norms deriving from existing international law. Even though the report 
concluded that unique attributes of ICTs might warrant the development of 
additional norms over time, the main focus lied still with international law 
(UNGA 2013, para. 16). The report named a number of international law 
norms and principles that states ought to abide by ranging from sovereignty, 
including the international norms and principles that flow from sovereignty, 
to human rights and state responsibility (UNGA 2013, para. 19–23). This 
was a big step in the thus far binary discussion on whether international law 
applies or not. Together with the Tallinn Manual on the International Law 
Applicable to Cyber Warfare published in 2013 (Schmitt 2013), high hopes 
were put on international law to provide the normative framework applicable 
to states’ cyberspace activities. The norms discussion continued in connec-
tion to international law. To keep the momentum, the UNGA decided to 
gather another UN GGE as soon as possible.
The Turn
The 2015 iteration of the UN GGE was tasked with analyzing the specific 
application of international law principles elaborated in the 2013 report. 
However, this turned out to be a contested area of study, as states’ understand-
ing and interpretations of international law in general already vary greatly,15 
let alone in the context of cyberspace and responsible state behavior. The 
application and interpretation of international law reflect different value sys-
tems that states have. These fundamental differences necessitated an approach 
that would allow the group to not address the disputed issues regarding inter-
national law. In an effort to make progress on previous groups’ work, the UN 
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GGE turned to a new construct to get past the contestation: general nonbind-
ing, voluntary norms, rules, and principles for the responsible behavior of 
states. The latter, that is, norms as a concept, which had been in 2013 report 
deriving from international law and thus, deeply connected to it, was now pre-
sented as a different source for guidance regarding responsible state behavior 
than international law. This was reflected in the fact that international law and 
norms, rules and principles were now two different sections in the UN GGE 
report (UNGA 2015b, sec. III and VI). Moreover, the new norms, rules, and 
principles section reflected to a great extent (with some exceptions) already 
existing international law (for further elaboration, see UNODA 2017). The 
UN GGE, however, did not put forth any conceptualization regarding the rela-
tionship between the proposed recommendations of norms and international 
law. Yet, this conceptual opaqueness seemed to not be a concern. The U.S.-
led voluntary, nonbinding norms approach, as argued by some, was a way 
sidestep the question of a possible cybersecurity treaty amid conflicting views 
on the application of international law, and at the same time allowed states 
to articulate issues that require more normative guidance than international 
law currently offers (Tikk et al. 2018b, 20–21). Outside the UN GGE, despite 
the fact that norms were seen as voluntary and nonbinding in the context and 
framework of the UN GGE, the following academic (Crandall et al. 2015; 
Finnemore 2017, 2011; Finnemore et al. 2016) as well as policy16 discussion 
saw cyber norms the same way as the UN GGE. Thus, the narrative created 
by the UN GGE of norms as an alternative to binding international law had 
carried over to the wider cyber-norms debate.
However, the eleven recommendations for cyber norms (UNGA 2015, 
para. 13) proposed by the UN GGE in 2015 reflect to a great extent already 
existing international law. The implementation guide for said norms was left 
as a task for the following UN GGE that commenced its work in 2016. In 
2017, however, the UN GGE failed to reach consensus. For the first time, two 
countries—the United States and Cuba—explained their views as to the fail-
ure of the closed and nontransparent process. The United States argued that 
the process failed over states’ unwillingness to clarify how specific aspects 
of international law, such as law of the armed conflict or state responsibility, 
apply to cyberspace. Furthermore, the United States saw the lesser extent of 
the agreement in the 2017 UN GGE as backtracking the progress that had 
been made with previous reports (Markoff 2017). Cuba, on the other hand, 
argued that reinterpreting law of armed conflict would legitimize cyberspace 
as a domain for military conflict, giving thereby state-sponsored cyber opera-
tions a green light (Cuba’s Representative Office Abroad 2017).
While the progress at the UN GGE stalled due to strategic, value, and 
interpretation differences, the international dialogue outside of the UN GGE 
continued. The year 2017 also marked the publication of Tallinn Manual 
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2.0 on International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations, which this time 
focused on peacetime operations as well as provided a revised look at the law 
applicable during conflict (NATO CCD COE 2017). The second iteration of 
creating the interpretative guidelines attracted over fifty states in the Hague 
Process. This was, however, in a merely consultative, not substantively 
contributing role.17 The states participating in the Hague Process did not put 
forth their official positions on the interpretation of international law.18 Thus, 
the Tallinn Manual represents an academic process focusing solely on the 
application of international law. The policy action in the parallel track has 
moved from application of international law and norms deriving therefrom 
to a dialogue focusing on international law and cyber norms without a clear 
understanding what the status and meaning of the latter vis-à-vis the former 
is. This has led to methodological and conceptual opaqueness.
INTERNATIONAL NORMS
The political, as well as academic focus on international cyber norms, aims 
at reconciling the contestation among different views. Even though the 
vision and characteristics, how peace and security ought to be achieved in 
cyberspace have divided the discourse into multiple views19 they still share 
the understanding that cyberspace and activities therein need regulation. 
Yet, the focus on cyber norms that the international community has seen 
since 2013 and especially after the 2015 UN GGE session is no silver bul-
let for fundamental differences among stakeholders. Different understand-
ings of the development, role, and form of norms have created diverging 
views as to the necessity and utility of norms for cyberspace and norms for 
responsible state behavior. At the same time, the initiatives for creating or 
developing the norms discourse have not been able to unequivocally explain 
what norms are, why norms are needed, what type of norms are consid-
ered and how this discourse is or is not different from the international 
law discourse that has been going on for the past decade.20 The Western 
approach highlights regulation through existing legal and other regulative 
frameworks. Yet, they fail at providing an understanding of the application 
and context-specific interpretation of said frameworks. At the same time, 
latching on to the novelty argument surrounding cyberspace activity, the 
Sino-Russian coalition is lobbying for a new multilateral cyber-specific 
legislation. Different approaches to the regulation to cyberspace reflect that 
the inherent differences in the state approaches pertain not only to norms, 
laws, and cyberspace, but toward a legal, strategic, and regulatory culture, 
as well as the understanding of the existing world order in a wider sense 
(Roberts 2017).
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The definition of what an international cyber norm is depends on the 
disciplinary perspective of the person who poses the question. Those 
firmly believing in the adequacy and sufficiency of existing international 
law do not necessarily comprehend the utility of norms in a more general 
sense, especially in their nonbinding, voluntary form (Grigsby 2017) and at 
times conflate norms and cyber norms automatically with international law 
(Schmitt et al. 2014; Schmitt 2018). Defining a norm from the legal perspec-
tive entails mostly a strict view of norms as laws established by treaties or 
customary international law. From a more philosophical perspective, norms 
could be understood, for example, as social norms or ethical norms. From the 
international relations and especially constructivist perspective, international 
norms are defined as shared expectations or standards of appropriate behav-
ior accepted by and applied in a certain community of actors with a given 
identity (Martinsson 2011, 2; Khagram et al. 2002, 4; Klotz 1995, para. 14; 
Katzenstein 1996, para. 5).
Norms can take different forms, as there is no single definition or one par-
ticular form of norms. According to one categorization, norms can be either 
constitutive or regulative. Some norms can have a constitutive effect, which 
means that they will specify what actions will cause others to recognize a par-
ticular entity (Katzenstein 1996, 5). For example, the Montevideo Conven-
tion establishes what entities can be considered states (Seventh International 
Conference of American States 1933). Its criteria have come to be accepted 
as the international norm on what constitutes a state. Regulative norms, on the 
other hand, are standards for the proper behavior for an entity with particular 
identity (Jepperson et al. 1996, 54). This entails in the context of responsible 
behavior of states in cyberspace, for example, standards defining what a prop-
erly conforming state would do in particular circumstances. Thus, regulative 
norms can prescribe or proscribe behavior for already constituted entities. 
These norms establish expectations how those defined entities will behave 
in varying circumstances (Jepperson et al. 1996, 54). This article focuses on 
responsible behavior of states. According to this categorization, the article 
would look into states and the regulative norms that prescribe, regulate, and 
constrain states’ behavior in cyberspace.
Continuums of Norms
Yet, instead of binary approaches, this article proposes to address norms in 
terms of continuums.21 The first continuum ranges from norms that have been 
codified into hard laws to soft law to voluntary, nonbinding norms. Gener-
ally, laws are expressions of norms that the international community accepts. 
States conform their behavior to laws because of the wide acceptance of the 
underlying norms (Sloss 2006, 170). Moreover, international law often also 
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serves an expressive function. States become a party to a treaty or engage 
in discussions to express their support for the emerging norm (Sloss 2006, 
187).22 International law provides a baseline to evaluate behavior—whether 
it conforms to the expectation of appropriate behavior in the international 
community or not—and threatens consequences for noncompliance. The aim 
of international law norms, as well as other regulative norms, is to induce 
a certain behavior. International law facilitates this behavior by delivering 
the framework and vocabulary that enables international politics among the 
international community (Klabbers 2017, 18).
International law is to a large extent comprised of hard norms. Treaty law 
and customary international law are the most binding forms of international 
law that also means that upon breaching the obligations therein state respon-
sibility and sanctions mechanisms could apply. However, international law 
increasingly encompasses a substantive body of soft norms as well (Terpan 
2015; Chinkin 1989). The body of international law is increasingly seen as 
a continuum between law and non-law, as formal law ascertainment has not 
managed to offer solutions to various legal phenomena in the international 
arena or offer them fast enough. Thereby, norms enshrined in soft instru-
ments, as opposed to hard instruments such as treaties, belong to the con-
tinuum between hard and soft norms (D’Aspremont 2011, 128–29). On the 
other end of the bindingness spectrum23 are completely legally nonbinding, 
voluntary norms, which does not mean that they might not be binding socially 
or morally and call for corresponding consequences once breached. The 
recommendations for norms made by the UN GGE in 2015 were from the 
outset framed as being nonbinding, voluntary norms. The Code of Conduct 
proposed by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization similarly frames the 
norms in the document in voluntary terms (UNGA 2011, 2015a). At the same 
time, the UN Charter, the applicability of which was confirmed by UN GGE 
in 2013 in the norms, rules, and principles section of the report comprises 
solely of hard norms as accepted by the international community (UNGA 
2013, para. 19).
The second continuum that needs to be considered moves on the scale 
from general standards to specific rules. Norms can be understood as general 
standards, which are often goal-oriented and allow discretion for interpreta-
tion and do not prescribe specific action, which is needed to conform by 
the standard. Specific rules, however, allow for very limited discretion and 
set red lines in order to convey an obligation to achieve a certain outcome 
through certain means and measures (Wolfrum 2010, para. 65 ff). Thus, rules 
work well in circumstances when there is no solidarity or there is limited trust 
among the community. At the same time, the issue to be regulated occurs 
often. On the other hand, standards fulfill their intended outcome in opposite 
circumstances. Since standards are open-ended and allow for discretion, 
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they require trust and solidarity among the community. When the issue to be 
regulated occurs rarely, that is, single isolated incidents, standards alongside 
trust ensure that given the circumstances, the actors will balance all relevant 
interests while making the decision on how to act (Koskenniemi 2019).
When it comes to the UN GGE norms, majority of them seem from the 
outset to be rather specific, that is, they have been cast in ICT-specific terms. 
Even though they pertain to specific “siloed” categories, such as coopera-
tion (UNGA 2015b, para. A, D, H, J), due diligence of transit states (UNGA 
2015b, para. C), critical infrastructure protection (UNGA 2015b, para. F, G), 
human rights protection (UNGA 2015b, para. E), and protection of CERTs 
(UNGA 2015b, para. K), they are essentially cast in the form of standards, 
providing no further guidance than the basic goal-oriented obligation set forth 
in the norm.
For example, the UN GGE 2015 report put forth a norm that state should 
not knowingly allow their territory to be used for internationally wrongful 
acts using ICTs (UNGA 2015b, para. 13[C]). Even though it is made ICT 
specific through the addition of “using ICTs,” it still puts forth a general obli-
gation of due diligence in cyberspace. The latter is a standard in itself, which 
means that the ICT specificity of it has created marginal additional value. The 
use of general standards applies to norms in the SCO’s Code of Conduct’s 
as well. Even content wise specific norms’ proposals for the protection of 
the public core of the Internet24 or the norm against the manipulation of the 
integrity of financial data25 are inherently standards. Thus, considering the 
uncertainty and the novelty of activities in cyberspace, the push for standards 
instead of rules makes somewhat sense. Standards are useful when stakes and 
the cost for errors are high. This has been inherently the case in cyberspace. 
However, considering the state of the regulatory debate surrounding cyber-
space, political contestation, and the lack of trust and solidarity among the 
international community, the likelihood of implementation and purposeful 
functioning of these standards is small.
Thus, even though the concept of norms has grown to be used in the cyber-
security discourse as indicating only voluntary and nonbinding nature, the 
view of norms ought to be much wider. Yet, even when options are abundant 
and clarity would help with reducing uncertainty, participants in different 
norms discussions are reluctant to define what they mean by norms. They are 
often conjoined with the notion of responsible state behavior. Norms are seen 
as a tool to limit the malicious or negligent behavior of actors and incentivize 
desired behavior, thereby defining and explaining acceptable and unaccept-
able behavior.26 If binding international law is not clear or its application is 
contested due to grave political differences, norms of different nature may 
offer an avenue for striving toward predictable behavior of states, creating 
trust and stability.
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Hence, the article sees cyber norms for responsible state behavior in the 
broadest sense as legally relevant expectations, in the form of rules or stan-
dards, regarding appropriate behavior in cyberspace among the international 
community. Yet, norms in and of themselves do not guarantee compliance. 
All emergent norms must compete with existing or even countervailing ones, 
as norms are not created in a vacuum. Whereas new norms do not guarantee 
action nor do they determinate the results of said norm, they can legitimize 
new types of action (Jepperson et al. 1996, 56). At the same time, if complied 
with, norms also channel, constrain, and constitute action. As such, norms are 
“a fundamental component of both the international system and actors’ defi-
nitions of their interests” (Klotz 1995, 15). Cyber norms regulate or the very 
least guide, depending on their nature, the behavior of states in cyberspace 
(Iasiello 2016, 31–32).
Different Shades of Norms
Norms are not all equal, nor are they created, implemented, or interpreted 
equally. Norms may be different in terms of the sphere that they are estab-
lished in. For example, the UN GGE has proposed global norms applicable 
to all. At the same time, norms agreed upon in the SCO (e.g., see Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization 2019), OSCE, ASEAN Regional Forum (here-
inafter ARF) are regional norms. Additionally, there can be a wide variety 
of domestic norms that each state can enact. Norms vary also in terms of 
their content. As shown above, norms can be specific, for example, pertain 
to a particular part of critical infrastructure such as the submarine cables or 
they can be general and address the whole cyberspace and activities therein. 
One of such norms is the cooperation norm in the UN GGE 2015 report. It 
establishes that “States should cooperate in developing and applying mea-
sures to increase stability and security in the use of ICTs and prevent ICT 
practices that are acknowledged to be harmful or that may pose threats to 
international peace and security” (UNGA 2015b, para. 13(a)). This norm 
is a blanket suggestion for states to cooperate, leaving a wide room for 
interpretation.
The interpretation of norms adds another layer of complexity. As norms are 
expectations of behavior in a certain community, there might be differences 
of opinion with respect to the existence of the norms, that is, whether there 
exists a norm at all. For example, for some countries reporting of ICT inci-
dents might be a norm, for others it might not. There might also be difference 
of opinion, when it comes to applicability of a norm. In this instance, there is 
an agreement that there is a norm, but disagreement about its application. For 
example, some characterized the Stuxnet attack on Iranian nuclear facility as 
an armed attack, which would have allowed Iran to use self-defence measures 
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under UN Charter Article 51. At the same time, there were also those, who 
asserted that the attack did not reach the level of use of force in order to 
be considered an armed attack. As such, it remained a below-the-threshold 
operation which would have prevented Iran from acting in self-defence. In 
this case, there is an agreement that states have the right to act in self-defence, 
if there is an armed attack. However, there is disagreement whether the cyber-
attack reached the threshold of an armed attack or not. Third, there might be 
variations of application of the norm, that is, interpretation of how to apply 
the norm in a particular case. This would be the case, for example, with the 
UN GGE 2015 report recommended norms, as there is no uniform interpreta-
tion guidance, all states can interpret them as they wish.
What connects this fragmented picture of norms is that they are all created 
through interaction among different actors in the international community. 
This is especially true when it comes to international norms. As the inter-
national level does not have a single authority who could prescribe or pro-
scribe norms upon the international community, it is generally understood 
that most international norms for states are created through the interaction of 
states.27 This does not mean that all international norms are created by states. 
Yet, considering that states are still the main subjects of international law, 
creating binding norms regulating their behavior still belongs to the purview 
of states. However, norm-creation in a broad sense is not just the preroga-
tive of states or powerful states for that matter. Non-state actors and states 
alike can act as norm entrepreneurs. This has been particularly evident in 
the cybersecurity discourse.28 It is then up to states to decide whether these 
norms, created or championed by non-state actors or nonbinding and volun-
tary, are legally relevant for them or not. As a result, some of those soft or 
voluntary, nonbinding norms created in the interaction among states or put 
forth by non-state actors can harden and become binding treaty or custom-
ary law, backed by responsibility and liability mechanisms in occurrence of 
noncompliance.
THE FUTURE
The policy action regarding “the rules of the road” has not dealt with norms in 
such detail, rather the calls for promoting voluntary, nonbinding norms have 
become ubiquitous and opaque without clear understanding of what are the 
norms that are being promoted, how they should be implemented and what is 
the impact of such calls. The intricacies and different “shades” of norms are 
not always apparent.
On the one hand, the conceptual opaqueness created by the UN GGE and 
carried forward by states allows for room of manoeuvre. The conceptual and 
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terminological opaqueness serves the interest of those who want to maintain 
the regulatory grey areas. States not agreeing on the binding rules of the road 
and instead focusing on developing voluntary, nonbinding cyber norms make 
use of the permissive system of international law. When the rule is what is not 
prohibited is permitted, states can make use of the grey areas with no direct 
violations of international law.29 Legal uncertainty and ambiguity surround-
ing the existence, content, and interpretation of a normative framework for 
activities in cyberspace is thus instrumentalized by states for their own benefit 
(Mačak 2017, 887).
In addition, cyber norms, as put forth by the UN GGE and promoted by 
states, have been framed as voluntary, nonbinding, and thus qualitatively 
different from international law norms. This means that there is no frame-
work for implementing and enforcing them, which often leads to calls for 
the end of cyber norms (Grigsby 2017; Tikk et al. 2018a; van de Velde 
2018; Soesanto et al. 2017) and for getting “past” cyber norms (Hampson 
et al. 2017; Segal 2017). Thus, norms, which were and are seen as a way 
out of the contestation regarding international law, are seen by many in 
rather grim tones due to their voluntary nature. Regardless of enforceability 
and their binding or nonbinding nature, norms establish expectations in the 
international community and delineate what is acceptable and unaccept-
able behavior. Norms influence state behavior (Sloss 2006; for an opposite 
view, see Goldsmith and Posner 2005). Even though cyber norms that are 
considered voluntary, nonbinding do not allow for legal consequences, such 
as countermeasures or self-defence, there are several other more political 
responses (such as retorsion, naming, and shaming that leads to reputation 
loss [Sloss 2006, 194], economic and diplomatic consequences) that can be 
more effective than legal consequences the use of which is highly regulated 
(Adamson et al. 2017).
The conceptual opaqueness regarding norms, international law, and their 
relationship is reflected in the cyber norms discourse by the fact that cyber 
norms now have come to mean everything and at the same time nothing at 
all. From the UN GGE interpretation, the previously existing connection 
between international law and norms has been significantly downplayed, 
indicating that norms are something different than international law. At first, 
states and academics alike were enthusiastic of the flexibility and vagueness 
of the concept of norms of responsible state behavior framing it as generally a 
good thing that promises progress for the establishment of rules of the road in 
cyberspace. Norms were perceived as being more malleable than hard laws. 
Yet, increasingly the concept of cyber norms acts as a “sponge for meaning, 
soaking up whatever content is nearby.”30
Moreover, putting forth cyber norms as standards, implementation of which 
relies on overall solidarity and trust among the international community, 
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might turn out to be a futile effort. Considering the contestation and strategic 
behavior surrounding regulatory efforts, the continued increase of offensive 
cyber activities, and the rise of political attributions instead of legal ones, it 
is clear that there is significant lack of trust in the international community. 
Without trust, however, there is no meaningful way to apply the agreed-
upon standards or hope for reciprocated behavior on others’ part. At the 
same time, there is no space nor political will to create red lines rules, as 
cyberspace activity is largely unpredictable due to exponential technological 
development. Thus, the challenge here is to create actionable norms, whether 
standards or rules, in and for a highly unpredictable, contested, and strategic 
environment.
While there is a push forward on the progress regarding international legal 
norms applicable in cyberspace, states do not necessarily interpret cyber 
norms as legal norms, emphasizing often separately the adherence to interna-
tional law and the support for norms for responsible state behavior in cyber-
space. The latest National Cyber Strategy of the United States of America, 
for example, states that “International law and voluntary non-binding norms 
of responsible state behavior in cyberspace provide stabilizing, security-
enhancing standards that define acceptable behavior to all states and promote 
greater predictability and stability in cyberspace” (The White House 2018, 
20). This clearly shows that for the United States, norms and international 
law are as regulatory frameworks two complementary, yet conceptually sep-
arate things. Without defining the relationship between international law and 
international norms of behavior that have been created and are created, the 
opaqueness might lead to fragmentation and eventually unclear guidance for 
state behavior. This runs contrary to the object and purpose of cyber norms 
and norms in general, as norms are supposed to provide clarity, stability, and 
predictability.
It is apt to recall that norms and international law influence, condition, 
and develop dependent on each other. Voluntary, nonbinding norms do not 
undermine existing binding hard norms. On the contrary, laws yield a deeper 
support for the ideas reflected by norms. Cyber norms, even if seen in a vol-
untary, nonbinding form, are grounded in international law and at the same 
time, eventually, norms are going to have an impact on the interpretation and 
development of international law as well. There is no regulatory vacuum or 
norm vacuum when it comes to cyberspace. New norms build on already 
existing regulatory order. Thus, as norms build on and influence other norms, 
it is a fallacy to depict the norms and international law as being detached from 
each other, as is a fallacy to equate international law and cyber norms.
The UN GGE-proposed recommendations of future norms are clearly 
grounded in existing international law (see further, UNODA 2017). It is often 
used as a point of criticism, yet the norms could also be seen as ICT-specific 
34 Liisi Adamson
iteration of standards known and accepted in general international law. Exist-
ing international law provides the new norms legitimacy and might thus 
invite a normative pull toward the norms. Denying then the applicability of 
norms, which are informed by existing international law, means indirectly 
denying the applicability of international law to cyberspace activities. This 
contravenes then the accepted and endorsed view that existing international 
law applies in cyberspace (UNGA 2013). Similarly, relying only on binding 
international law and denying the impact of other norms, which are not char-
acterized by their binding nature, means denying the ethos and underlying 
fundamental values carried by those norms. Thus, norms and international 
law need to be grounded in each other.
In October 2018, both the United States and Russia put forward their 
vision for the next UN GGE in the UN 1st Committee in the form of draft 
resolutions. Russia and allies were emphasizing the need for a more open-
ended UN GGE process and pushed the international community to accept a 
draft resolution containing a Code of Conduct 3.0 that integrated the content 
of previous reports of the UN GGE and the Code of Conduct previously 
presented by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (UNGA 2018a). This 
was a clear move toward politically binding norms.31 The United States and 
like-minded states continued with the known format of UN GGE and the 
dual logic of international law and norms, rules and principles of responsible 
behavior of states. As a novelty, the US draft resolution emphasized the need 
for UN GGE-participating states to clarify through national contributions 
how international law applies in cyberspace.32 Thus far, a few countries, 
such as the United Kingdom, Estonia, and France, have put forth such dec-
larations. While the progress of regulation for responsible state behavior is 
welcomed, the conceptual ambiguity continues, hampering the understand-
ing and implementation of already agreed-upon norms and leading to the 
question whether the norms, in the eyes of the states, are legally relevant or 
not. If the answer would be no, then it is questionable, what would be the 
utility and possible impact of such standards. If the norms are considered 
legally relevant, it would mean that even if they are framed as voluntary, 
nonbinding, they are still to be considered as connected to international 
law, informing the cyberspace-specific application thereof. However, if 
the UN GGE, as a pioneer in the cyber-norms debate continues to promote 
the conceptual opaqueness, it might lead states to turn inward33 and look at 
domestic solutions to international cybersecurity issues instead of embrac-
ing the international normative toolbox. Nevertheless, there is hope that the 
two parallel and hopefully complementary processes—the UN GGE and 
the Open-Ended Working Group—in the UN manage to make progress and 
stride toward further clarity regarding responsible behavior in cyberspace in 
the years to come.
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CONCLUSION
Calls for responsible behavior of states in cyberspace and rules of the road in 
said space have become ubiquitous. Out of the work of the UN GGE a distinct 
discourse on cyber norms has emerged. First developed as a response to con-
testation regarding international law, cyber norms have gradually obtained a 
rather opaque meaning.
This chapter argued that even though the UN GGE has moved from dis-
cussing international law norms to discussing international law and norms, 
rules and principles, the two are not detached from each other. Norms in gen-
eral ought to be seen in several continuums, where norms have the potential 
to move and change when it comes to their binding nature and specificity. 
Having a “siloed” understanding of norms, meaning considering one type of 
norms detached from others is detrimental to the international community’s 
understanding of what shapes state behavior. For example, hard norms in the 
form of international law might not always be the most effective forms of 
regulating behavior, as they are often accompanied by grave political differ-
ences. All norms pertaining to an issue-area ought to be seen as an ecosystem, 
where norms are mutually reinforcing, sometimes contesting, yet in general 
inform and influence the application of each other. Thus, when it comes to 
cyber norms, norms and application of international law to cyberspace can-
not be seen as two parallel tracks of regulatory interventions. Norms are not 
necessarily an easier avenue to achieve consensus amid disagreement on the 
application of international law. Norms, even in voluntary, nonbinding form, 
are a powerful tool to change and regulate behavior, but not when they mean 
everything and nothing at all.
NOTES
1. Most notably, international law was also a point of contestation in the 
2016/2017 iteration of the UN GGE, which did not adopt a consensus report (Markoff 
2017; Cuba’s Representative Office Abroad 2017).
2. Interestingly, Russia raised the issue of regulation of ICTs in the Disarmament 
and Security Committee, but not in the UN Sixth Committee, which addresses the 
development of international law and other legal issues. Especially because the issues 
that Russia wanted to discuss among states pertained not only to international conflict 
and sovereignty, but also to terrorist and criminal use of such technologies.
3. The perception was created by point 3(c) in the draft resolution proposal, 
which called for “advisability of developing legal regimes to prohibit the develop-
ment, production or use of particularly dangerous forms of information weapons, and 
of taking measures to combat information terrorism and crime, including the estab-
lishment of an international system (centre) for monitoring threats to the security of 
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global information and telecommunications systems.” The Russians defined informa-
tion weapon in their proposal as a weapon “the destructive effect of which may be 
comparable to that of weapons of mass destruction.” Information war was understood 
as “actions taken by one country to damage the information resources and systems 
of another country while at the same time protecting its own infrastructure” (UNGA 
1998).
4. The X-road is the data exchange layer for information systems. It is a tech-
nological and organizational environment enabling a secure Internet-based data 
exchange between information systems. X-road is the backbone of all Estonian 
e-services (Estonian Information System Authority 2018).
5. In his foreword, President Toomas Hendrik Ilves noted that the 2007 attacks 
in Estonia, even though mild in retrospect, considering our current capacity and capa-
bilities, were the first time “one could apply the Clausewitzean dictum: War is the 
continuation of policy by other means” (NATO CCD COE 2017, xxiii).
6. For example, UN GGE process, Shanghai Cooperation Organization Code 
of Conduct process and Organization for Security and Co-Operation’s proposals for 
stabilizing confidence-building measures to be applied among adversaries.
7. The first edition of the Tallinn Manual was published in 2013 with the second 
iteration published in 2017 (NATO CCD COE 2017; Schmitt 2013).
8. These ranged mostly from nuclear disasters to Cyber Pearl Harbor. Leon E. 
Panetta stated that “[t]he collective result of these kinds of attacks could be a cyber 
Pearl Harbor; an attack that would cause physical destruction and the loss of life. 
In fact, it would paralyze and shock the nation and create a new, profound sense of 
vulnerability” (Panetta 2012; Clarke and Knake 2012; Farwell and Rohozinski 2012, 
2011).
9. Table of sponsorship of the UN I Committee Resolution 2006–2018 (compiled 
by the author, available upon request).
10. Table of replies from governments 1999–2017 (compiled by the author, avail-
able upon request). Of the cyber powers, Russia has never presented their views on 
the matter after putting forth the first proposal. The United States has presented their 
views three times and China four times.
11. Only thirty-eight countries in the world have been part of this process over four-
teen years of having UN GGE’s. Six countries have been part of all five UN GGE’s 
(China, France, Germany, Russia, United Kingdom, and United States). (Table of mem-
bership of the UN GGE 2004–2017, compiled by the author, available upon request.)
12. UN GGE has had five iterations and three of them had a substantial outcome in 
the form of a consensus report. UN GGE is increasingly also perceived as an avenue 
of diplomatic negotiations in an issue which lends itself to increasingly contested 
views on how cyberspace ought to be regulated.
13. Confidence-building measures (CBMs) are a set of practical measures aimed at 
enhancing interstate cooperation, transparency, predictability, and stability in order to 
reduce the risks of misperception, escalation, and conflict that may stem from the use 
of ICTs. This entails for example exchanging white papers, strategy documents and 
national views on cyber matters, sharing information and implementing legislation 
that would allow to do so, encouraging responsible disclosure of ICT vulnerabilities, 
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and nominating a national point of contact to facilitate dialogue between states on 
cyber matters. CBMs are often employed among adversaries to increase transparency 
and thereby maintain peace and security (UNGA 2015b, 9; OSCE 2013, 2016).
14. UN GGE understands capacity-building measures as measures that “provide 
technical or other assistance to build capacity in security ICTs in countries requiring 
and requesting assistance” (UNGA 2015b, paras 19–23).
15. For an overview of different approaches to International Law, see Roberts 
(2017).
16. The language on international law and voluntary, nonbinding norms for 
responsible state behavior in cyberspace has been increasingly adopted in several 
multilateral settings (see G7 2017, 2016; US Department of State 2016; NATO 
2016a, 2016b; Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs 2017).
17. The Netherlands facilitated the consultation process between the States and 
NATO CCD COE (NATO CCD COE 2016).
18. Thus far, only United Kingdom, Estonia, and France have officially explained 
how principles and rules of international law apply in cyberspace according to their 
understanding (Wright 2019; Kaljulaid 2019; Ministère des Armées 2019).
19. Most notably the like-minded Western view and the Sino-Russo vision of the 
future of cyberspace.
20. For a solid effort in understanding the different aspects and forms of cyber 
norms, see Osula and Rõigas (2016).
21. This chapter addresses only the two most pertinent continuums for cyber norms’ 
purpose. For more specific general categorizations of norms, see Bodansky (2004).
22. A good example here is Sweden’s actions during the negotiation of the nuclear 
nonproliferation treaty. It had nothing to gain security wise in signing the Treaty on 
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; however, it primarily ratified it to express 
its support for the emerging nonproliferation norm.
23. Bindingness spectrum then ranges from hard laws, which are norms codified in 
written form and noncompliance with said norms is backed by sanctions, to voluntary, 
nonbinding norms.
24. The norm pertains to the protection of core logical and physical ICT infrastruc-
ture from unwarranted state interventions (Broeders 2015, 2017).
25. The norm is a specific norm for the protection of a specific critical infrastruc-
ture component (Maurer, Levite, and Perkovich 2017).
26. On the explanatory power of norms, see Björkdahl (2002, 11 ff).
27. As only states have the formal authority to craft new international legal 
regimes and authoritatively interpret existing international law (Shaw 2017, 155 ff).
28. This has been particularly visible for example regarding the norm entrepre-
neurship of Microsoft and Siemens, but also in the work of the Global Commission 
on the Stability of Cyberspace (see further McKay et al. 2014; Charney et al. 2016; 
Smith 2017; Microsoft et al. 2018; Airbus et al. 2018; GCSC 2018a, 2018b).
29. PCIJ, SS Lotus, 1927, Publ. PCIJ, Series A, no. 10. (Klabbers 2017, 25).
30. The problematique is inspired by James Shires and Max Smeets’ analysis of 
similar tendencies when it comes to the word “cyber” (Shires and Smeets 2017; see 
also Futter 2018).
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31. UNGA resolutions are not legally binding on states.
32. The draft resolution envisages an annex to the report containing “national con-
tributions of participating governmental experts on the subject of how international 
law applies to the use of information and communications technologies by States” 
(UNGA 2018b, para. 3).
33. After the non-report outcome of the 2016/2017 UN GGE, US put forth that 
violations of norms need to be responded to and violators need to be held accountable. 
It recognized that this may not be achievable through the UN framework, which is 
why the United States is focusing on imposing consequences, also with like-minded 
partners and “call out bad behavior and impose costs on our adversaries.” The same 
was echoed by the latest US national cybersecurity strategy (The White House 2017, 
2018).
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It is by now accepted that international law applies to cyberspace. The 2013 
Report of the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on devel-
opments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of 
international security affirmed that international law, especially the UN Char-
ter, applies to cyberspace and that state sovereignty and international norms 
and principles that flow from sovereignty apply to state conduct of Information 
and Communication Technology (ICT)-related activities, and to jurisdiction 
over ICT infrastructure within a state’s territory (U.N. General Assembly 
2013, paras 19–20). The 2015 GGE Report went a step further by spelling 
out specific international norms and principles that apply, or should apply, to 
cyberspace. Among the international law principles that apply to cyberspace 
are the principle of state sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention in 
the internal affairs of other States (U.N. General Assembly 2015, para. 26). 
In the same vein, states have affirmed the application of international law and 
of the principle of non-intervention to cyberspace. According to China, “[c]
ountries shouldn’t use ICTs to interfere in other countries’ internal affairs and 
undermine other countries’ political, economic, and social stability as well as 
cultural environment” (P. R. C. Permanent Mission to the U.N. 2013).
Notwithstanding such strong assertions, how international law or, more 
specifically, how the principle of non-intervention applies to cyberspace and 
to cyber operations is beset by uncertainty. According to the former legal 
adviser to the State Department, Brian Egan, “States need to do more work to 
clarify how the international law on non-intervention applies to States’ activi-
ties in cyberspace” (Egan 2017, 175).1 This state of affairs came to a head 
with regard to the Russian cyber interference in the 2016 US presidential 
election. Russia’s toolkit of electoral interference consisted of disinformation 
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and “hack and leak” operations (U.S. ODNI 2017, 1; EU vs Disinfo 2019). 
Views concerning the legal characterization of Russia’s actions vary and 
although commentators invoked the principle of non-intervention, the major-
ity concluded that Russia’s actions did not fulfill its conditions in particular 
that of coercion (Hollis 2016; Ohlin 2016; Watts 2016). The US incident is 
not the only example of electoral cyber interference; other incidents involve 
elections in the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany to 
name just a few (Brattberg and Maurer 2018; Galante and Ee 2018; Bay and 
Šnore 2019).2 Although electoral interference is not a new phenomenon, 
cyberspace increases the scalability, reach, and effects of such interference 
and poses a serious threat to a state’s sovereign authority.
Against this background, this chapter examines the question of how the 
principle of non-intervention can be contextualized and reconceptualized 
in cyberspace in order to attain its purpose of protecting a state’s sovereign 
authority in cases of electoral cyber interference. I will do this by aligning 
the principle of non-intervention with the principle of self-determination and 
by identifying the baseline of intervention and the pathways intervention can 
take in cyberspace. By reassessing the concept of intervention, its regulatory 
scope and effectiveness in cyberspace will be enhanced since cyberspace is 
linked to the political, economic, military, diplomatic, social, and cultural 
functions of a state and is a domain within which, or through which, states 
operate, interact, and exert power.
The chapter proceeds in the following manner. In the next section, I 
explain the content and meaning of the principle of non-intervention as tra-
ditionally interpreted in international law and in the third section I will apply 
this definition to Russia’s interference in the 2016 US election. Because of 
the identified normative and regulatory gaps, in the fourth section I expose 
the relationship between the principle of non-intervention and that of self-
determination, define the baseline of intervention as control, and explain the 
different pathways intervention can take in cyberspace. In the fifth section, I 
apply this concept to electoral cyber interference such as the interference in 
the 2016 US election. The conclusion sets out the chapter’s overall findings 
and explains the importance of reassessing the meaning of intervention in the 
cyber context and more generally.
THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-INTERVENTION
Non-intervention is a fundamental principle of international law that has 
acquired customary law status even if it is not mentioned in the UN Charter 
(Nicaragua Case 1986, para 202; Jamnejad and Wood 2009, 347–367).3 
According to the 1965 General Assembly Declaration on the Inadmissibility 
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of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of Their 
Independence and Sovereignty, which was repeated almost verbatim in the 
1970 General Assembly Declaration on Friendly Relations: “No State has 
the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the 
internal or external affairs of any other State. Consequently, armed interven-
tion and all other forms of interference or attempted threats against the per-
sonality of the State or against its political, economic and cultural elements, 
are condemned” (U.N. General Assembly Res. 1965, Annex, para. 1).4 In 
the Nicaragua Case, the ICJ defined non-intervention as “the right of every 
sovereign State to conduct its [external or internal] affairs without outside 
interference.”5
The importance of the principle of non-intervention derives from the fact 
that it emanates from and protects essential aspects of the principle of state 
sovereignty (Jennings and Watts 1992, 428; Vincent 1974, 14; U.N. General 
Assembly 1964, para. 216). Sovereignty as the foundational principle of the 
modern international system is an all-embracing principle and can be dis-
sected into more specific principles or rules that protect specific aspects of 
state sovereignty. The principle of non-intervention protects the integrity and 
autonomy of a state’s authority and will in the sense of its capacity to internal 
and external self-governance.6 Understood in this way, the principle of non-
intervention creates a juridical space where the government, as the holder of 
authority and will, can exercise its will freely and make free choices in view 
of the fact that in international law the state is represented by the government. 
Because it protects an essential aspect of state sovereignty, the principle of 
non-intervention acquired independent legal status and it is critical in an inter-
national system defined by sovereignty and by interactions between sovereign 
States. Its alignment, however, with the principle of sovereignty has important 
normative and operational implications in that the scope and content of the 
principle of non-intervention is molded by the meaning and content of the 
principle of sovereignty as developed in international law and relations.
In order to define the content and meaning of the principle of non-inter-
vention in international law, we need to explain the meaning of its opposite, 
that is, intervention. According to Oppenheim’s definition, intervention is 
interference “forcible or dictatorial, or otherwise coercive, in effect depriving 
the state intervened against of control over the matter in question” (Jennings 
and Watts 1992, 428).7 The ICJ in the Nicaragua Case defined prohibited 
intervention as “one bearing on matters in which each State is permitted, by 
the principle of State sovereignty, to decide freely . . . and uses methods of 
coercion in regard to such choices, which must remain free ones.”8 From the 
above definitions, it transpires that in order for interference to constitute inter-
vention, it should satisfy two conditions: first, it should impinge on matters 
that fall within a state’s sovereign affairs and, second, it should be coercive.
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The first condition describes the domain within which interference should 
take place as well as the object of such interference. In this respect, the ICJ 
mentioned the choice of political, economic, social, and cultural systems 
and the formulation of foreign policy.9 It thus transpires that the protected 
domain is a state’s political, economic, social, and cultural system whereas 
the object of intervention is the ability to make free choices in this domain. 
That said, the aforementioned list is not exhaustive and can change in light of 
related developments concerning the meaning and scope of state sovereignty 
(Jennings and Watts 1992, 428). As a result, the domain protected from inter-
vention may expand or decrease, something that will affect the scope of the 
non-intervention principle.
The second condition—coercion—refers to the nature of the interference 
and is what differentiates intervention from pure interference or influence. As 
the ICJ said, “the element of coercion . . . defines, and indeed forms the very 
essence of, [a] prohibited intervention.”10 Traditionally, coercion in interna-
tional law has been taken to imply compulsion whereby one state compels or 
attempts to compel another state to take a particular course of action against 
its will thus obtaining, in the words of the 1970 Friendly Relations Declara-
tion, “the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights” (U.N. General 
Assembly Friendly Relations Declaration 1970).11
Such a construction of intervention can very well apply to cyberspace. For 
instance, if a state’s governmental services are targeted by a Distributed Denial 
of Service (DDoS) attack in order to compel its government to change its poli-
cies or decisions, this would amount to prohibited intervention. The 2007 DDoS 
attacks against Estonia come immediately to mind. They were launched after 
the Estonian government decided to relocate a Soviet-era statue, a decision 
that was resisted by the country’s Russian-speaking minority and was frowned 
upon by Moscow. To the extent that they were intended to put such pressure on 
Estonia to change its decision and provided that they were attributed to Russia,12 
in my opinion, they would constitute prohibited intervention (Tsagourias 2012, 
35; Buchan 2012). In contrast, the 2014 Sony attack (Zetter 2014) does not 
amount to intervention because the target of the attack was a private company 
not connected to the US government and it did not involve a matter that falls 
within the sovereign prerogatives of the United States nor was there any attempt 
to coerce the US government to take a particular course of action.
INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016 US ELECTION AND 
THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-INTERVENTION
How would the abovementioned construction of intervention apply to Rus-
sia’s interference in the 2016 US presidential election? Russian operations 
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included hacking into the Democratic National Committee e-mails and the 
release of confidential information as well as disinformation operations (U.S. 
ODNI 2017, 2-5). The former is referred to as doxing (Kilovaty 2018, 152) 
whose objective is to “expose, disgrace, or otherwise undermine a particular 
individual, campaign, or organisation in order to influence public opinion 
during an election cycle” (EU vs Disinfo 2019) whereas disinformation is 
the dissemination of “false, inaccurate, or misleading information designed, 
presented and promoted to intentionally cause public harm or for profit” and 
can threaten the “democratic political processes and value” (European Com-
mission 2018, 10).13 The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the 
Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) issued a joint state-
ment claiming that the Russian government was responsible for the hack 
and the publication of the materials in an attempt to “interfere with the US 
election process” (U.S. DHS and ODNI 2016) and, according to ODNI, the 
intention of the leaks was to “undermine public faith in the US democratic 
process, denigrate Secretary Clinton and harm her electability and potential 
presidency” (U.S. ODNI 2017, ii). Following investigations, a number of 
Russian operatives were indicted. According to the Mueller indictment, “[t]
he conspiracy had as its object impairing, obstructing, and defeating the law-
ful governmental functions of the United States by dishonest means in order 
to enable the Defendants to interfere with U.S. political and electoral pro-
cesses, including the 2016 U.S. presidential election” (Mueller  Indictments 
2018).14
One can plausibly say that Russia’s actions satisfied the first condition 
of unlawful intervention by targeting the conduct of elections. As the ICJ 
opined in the Nicaragua Case, the “choice of political system” is a matter 
falling within a state’s sovereign prerogatives which should remain “free 
from external intervention”15 and went on to say that holding elections is a 
domestic matter.16 There are problems, however, with the second condition 
namely that of coercion. According to Brian Egan, “a cyber operation by a 
State that interferes with another State’s ability to hold an election or that 
manipulates a State’s election results would be a clear violation of the rule of 
non-intervention” (Egan 2017, 175). Likewise, according to the former UK 
attorney general, “the use by a hostile state of cyber operations to manipulate 
the electoral system to alter the results of an election in another state . . . must 
surely be a breach of the prohibition on intervention in the domestic affairs 
of states” (U.K. Attorney General’s Office 2018). These statements refer to 
interference with the electoral administration, for example, interference with 
electoral registers to delete voters’ names as well as on interference with the 
electoral infrastructure, for example, interference with the recording or count-
ing of votes or the blocking of voting machines thus cancelling an election. 
Since Russia’s operations, according to the aforementioned reports (U.S. 
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ODNI 2017, 3), did not amount to such interference, they do not breach the 
non-intervention norm.
That said, many states since then have designated their electoral infra-
structure (registration, casting and counting votes, submitting and tallying 
results) as critical national infrastructure (U.S. DHS “Election Security”).17 
In the same vein, the Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace 
(GCSC) proposed a norm prohibiting the disruption of elections through 
cyberattacks on the technical infrastructure that supports elections (GCSC 
2018).18 Although these are important developments, they only address one 
aspect of the phenomenon of electoral cyber interference, that is, meddling 
with the electoral infrastructure but do not extend to the process according to 
which the will of the people is formed and how intervention can impact on 
them. Yet, outcomes can be affected not only by interfering with the electoral 
infrastructure but also by interfering with the process of will formation. This 
is an issue that will be discussed in the next section.
CONTEXTUALIZING AND RECONCEPTUALIZING 
INTERVENTION IN CYBERSPACE
In this section, I revisit the phenomenon of intervention in order to contextual-
ize and reconceptualize the principle of non-intervention for cyber purposes. 
This is necessary for many reasons. In the first place and as was said earlier, 
cyberspace is a new domain but one that is embedded in the political and legal 
environment where states operate. States thus use cyberspace as a conduit of 
power and indeed as a conduit of intervention by employing not only the tra-
ditional diplomatic, political, military, or economic tools of coercion but also 
new tools suitable to cyberspace. Second, because of the particular features 
of cyberspace such as its interconnectedness and anonymity, the pathways of 
coercion can diversify whereas the scalability, reach, and effects of intervention 
enhanced.19 Third, the very nature of the concept of intervention invites such 
reassessment. Intervention is not a static concept but a concept that is con-
stantly contextualized in time or domain and whose meaning, scope, and prac-
tice changes accordingly. What intervention signified in the nineteenth century 
is not the same today, neither is the meaning of military, diplomatic, political, 
or legal intervention. It is for these reasons that the concept of intervention 
needs to be contextualized and reconceptualized for cyber purposes and in what 
follows I will do this by first explaining the intimate relationship between non-
intervention and self-determination, hence repositioning the domain and object 
of intervention and, secondly, by reassessing the baseline of coercion and by 
explaining the pathways coercion can take in cyberspace and how they impact 
on self-determination and consequently on the principle of non-intervention.
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Non-intervention and Self-Determination
With regard to the first issue, it was said in the first section that intervention 
acquires meaning within a configuration of sovereign relations by protecting 
the integrity and autonomy of a state’s authority and will against external 
interference. As was also explained, the domain protected from intervention 
consists of the state’s sovereign prerogatives whereas the object of interven-
tion is the ability to make free choices on these matters. This traditional 
reading of intervention focuses on the internal and/or external manifestation 
of authority and will by the state represented by the government; it vests, 
in other words, all sovereign authority and will in the government which 
is then protected from intervention but does not take into account how 
this authority and will are formed and how intervention can impact on the 
process of their formation. Instead, it treats the state and its government as 
if they were cut off from the prior process of authority and will formation. 
However, that process of authority and will formation is connected with the 
internal and external manifestation of such authority and will by the govern-
ment. To explain, a government’s authority and will remain free only when 
its sourcing is also free. This immediately brings to light the relationship 
between non-intervention and self-determination (Ohlin 2016; U.N. General 
Assembly 1964, para. 216), another principle that derives from and protects 
the principle of state sovereignty. Self-determination refers to the right of 
peoples to determine freely and without external interference their political 
status and to pursue freely their economic, social, and cultural development 
(U.N. General Assembly ICCPR 1966, article 1(1); U.N. General Assembly 
1970).
From this definition, it transpires that the scope of the right to self-determi-
nation is broader and is not exclusively linked to the right of peoples to form 
their own state. Moreover, it does not cease once a state has been created but 
thereafter self-determination refers to the “right to authentic self-government, 
that is, the right of a people really and freely to choose its own political and 
economic regime” (Cassese 1995, 137).20 It follows from this that the prin-
ciple of non-intervention protects against external interference the expression 
of authority and will by the people and also protects the conditions that enable 
the people to form authority and will freely and make free choices.21 External 
interference through disinformation combined with identity falsification, for 
example, distorts, undermines, or inverses this process and nullifies the genu-
ine expression of authority and will by the people (Ohlin 2018). It also taints 
the internal or external manifestation or expression of authority and will by 
the government that emerges. For this reason, in the words of Crawford, “the 
principle of self-determination is represented by the rule against intervention 
in the internal affairs of that state” (Crawford 2007, 127).
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By aligning the principles of non-intervention and self-determination, 
the normative and operational scope of the principle of non-intervention 
shifts. More specifically, the domain and object of intervention shifts from 
the government to the actual power holder, the people, and to the process 
of forming authority and will through which the goal of free choice is also 
attained. Whereas the government as the depository of such authority and 
will is protected by the principle of non-intervention, it is not the primary 
object of protection as the traditional reading holds, but a derivative one; the 
primary object of protection are the people and the process of authority and 
will formation.
Control as the Baseline of Coercion 
and the Pathways of Coercion
Having identified the domain and object of protection by the principle of 
non-intervention, I will now consider its second element, that of coercion. 
In international law, there has been little consideration of the threshold 
or the baseline of coercion above which intervention takes place. Oppen-
heim’s definition is, however, quite instructive. According to him, the 
essence of coercion is the fact that a state intervened against is, in effect, 
deprived of control over a matter. Control means one state’s intentional 
direction over another state’s authority and will, which prevents the lat-
ter from discharging its authority and will freely and making free choices. 
When a state assumes control over a matter at the expense of the state, 
which has a legitimate claim of authority and will over that matter because 
it falls within its sovereign prerogatives, it effectively curtails the latter’s 
capacity to self-determination as self-governance, which, as was said, are 
protected by the principle of non-intervention. It inverses these values by 
forcing the state to act counterintuitively to what its free authority and will 
would advocate.22
Regarding the pathways to coercion, or the means and methods through 
which coercion can be actualized, the ICJ spoke of “methods” of coercion 
in the plural and also spoke of direct and indirect methods. This means that 
there is a spectrum of coercion which can manifest itself through various 
means and methods. In the first place, coercion, as Oppenheim noted, can be 
forcible. In the Nicaragua Case, the ICJ said that one of the most obvious 
forms of coercion is the one that uses force either in the direct form of mili-
tary action or in the indirect form of support for subversive or terrorist armed 
activities within another state.23 In this case, the intervened against state loses 
control over a matter, for example, over parts of its territory, through the use 
of armed force. Forcible coercion is direct and perhaps the most dramatic 
and serious form of coercion and, for this reason, it acquired its own legal 
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meaning and status in the rule prohibiting the use of force contained in Article 
2(4) of the UN Charter and in customary law.
Another pathway to coercion mentioned by Oppenheim is that of dictato-
rial interference. Dictatorial interference is when a state prescribes a course of 
action in imperative terms and usually by threatening negative consequences, 
forcing thus the will of the recipient state. This is again a direct form of coer-
cion and describes a situation where two sovereign “wills” clash over a matter 
and one state loses control over a matter by subordinating its will.
In addition to these direct pathways, there are also other more subtle or 
indirect pathways to coercion where one state extends its will over another 
and thus assumes control even if the latter State appears to behave freely. 
This can happen when the intervening state arranges the targeted state’s 
choices in such a way that it has no effective choice. Another instance is 
when the intervenor, through manipulation, arranges the other state’s prefer-
ences in such a way that the state acts in accordance with the intervenor’s 
preferred choices. In these cases, coercion as control does not appear to be 
conflictual since the victim state apparently acts voluntarily but the intervenor 
exerts control over the other and extends its will by rearranging the avail-
able choices or by rearranging preferences to align them with its own. For 
example, if a state assumes control over another state’s governmental systems 
(or systems supporting critical national infrastructure) and manipulates their 
operation, this would amount to coercion to the extent that the systems oper-
ate counterintuitively to how they were programed to operate by the victim 
state and produce actions and effects desired by the intervener. Also, when a 
state, through cyber espionage, acquires information on another state’s poli-
cies which is then used to direct the choices of the victim state, it controls the 
latter’s choices against its wishes.24
Electoral Cyber Interference and Intervention
Where coercion as control can manifest itself more acutely is when a state’s 
authority and will are manipulated at its source; in the process of their forma-
tion. To explain, when a state interferes with the structures and the environ-
ment that condition and facilitate the formation of authority and will by the 
people, and substitutes the legitimate process of self-determination with an 
artificially constructed process in order to generate particular attitudes and 
results to serve its particular interests,25 the intervening state controls not only 
the attitudes, will, and choices of the people, but also the will of the govern-
ment that emerges. Consequently, the right to self-determination as self-
governance which is protected by the non-intervention principle is essentially 
curtailed. Take, for example, the case of deep fakes when, during an electoral 
campaign, imageries, voices, or videos of politicians are simulated in order to 
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discredit them. To the extent that such operations are designed and executed 
in such a way as to manipulate the cognitive process where authority and will 
are formed and to take control over peoples’ choices of government, they 
would constitute intervention.
As the aforementioned example shows, cyberspace provides a facilitative 
ecosystem where electoral interference can take place and as was said, it can 
also enhance its scalability, reach, and effects of coercion. To explain, cyber-
space has made it easier to produce, disseminate, and share disinformation, 
enhances its accessibility by amplifying the circle of targeted audiences or 
by micro-targeting, increases the immediacy and speed of such operations, 
complicates attribution, and allows for remotely conducted operations.
The interference in the 2016 US elections is a case in point. As was 
said, Russian operations included the hacking and release of confidential 
information and social media-enabled disinformation. The primary target 
of such operations was the cognitive environment which enables the mak-
ing of choices that are subsequently reflected in the type of government that 
emerges from the process (Hollis 2018, 36; Lin and Kerr 2017). As James 
Comey, the former FBI director, said before the Senate Intelligence Commit-
tee: “[t]his is such a big deal, . . . we have this big, messy, wonderful country 
where . . . nobody tells us what to think, what to fight about, what to vote for, 
except other Americans . . . . But we’re talking about a foreign government 
that, using technical intrusion, lots of other methods, tried to shape the way 
we think, we vote, we act” (New York Times 2017). In a similar vein, the 
2017 US National Security Strategy opined that “[a] democracy is only as 
resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental 
requirement for a free and resilient nation. . . . Today, actors such as Rus-
sia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy 
of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial net-
works, and personal data” (U.S. White House 2017, p. 14).
From the preceding discussion, it can be said that Russia’s interference 
met the two conditions of unlawful intervention. Although one could have 
stopped here, it is important to consider a number of other issues which 
should be present although their status has not been firmly settled in legal 
doctrine.
The first is intention and more specifically whether coercion should be 
intentional. The Tallinn Manual treats intent as a constitutive element of the 
principle of non-intervention (Schmitt 2017, Rule 66, para. 27), but there 
are also dissenting voices who treat intervention as an objective state of 
affairs (Watts 2015, 249, 268–269). If, as was said previously, intervention 
is relational and contextual, it can never be an objective state of affairs. It 
seems that the ICJ in the Nicaragua Case required intent when it said that “in 
international law, if one State, with a view to the coercion of another State, 
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supports and assists armed bands in that State whose purpose is to overthrow 
the government of that State, that amounts to an intervention by the one State 
in the internal affairs of the other, whether or not the political objective of the 
State giving such support and assistance is equally far-reaching.”26 What the 
court meant is that a state should have the intention to coerce another state by 
using proxies although it may not share the particular objective of the proxies 
it is supporting.
In the opinion of the present writer, intent is critical, particularly in cyber-
space, where operations are often factually indistinguishable, and their effects 
permeate borders unintentionally. Moreover, intent distinguishes influence 
operations or in general propaganda from operations that are purposively 
designed to exert control over a sovereign matter (self-determination) through 
false, fabricated, misleading, or generally through disinformation.
That having been said, it should be acknowledged that it is difficult to 
establish intent. There may exist some factual and demonstrable evidence to 
prove intent in the form of statements or the involvement of state operatives 
(U.S. ODNI 2017; Mueller Indictments 2018), otherwise intent can be con-
structed from circumstantial evidence and from surrounding circumstances. 
For example, the target of the operation27 and the means used (disinforma-
tion) are important indicators (U.S. ODNI 2017, 3; Mueller Indictments, 
para. 2). With regard to the latter, one can look into whether the confiden-
tiality, integrity, or availability of information has been breached (Herpig, 
Schuetze and Jones 2018, 14ff). For example, in the case of deep fakes or 
leaked e-mails, it is the authenticity, integrity, and confidentiality of the dis-
seminated information that is breached but even in the case of true informa-
tion, it is its integrity and authenticity that is encroached if it is mixed with 
false information or is presented in a false or fabricated context or if it relates 
to partial truths. Other factors to take into account to establish intent are the 
political and ideological competition that exists between states, the strategic 
or other interests served by the operation, the timing of the operation, the 
intensity and widespread nature of the operation. With regard to the latter, 
the Mueller indictment demonstrated the widespread and systematic nature 
of Russia’s interference. 28
The second condition is that of knowledge in the sense of whether the vic-
tim state should be aware of the coercion. Certain commentators contend that 
knowledge is not required whereas others claim that it is required because a 
state cannot be coerced when it is unaware of the act of coercion (Schmitt 
2017, Rule 66, para. 25). In international relations theory, which views 
coercion as an instrument of power and usually identifies it with threats, 
knowledge of the threat and of its author is important because it relates to 
the persuasiveness and credibility of the threat. For this reason, some inter-
national relations commentators view cyber coercion as inconsequential 
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because of the covert nature of cyber operations (Lindsay and Gartzke [2014] 
2018, 179).
The difference, however, between international law and international rela-
tions is that the latter takes a functional approach to intervention whereas 
international law takes a normative approach. It is thus submitted that 
knowledge is not a constitutive element of intervention, but knowledge is 
required in order to trigger a claim that intervention has taken place. This 
also means that the fact that intervention may be covert, or that it was 
attempted without actually succeeding, will not affect the qualification of the 
impugned behavior as intervention for international law purposes when the 
intervened against state becomes aware of the situation, provided of course 
that the criteria of intervention have been satisfied. To put it differently, 
the intervening state cannot claim that there was no intervention or that 
there is no breach of the non-intervention rule because at the time interven-
tion happened the victim state was not aware of the intervention. This also 
means that the victim state is not prevented from taking countermeasures 
after acquiring knowledge of the intervention even if the act of intervention 
occurred much earlier because there will be temporal proximity between the 
countermeasures and the claim of wrongfulness. In the US case, the fact that 
subsequent reports established the facts will not prevent the United States 
from claiming that it was victim of unlawful intervention although whether 
it will do so is a matter of politics.
Finally, such interference needs to reach a certain level of severity to 
amount to intervention. Severity can be assessed against the importance of 
the values affected which in this case is the value of self-determination; the 
consequences of intervention which in this case is the control of a state’s 
authority and will and, according to McDougal and Feliciano, the extent to 
which values are affected and the number of participants whose values are 
so affected.29 Although no analytical tool exists to measure the real impact 
of electoral interference on people or how their voting preferences were 
affected, however, analysis of social networks can reveal the number of 
viewers or artificial movements and to some extent measure the number of 
affected individuals (Howard et al. 2018).30
CONCLUSION
This chapter has shown that cyberspace is a new domain where the principle 
of non-intervention can apply. However, deciphering its content and under-
standing how it applies to cyberspace are a difficult exercise that can impact 
its effectiveness to regulate cyber activities. Consequently, reassessing the 
meaning of intervention in the cyber domain is critical because cyberspace 
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is a domain where states compete and exert power and it is an environment 
which increases the scalability, reach, and effects of intervention.
For this reason, in this chapter I contextualized and reassessed the prin-
ciple of non-intervention for cyber purposes. More specifically, I aligned 
the principle of non-intervention with that of self-determination and argued 
that non-intervention protects not just the integrity and autonomy of a state’s 
authority and will as it manifests itself internally and externally through the 
government, but primarily it protects its source, the people, and the process 
according to which authority and will are formed. I then identified the base-
line of coercion as control over a matter that falls within a state’s sovereign 
prerogatives and applied this definition to cyberspace by looking into the 
different ways control and, therefore, coercion manifests itself. In relation to 
electoral interference, it manifests itself as control over the conditions that 
enable the exercise of self-determination by the people in the sense of freely 
forming authority and will that subsequently extends to control over the 
manifestation and expression of such authority and will by the government.
By reassessing what the principle of non-intervention entails in the cyber 
era, international law will be able to fill many normative and operational gaps 
that currently exist when it is called upon to apply to cyber operations. The 
implications of such reconceptualization are not limited to cyber intervention 
but extend to the concept of intervention in general which, as was said, is a 
dynamic concept that requires constant reevaluation. However, it should be 
admitted that this is not the end of the road because it is for states to take up 
the mantle and provide normative and operational clarity as to the meaning 
of intervention in cyberspace and, more broadly, in the physical world. Yet, 
even if agreement on the meaning of cyber intervention is attained, interven-
tion will still be a controversial concept because there is disagreement as to 
which interventions are lawful or unlawful but justified. For example, is elec-
toral cyber interference in democracies unlawful whereas a cyber campaign 
to overthrow a dictatorial regime lawful or at least justified? To the extent that 
these issues have not been settled in international law, intervention and non-
intervention will remain a Jekyll and Hyde concept even in the cyber context. 
That having been said, this is a second-order enquiry because the first-order 
enquiry is ontological; it is about the meaning of intervention to which this 
chapter attempted to provide an answer.
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Ever since the Treaty of Westphalia established the modern legal order, the 
sovereignty of states is one of the foundational principles of public interna-
tional law. The principles of state sovereignty and sovereign equality have 
been reaffirmed in Art. 2(1) of the United Nations Charter and form the bed-
rock of the post–World War II international legal order. This legal order, con-
ceived in a time when global computer networks carrying information across 
continents in seconds and making it available without regard for location and 
geographical distance were but a distant dream, must evolve to account for 
new technological developments such as the rise of information and com-
munication technologies (ICTs), which link states and people closer together 
through cyberspace. Faced with a new medium with unique characteristics 
of ubiquity and aterritoriality of information, states as the principal actors of 
the international legal order had to decide whether this new medium—cyber-
space—is a unique “space,” requiring a different set of rules governing state 
rights and state behavior, or whether existing rules of international still apply.
Gradually, a consensus has begun to form around the proposition that 
rules and principles of international law, as enshrined in the UN Charter, 
apply in cyberspace. As the former legal adviser to the US Department of 
State, Harold Koh, put it: “cyberspace is not a ‘law-free’ zone where anyone 
can conduct hostile activities without rules or restraint. (. . .) States conduct-
ing activities in cyberspace must take into account the sovereignty of other 
states” (Koh 2012, 3, 6). This consensus has been cemented through the work 
of the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in 
the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of Interna-
tional Security (GGE), which in 2013 and 2015 issued two reports detailing 
the rules and principles of international law applicable to state behavior 
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in cyberspace (United Nations General Assembly 2013, 2015). While the 
Group of Governmental Experts managed to clarify many fundamental 
aspects relating to state sovereignty in cyberspace, including the jurisdiction 
of states over cyber infrastructure located on their territory (United Nations 
General Assembly 2013, para. 20), the prohibition on the use of force and 
non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states (United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly 2015, para. 26), the interpretation of the principle of state 
sovereignty and its application to state conduct in cyberspace have not been 
addressed in great detail.
One of the questions left open by the GGE reports is whether cyber opera-
tions which do not constitute a use of force or intervention into internal affairs 
of another state are nevertheless prohibited by virtue of a duty to respect the 
sovereignty of states, or whether the absence of a specific prohibitive rule 
leaves states free to conduct cyber operations within and against cyber infra-
structure located on the territory of other states (provided they do not rise to 
the level of force or intervene into internal affairs). It is, therefore, no surprise 
that the question whether international law recognizes a general rule of ter-
ritorial sovereignty, operating below the threshold of use of force and inter-
vention is currently one of the most contentious issues in international law, in 
light of the fact that such a rule may be violated through state-conducted or 
state-sponsored cyber operations. Moreover, it remains unclear if this rule is 
recognized, then how to precisely define its scope. Maybe the most prominent 
academic effort to comprehensively map and describe the rules applicable to 
state conduct in cyberspace is the Tallinn Manual. Now in its second edition, 
the Manual states in Rule 4 that “[a] State must not conduct cyber operations 
that violate the sovereignty of another State” (Schmitt and Vihul 2017c, 17). 
In ascertaining when such a violation of sovereignty may occur, the Tallinn 
Manual 2.0 employs an effects-based test which focuses on two bases: the 
degree of infringement upon the state’s territorial integrity and the interfer-
ence with, or usurpation of, inherently governmental functions (Schmitt and 
Vihul 2017c, 20). Under this test, cyber operations which violate the integrity 
of ICT systems in another state by installing malware containing malicious 
payloads are not prohibited per se, unless they lead to the loss of functional-
ity of the target system. In effect, a majority of the Manual’s authors does 
not regard the act of installing and sustaining malicious code in foreign ICT 
systems as a violation of international law.
This chapter critically examines the Tallinn Manual’s Rule 4 and argues 
that a purely effects-based approach to violations of territorial sovereignty is 
at odds with the traditional understanding of sovereignty as espoused by the 
Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) and the International Court 
of Justice (ICJ). If we understand sovereignty as the exclusive right of states 
to regulate entry into their territory and the right to forbid any assertion of 
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jurisdiction or the performance of acts de iure imperii within their territory 
by another state without their consent, then any unauthorized presence and 
any act of foreign state power violates sovereignty, regardless of whether 
these actions cause physical harm or not. Therefore, the chapter argues for a 
different, intrusion-based approach to violations of territorial sovereignty in 
cyberspace. Under the proposed intrusion-based test, the violation of a state’s 
territorial sovereignty is linked to the breach of the information security—
especially the integrity—of the targeted ICT system. This allows for a more 
technical and precise determination of the boundary between permissible and 
impermissible acts in cyberspace and would help to reduce the legal uncer-
tainties which currently exist in relation to low-intensity cyber operations.
This chapter proceeds in three steps. First, it discusses the traditional 
concept of sovereignty and addresses the question whether sovereignty is 
a principle of international law from which more concrete rules of state 
behavior—such as the prohibition on the use of force and the prohibition of 
intervention into internal affairs of other states—derive; or whether it is itself 
a rule of international law, prohibiting conduct which violates the territo-
rial sovereignty of states. While this question has already been addressed in 
many publications (see, e.g., Eichensehr 2015; Heintschel von Heinegg 2012, 
2013; Pirker 2013; Schmitt and Vihul 2017a, 2017b, 2017c), a recent speech 
by the United Kingdom attorney general, Jeremy Wright QC MP, in which 
he firmly spoke against the existence of such a rule of territorial sovereignty 
(Wright 2018), warrants a further look at this issue. Second, it addresses 
the Tallinn Manual 2.0 Rule 4 and its interpretation of the rule of territorial 
sovereignty, with special regard to the tests proposed by the authors of the 
Tallinn Manual to ascertain when a violation of territorial sovereignty takes 
place. Last, it proposes a different, intrusion-based test of the violation of 
territorial sovereignty.
THE CONCEPT OF TERRITORIAL 
SOVEREIGNTY IN CYBERSPACE
Rule 4 of the Tallinn Manual 2.0 states that “[a] State must not conduct cyber 
operations that violate the sovereignty of another State” (Schmitt and Vihul 
2017c, 17). It is based on the assumption that the international legal order 
contains, apart from the prohibition on the use of force and the prohibition of 
intervention into the internal affairs of other states, a separate norm requiring 
respect for the (territorial) sovereignty of other states, which may be violated 
through the performance of certain cyber activities within other states’ territo-
ries without their consent. However, the existence of such a rule has recently 
been put into question—at least with respect to activities in cyberspace. In his 
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Chatham House speech of May 23, 2018, the attorney general of the United 
Kingdom, Jeremy Wright QC MP, has stated that he is “not persuaded that 
we can currently extrapolate from [the] general principle [of sovereignty] a 
specific rule or additional prohibition for cyber activity beyond that of a pro-
hibited intervention. The UK Government’s position is therefore that there 
is no such rule as a matter of current international law” (Wright 2018). The 
United Kingdom has been the first state to officially articulate its doubts as to 
the existence of a rule of territorial sovereignty in such clear terms, but this 
position seems to reflect earlier arguments brought forth by (at least) some 
branches of the US government. The then legal adviser to the US Depart-
ment of State, Brian Egan, noted that “cyber operations involving computers 
located on another State’s territory do not constitute a violation of interna-
tional law. (. . .) This is perhaps most clear where such activities in another 
State’s territory have no effects or de minimis effects” (Egan 2016). Further-
more, as has been reported by some authors (Watts and Richard 2018, 859; 
Schmitt and Vihul 2017a, 1641), on January 19, 2017, the outgoing general 
counsel of the US Department of Defence has issued a memorandum on the 
“International Law Framework for Employing Cyber Capabilities in Military 
Operations.” The memo—which is not publicly available and whose content 
the present author can therefore only assess through secondary sources—
reportedly stated that sovereignty is not a rule but a “baseline principle” 
which undergirds other binding rules of international law such as the prohibi-
tion on the use of force and the prohibition of intervention (Schmitt and Vihul 
2017a, 1642). The 2017 DoD memo’s position seems to be shared by some 
American authors, including authors which at the time of writing are work-
ing for US Cyber Command (Corn and Taylor 2017; Corn and Jensen 2018).
Two Arguments Against Territorial 
Sovereignty in Cyberspace
The case against the existence of a rule of territorial sovereignty can be sum-
marized as resting on two arguments. First, in what may be called the argu-
ment from lack of state practice, it is stated that there is not sufficient state 
practice and opinio iuris to conclude the existence of such a rule in customary 
international law (Wright 2018; Corn and Jensen 2018). Second, in what may 
be termed the argument from cyberspace design and practicality, it is held 
that while sovereignty has always been tightly tied to territory, the logical 
and social layers of cyberspace have “at most a tenuous connection to geog-
raphy” (Corn and Jensen 2018) and thus territorial concepts are not readily 
transposable to an aterritorial medium by way of simple analogy. Moreover, 
the global reach and availability of cyber infrastructure makes it possible 
for malicious cyber operations to be mounted from a multitude of globally 
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dispersed locations (Corn and Jensen 2018). States wishing to protect their 
cyber infrastructure from such threats, therefore, need to be able to counter 
cyberattacks regardless of their starting location. The sovereignty-as-a-rule 
approach would create “unworkable hurdles to States conducting such limited 
but potentially important operations” (Corn 2017).
According to the lack-of-state-practice argument, sovereignty is a baseline 
principle of international law, from which other, more concrete prohibitive 
rules of international law flow. These rules, such as the prohibition on the use 
of force and the prohibition of intervention, exist as customary international 
law, because they are evidenced by a sufficiently uniform and universal prac-
tice and opinio iuris of states, and/or have been codified in the United Nations 
Charter. Below the threshold of these two rules, “international law does not 
obligate other states to refrain from all activities that might infringe upon or 
operate to the prejudice of the territorial state’s internal sovereignty” (Corn and 
Taylor 2017, 209). Evidence of this is to be seen in the fact that states conduct 
espionage operations within the territory of other states, yet international law 
does not prohibit espionage as such (Corn and Taylor 2017, 209). Moreover, 
one cannot find evidence of one single universal rule of territorial sovereignty, 
as the content of rights in relation to a particular territory varies depending on 
which domain (land, sea, air, space) is affected. While access to airspace is 
severely restricted, and entry without consent is a serious violation of interna-
tional law which may lead to grave consequences (as has most recently been 
evidenced by the shoot down of a Russian fighter jet by the Turkish army for 
violating Turkish airspace), international law allows the innocent passage of 
warships through the territorial sea of states and in the case of space, orbiting 
objects do not violate the airspace or territory states they overfly (Corn and 
Taylor 2017, 210). In consequence, given that no separate regime of restricted 
access to a state’s cyberspace domain (below the thresholds of use of force and 
intervention) has yet developed, states are free to act as they wish by virtue of 
their sovereignty, as has been found by the PCIJ in the Lotus case (S.S. Lotus 
[Fr. v. Turk.], 1927 P.C.I.J. Rep. [ser. A] No. 10, at 18).
In the author’s view, both arguments are to be rejected. They disregard 
long-standing jurisprudence of the PCIJ and ICJ, do not take account of more 
recent state practice, and are based on a false understanding of the so-called 
Lotus doctrine whereby states have unlimited freedom of action barring a 
prohibitive rule of international law.
International Jurisprudence Supports the Existence 
of a Rule of Territorial Sovereignty
The essence of state sovereignty is perhaps best captured in a passage from 
Judge Max Huber’s arbitral decision in the Island of Palmas case. The 
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arbitrator stated that “Sovereignty in the relations between States signifies 
independence. Independence in regard to a portion of the globe is the right 
to exercise therein, to the exclusion of any other State, the functions of a 
State” (Island of Palmas [Neth. v. U.S.], P.C.A. 1928, 2 R.I.A.A 829, 838). 
Traditionally, this independence is understood to contain an internal as well 
as an external aspect (Besson 2011; Tsagourias 2015, 17). While internal 
sovereignty means the supreme authority within the state to regulate political, 
social, and legal affairs and enforce rules, external sovereignty pertains to the 
rights and duties of states toward each other and denotes the competence of 
states to engage in activities outside of their territory, subject only to binding 
rules of international law (Crawford 2015, 118). From this internal sover-
eignty arises the authority to determine inter alia who may enter the territory. 
This is exclusive in the sense that “governmental authority carried out on the 
territory of another state is only lawful if performed with the latter’s consent” 
(Crawford 2015, 121). The supreme authority of a state vis-à-vis other states 
within its territory thus gives rise to a fundamental “restriction imposed by 
international law upon a State (. . .) that—failing the existence of a permissive 
rule to the contrary—it may not exercise its power in any form in the territory 
of another State. In this sense jurisdiction is certainly territorial; it cannot be 
exercised by a State outside its territory except by virtue of a permissive rule 
derived from international custom or from a convention” (S.S. Lotus [Fr. v. 
Turk.], Judgement, 1927 P.C.I.J. Ser. A No. 10, p. 4, 18–19). This dictum of 
the PCIJ has been upheld after the entry into force of the UN Charter by the 
ICJ. In the Corfu Channel case, the Court had to decide whether a demining 
operation conducted by the United Kingdom in Albanian territorial waters 
violated Albanian sovereignty even if it was a necessary self-help measure. 
The court held that “[b]etween independent States, respect for territorial sov-
ereignty is an essential foundation of international relations. The Court recog-
nizes that the Albanian Government’s complete failure to carry out its duties 
after the explosions (. . .) are extenuating circumstances for the action of the 
United Kingdom Government. But to ensure respect for international law, 
of which it is the organ, the Court must declare that the action of the British 
Navy constituted a violation of Albanian sovereignty” (Corfu Channel [U.K. 
v. Alb.], Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 4, 35). Furthermore, in Nicaragua, the 
court clarified the relation between the requirement of respect for territorial 
sovereignty and the lex specialis prohibition on the use of force. It held that 
“[t]he effects of the principle of respect for territorial sovereignty inevitably 
overlap with those of the principles of the prohibition of the use of force and 
of non-intervention. Thus the assistance to the contras (. . .) not only amount 
to an unlawful use of force, but also constitute infringements of the territo-
rial sovereignty of Nicaragua, and incursions into its territorial and internal 
waters” (Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua 
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[Nicar. v. U.S.], Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, para. 251). What becomes 
clear from this brief overview is, therefore, that sovereignty is not only a prin-
ciple, from which other more specific rules are derived, but that sovereignty 
demands respect for the supreme authority of a state within its territory and 
as such forms itself a prohibitive rule of international law. Territorial sover-
eignty is, therefore, a “baseline rule” derived from general international law 
(Watts and Richard 2018, 859), which reflects the structural framework of 
international law for the exercise of state sovereignty in order “to ensure the 
co-existence of independent communities and facilitate the achievement of 
common aims” (Hertogen 2015, 912). As Judge Shahabuddeen has noted in 
his dissent in the Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion: “It is difficult (. . .) to 
uphold a proposition that, absent a prohibition, a State has a right in law to 
act in ways which could deprive the sovereignty of all other States of mean-
ing” (Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen, 1996 I.C.J. Rep. 226, 393–394).
State Practice Is Not Uniform
With regard to state practice, it is certainly true that so far only a small num-
ber of states have publicly presented their understanding of the application 
of sovereignty to cyberspace. Declarations such as the speech given by the 
UK attorney general help to identify and clarify the content of international 
norms applicable to cyberspace and may, in time, be of sufficient number 
and uniformity to restrict the application of a rule of territorial sovereignty 
to cyberspace along the lines advocated by Attorney General Wright and 
some American authors (Schmitt 2018, 18). However, in the author’s view, 
the current state practice on this topic is not uniform and may even point to a 
majority position contrary to the attorney general’s. For instance, in a speech 
held at Chatham House London on May 18, 2015, the then commissioner 
for International Cyber Policy of the German Foreign Office, Ambassador 
Norbert Riedel, stated that “There is consensus that State sovereignty and 
international norms and principles that flow from sovereignty apply to State 
conduct of activities related to information and communication technology, 
and to their jurisdiction over the required infrastructure within their territory.” 
While cyberattacks which amount to a use of force or even an armed attack 
are prohibited by the UN Charter and customary international law, “[e]ven 
in cases where one cannot speak of a use of force, the use of cyber capabili-
ties might constitute a violation of sovereignty, if the attack can be attributed 
to a state” (Riedel 2015). The argument that territorial sovereignty applies 
in cyberspace is even more forcefully put forward by France. The French 
“Strategic Review of Cyberdefence” (Revue stratégique de cyberéfense) 
of February 12, 2018 offers the view that cyber incidents of a significant, 
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but not extreme, impact fall below the threshold of armed attack, but may 
nevertheless constitute other internationally wrongful acts such as interven-
tion, violation of sovereignty or use of force (“les actions correspondant à 
ces niveaux pourraient néanmoins constituer d’autres faits internationaux 
illicites [intervention, violation de la souveraineté, usage de la force, etc.])” 
(Secrétariat général de la défense et de la sécurité nationale 2018, 80). This 
view is elaborated upon in the declaration on “International Law Applicable 
to Operations in Cyberspace” (Droit international appliqué aux opérations 
dans le cyberespace”), published by the Ministry of Defence on 9 Septem-
ber 2019. The document argues that since France has sovereignty over ICT 
systems located within its territory, any cyberattack—defined as an operation 
which breaches the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the targeted 
system—constitutes at minimum a violation of sovereignty, if attributable to 
another state. Such a violation occurs not only when effects are produced on 
French territory, but already when there is a penetration of French computer 
systems (Ministère des Armées 2019, 6–7).
Similarly, the GGE consensus reports clearly conclude that states have 
jurisdiction over ICT infrastructure located within their territory (United 
Nations General Assembly 2015, akap. 28[a]). States regularly assert 
jurisdiction, both civil and criminal, over activities within their cyber infra-
structure. For example, on July 13, 2018, the US Special Counsel filed an 
indictment of twelve Russian intelligence officers alleged to have hacked the 
servers of the Democratic National Committee and thus to have committed 
computer-related offenses within the United States (United States vs. Netyk-
sho et al., US District Court for the District of Columbia, Case No. 1:18-cr-
00215-ABJ, filed July 13, 2018). It is thus clear that states treat activities 
within their cyber infrastructure as falling into the territorial confines of their 
sovereignty (some states even speak of “national cyberspace,” e.g., the Pol-
ish cybersecurity strategy “Polityka Ochrony Cyberprzestrzeni Rzeczpospo-
litej Polskiej” [Ministerstwo Administracji i Cyfryzacji 2013]), even though 
some states may deny the existence of a rule of territorial sovereignty. In the 
author’s view, it follows from sovereignty over ICT devices that sovereign 
activities conducted within the cyber infrastructure located on the territory of 
other states violate their territorial sovereignty if they constitute an exercise 
of power without the consent of the affected state.
In summary, it may very well be that the rule of territorial sovereignty in 
cyberspace will have to adapt for the (perceived) aterritoriality of the logical 
and social layers of cyberspace, the loss of distance typical for geographical 
territory and the ease of access this structural characteristic of cyberspace 
presents to malicious cyber actors. The practical necessity of defending 
against threats originating from multiple locations and using cyber infra-
structure located in various states, coupled with the currently slow process of 
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international legal assistance and the disinterest or inability of many states to 
actively counter malicious activity emanating from their cyber infrastructure, 
may require an adjustment of the international legal regime to allow for a 
greater degree of self-help (although, as the Tallinn Manual points out, legal 
remedies in the form of countermeasures and the doctrine of necessity are 
available [Schmitt and Vihul 2017c, 111–141]). But, as the law currently 
stands, the baseline rule of territorial sovereignty, as recognized by the ICJ 
in Corfu Channel and Nicaragua, still applies. States arguing for its nonex-
istence would have to demonstrate on the basis of universal state practice 
and opinio iuris the emergence of an exception to territorial sovereignty in 
cyberspace, not the other way around.
VIOLATIONS OF TERRITORIAL SOVEREIGNTY 
UNDER THE TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 RULE 4
Assuming that territorial sovereignty exists as a rule of international law and 
further assuming that this rule is applicable to state conduct in cyberspace, the 
next question is to ascertain the precise content of this rule. So far, the most 
elaborate attempt to formulate a test for the violation of territorial sovereignty 
in cyberspace has been offered by the authors of the Tallinn Manual 2.0 in 
Rule 4 (Schmitt and Vihul 2017c, 17). The Tallinn Manual 2.0 stipulates 
that the lawfulness of remote cyber operations that manifest on a state’s ter-
ritory depend on the “degree of infringement upon the target State’s territo-
rial integrity” and/or on the “interference with or usurpation of inherently 
governmental functions” (Schmitt and Vihul 2017c, 20). With regard to the 
infringement upon territorial integrity, the Manual’s authors stipulate that 
cyber operations, which result in physical damage, show a sufficient degree 
of infringement to constitute a violation of territorial sovereignty. Further-
more, the experts argue that a loss of functionality of the targeted system 
may constitute a violation of sovereignty, if it reaches a certain threshold. 
The precise threshold could not be established, but the experts agreed that 
cyber operations resulting in the requirement to replace and repair computer 
systems or their components are sufficiently akin to physical damage to con-
stitute a violation of sovereignty (Schmitt and Vihul 2017c, 21). There was 
no consensus among the experts as to whether cyber operations falling below 
the threshold of loss of functionality violate territorial sovereignty; therefore, 
the Tallinn Manual 2.0 does not take a position on this issue.
The Tallinn Manual’s approach to territorial sovereignty is thus largely 
effects-based. The Tallinn Manual itself does not explain how the authors 
arrived at the abovementioned set of factors to determine the existence of 
a violation of sovereignty. It appears that these factors are derived from a 
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particular interpretation of the object and purpose of sovereignty: since the 
physical damage of targeted computer systems and the loss of functionality 
requiring repair and replacement lead to similar effects as unconsented physi-
cal presence, they, therefore, infringe sovereignty, which “clearly protects 
territorial integrity against physical violation” (Schmitt and Vihul 2017c, 
20). Furthermore, the Manual takes into account the traditional aspect of 
sovereignty of regulating access to territory (c.f. Vilvarajah and others v UK, 
ECtHR, Ser. A, 215, October 30, 1991) and concludes that territorial sov-
ereignty is violated if a state conducts cyber operations when its agents are 
physically present in the target state (Schmitt and Vihul 2017c, 19). Virtual 
presence through remote-access cyber operations, on the other hand, seems 
not to be sufficient to violate territorial sovereignty.
In the author’s view, this approach overemphasizes physical effects on ter-
ritory, while omitting a crucial aspect of sovereignty, namely the exercise of 
state power. Moreover, the emphasis on the physical effects of a cyber opera-
tion does not sufficiently take into account the technical side of most cyber 
operations, thus leading to difficulties in the precise determination when a 
violation of territorial sovereignty occurs or is ongoing.
Regarding the first point, the Tallinn Manual 2.0 seems to consider the 
main object and purpose of sovereignty to be “the protection of territorial 
integrity against physical violation” (Schmitt and Vihul 2017c, 20). How-
ever, as discussed above, the regulation of access to territory is but one of the 
aspects of internal sovereignty. Furthermore, the main aim of this exclusive 
right of the state is not to protect its territory from physical effects—after all, 
unconsented overflights or transboundary abductions, which are regarded as 
violations of territorial sovereignty (Wilske 2012), do not usually cause dam-
age or lasting physical effects on the territory of the affected state. Rather, 
the object and purpose of the rule of territorial sovereignty is to be seen in 
the protection of the exclusivity of state authority within its territory. As held 
by the PCIJ in the S.S.Lotus: “failing the existence of a permissive rule to the 
contrary [a State] may not exercise its power in any form in the territory of 
another State” (S.S. Lotus [Fr. v. Turk.], Judgement, 1927 P.C.I.J. Ser. A No. 
10, pp. 4, 18–19). While in a globalized world, and especially in cyberspace, 
actions undertaken by one state may very well have a substantial effect on 
the (cyber) territory of other states, this effect has to be tolerated by virtue of 
the principle of sovereign equality only insofar as it is a consequence of the 
exercise of the acting state’s internal sovereignty. Conversely, the exercise 
of state power within the territory of another state violates the target state’s 
exclusive authority and thus its territorial sovereignty. Admittedly, one has to 
be careful with territorial analogies with regard to cyberspace, as the medium 
has different characteristics. Nevertheless, every action taken through 
cyberspace manifests itself on cyber infrastructure located within a specific 
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territory. As the UN GGE noted in its two reports, states have jurisdiction 
over the ICT infrastructure located within their territory (United Nations 
General Assembly 2015, akap. 28[a]) and they do assert their jurisdiction 
over actions performed by individuals as well as agents of other states. If 
the agents of a state perform cyber operations within the cyber infrastructure 
of another state in ways other than the intended use of said cyber infrastruc-
ture, that is, by violating the information security of computer systems, they 
exercise state power vis-à-vis cyber infrastructure under the jurisdiction of 
another state. Thereby they actively change the functioning of computer sys-
tems within the sphere of authority of another state and thus exercise a power 
which, by virtue of the principle of sovereignty, should remain exclusively 
with that state.
Secondly, if the violation of territorial integrity depended on the manifesta-
tion of physical effects, states would not have a legal remedy against cyber 
operations which are in their preparatory stages or ongoing. Looking at the 
technical side of cyber operations, one sees that conducting offensive cyber 
operations requires several preparatory steps: identifying a target, choosing 
the appropriate attack vector, bypassing the security of the attacked computer 
system and finally conducting the intended activity. There are many analyti-
cal models describing the various steps of a cyberoperation and its effects 
(Smeets 2017, 30; CCHS 2016, 5; Ducheine 2015, 230), but one of the most 
common models—the so-called Cyber Kill Chain, developed by employees 
of the Lockheed Martin Corporation—divides cyber operations into seven 
phases: Reconnnaisance, Weaponization, Delivery, Exploitation, Installa-
tion, Command and Control and Action on objective (Hutchins, Cloppert and 
Amin 2011, 5). During the reconnaissance phase, the attacker identifies and 
selects potential targets. Information about the target can be collected from 
many sources: from open-source intelligence through secret intelligence 
sources, to the scanning of computer systems (for a detailed description see 
Maybaum 2013, 217–219). After identifying the proper target and its vulner-
abilities, the attackers can gain access to the targeted system (delivery and 
exploitation phases). This can happen remotely (in so-called remote-access 
cyber operations, e.g., by sending an infected message to the victim’s mail-
box) or directly (in so-called close-access cyber operations, e.g., by install-
ing malicious software directly on the target system by the agent, vendor) 
(Owens and ors. 2009, 87). Most often, malicious code installed after gaining 
access does not yet contain the proper harmful payload but is used for self-
replication and “raising the drawbridge” through which the system will be 
accessed and further payloads will be installed. In many cases, the installed 
code is a so-called Remote Access Tool (RAT), which makes contact with 
the command and control server and waits for further commands from the 
attackers (Maybaum 2013, 122).
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The activities described above are preparatory phases of a cyber operation. 
The further course depends on the intentions and decisions of the attacker. If 
the purpose of the operation is to obtain confidential information, the payload 
will contain code for searching information, tracking the user’s computer 
communication, activating the camera and microphone, and so on. If the pur-
pose is to destroy data or impact on machines and processes controlled by a 
given computer system, the payload will contain appropriate mechanisms. To 
this end, many RATs allow the installation of additional modules, depending 
on the operator’s current needs. It should be noted that the nature of a cyber 
operation is not obvious at the time the information security of the infected 
system is first compromised. It is only the content of the payload that deter-
mines whether it is intended for espionage or for specific damage. In the case 
of most cyber operations, the determination of their character is possible only 
after technical analysis of the payload, which requires technical expertise, 
adequate resources and time (the technical analysis of Stuxnet took several 
months after its initial discovery [Falliere, Murchu, and Chien 2011]). Never-
theless, the initial illegal access to the targeted computer system, irrespective 
of the subsequent actions, already constitutes a criminal offense against the 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of computer data and systems under 
the domestic law of many states, as required by Art. 2 of the 2001 Cybercrime 
Convention (Convention on Cybercrime, Budapest, 23.11.2001, E.T.S. No. 
185).
The outline of a typical cyber operation above is obviously very simpli-
fied. However, three conclusions can be drawn: first, actors conducting cyber 
operations use previously identified vulnerabilities to gain access to computer 
systems without authorization, thus breaching the information security of the 
targeted systems. Second, the unauthorized intrusion into computer systems 
constitutes a breach of their information security and thereby a criminal 
offense. Third, the intended effect of a cyber operation is ascertainable either 
after the prior detection and technical analysis of the payload, or after the 
activation of the payload and the materialization of its effects. If the violation 
of territorial sovereignty were to depend exclusively on the physical effects 
of a cyber operation (either through physical damage or a significant loss of 
functionality), the intrusion into a computer system and the compromising of 
its information security would not yet constitute a violation of sovereignty 
(although in most cases it would already constitute a criminal offense under 
the domestic law of the targeted state). Under the so-called Lotus doctrine, 
which presumes a state’s freedom of action unless a prohibitive norm has 
been created through state consent (Kwiecień 2012, 48), this freedom to 
act would in effect create a freedom to install malware on foreign computer 
systems. Although the targeted state would still be free to sanction violations 
of information security under its domestic law, it would be powerless to 
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prevent this under international law, as countermeasures and the obligation of 
cessation depend on the existence of an internationally wrongful act (United 
Nations International Law Commission 2001). In consequence, the interna-
tional legal order would be put in a situation where, based on its external 
sovereignty, a state would be free to exercise its power through cyber opera-
tions, affecting the information security of computer infrastructure in other 
states, and to allow its agents to commit criminal offenses, while the targeted 
states would have no legal redress to enforce the exclusivity of their author-
ity within their territory. To quote Judge Shahabuddeen again: “It is difficult 
(. . .) to uphold a proposition that, absent a prohibition, a State has a right 
in law to act in ways which could deprive the sovereignty of all other States 
of meaning” (Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory 
Opinion, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen, 1996 I.C.J. Rep. 226, 
393–394).
AN INTRUSION-BASED APPROACH TO 
VIOLATIONS OF TERRITORIAL SOVEREIGNTY
Given this unsatisfactory state of events, what could an alternative approach 
to violations of territorial sovereignty look like? The author proposes to start 
from what the rule of territorial sovereignty seeks to prohibit: the unauthor-
ized exercise of state power in the territory of another state, as exemplified 
in the Lotus judgment (S.S. Lotus [Fr. v. Turk.], Judgement, 1927 P.C.I.J. 
Ser. A No. 10, pp. 4, 18–19). It is clear from this and other judgments such 
as Corfu Channel, as well as state practice, that the exercise of state power is 
not measured by the effects of one state’s actions on the territory of another 
state, but rather by the nature of the action itself. Any activity of a sovereign 
(i.e., noncommercial) nature taken within or against another state’s territory 
without that state’s consent or a legal basis in international law constitutes an 
unauthorized exercise of state power and thus a violation of territorial sover-
eignty. This is why United Kingdom’s demining operation in Albanian ter-
ritorial waters (see Corfu Channel [U.K. v. Alb.], Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 
4, 35), the US training and financing of Contra rebels in Nicaragua (Military 
and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua [Nicar. v. U.S.], Judg-
ment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, para. 251) or the abduction of a person from the 
territory of a state by the agents of another state (Ghafur Hamid 2004, 79) 
constitute such violations.
It is furthermore clear that while cyberspace undoubtedly has other proper-
ties than physical space, it is by no means aterritorial, as has been claimed 
in the 1990s (Johnson and Post 1996). It is true that data mobility and inter-
connectedness pose a challenge to strictly territorial notions of jurisdiction 
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requiring a reconceptualization or a new approach (Daskal 2015; Roguski 
2019), but this challenge does not invalidate the strict link between geog-
raphy and sovereignty in cyberspace (but compare Corn and Jensen 2018). 
This is because actions taken against specific computers or networks, even 
if undertaken remotely, ultimately manifest themselves in the territory of 
the state where the physical infrastructure is located. For this reason, states 
continue to assert jurisdiction over the physical components of cyberspace 
(United Nations General Assembly 2015) and apply their national (criminal) 
law to actions taken against these components, irrespective of the loca-
tion of the perpetrators (U.S. District Court, ND California, U.S. v. Dmitry 
Dokuchaev, et al., Case 3:17-cr-00103-VC).
Established notions of international law and current state practice, 
therefore, suggest that states can (and do) assert exclusive authority over 
computers and networks physically located within their territory and, in 
consequence, any exercise of power by other states in those networks, 
irrespective of its physical effects, would violate the territorial integrity 
of that state. What, then, should be the test for establishing the exercise of 
state power through cyberspace within the territory of another state? Rather 
than to focus on the physical effects of cyber operations, the present author 
proposes to focus instead on the technical aspects of a cyber operation. As 
has been shown above, the essence of every cyber operation is the act of 
“hacking,” or—to use a definition well established in the technical (and 
legal) community, the breach of the information security of a computer sys-
tem through an action compromising either the confidentiality, integrity, 
or availability of the information stored in the computer system (Kosseff 
2018). This so-called CIA Triad, although not a legal definition, is well 
established in the realm of cybersecurity and is used by some states—Ger-
many and Austria, for example—to define a cyberattack in their national 
cyber strategies (Bundeskanzleramt Österreich 2013, Bundesministerium 
des Inneren 2016). Moreover, under the Cybercrime Convention (Conven-
tion on Cybercrime, 23.11.2001, E.T.S. No. 185) states parties are obliged 
to penalize offenses against the confidentiality, integrity, and availability 
of computer data and systems (Convention on Cybercrime Articles 2–8). 
In particular, the Cybercrime Convention obliges states parties to crimi-
nalize illegal access to computer systems, data and system interference, 
computer-related fraud and so on. Most states parties have implemented 
these provisions into their national law or have similar provisions. The 
United States, for instance, have penalized computer crime, including 
computer intrusions, denial-of-service attacks, and viruses (Doyle 2014; 
US Department of Justice—Computer Crime and Intellectual Property 
Section 2010) through the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (codified in 18 
U.S. Code 1030).
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Since computer crimes and state cyberattacks share the same techni-
cal characteristics and the forensic analysis of both types of attacks is the 
same—the difference lying only in the attribution of the action constituting 
a computer crime to a state actor, thus subjecting it to international rather 
than (only) national law—the present author proposes to use the criterion 
of computer intrusion or interference to assess the moment state power is 
exercised in the territory (cyber infrastructure) of another state. This means 
that whenever a foreign state damages, deletes, deteriorates, alters, or sup-
presses data stored on a computer system within the territory of another state 
(compare Art. 4 Cybercrime Convention), this action would be regarded as 
an exercise of state power and thus a violation of the territorial sovereignty 
of the targeted state.
The criterion of “intrusion,” closely related to the integrity of data stored 
on a computer system, does not encompass every action of a state in foreign 
networks. For instance, intrusion does not mean the regular use of cyberspace 
infrastructure for their intended purposes, as no damage to or alteration of 
data is being done in this process. This is true even for actions undertaken 
with malicious intent, such as port scanning for the purposes of reconnais-
sance and preparation of a cyberattack in the future. Since the scanning of 
ports is possible without interference with data stored in a network due to the 
technical design and functioning of global networks such as the Internet and 
states allow the use of their ICT infrastructure for the purposes of informa-
tion transfer, regular usage, even including the routing of cyber operations 
through foreign infrastructure, would therefore not violate territorial sover-
eignty. Similarly, even gaining access to a computer network without proper 
authorization (i.e., breaching the confidentiality of a computer system or net-
work, for instance through phishing) would not constitute an intrusion under 
the proposed test as the integrity of data stored within the system would not 
be compromised. The present author submits that the focus on the integrity 
(rather than its confidentiality or availability) of a computer system or data 
stored therein is justified, as it is the interference with the functioning of a 
computer system in the territory of another state—for example, the deletion 
or alteration of data, the implantation of malware, remote access tools, the use 
of the computer system to cause effects on systems or processes controlled by 
that computer.—which bears the closest resemblance to the exercise of state 
power in the traditional sense.
The proposed intrusion-based approach would have several advantages 
over the no-sovereignty approach advocated by the UK attorney general 
(Wright 2018) or the effects-based approach proposed by the Tallinn Man-
ual 2.0 (Schmitt and Vihul 2017c). First, with respect to the sovereignty-
as-a-principle view, it respects established international jurisprudence and 
international law, which is, in the view of the present author, unequivocal 
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in this point. Secondly, with respect to the Tallinn Manual 2.0 approach, 
focusing on a technical, rather than an effects-based criterion, has the 
advantage of forensic clarity and predictability, thus enhancing legal 
certainty. Whereas a successful hacking operation may not produce any 
physical effects at all or these effects may not manifest for some time, under 
the intrusion-based approach it is the hacking itself which constitutes the 
violation of sovereignty. The affected state would thus not have to wait for 
physical effects to emerge—or to be severe enough—to be legally entitled 
to enact countermeasures. Thirdly, the close resemblance of the intrusion 
criterion to the legal framework regulating computer crimes would allow 
states to rely on technical expertise and procedures established by law 
enforcement. In other words—the terrain would be more familiar. And 
lastly, treating computer intrusions as violations of sovereignty would truly 
establish territorial sovereignty as the “baseline” norm (Watts and Richard 
2018) in cyberspace, thus creating a predictable framework of primary 
norms and norms-imposing consequences for their breach (such as counter-
measures) and could therefore enhance the stability of cyberspace through 
clear legal principles.
The approach proposed in this chapter has recently gained prominent sup-
port in the form of the French declaration on “International Law Applicable 
to Operations in Cyberspace,” which has been published after the submission 
date of this article and thus can only be briefly referred to. In this document, 
France argues that a violation of sovereignty may already exist when there is 
a penetration of computer systems under the sovereignty of France (Ministère 
des Armées 2019, 6–7). Given that a penetration occurs when there is a 
breach of the information security, that is, the confidentiality, integrity, or 
availability, of the targeted system, it is similar to the criterion of intrusion 
proposed in this article.
CONCLUSION
This chapter argued that territorial sovereignty, which as a primary norm of 
international law is also applicable to state conduct in cyberspace, requires 
a clear and operable criterion in order to provide a clear and predictable 
framework for states to operate in. Rather than concentrating on the physical 
effects of cyber operations, it is proposed that an intrusion-based approach, 
which concentrates on the technical side of cyber operations, would provide 
a familiar, less ambiguous and more viable tool for assessing violations 
of sovereignty in cyberspace. The criterion of intrusion conforms to the 
essence of territorial sovereignty, which is the regulation of access to terri-
tory and the preservation of exclusivity of state power within its territory. It 
81Violations of Territorial Sovereignty in Cyberspace
is independent of the intent of the attacking state and the consequences of 
its actions and relies on a verifiable technical criterion to ascertain whether 
a violation of territorial sovereignty has taken place. Furthermore, if the 
internationally wrongful act of violating the territorial sovereignty of a state 
in cyberspace were to depend on the intrusion into the targeted computer 
system, rather than on the effects of that intrusion, the targeted state would 
have legal redress in the form of a right to demand cessation and to institute 
countermeasures before the harmful effects of the cyber operation material-
ize, rather than after. In conclusion, an intrusion-based approach to territorial 
sovereignty would more clearly reflect the object and purpose of sovereignty, 
allow states to counter malicious activities before their effects are manifested 
and would more clearly correspond to the technical side of cyber operations. 
Although the interpretation of international law in cyberspace has solidified 
with respect to many norms, for example, the use of force, only a fraction 
of states has thus far set out their views on the application of territorial sov-
ereignty in cyberspace. New ideas can—and should—be explored and dis-
cussed. The new Group of Governmental Experts as well as the Open-Ended 
Working Group, which have been established in 2019 to further explore the 
interpretation and application of international law in cyberspace, would be 
good fora for such discussions.
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The standard analytical narratives regarding Russia’s behavior in global 
diplomacy, today, revolve around great power aspirations, revisionist power 
games, and a threat to liberal democracy as we know it. The Russian dis-
course can also, however, be parsed with reference to resentment, result-
ing from the sense of “being betrayed” by the West (Kurowska 2014), or 
to anger over apparent disrespect received from other international actors 
(Larson and Shevchenko 2014). Demand for status recognition is a key fac-
tor in Russia’s international conduct (Krickovic and Weber 2018; Schmitt 
forthcoming; Neumann 2016, 1996), which finds its expression in Russia’s 
regular insistence on acknowledging its indispensability to the international 
order (Lo 2015, 47). Despite declarations of pragmatism in foreign policy 
(Omelicheva 2016; Casier 2006), this status-related rationale often over-
shadows what would appear more rational courses of action. Demands for 
recognition may also result in embarrassment. One vivid example of the 
latter involved the emotional outburst by the acting Russian representative 
to the UN, Vladimir Safronkov, toward the UK representative during a 
Security Council session in April 2017: famously, “Look at me!” and “Don’t 
you dare insult Russia again!” (RFE 2017). Many looked away mortified, 
but Safronkov’s superiors in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs commended 
his behavior, as part of resistance toward Western attempts at hegemonic 
imposition (Schreck 2017).
The current tit-for-tat clashes over models of global Internet gover-
nance, which effectively reinstate Russia to the highest echelons of inter-
national interactions, are redolent of the Cold War diplomatic ritual that 
Russia enjoys. It matters, once again, what Russia says. There is a timely 
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narrative in this strategic communication, backed by effective diplomatic 
outreach, which is by no means “cheap talk.” The contestation over global 
Internet governance both manifests and indicates the emerging contours of 
a new international order. Examining Russia’s priorities in this struggle is 
not easy, however, due to radical political polarization but also a certain 
“confusion-of-tongues.” In cyber diplomacy, or in international informa-
tion security (as is the preferred term in the Russian discourse), actors 
use identical or similar terminology, but such terminology derives from 
different imaginaries about the international order, and, arguably, differ-
ent imaginaries about the good life.2 The place of the individual in inter-
national society remains the bone of contention across these ideational 
frameworks. It will inform, implicitly and explicitly, the normative stakes 
in global governance of the Internet for years to come, including with 
regard to technology-related questions.
This chapter brings these issues to sharp relief, contributing to a better-
informed debate. In its substantive introduction, it lays out the basics of the 
current framing of Russia’s cyber narrative. It then explains the priorities of 
Russian cyber diplomacy with reference to Russia’s self-perceived standing 
and responsibility in maintaining peace and security. Crucial to grasping 
this position is understanding the conception of international law that Russia 
applies in cyberspace, how this ties back to its doctrine of multipolarity, and 
the peculiar interpretation of multilateralism that comes along with this. Fur-
ther, the chapter unpacks a core trope in Russia’s strategic diplomatic com-
munication more broadly: that is, the notion of “democratizing” international 
relations. This is a self-serving rhetorical trope, readily dismissed by the 
West as nonsense. But it is not without the potential to subvert the Western 
normative dominance in global Internet governance. This rhetoric appeals 
to genuine grievances over the existing inequalities in international society 
and capitalizes on the West’s own subversion and betrayal of the liberal 
ethos. Russia’s strategy to advance its “democratization” agenda resembles 
“trickstery” (Kurowska and Reshetnikov 2018b): It is a mixture of a spoiler’s 
tactic of sowing confusion, along with a sombre discourse of responsibility 
for international security.
The last two parts of this chapter look more closely at, first, the doctrine 
of information security, which is fundamental for grasping Russia’s cyber 
conduct at the juncture of its domestic and foreign policy, and, second, the 
regional effort to codify this doctrine, which is incrementally being uploaded 
globally. The chapter concludes with the suggestion that Russia’s posturing 
in cyber diplomacy is not a security threat as such but a “normative threat” 
(Creppell 2011) to the liberal way of life. As such, it is a manifestation of an 
ideological struggle that liberal cyber-norms entrepreneurs cannot afford to 
simply disparage or ignore. An analysis of exactly what is being contested 
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can help to reform their effort. The rather urgent political question, in this 
context, involves how to smartly counteract being cast as a villain by Russia’s 
narrative about the post-liberal world. In other words, the question concerns 
how to offer an appealing and inclusive alternative.
“2018—RECLAIMING THE DEBATE”
The adoption of two competing resolutions regarding global governance 
of the Internet in 2018, the U.S.-sponsored reaffirmation of UN Group of 
Governmental Experts (UN GGE) (General Assembly 2018a) and the Russia-
sponsored launching of the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) (General 
Assembly 2018c), marks the final breakdown of international consensus on 
the issue.3 In Russia’s cyber narrative, it is, however, taken as a positive 
breakthrough, fortuitously overlapping with the twenty-year anniversary of 
1998 when Moscow tabled its first draft resolution on Information and Com-
munication Technology in the General Assembly’s First Committee on Dis-
armament and International Security (Kommersant 2018, 6). In 2018, Russia 
in fact successfully sponsored two resolutions, the abovementioned one 
launching OEWG and another, adopted in the Third Committee of the Gen-
eral Assembly on cybercrime (General Assembly 2018b), both framed as a 
significant way forward instigated by Russia’s cyber diplomacy (Chernukhin 
2019). They are portrayed as a return to the original purpose of the UN track 
on International Information Security, as initiated by Russia in 1998, which 
is to create accountability in the fundamentally “ungovernable” cyberspace. 
The OEWG resolution sets thirteen rules, norms, and principles (in compari-
son with the eleven laid out in the U.S.-sponsored resolution) of responsible 
state behavior that are the first “rules of the road” in history with regard to this 
issue —despite them formally being “recommendations for considerations by 
States” (Ibid.). Specifically, the resolution includes a re-assertion of cultural 
diversity, enshrined in the UN Charter, in global Internet governance. The 
launch of OEWG is presented as ushering in a genuine democratization of 
global Internet governance and a potential space where negotiations over an 
international cyber treaty can be launched.
The aim of the resolution on cybercrime was, in turn, to launch a separate 
track on the matter in the UN, as an alternative to the Budapest Convention 
on Cybercrime. Drawn up by the Council of Europe in 2001 to foster inter-
national cooperation in cybercrime matters and promoted by the group of 
the “like-minded,” the Budapest convention is opposed by Russia and others 
due to its paragraph 32b, which allows for transborder access to data during 
cybercrime investigations by the intelligence services. Russia’s advocacy for 
a cybercrime treaty within the UN, recently bolstered by a new resolution 
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adopted in the Third Committee, is portrayed as part of the attempt to extend 
the control of the state over the Internet and curtail the political rights of the 
individual (Nakashima 2019). This is, in broad terms, the crux of “the like-
minded” position. Russia, similar to some other non-Western actors, charges 
the West with maintaining digital inequality and infringement of sovereignty 
in the pursuit of upholding the liberal world order. The remainder of the 
chapter unpacks the Russian perspective on the current state of “unpeace” 
(Kello 2017, 78) that thus unfolds in cyberspace and the tasks that the Russian 
diplomacy sets for itself in this regard.
PRIORITIES OF RUSSIA’S CYBER DIPLOMACY
The short answer to what Russia wants in and through cyber diplomacy is 
twofold. First, cyberspace promises Russia respect (уважение/uvazheniye), 
not only at the well-cultivated regional level, but, potentially, globally. It 
affords status recognition that Russia lost and craved to regain since the 
unsuccessful attempt to integrate into the liberal world order in the early 
1990s. Status thirst is, however, difficult to engage with in politics. It is a 
moving target and the approaches of Western countries are likely to “fall 
below Moscow’s expectations to be treated as it feels it deserves” (Schmitt 
forthcoming, 20). Second, the long-standing priority of Russia’s cyber diplo-
macy is “to create conditions [emphasis mine] for promoting internationally 
the Russian initiative to develop and adopt a Convention of International 
Information Security by United Nations Member States” (Security Council 
2013). The lex specialis for the cyber domain may not yet be realistic, in other 
words, but Russia is working to prepare the ground for it.
“The like-minded” tend to justify their objection to an international cyber 
treaty by reference to the consensus that existing international law applies 
in cyberspace, which, supported by the norms of responsible state behavior, 
is sufficient to defend “the rules-based international order” in cyberspace. 
Negotiations over a new binding instrument would, in this context, only 
divert efforts from implementing what is already agreed upon; they would 
draw the world into an unnecessary, lengthy, and divisive struggle, and, as 
emphasized particularly in US discourse, hinder technological development 
(Rõigas 2015). Russia’s advocacy for the treaty relies on the claim to defend 
the international order in its classic version where binding legal instruments 
are a traditional form of regulation. An international cyber treaty is also 
portrayed as a means to curb the liberal international order which legitimizes 
intervention into the domestic makeup of states, and thus a tool against the ad 
hoc decisions by the strong.
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The notion of “the rules-based international order”4 is particularly con-
tested, in this respect, as a replacement for, rather than a continuation of, 
an international law-based order. The idea is vehemently attacked in Rus-
sian diplomacy as an attempt to “usurp the decision-making process on key 
issues” by “[replacing] the universally agreed international legal instruments 
and mechanisms with narrow formats, where alternative, non-consensual 
methods for resolving various international problems are developed in cir-
cumvention of a legitimate multilateral framework” (Lavrov 2019). Such 
rhetoric, as the chapter lays out below in more detail, is self-serving; how-
ever, it is short-sighted of the West to disregard it. The concern with repre-
sentativeness, and the instrumentalization of such a concern for both tactical 
and strategic gains, increasingly inform political positions in the global 
governance of Internet.
Finally, Russia’s advocacy of an international cyber treaty has another 
snappy line: International law applies in cyberspace but even experts do 
not know how, and there is a reason for it. The very term “responsible 
state behavior in cyberspace” is, in the Russian interpretation, not clear. 
International procedural law, as a set of principles and norms governing 
the exercise of the rights and obligations of subjects of international law, 
is seen as being not adapted to the regulation of international relations in 
the field of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) (Strel’tsov, 
Sharyapov, and Yashchenko 2016, 6, para. 1.7.). The use of international 
customs and general principles of law is, further, unpromising in this area 
given the lack of a common understanding of some objects of legal regula-
tion; for example, the use of ICT as a means of warfare (Ibid). This almost 
sacrosanct portrayal of international law has been part of Russia’s foreign 
policy for two decades. After the 1999 NATO operation in Kosovo, which 
Russia contested passionately, the then Minister for Foreign Affairs, Igor 
Ivanov formulated what became a default Russian position: the objection 
to changing “basic principles of international law” in order to replace them 
with the doctrines of “limited sovereignty” (Igor Ivanov cited in, Averre 
2009, 586).
This sacrosanct understanding of international law as above politics has 
been interrogated in the Western doctrine of international law as a political 
move in itself (Klabbers 2004; Koskenniemi 2011). Despite its claim to neu-
trality and impartiality, international law is part of the way political power 
is used, critiqued, and sometimes limited. The Russian initiative to create 
conditions conducive to negotiating an international cyber treaty needs to 
be seen in this light: It is part of the process of imposing a particular vision 
of international relations, in the process critiquing and possibly limiting the 
power of Western liberal states, above all the United States.
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RUSSIA’S COMEBACK AS “A 
RESPONSIBLE CYBER POWER”
The promotion of a dedicated and legally binding instrument in cyberspace 
belongs to Russia’s twofold strategy. On the one hand, Russia engages in 
intense “securitization”5 of cyberspace: It invests in portraying everything 
“cyber,” or digital, as a grave security threat (see below). On the other, it 
takes up the role of a responsible great power which can be relied upon to 
counter this threat. Russia thus acts simultaneously as spoiler and savior. This 
position yields distinct rewards: It provides discursive resources for Russia 
to frame itself as a concerned, influential, and capable cyber leader for the 
non-Western, or post-liberal world. Thus, Russia returns to the global game 
of international order.
The analogy with the new “Cuban missile crisis,” conjured up by Andrey 
Krutskikh, Director of the Department of International Information Security 
in Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Andrey Krutskikh cited in, Kom-
mersant 2019b) is an example of the securitizing discourse about the world 
at the brink of a cyber catastrophe. Russia substantively likens the hazards 
of nuclear weapons and digitalization because of the technological implica-
tions of the scale of threat and interlinkages between them (Sharikov 2018a). 
The very initiation of the cyber debate in the context of international security 
within the UN First Committee on Disarmament was justified in terms of 
the dangers of “information weapons” (the term now formally withdrawn 
but hardly forgotten) and modeled on the nuclear nonproliferation regime. 
Russia hoped to emulate the parameters of the nuclear regime for informa-
tion security in cyberspace to mediate Western superiority in that domain 
(cf. Chernenko 2018). Cyber debates predictably proliferated across the UN 
landscape to include all domains of international relations. But the security 
tone that Russia set back in the late 1990s remains dominant.
The image of the new Cuban crisis has a wider appeal, however. It 
 excavates the frame of the Cold War Soviet–US relationship as ruling the 
world, and of the international order as it was fixed in 1945 by the victorious 
allies, with the caveat that China has risen in the meantime. This is a rein-
vigorating turn for Russia’s long-frustrated aspiration to regain (even sym-
bolically) parity with the West and the image of an imminent disaster is well 
exploited. As the current mantra of Russian diplomats goes: “[U]nlike the 
US, Russia, as a responsible [emphasis mine] State, is not interested in new 
missile crises,” but it has the obligation to mitigate US “destructive actions” 
in global politics (Vladimir Yermakov cited in, Permanent Mission 2019b, 2). 
An impoverished country with tangibly little to mold the world affairs, but 
with a reputation in need of restoring, Russia can only gain from revamping 
its international role by becoming “a responsible cyber power” (cf. Nocetti 
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2018). The role gives a shiny and topical veneer to an anachronistic under-
standing of the international order, reasserting Russia’s special responsibility 
as the permanent member of the UN Security Council for shaping global 
cooperation and maintaining peace and security. The distinct advantage of 
the cyber domain is that it is highly “actionable.” Nuclear weapons are, 
ultimately, not to be used; the international community has even managed to 
create a taboo over such potential use (Tannenwald 1999). By contrast, cyber-
space means of disruption and interference may be, and are, in common use.
In rhetoric, Russia’s chief preoccupation is then with the militarization of 
cyberspace, which adds urgency to global Internet regulation. In practice, 
cyber diplomacy provides Russia with a global platform for uploading its 
long-cultivated regional effort to counter the liberal world order. The fre-
quency of cyberattacks and scandals, like that of the Snowden and Cambridge 
Analytica revelations, bolster Russia’s claim of cyberspace as dangerous and 
lacking proper “rules-of-the-road.” The growing populist sentiment at the 
global level further plays into the hands of the Kremlin, which has the ideo-
logical and operational resources to tap into this sentiment as a new structur-
ing force in international politics. A key discourse in this respect is Russia’s 
broad agenda of defending international law and democratizing international 
relations, read containing the US hegemony, revamped in the rhetoric of 
fighting digital inequality.
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL 
NORMS IN RUSSIA’S CYBER DIPLOMACY
There is a missing link in the debate over whether international law applies 
in cyberspace. The explicit consensus that it does, indeed, apply is marked by 
different understandings of the role of international law as such.6 The consen-
sus is, therefore, hardly a reason to celebrate. The recent recommendation that 
national governments append to UN GGE reports their explanation of how 
international law applies in cyberspace is a move toward clarification. It will 
not, however, eradicate fundamental differences in interpretation.
The Kremlin interprets international law as the body of rules and conven-
tions that govern relations between the major powers. Formally speaking, this 
reflects a procedural and pluralist understanding of international law as a par-
ticular kind of a legal system, with a commitment to legality in international 
politics as an end in itself rather than a means toward an end beyond itself 
(Collins 2019, 196). This traditional positivist notion contrasts with a model 
of international law as a way to judge, in terms of its “functional capacity to 
actually pre-empt political choices and realise agreed-upon objectives” (Ibid). 
In other words, for Moscow, international law regulates relations between 
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states of different ideological disposition, without prejudice as to such dis-
position. “The like-minded” see international law more as a means toward 
upholding a liberal consensus, in this case an open and free Internet which 
belongs to the liberal vision of international order. As a result, there are dif-
ferent models of international law that apply in cyberspace.
The core to the Russian interpretation is the preponderance of the statist 
discourse of international law, with the emphasis on the classic understanding 
of sovereignty and a categorical rejection of the notion of the individual as a 
subject of international law (Dmitry 2017). At the same time, the individual 
becomes increasingly empowered in the Western discourse on international 
law which also shifts toward transnational, rather than state-based, solutions. 
The glorification of the state in the Russian legal doctrine (Mälksoo 2015, 
100) leads to a distinct twist on the very idea of law as “speaking truth to 
power”: In the Russian rendition, the addressee of the “truth of international 
law” rather is the United States, or the “West” by extension, and not the Rus-
sian government (Ibid, 81).7 International law “à la Russe serves to restrain 
the exercise of American power” (Lo 2015, 95).
When the Russian foreign minister Lavrov repeats the mantra of the double 
standards in the application of international law (Lavrov 2016) and denounces 
“attacks on international law” (Sergey Lavrov cited in, Kommersant 2019a), it 
is this version of speaking truth to power that is being exercised. Such tirades 
may be interpreted as ludicrous and hypocritical by Western observers. It 
eludes these observers, however, that international law is often portrayed out-
side of the West as a hegemonic tool of the West. The Russian Investigative 
Committee chief Alexander Bastrykin taps into anti-hegemonic grievances 
in international society when he states that “international law and the justice 
based on it have increasingly become tools of [hybrid] war” against Moscow 
(Alexander Bastrykin cited in, Kommersant 2016, 20).
Such grievances are appealed to in Russia’s pursuit of the “democratiza-
tion” of international relations, even as the agenda serves the Russian doc-
trine of multipolarity, rather than the cause of a genuine democratization of 
decision-making in the international system. Simply put, multipolarity, or 
the polycentric world order, refers to a system in which power is distributed 
among at least three significant poles concentrating wealth and/or military 
capabilities and which are able to block or disrupt major political arrange-
ments that threaten their major interests (Kurowska 2014; Makarychev and 
Morozov 2011). A pole is also understood as an actor capable of producing 
order or generating disorder, usually a regional power with a global outreach. 
Multipolarity, therefore, means concentrating power in the hands of a few. 
When Russia speaks of a polycentric world order, it also projects a value sys-
tem that would support such order (Kagan 2008). This builds on civilizational 
diversity; that is, the notion that countries should not have the right to judge 
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each other’s domestic practices and cultures. The principle is not politically 
neutral; the pole exerts the normative, as well as political, influence. The 
principle is rather intended “to chip away at the authority of Western forms 
of order and empower regimes to dismiss liberal norms as intrusive and inap-
propriate for their culture” (Cooley 2019, 22).
Multipolarity is often conflated with multilateralism in Russian diplomacy, 
to the extent that it baffles external observers. Russia approaches international 
institutions as equalizers of liberal hegemony and as a means of guarding 
its own sovereignty, not as components of transnational regimes generating 
global governance, which contravenes sovereignty, or makes it “conditional.” 
The insistence on the UN’s central and coordinating role in world politics 
should be read in this light: It reasserts collective leadership by major powers 
through the Security Council, as fixed in 1945. It also constitutes a balancing 
mechanism to both prevent an imposition with regard to domestic governance 
and curb a unilateral action based solely on national interest (i.e., the US 
interest).
International law and international norms are crucial to maintaining this 
system, hence Russia’s whole-hearted commitment to them. They do so dif-
ferently from how they are envisaged in the liberal paradigm, however. As 
explained above, in the Russian doctrine, international law is understood 
procedurally. The international cyber treaty is supposed to target the current 
“loose” cyber regime based on the “common law” logic that reflects, enables, 
and reproduces the liberal consensus. A dedicated legal instrument estab-
lishes procedural rules of the game, in a supposedly politically neutral man-
ner, to prevent acting on the liberal reflex. International norms, specifically 
those such as, for example, sovereignty and multilateral decision-making, 
have also been extremely important in the Russian foreign policy discourse 
because they help Russia maintain its technically great power status (Hopf 
2002, 225). From this position, norms, including cyber norms, must be or 
should become binding, as a transitionary step toward codification. The cur-
rent politically, rather than formally, binding character of cyber norms is, 
therefore, unsatisfactory for Russia as it reflects the suboptimal state of the 
regulation of the cyber domain.8
Norms are not, however, understood in accordance with the liberal idea of 
norm diffusion by enlightened norm entrepreneurs, as progressively adopted 
across the international community to constitute a uniform social glue and 
superior morality (cf. Kurowska 2019). Quite the opposite, in the Russian 
doctrine, norms are in place in order to regulate conduct between states of 
a different normative makeup, and, to be effective, they need to be formally 
binding. This is how Russia interprets the rules and norms of responsible state 
behavior in cyberspace. A global value-bound community, which does not 
need a binding legal instrument because it can act on a case-by-case basis on 
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shared understandings, is an embodiment of hegemony in this interpretation. 
Attempts to design and implement new cyber norms are supported because 
they are in Russia’s interests of regulating the Internet; but they need to be 
monitored as they potentially penetrate the state and pose the risk of “norm 
weaponization” in the interests of liberal interventionism.
DEMOCRATIZATION À LA RUSSE
One of the curious political implications of cyber treaty advocacy is that it 
furthers a fundamentally conservative process, in the spirit of the post-1945 
international arrangement, by imitating the progressive politics that exposes 
digital inequality. A good illustration thereof is Russia’s standing claim that 
developing states become “hostage to the cyber neocolonialism policy,” as 
they also become the wasteland of the West’s cyber refuse (Andrey Krutskikh 
cited in, Permanent Mission 2019a, 3). It often pushes Western countries into 
defensive positions, even as Russian “democratization speak” is recognized 
as instrumental given Russia’s own practices of exclusion and domination.
The function of such rhetoric can be better understood, however, in the 
framework of great power management (Astrov 2011, 6). As defined by 
Hedley Bull, great power management consists of two practices: managing 
relations among themselves in the interest of international order, for example, 
by preserving the balance of power, and exploiting dominance in relation to 
the rest of international society, by acting either in concert or unilaterally 
(Bull 1977, 205-6; Astrov 2011). Within the framework of great power man-
agement, and in line with the doctrine of multipolarity, “democratization” of 
international relations denotes the decentralization of power from the United 
States, as the former hegemon, to a group of great powers, including Russia 
and now China. Despite the populist use of the term in Russia’s cyber diplo-
macy, small states are instrumental in this configuration. They can be wooed 
or coerced for tactical purposes but only great powers ultimately have the 
responsibility to manage the international order.
This rationale is an important qualification in evaluating Russia’s advocacy 
of the OEWG as a parallel UN track to the UN GGE. Russia’s initial support 
for the UN GGE followed the logic of the world being governed by a few—
that is, great power management, here represented by governmental experts. 
Formally launched in 2004, the UN GGE produced three reports in 2010, 
2013, and 2015. The reports are not legally binding but they have become the 
main point of reference in the discourse of responsible state behavior and the 
question of the applicability of international law in cyberspace. The failure 
of the 2017 UN GGE is attributed by Andrey Krutskikh to Western experts’ 
monopolization of the leadership of the group and the need of Russia to resist 
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that (Andrey Krutskikh cited in, Kommersant 2019b, 6). It is the realization 
that Russia could not further advance its great power cyber goals within the UN 
GGE that led to a major diplomatic swerve in 2018 and the resolution which 
launched the OEWG (General Assembly 2018c). From then on, it proceeded to 
label the UN GGE as a U.S.-promoted mechanism driven by experts who act 
in their personal capacity, which makes it unrepresentative and exclusionary.
The statements about the final draft of the OEWG-launching resolution in 
the First Committee on November 8, 2018 demonstrate a successful applica-
tion of “democratization” rhetoric for contesting the liberal order. Russia 
denounced the UN GGE, ironically given its role in instantiating the process, 
as “the practice of some club agreements [that] should be sent into the annals 
of history” (Disarmament and International Security Committee 2018). “The 
like-minded” responded with pledges to strengthen capacity building and 
envisaging merely a secondary and consultative role for the OEWG in imple-
menting norms created by the UN GGE. This made them politically vulner-
able to charges of maintaining the structural inequality of the global Internet 
governance. The Russian portrayal of the OEWG, as, first, providing equal 
access to all the UN membership to shape Internet governance decisions, and, 
second, as returning sovereign states to the driver’s seat of making such deci-
sions (Andrey Krutskikh cited in, Permanent Mission 2019c, 3), appealed to 
concerns over representativeness in non-Western constituencies.
The diplomatic feat of launching the OEWG unsettles the process of global 
Internet governance but it will not be easy to exploit. With the OEWG advo-
cacy, Russia seeks to break its own marginalization, yet it can simultaneously 
harm its overall objective; that is, achieving an equal status at the table of 
those shaping the global governance structures of the Internet. The OEWG 
constitutes “a cyber agora” which, in the long run, can provide a platform for 
treaty negotiation. But it comes with agora-like politics which cannot be eas-
ily channelled or made conducive to intimate deals among “poles of power,” 
something that Russia craves to be involved in.
The diplomatic downfall experienced in November 2019, after the gen-
erally positive atmosphere around the launch of the OEWG in June and 
September 2019, shows how “democratization agenda” is but a tool in the 
geopolitics of global Internet governance. The First Committee session on 
November 6, 2019 saw, again, two votes over competing resolutions. The 
U.S.-sponsored document (General Assembly 2019a) elaborates on and 
reasserts the primacy of the UN GGE and concedes to “also welcoming” 
rather than only noting the launch of the OEWG. The Russian-sponsored, 
and little-consulted, document (General Assembly 2019b) prioritizes the 
OEWG while “also welcoming” the UN GGE and underscoring the sta-
tus of both as independent mechanisms under United Nations auspices 
that should work in parallel toward peace and stability in ICTs. This 
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head-on rhetorical confrontation between the two main cyber orators cre-
ates confusion and divisions among “the like-minded.” Caught between 
its commitment to working within both the OEWG and the UN GGE and 
its allegiance to “the like-minded” vision of cyberspace, the EU abstained 
rather than voting against the Russian-sponsored resolution. The explana-
tion of the vote cited “the non-consensus based language” but reaffirmed 
the commitment to “work both within the UN GGE and the OEWG in a 
complementary and coordinated fashion, to promote and further build on 
the cumulative achievements of the previous UN GGEs” (EEAS 2019). 
Switzerland, chairing the OEWG, voted in favor. A closer look at the 
underpinnings of Russia’s cyber narrative may help better manage the 
confusion it generates.
“DIGITALIZATION IS DANGEROUS”—THE 
DOCTRINE OF INFORMATION SECURITY
The staple of the Russian cyber narrative is that digitalization is dangerous. 
It is generally seen as уязвимость/uyazvimost’ (vulnerability). Domestically, 
it constitutes a disruptive tool with regard to regime stability, a view which 
consolidated in the realization of the power of the social media during the 
Arab Spring, drove home by the extent of anti-regime protests in Russia in 
2012 (Pigman 2019). Internationally, the Internet is portrayed as a dangerous 
instrument of foreign interference. The doctrine on information security laid 
out in the International Convention on Information Security stresses threats 
of information warfare and dangers stemming from foreign governments’ 
exploiting information and communication technologies for undermining 
state sovereignty, political independence, and territorial integrity (MID 
2011). Every year since 1998, Russia has put forward resolutions at the 
United Nations to prohibit “information aggression,” which is interpreted to 
mean ideological attempts to undermine regime stability. Moscow seems to 
see itself in a particular situation vis-à-vis Western countries: a non-declared 
war, no peace context, but information warfare as a continuous state of flux 
between peace and war (Franke 2015, 42).
Russia’s understanding of what constitutes information security merits 
scrutiny in this context. In contrast to the Western approaches focused on 
technology, protection of communication infrastructure, and free access to 
information, the doctrine of information security relates to the responsibility 
of the government to secure the information itself and, therefore, ultimately, 
national sovereignty (Sharikov 2018c). If Western countries seek security 
of communication, the Russian government wants control over the con-
tent of information, since content can be used as a tool of influence in the 
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socio-humanitarian sphere (Nocetti 2018, 187). More broadly, two political 
principles are key to the doctrine. One is the understanding of “real” sov-
ereignty as the stability of the political system, national unity, prevention 
of fundamental contradictions between the authorities, the society, and the 
elites (Kokoshin 2006, 26); in other words, prevention of political dissent. 
The other relates to the perception of the politically empowered individual, 
especially one who uses information technologies to advance their rights, 
as both a vulnerability and a security threat to the state (Sharikov 2018b, 
172–4).
The Kremlin’s expansion of a “digitally sovereign” Russia program is, 
therefore, a defence of the state against both the discontent of their own citi-
zens and uncontrolled Western influence. The development of the Russian 
segment of the information and communication network, known as Runet, is 
part of this agenda. The Sovereign Internet Law, which came into force on 
November 1, 2019 and will be incrementally rolled out in the coming years, 
envisages technical arrangements in case of disconnection from the rest of the 
Internet, as, for example, due to foreign aggression. Russian telecom firms 
have to install, for this purpose, “technical means” to re-route all Russian 
Internet traffic to exchange points approved or managed by Roskomnazor, 
Russia’s telecom watchdog. The “Runet” logic is, in essence, defensive of 
the regime. But it is also a local response to challenges of digitalization 
at the global scale, which calls for a greater technological sovereignty and 
economic protectionism. The championing of data localization also belongs 
to this agenda. Understood as storing data within the borders of the country 
where it was generated and justified in terms of resisting the concentration 
of transnational data storage in California, United States, data localization 
constitutes a crucial part of state digital sovereignty. If, in the United States, 
information regime data belongs to tech companies, and in the EU General 
Data Protection Regulation framework it belongs to the individual, in Russia 
data belongs to the state and must be strictly controlled by it (Sharikov and 
Stepanova 2019).
GLOBALIZING INFORMATION SECURITY 
THROUGH REGIONAL PLATFORMS
The regional promotion of a counter-liberal order commenced in the late 
1990s by mainstreaming the counternorms of civilizational diversity and 
traditional values, the old-new rearticulation the norm of sovereign equal-
ity (cf. Cooley 2015). Russia could not afford, however, a global model of 
illiberal contestation for the utter lack of legitimacy, both in terms of its own 
standing and the strength of the liberal order at that time. Regional platforms 
98 Xymena Kurowska
have presently become regulation entrepreneurs: a laboratory for global cyber 
regulation and a space for coalition building for global cyber diplomacy.
Russia has uploaded to regional platforms its own solutions for counter-
ing the vulnerabilities of digitalization. Within the framework of the Shang-
hai Cooperation Organization (SCO), it has, for example, streamlined the 
norm of digital sovereignty in contrast to the U.S.-advocated “cyber-free-
dom” and in 2009 facilitated the SCO agreement for cooperation to ensure 
“international information security.” Initiated in a 2011 letter to the UN 
General Assembly by the Russian coalition (gathering China, Uzbekistan, 
and Tajikistan), it includes a pledge that states subscribing to the Code “not 
use information and communications technologies and other information 
and communications networks to interfere with the internal affairs of other 
states or with the aim of undermining their political, economic and social 
stability” (General Assembly 2011). The 2011 proposal also banned the use 
of the Internet for military purposes, but was criticized for the very attempt 
at formalization, the inconsistency with the multistakeholder approach, the 
de facto justification of censorship in the name of national sovereignty, and 
the overemphasis on terrorism and extremism to the neglect of cross-border 
law enforcement cooperation (Rõigas 2015). The 2015 updated version 
retracts the term “information weapons” that generated much controversy 
and states the commitment that human rights apply online as they do offline, 
but submits this recognition to national security prerogatives (Kavanagh 
2017, 25). It also, however, introduces a provision not to take advantage of 
a “dominant position in the sphere of IT” (section 5), which is in line with 
the broader agenda of “democratization,” and reiterates the role of govern-
ments in Internet governance (section 8), which may be interpreted as a 
continuous opposition to the multi-stakeholder model propagated by “the 
like-minded.” This acquis clashes too violently with the liberal model of 
Internet governance to be uploaded in its entirety. Still, the regional cyber 
codification is attractive to many actors who are concerned with the cyber-
space being unregulated, are increasingly puzzled at the West’s refusal of 
the international cyber treaty, and are inclined toward the state-controlled 
regulation of the Internet. The call for stricter regulation is gaining salience 
as it addresses many contemporary issues in cyberspace. The generic call 
for “free, safe, open, and secure” Internet will not alleviate such concerns 
and challenges. This is the immediate leverage that regional regulation 
entrepreneurs do possess.
While Russia did not fabricate the backlash against the hegemonic 
liberal world order and the reassertion of the conservative ideologies in 
these regions, it will rush to expedite such processes and turn them to its 
own advantage. Its traditionally strong regional expertise and the histori-
cal record of playing on regional grievances during the Cold War come in 
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handy especially strongly vis-à-vis colonial legacies and the extractive post-
colonial policies that proliferate in cyberspace. The strategy of empowering 
regional organizations as responsible for regional security in accordance 
with the UN Charter adds legitimacy to this self-serving endeavor. Many 
regional actors recognize the “pragmatist” logic of this rhetoric. Even if 
they do not necessarily fall for Russia’s supposedly democratic campaign, 
their concern with structural inequality in the international system partially 
overlaps with Russia’s agenda. What gets corrupted in the process of align-
ing such positions is the very ideal of decolonization and de-hierarchization. 
It is hijacked for Russia’s pursuit of collective leadership by great powers 
which will disregard the voices of those structurally disadvantaged in the 
system.
CONCLUSION
Cyber diplomacy has become a way of revendicating and revalorizing Rus-
sia’s global role, another rendition of the old “Gentlemen, Russia is back!” 
(Rossiyskayagazeta 2007). That declaration after the Munich speech (Putin 
2007) which heralded a more active international politics by the Kremlin 
lacked, however, in the realm of legitimacy for many years to come. The 
realm of global Internet governance provides a new ground of legitimation 
because it strikes a peculiar balance between Russia being able to break 
and fix things. It depicts the Internet as the ultimate contemporary security 
threat to monger fear and justify extraordinary measures, and champions the 
cause of regulation in one breath. Russia often punches above its weight in 
this game, and its cyber narrative is simplistic. But it exposes the hypocrisy 
and self-subversion of the liberal order on the global stage the way populists 
expose the liberal hypocrisy domestically. This is where the normative threat 
of endangering the sustainability of the liberal way of life and the liberal 
international order manifests itself most clearly.
One of the distinguishing features of liberalism is, however, that it can 
reform and adapt itself while authoritarianism only learns how to be more 
effective. The Russian vision is, ultimately, anachronistic. It relies on control 
and subordination of the individual to the state, which ignores the extent of 
and the hunger for genuine democratization and freedom at the level of the 
cyber citizen. The liberal cyber regime should hence reinvigorate its holistic 
commitment to the individual as the center of gravity of international cyber 
society. Not only as a free entrepreneur but as a political subject with a full 
spectrum of political rights, and with community and national attachments as 
a source of self-expression rather than subservience. “Leading by example,” 
the old liberal means of persuasion, may have lost much of its charm as an 
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effective strategy to achieve such aim. Its righteousness also becomes anach-
ronistic in international society, underpinned by normative pluralism and the 
contestation of hierarchies, including those created by liberal social norms. 
The shift from paternalism to participatory modes of engagement in building 
sustainable cyber societies better corresponds to the realities of the contem-
porary world. It builds an alternative, human- rather than security state-based 
model of democratization in international relations. The major challenge in 
this process is to “de-securitize” the politics of the global governance of the 
Internet and reformulate the parameters of the debate about digital society.
NOTES
1. I thank Patryk Pawlak and Mika Kerttunen for detailed comments on this chap-
ter. I would also like to acknowledge research opportunities provided by EU Cyber 
Direct Team and non-attributable conversations with national diplomats participat-
ing in the UN processes. I further thank Bibi van den Berg and Dennis Broeders for 
numerous textual and terminological suggestions. Philip Conway helped with copy 
editing. The views expressed in this chapter are solely mine and I bear responsibility 
for any possible mistakes. A version of this paper was first published by EU Cyber 
Direct. Reprinted here with permission.
2. See Giles and Hagestad (2013) for an analysis of terminological misunderstand-
ings in the domain of cyber and information security as evident in the policy docu-
ments by Russia, China, United States, and United Kingdom.
3. For an alternative view, see Tikk and Kerttunen (2018).
4. “The rules-based international order” has not been neatly defined but it can be 
understood as “a shared commitment by all countries to conduct their activities in 
accordance with agreed rules that evolve over time, such as international law, regional 
security arrangements, trade agreements, immigration protocols, and cultural arrange-
ments” (Association of Australia 2015, 3).
5. Securitization in international relations is the process of state actors transform-
ing subjects into matters of “security”: an extreme version of politicization that 
enables extraordinary means to be used in the name of security (Buzan, Wæver, and 
de Wilde 1998, 25). The successful securitization of ICT by the Russian Federation 
was noticed by Tikk and Kerttunen (2018, 56, 58).
6. Some authors speak of the Russian version as “a simulacrum or concave mirror 
to Western use” (Mälksoo 2015, 185). See Tikk and Kerttunen (2018), for examples, 
of how specific concepts of international law have been differently understood across 
a range of actors participating in the UN GGE.
7. This can also be interpreted as a “pragmatist relation to truth,” which opens 
another line of interpretation of the Russian agenda of democratizing international 
relations. On the domestic culture of the pragmatic relation to truth as manifested in 
pro-Kremlin trolling, see Kurowska and Reshetnikov (2018a).
8. I thank Mika Kerttunen for highlighting this point to me.
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Since its initial connection to the global Internet in the 1990s, China has expe-
rienced a tremendous technological leap forward. Over 850 million Chinese 
individuals have become network users (CNNIC 2019), using increasingly 
sophisticated devices to access a rapidly burgeoning digital economy. Chi-
nese hardware and software businesses, including Alibaba, Tencent, Huawei, 
and ZTE, have become industry leaders with a growing global footprint. 
Technology questions have swiftly gained political prominence, reflected in 
the creation and expansion of institutions such as the Cyberspace Adminis-
tration of China (CAC) and the Central Commission for Cybersecurity and 
Informatization, chaired by Xi Jinping personally (Creemers 2019). Yet, the 
nomenclature of the latter body also points at a tension fundamental to Chi-
na’s technology policy: while informatization—the introduction of informa-
tion technologies (ITs) into social and economic life—promises considerable 
benefits, it equally creates considerable security concerns.
These concerns are not limited to technical questions surrounding the 
integrity, availability, and correct functioning of IT systems and the data 
stored within them. For decades, the Chinese leadership has feared ideologi-
cal subversion, and has designated online content as a potential weapon for 
“peaceful evolution” (Wang 2011). In recent years, the growing adoption 
of ITs and tensions resulting from China’s expanding geopolitical role have 
led to new worries, particularly in relation to the United States. Overall, 
China sees itself standing at the wrong end of a digital divide, where the 
distribution of resources and capabilities in cyberspace is highly asymmetric 
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(Shen 2016). The Snowden revelations, US technology export bans target-
ing ZTE and Huawei, and the discontinuation of security support for Win-
dows XP each highlighted vulnerabilities resulting from forced reliance on 
currently irreplaceable US technology. Until its reform process, the Internet 
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) was often viewed 
as an extension of the US government. US-led efforts to curtail the global 
presence of Huawei, particularly its participation in the standardization 
process for fifth-generation mobile networks (5G) form one of the major 
elements of what some observers already call the “US-China technology 
cold war” (Yuan 2019). Concerns about surveillance and espionage, the 
survival of national economic champions and even China’s basic ability to 
access the global Internet thus joined propaganda and ideology in Chinese 
technology policy.
Inasmuch as the tensions between China and the United States (or more 
broadly, the “like-minded” nations) result from competing national interests, 
they are also the product of opposed views on the role of IT in the relationship 
between the state, citizens, and the economy. Since the 1990s, the U.S. tech 
community has espoused a “free and open” view of the Internet, embodying 
American liberal democratic norms including free speech, access to informa-
tion and free-market capitalism, as well as some of the libertarian ethics of 
the academic and engineering communities that created the Internet. The 
economic dominance of the US tech industry, and the central role played by 
these communities, meant these views were nearly universally disseminated 
without much opposition as the Internet expanded in the decades since (Dem-
chak 2016). Over the past decade, however, China has become increasingly 
vocal and active in defending a different approach, one based on “cyber sov-
ereignty” (wangluo zhuquan).
Cyber sovereignty has become a mainstay in documents and statements 
for international consumption since its first high-profile appearance in the 
2010 White Paper outlining China’s position on the Internet (SCIO 2010). 
Together with Russia, China proposed a Code of Conduct for state behavior 
in the United Nations General Assembly in 2011 (UN 2011) and again in 
2015 (UN 2015). Sovereignty was the first of five principles for international 
cooperation in cyberspace that the Chinese delegation proposed at the 2012 
Budapest Conference on Cyberspace (MFA 2012), and the second item in the 
Wuzhen Declaration that China proposed at the first World Internet Confer-
ence in 2014 (WIC 2014). It has been a repeated element in speeches by top 
leaders including General Secretary Xi Jinping (Xi 2015) and ex-Internet 
“czar” Lu Wei (Lu 2014), as well as a key objective in China’s national 
cybersecurity strategy (CAC 2016a), its Cybersecurity Law (NPC 2016C), 
its development program for the ICT sector (Central Committee and State 
Council 2016), and its international cyber strategy (MFA 2017).
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These policy documents usually define cyber sovereignty in vague and 
broad terms. In the words of Xi Jinping, a state has the right “to choose 
its online development path, its network management model and its public 
Internet policies, and to equal participation in international cyberspace gov-
ernance.” In turn, states should refrain from “engaging in cyber hegemony, 
interfering in other countries’ internal affairs, and engaging in, tolerating or 
supporting online activities harming the national security of other countries” 
(Xi 2015). Yet, what this implies in specific national and international legal, 
regulatory and policy questions is often unclear, and subject to considerable 
debate in China itself (Zeng, Stevens and Chen 2017). Existing literature has 
primarily focused on the discussion of sovereignty in diplomatic processes 
and foreign policy, such as global Internet governance regimes including 
ICANN, WSIS, and the Internet Governance Forum (Shen Hong 2016; 
Mueller 2012; Arsène 2012), military and strategic cybersecurity (Swaine 
2013; Harold, Libicky and Stuth Cevallos 2016; Kolton 2017; Lindsay 
2014), and the reshaping of the global cyber order (Demchak 2016). How-
ever, in this literature, cyber sovereignty is largely taken as given, and the 
substance of the concept, as well as its role as an organizing principle for 
cyberspace, receives little attention. This chapter thus intends to bookend 
this body of literature by supplementing two elements: first, how the cyber 
sovereignty concept emerges as part of China’s broader approach to foreign 
policy, and second, how Chinese authorities have structured the domestic 
legal, regulatory, and policy landscape in order to realize the goals sover-
eignty entails.
This chapter contains two sections. The first section explores the develop-
ment of China’s conception of sovereignty, both general and cyber-related, 
against a historical background. It will pay particular attention to how China’s 
reading of sovereignty embodies its broader views of the global order, as well 
as to the multidimensional nature of the sovereignty concept. It will identify 
two major components of the sovereignty concept: a normative component 
defining how states should conduct themselves in cyberspace, and a capa-
bility component that identifies the governance and material resources and 
mechanisms a state requires to realize the normative component in a poten-
tially antagonistic environment. The second section will review how China 
has sought to construct these governance and material resources through law, 
regulation, and policy. It finds the Chinese state has mainly sought to institute 
and consolidate effective control over online actors, activities, and content 
through a process of territorialization, indigenization, and investment, while 
maintaining technical interoperability with the global Internet. Even so, there 
is a considerable degree of complexity: although it is one thing to declare 
cyber sovereignty, it is quite another thing to unpick the tightly woven fab-
ric of the digital society without undue harm, particularly as the interests of 
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various Chinese stakeholders are often at odds. The conclusion will discuss 
practical and theoretical implications of these processes for the global Internet.
THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY IN CYBERSPACE
Parallel Histories
While the classical attribution of sovereignty to the 1648 Peace of Westphalia 
has been disputed, it is generally accepted that the notion of sovereignty—
supreme and exclusive political authority within a bounded territory—was 
consolidated across Europe in the seventeenth century. This international 
order was based on the principles of non-intervention and sovereign equal-
ity: no foreign entity outranked the ruler of a territory, or was permitted to 
interfere in its internal affairs (Krasner 1999). This was particularly impor-
tant with regard to religion. Religious wars had wrought havoc across the 
continent for over a century. In this sense, with the principle of cuius region, 
eius religio, sovereignty expressed an agreement to disagree: disputes over 
alleged universal moral truths would no longer form a justification for con-
flict. In the centuries since, the sovereign state has become the primary form 
of territorial organization worldwide.
To be sure, the sovereignty principle has often been honored in the breach 
as much as the observance. The attempted invasion by monarchical powers 
into revolutionary France, for instance, was largely justified by arguments for 
regime change. Racist ideas concerning “civilization” withheld sovereignty 
from much of the non-European world until after World War II. Yet, as 
decolonizing states increasingly achieved sovereignty and self-determination, 
another trend toward constraining sovereignty started gaining traction: one to 
limit state cruelty and injustice. In the wake of the Holocaust, the Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights became the first component of a growing body 
of human rights law. The Helsinki Process of the 1970s created commitments 
on civil rights that greatly encouraged dissident and democratic movements 
in the USSR and its satellite states (Thomas 2001). Following the end of the 
Cold War, doctrines such as the Responsibility to Protect further eroded the 
authority of the non-intervention norm (Glanville 2013). Lastly, de facto if 
not de jure, economic globalization has grown to considerably curtail the 
space for movement of states, and consolidated the dominance of a (neo-)
liberal capitalist model around the world (Stein 2016).
China’s approach to sovereignty, in contrast, was predominantly concerned 
with a drive to counteract the presence of imperialist powers that had estab-
lished extraterritorial rule in their concessions and had taken over a number 
of Chinese government authorities, and start China on a path back toward 
111China’s Conception of Cyber Sovereignty
wealth and strength (Schell and Delury 2014). Their efforts rarely met with 
success. At the end of World War I, China hoped to cash its material support 
for the allies with the return of German-held concessions in Shandong. Del-
egation member (and later International Court of Justice judge) Wellington 
Koo eloquently argued that the Wilsonian principles of independence and 
self-determination implied Japan’s competing claims should be rejected. The 
territories were subsequently handed over to Japan as part of a compromise 
to mitigate tensions in the Pacific and stave off Japanese calls for the explicit 
recognition of racial equality in the League of Nations (MacMillan 2011, 
chapters 23–24). In China, this disappointment triggered dejection, protests, 
a transformational nationalist cultural movement (Forster 2018), the estab-
lishment of the Chinese Communist Party, and a lingering sense that, in the 
final analysis, foreign powers were not serious in their stated commitment to 
international law, but would use it as an instrument of power (Kent 2008). 
China’s task, therefore, would be to acquire power, not play the law game.
Distrust continued to color the foreign relations of the Chinese Republic 
and People’s Republic, even with its nominal allies. During World War II, 
even though Chiang Kai-shek managed to secure agreements ending extrater-
ritoriality and renouncing territorial concessions from Britain and the United 
States, the alliance was strained due to Chiang’s—not unjustified—sense 
that both countries were only doing the bare minimum to keep China in the 
war and Japanese soldiers tied up (Mitter 2013). Ideological differences, 
disagreements on relationships with the West, and competition for leader-
ship in the global Communist movement led Mao to curtail relationships 
with the Soviet Union in the early 1960s. China’s near-total isolation from 
global diplomacy would last until the 1970s, when gradual overtures toward 
the United States led to Beijing’s takeover of the Chinese membership of the 
UN, hitherto held by Taipei, and the recognition of the People’s Republic by 
most nations worldwide. The Dengist reforms further spurred openness to the 
outside world, as China started participating in numerous global diplomatic 
and legal regimes. Yet, even as China developed a more pragmatic form of 
global engagement, the rhetorical basis of China’s foreign policy remained 
the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, developed in the mid-1950s, of 
which sovereignty was the most important one (Kent 2008).
The Tiananmen events of 1989 underscored the distance the regime would 
go to, to safeguard its existence, and in a certain sense, their aftermath has 
continued to shape China’s relationship with the outside world. Coinciding 
with the end of Communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the dissolution 
of the Soviet Union, the West came to believe that Tiananmen indicated it 
would only be a matter of time until the Chinese regime would follow them 
into the annals of history (Pei 2006; Chang 2010). Human rights became an 
important part of American and European diplomatic efforts toward China, 
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and democratization became one of the key themes of China scholarship. 
The Chinese leadership, however, considered its response to the Tiananmen 
protests as a regrettable but necessary defensive measure. Since then, stability 
maintenance (weiwen) has been one of the cornerstones of Chinese domestic 
politics, affecting areas ranging from media and education to policing and 
surveillance (Wang and Minzner 2015). The explicit Western support for the 
Tiananmen protests, as well as liberal activism in the decades since, has fos-
tered further distrust among the leadership about Western intentions vis-à-vis 
China. Senior leaders and party media often refer to the efforts by “foreign 
hostile powers” (Hu 2011) that attempt to Westernize and divide China, or 
subvert CCP leadership. China’s conception of sovereignty embodies the 
core of these tensions: China’s definition of sovereignty primarily concerns 
the integrity of its political structure, while Western states consider this a 
defence of exactly those abuses that the more conditional, post–Cold War 
reading of sovereignty sought to curtail.
Sovereignty and Cyberspace
The controversy concerning cyber sovereignty is one specific manifestation 
of these broader tensions. Here as well, China’s views of the role of the state 
evolved separate from those in the West, where the trend has been one of 
progressive withdrawal of the state. For the first few decades of their devel-
opment, information technologies were primarily driven by national security 
interests, and more specifically, intelligence, surveillance, and encryption 
(Corera 2015), as well as prestige projects such as Apollo. However, the 
growing adoption of computers by businesses and individuals meant that 
states gradually lost their exclusive control over networking and encryption 
technologies. In the United States, a budding community of academics and 
engineers started building what became the Internet, on the basis of libertar-
ian ethical principles of openness, transparency, and skepticism of govern-
ment. Governments attempted to resist their efforts for a while, during the 
crypto wars of the 1980s. But the relaxed political environment following 
the end of the Cold War encouraged the broad adoption of this mind-set, 
including by governments. No longer a secretive part of the state’s security 
arsenal, information technology came to symbolize the post–Cold War belief 
that liberal democracy and free-market capitalism were the inevitable end of 
history (Demchak 2016).
In this techno-optimist view, cyberspace had become a phenomenon all of 
its own, in which traditional government no longer played a significant role. 
John Perry Barlow’s Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace explic-
itly claimed that governments, “weary giants of flesh and steel,” no longer had 
sovereignty in the digital domain (Morrison 2019). Technology businesses 
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enthusiastically embraced this narrative of openness, with its rejection of 
strong government regulation, as it allowed them to rapidly grow on a global 
scale. Political and economic elites came to see digital technology as a solu-
tion for a wide variety of economic and social ills, but also as a battering ram 
against the remaining bastions of authoritarianism. The reduced role of the 
state also became clear in many aspects of Internet governance, for instance, 
in ICANN and the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), where the multi-
stakeholder model became the norm (Dutton and Peltu 2008). In this model, 
technical and business communities, as well as civil society, became at least 
as important as government in creating governance rules for the Internet.
China’s relative latecomer status to information technologies meant it had 
little influence or participation in the emergence of these processes. Nonethe-
less, it espoused its own version of techno-optimism, which led it to espouse 
information technologies enthusiastically with its agenda of “informatization” 
(xinxihua) (Qu 2010). This optimistic view shared the basic principle that 
digital technology could address socioeconomic questions, but fundamentally 
disagreed with its liberal democratic precepts. Rather, technologies were mar-
shalled as part of the broader CCP project that sought to combine economic 
development with strict political control, under the exclusive authority of the 
party (Central Committee and State Council 2016). Related tactics the party 
employed elsewhere were extended into the sphere of technologies, including 
media control and limitations to foreign and private participation in strategic 
economic sectors. By design, these tactics limited both commercial oppor-
tunities for foreign players, and the political liberalization foreign observers 
hoped for, leading to growing criticism. It is in response to this criticism, as 
well as the growing prominence of cyber-related questions in the diplomatic 
realm, that the concept of cyber sovereignty entered the political jargon.
In 2010, the Chinese government published its first comprehensive justi-
fication of its approach to cyberspace governance. This White Paper stated 
that, as the Internet fell under the jurisdiction of Chinese sovereignty, every-
one within Chinese territory was obliged to obey Chinese laws and regula-
tions (SCIO 2010). In 2012, at the Budapest Conference on Cyber Issues, 
China proposed five principles for international cooperation on cyberspace, 
echoing the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. Sovereignty was the 
first of these, defined as the entitlement of every state to “formulate its poli-
cies and laws in light of its history, traditions, culture, language and customs 
(MFA 2012).” At that point in time, the chief matter of concern was online 
content. Subsequent policy documents have slightly expanded on these prin-
ciples, or were updated to reflect new concerns. The Wuzhen Declaration, cir-
culated at the first World Internet Conference in 2014, stated that “We should 
respect each country’s rights to the development, use and governance of the 
Internet, refrain from abusing resources and technological strengths to violate 
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other countries’ Internet sovereignty” (WIC 2014). Xi Jinping reiterated this 
stance in his Wuzhen speech the following year (XI 2015). The 2016 National 
Cyberspace Security Strategy explicitly defended states’ rights to “prevent, 
curb and punish the online dissemination of harmful information endangering 
national security and interests, and to safeguard order in cyberspace” (CAC 
2016a). The most elaborate discussion of sovereignty in a policy document 
can be found in the 2017 International Strategy of Cooperation on Cyber-
space, and deserves to be quoted in full.
As a basic norm in contemporary international relations, the principle of sover-
eignty enshrined in the UN Charter covers all aspects of state-to-state relations, 
which also includes cyberspace. Countries should respect each other’s right to 
choose their own path of cyber development, model of cyber regulation and 
Internet public policies, and participate in international cyberspace governance 
on an equal footing. No country should pursue cyber hegemony, interfere in 
other countries’ internal affairs, or engage in, condone or support cyber activi-
ties that undermine other countries’ national security.
Upholding sovereignty in cyberspace not only reflects governments’ respon-
sibility and right to administer cyberspace in accordance with law, but also 
enables countries to build platforms for sound interactions among govern-
ments, businesses and social groups. This will foster a healthy environment 
for the advancement of information technology and international exchange and 
cooperation.
National governments are entitled to administer cyberspace in accordance 
with law. They exercise jurisdiction over ICT infrastructure, resources and 
activities within their territories, and are entitled to protect their ICT systems 
and resources from threat, disruption, attack and destruction so as to safeguard 
citizens’ legitimate rights and interests in cyberspace. National governments are 
entitled to enact public policies, laws and regulations with no foreign interfer-
ence. Countries should exercise their rights based on the principle of sovereign 
equality and also perform their due duties. No country should use ICT to inter-
fere in other countries’ internal affairs or leverage its advantage to undermine the 
security of other countries’ ICT product and service supply chain. (MFA 2017)
China’s Concept of Cyber Sovereignty: 
The Normative Dimension
The above descriptions, however vague, do allow the abstraction of three 
implicit general principles underpinning the cyber sovereignty concept. The 
first principle is that national governments enjoy sovereign rights against 
other national governments. This principle primarily is a response against the 
universalist claims of the proponents of online openness. By reserving the 
right to control all online activities under their jurisdiction to national gov-
ernments, this principle rejects the applicability of universal rights, including 
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free expression and access to information, as well as potential moves by 
adversaries to realize those rights, for instance, through circumvention soft-
ware. It is also up to individual states to decide how to use technology for 
purposes such as domestic surveillance and law enforcement. At a second-
ary level, it defends the right of states to organize and develop their digital 
industries as they see fit. This can entail development strategies including 
state subsidies and other forms of support, but also market access and security 
review regimes for foreign software and hardware, as discussed below.
The second principle is that national governments enjoy sovereignty over all 
non-state actors, be they domestic or foreign. This principle opposes the mul-
tistakeholder model of Internet governance that had been developed through 
institutions such as ICANN and the IETF, and endorsed by WSIS and the IGF. 
Instead, even if the technical and commercial communities have an important 
role to play, final authority should be exercised by nation-states through inter-
governmental institutions. China’s call for transforming ICANN into a special-
ized UN body under the ITU is perhaps the most prominent manifestation of 
this principle. Nonetheless, China has also come to propose a “multi-party” 
model, in which the consultative role of non-state entities is explicitly recog-
nized. The importance of this model should not be overstated. China’s Internet 
ecology consists of numerous industry associations and professional bodies 
that fall under the formal authority of state ministries, or whose senior officials 
are appointed by the CCP. Business leaders, too, are often party members. 
While that does not mean monolithic acceptance of central state policy—often 
quite the opposite—this model combines a semblance of institutional pluralism 
while maintaining a considerable degree of political control.
The third principle is sovereign equality of states in Internet governance. 
Under this principle, no state should have more power than others, or seek 
hegemony. This principle clearly targets what China sees as the hegemonic 
position of the United States, but it also has important tactical considerations 
in the multilateral context. As evidenced by the high level of support for the 
reforms Russia and China proposed in the ITU meeting of 2012 (Klimberg 
2013), as well as for the Open-Ended Working Group on norms for state 
behavior in cyberspace at the 2018 UN General Assembly, a significant num-
ber of countries worldwide at least partially share China’s position. In other 
words, the sovereignty narrative is also attractive to small and midsize player 
with whom China might seek common cause.
China’s Concept of Cyber Sovereignty: 
The Capability Dimension
The three abovementioned normative principles undergird China’s diplomatic 
efforts, but have also inspired an ongoing expansion of domestic measures 
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to ensuring sovereignty can be realized for China itself, even in the absence 
of international adoption. These measures have converged around three core 
strategies: territorialization, indigenization, and investment.
Territorial boundaries are a key component of the concept of sovereignty, 
but have been largely anathema in discussions on cyberspace. From a techni-
cal perspective, geography plays no meaningful role in the functioning of the 
Internet, even if the underlying infrastructure is territorial, and the absence 
of online borders was key to the techno-optimist view of cyberspace as a 
completely sui generis creature. Unsurprisingly, the Chinese government has 
taken a rather different approach. In 2013, CAC director Lu Wei stated that 
cyberspace is an extension of real space, and that it is, therefore, not a “land 
outside the law” (fa wai zhi di, Lu 2013). Yet, claiming jurisdiction over 
cyberspace implies having to define its limits and instituting border controls. 
Partly, the Chinese government has been able to do so through physical 
infrastructure: the Great Firewall’s hardware is mainly located at China’s 
international gateways (Lee 2018). But territorialization can also take place 
through regulatory means: by mandating that particular actors, activities, and 
data are located within China, jurisdictional questions are avoided altogether.
The indigenization strategy intends to increase the proportion of technol-
ogy used in Chinese cyberspace that is produced by Chinese suppliers. For 
most of the 2000s, the vast majority of information technology products used 
in China originated from foreign businesses, from Cisco routers in the net-
work infrastructure to Microsoft operating systems, from Apple smartphones 
and laptops to domain names purchased from foreign registrars. In 2014, 
a party journal claimed that 82 percent of servers, 73.9 percent of storage 
equipment, 95.6 percent of operating systems and 91.7 percent of databases 
in the country were foreign-sourced (Zhao and Xu 2014). A number of events 
highlighted China’s vulnerability to both foreign corporate decisions and 
governmental acts. When Microsoft announced in early 2014 that it would 
no longer support Windows XP, for instance, this operating system was 
still in use in the majority of Chinese computers. In response, China banned 
Windows 8 from government systems (Kai 2014), and Microsoft reversed 
its position. The Snowden revelations generated widespread concern about 
the possible implantation of backdoors or other forms of malicious code into 
foreign ICT equipment (Xi 2013, People’s Daily 2014). For both economic 
and political reasons, the Chinese government has increasingly sought to sub-
stitute foreign suppliers by domestic counterparts across a range of sectors. 
As a result, foreign content providers and online platforms have either not 
gained a significant foothold on the Chinese market, or in the case of Google, 
ended their Chinese activities as they were unwilling to comply with govern-
ment demands. The four brands Huawei, Oppo, Vivo, and Xiaomi combined 
now hold over 80 percent of China’s market share. China has also attempted 
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to develop indigenous technological standards and stimulated its domestic 
businesses to participate in the formulation of global standards, most notably 
5G. The success of this indigenization strategy nevertheless remains uneven. 
In many areas, including operating systems and semiconductors, Chinese 
products lag far behind foreign counterparts in quality, security, and market 
success (Triolo 2019). Equally, the international adoption of Chinese stan-
dards, as well as Chinese participation in global standards, remains extremely 
limited.
To remedy these weaknesses, the Chinese government has deployed sev-
eral industrial policy schemes across the technological spectrum. One major 
destination of funding has been research and education, both for general pur-
poses and specific technical capabilities. Universities have been encouraged 
to expand computer science and cybersecurity curricula, expanding China’s 
talent pool, with an increasing focus on emerging technologies such as big 
data and artificial intelligence (State Council 2016). Support is also offered 
through favorable government procurement policies or direct subsidies under 
industrial plans such as Made in China 2015 and the Internet Plus plan 
(Wübbeke et al. 2016). The Digital Silk Road component of the Belt-Road 
Initiative supports Chinese technology businesses in their international devel-
opment (Shen 2018). Some of these strategies have, however, backfired. For 
instance, governmental guidance funds meant to provide venture capital for 
the technology sector have been less successful than intended (Feng 2018). 
Moreover, governmental support for China’s technology businesses is a 
major factor driving the worsening of relations with major trading partners.
REALIZING SOVEREIGNTY AT HOME
The Chinese government has used various combinations of these three 
strategies in order to realize its cyber sovereignty objectives, going back 
to the early 2000s in some cases. This process has intensified since 2013, 
for a number of contributory reasons. Some of these concern the rapidly 
expanding adoption and complexity of ITs in general. From the point of 
view of sovereignty, they can also be seen as a response to two trends at the 
international level. First, China’s sovereignty stance has found little traction 
in existing cyber governance circles thus far. Partly, this is due to sym-
bolic reasons. “Like-minded” governments have come to see sovereignty 
as a shibboleth to justify of authoritarianism. Consequently, even if many 
of them have come to favor a somewhat greater degree of governmental 
control, they have been hesitant to endorse the inclusion of national sover-
eignty. On the Chinese side, this has stimulated accusations of hypocrisy. 
Chinese commentators have argued that initiatives such as the US buildup 
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of military cyber capabilities, and the introduction of the EU General Data 
Protection Regulation, are expressions of sovereign power in cyber affairs. 
Second, the likelihood of any agreement has become more remote as the 
Sino-American relationship has sharply deteriorated, most prominently 
through tensions concerning digital technology. During the second term of 
the Obama administration, the United States stepped up pressure against 
China on issues concerning cyber espionage, leading to an agreement in 
2015 that neither state would conduct or condone such activities (Sevasto-
pulo and Dyer 2015). The advent of the nationalist Trump administration, 
which campaigned on a strong anti-China platform, and growing disillu-
sion about the treatment of American businesses severely weakened the 
stabilizing role of the trade component in the overall relationship. As part 
of a broader trade war, the US government launched an investigation con-
cerning Chinese technology transfer requirements and intellectual property 
infringement, finding these constituted unreasonable burdens to US busi-
nesses (Congressional Research Service 2018). It also imposed sanctions 
against ZTE and Huawei for the violation of sanctions against Iran (SCMP 
2018). Reversing decades of economic integration, “decoupling” became 
a buzzword both in Washington and Beijing, particularly in the tech sec-
tor (Panda 2019). These evolutions fostered a greater sense of urgency in 
Beijing to enhance resilience, autonomy, and self-reliance (zili gengsheng, 
Thomas 2019), while still maintaining the advantages of global connectiv-
ity and interoperability. This section will review how this balance has been 
pursued in the areas of content control, the Domain Name System (DNS), 
data protection, and the engagement with foreign digital corporations.
Content Control
Perhaps the best-known boundary in cyberspace is the Great Firewall of 
China, the filtering infrastructure at the international gateways of China’s 
telecommunications networks that filters out undesirable content. Established 
in the late 1990s, it has been upgraded of the years to effectively remove from 
Chinese audiences content produced outside of Beijing’s ability to control. 
This includes explicitly political content, such as websites defending Falun 
Gong, the Tibetan or Uyghur cause, online media outlets reporting critically 
in China, social media networks that had been implicated in political events 
such as the Arab Spring and color revolutions in ex-Soviet states, as well as 
morally undesirable content such as pornography (Griffiths 2019). Allegedly, 
it was used to leverage the “Great Cannon” attack, which targeted developer 
platform GitHub in 2015 (Marczak et al. 2015). The Great Firewall has also 
been periodically updated to target circumvention software. For instance, par-
ticular commercial VPN services work less effectively around major national 
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celebrations, and The Onion Router (TOR), which enables anonymous and 
encrypted web access, does not function reliably from China.
Yet, the Great Firewall is not the only barrier to foreign content. Starting in 
2000, authorities started expanding the previous regulatory regime for media 
from the traditional realm to the Internet. The first provisional regulations 
already contained a ban on foreign audiovisual content on Chinese websites 
(SARFT 2000, Art. 16[g]), and imposed licensing requirements for online 
operators. The permitted share of foreign participants in online information 
services’ joint ventures was limited (State Council 2000, Art. 17), while the 
Chinese WTO accession schedule limited foreign market access for many 
media-related activities (MOFCOM 2001). Subsequent regulations barred 
foreign participation from activities such as news (SCIO and MII 2005, Art. 
9), online publishing (CAC 2016b, Art. 10), and provision of audiovisual 
content (SARFT 2004, Art. 7). Unsurprisingly, these regulatory barriers, in 
combination with a protectionist stance in favor of Chinese businesses, meant 
no large foreign online operator has been able to maintain a sustained pres-
ence on Chinese territory. Google had set up operations in Beijing in 2005 
but closed down its Chinese search engine in 2010 after it discovered state-
backed hacking operations into its user data (Waddell 2016). More recently, 
Facebook attempted to open a start-up incubator subsidiary in Hangzhou, but 
after a miscommunication between local and central authorities meant it did 
not obtain the required permits (Liao 2018). Instead, the market has come to 
be dominated by the domestic massive online platform companies Alibaba, 
Tencent, and Baidu. Among a list of top 100 mobile apps on the Chinese mar-
ket as measured in market penetration in 2017, only a handful are produced 
by a foreign entity (Jiguang n.d.).
In governing online content, Beijing thus has employed a combination 
of the territorialization (Great Firewall) and indigenization (barring foreign 
businesses) approaches, with considerable success. This not only has substan-
tial economic benefits, it also provides the leadership with a more effectively 
governed landscape. Regular tussles notwithstanding, over the years, a modus 
vivendi has emerged between China’s online businesses and the central gov-
ernment. Government recognizes private business has generated consider-
able economic and technological achievement, and thus maintains a mostly 
positive attitude, while businesses do not upset the governmental applecart, 
and are far more trusted on politically sensitive matters than their foreign 
equivalents (Creemers 2018).
The Domain Name System (DNS)
In the early days of the Internet, China’s participation in ICANN was limited, 
partially due to a comparative lack of Chinese expertise, but also because of 
120 Rogier Creemers
political objections against the structure and politics of ICANN. Some of 
these objections were quite specific. ICANN, as a private corporation, did 
not subscribe to usual diplomatic protocols concerning Taiwan. Rather, the 
Taiwanese government participated equally in ICANN institutions, including 
the Governmental Advisory Council (GAC). China also found ICANN lag-
ging on technical questions affecting its claims and preferences, particularly 
in terms of adapting the DNS to adapt Chinese and other non-Roman alpha-
bets. China boycotted ICANN conferences between 2001 and 2009.2 On these 
matters, China and ICANN reached an agreement. China would send a MIIT 
representative to the GAC, while ICANN would refer to Taiwan as “Chinese 
Taipei.” It would also create a fast track for the inauguration of top-level 
domains (TLDs) in non-Western scripts. Moreover, management powers for 
the Chinese character TLDs were handed over to CNNIC, providing a further 
economic incentive for the continued support of the ICANN system (Mueller 
2012).
Broader problems in China’s perception of ICANN were, perhaps ironi-
cally, its multistakeholder functioning on the one hand, and its close rela-
tionship with the US government on the other. From 1998 onwards, ICANN 
had managed the DNS through a contract with the Department of Commerce 
National Telecommunications and Information Administration, yet govern-
ments played a minimal role in its internal processes. On the one hand, China 
was concerned this meant decisions with potential strategic relevance could 
be taken outside of governmental control. On the other, there were fears 
concerning American preponderance in Internet infrastructure and traffic 
control. A 2012 People’s Daily piece, for instance, laments (incorrectly) that 
all thirteen root servers are set up within the United States, and that 80 percent 
of global Internet traffic passed through the United States (People’s Daily 
2012). These objections pushed China to propose a different arrangement to 
govern the DNS: ICANN, or its functions, should be brought under the con-
trol of the United Nations, or more specifically, under the aegis of the Interna-
tional Telecommunications Union. First presented at the first World Summit 
on the Information Society (Segal 2017), this position quickly became a core 
element of its international cyber strategy. Moreover, China was not the only 
country dissatisfied with the ICANN status quo: India equally proposed trans-
ferring responsibilities for Internet governance to the ITU (Shen 2016, 89).
Even so, relationships between Beijing and ICANN have improved con-
siderably over the years. For its part, ICANN has worked hard to establish 
good relationships with Chinese authorities during this process. It opened 
its first Engagement Centre in Beijing at the ICANN46 meeting (ICANN 
2013). This center liaises closely with authorities in order to build mutual 
trust and deepen collaboration. Then-ICANN CEO Fadi Chehadé joined the 
high-level advisory committee for the Wuzhen World Internet Conference as 
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cochairman (Xinhua 2015). China, equally, has made efforts to build closer 
relations. The ICANN50 meeting in London, most notably, was the venue for 
CAC director Lu Wei to make his first high-profile international appearance 
(Lu 2014). Furthermore, the ICANN transition away from a direct contractual 
relationship with the US government and toward nongovernmental, multi-
stakeholder stewardship assuaged some of Beijing’s concerns vis-à-vis the 
organization. Even so, some ambivalence remains in China’s stance. While 
ICANN reform seems less of a priority for Beijing, the International Strategy 
for Cooperation in Cyberspace, as well as the Chinese submission to the UN 
Open-Ended Working Group on Information and Telecommunications still 
contain references to the need to create a multilateral Internet governance 
system, and to ensure that institutions governing strategic Internet resources, 
such as root servers, remain “truly independent of any state’s control” (MFA 
2019). Partly, this reflects continuing concerns that, as a U.S.-registered 
corporation, ICANN could be compelled to limit its services to China, for 
instance, through a process akin to the Department of Commerce Entity List, 
which limits, among others, technology exports to specific businesses or 
institutions. Another element is that numerous other strategic resources, such 
as the root servers on which the DNS depends, remain owned or operated by 
US entities, further increasing perceived risk.
In the meantime, China has sought to mitigate some of the risks it saw ema-
nating from the ICANN structure through domestic regulation. Almost from 
the start, the administration of domain names became a government affair, 
eschewing the multistakeholder approach adopted elsewhere. In 1997, the 
newly established CNNIC, under the Chinese Academy of Sciences, became 
responsible for managing Chinese aspects of the DNS, including administra-
tion of the .cn domain (Xue 2004). CNNIC also required notification from 
server operators using other top-level domains (Ermert and Hughes 2003, 
202). Successive regulations promulgated in 2002 and 2004 started to extend 
Chinese jurisdiction over the domain name system, referring consistently 
to “our country’s domain name system.” Not only did they encourage the 
adoption of Chinese-language domain names, they also applied preexisting 
provisions on content censorship to domain names, and required providers 
to cease resolving DNS addresses upon request by public security depart-
ments (MII 2002; MII 2004). But perhaps, most importantly, it unilaterally 
took the initiative to create an alternative system to handle Chinese-language 
domain names, which still remained globally compatible. While this sys-
tem was operated relatively secretively at first, by 2006, the People’s Daily 
proudly boasted that “[Chinese] Internet users don’t have to surf the web via 
the servers under the management of the Internet Corporation for Assigned 
Names and Numbers of the United States (Cited in Mueller 2012).” Also, 
the continuing tensions over ICANN’s role led the Chinese government to 
122 Rogier Creemers
subsidize research on something that came to be known as IPv9: a separate 
technical protocol that allows systems to be “independent of the US Internet 
but [. . .] Internet compatible” (Wang and Shebzukhov 2019). Nevertheless, 
IPv9 seems not to play a role of any significance thus far.
New DNS regulations from 2017 illustrate the growing trend toward 
localization. These regulations require entities running DNS root servers 
registered in China to locate their servers inside Chinese territory. Domain 
name registries must be based domestically, and the top-level domains 
these registries manage thus explicitly fall under Chinese jurisdiction. 
Domain name registrars equally must be Chinese entities running their 
systems within Chinese territory. Both registries and registrars must estab-
lish domestically based emergency response systems, and create localized 
backups of their databases (MIIT 2017). At the same time, there has been a 
certain degree of restraint. A draft version of these regulations contained a 
provision that “domain names with network access services within the bor-
ders” must register their domain name with a Chinese provider (MIIT 2016, 
Art. 37). These requirements have been dropped in the final version, after 
they were widely seen as rendering all foreign websites in China unlaw-
ful (Global Times 2016). Even so, suspicions against foreign intelligence 
services’ surveillance capabilities led to the inclusion of an article in draft 
regulations on data protection published in May 2019, which require that 
domestic Chinese Internet traffic must be exclusively routed through Chi-
nese territory (CAC 2019c). The topography of China’s Internet, with only a 
limited number of international gateways, may facilitate the implementation 
of this requirement.
Data Protection
Like many governments, the Chinese leadership has identified data as a 
crucial resource for development, but also a potential source of vulnerabil-
ity. Many of those risks, such as data leaks leading to fraud and abuse, are 
domestic, but authorities have also voiced concern over the potential harm 
stemming from data on Chinese citizens and important businesses flowing 
abroad. Over the past few years, the leadership has thus sought to centralize 
its previously fragmented regulatory approach to data protection, and data 
localization is an important element in new regulations. Localization require-
ments were already issued for financial and healthcare data in 2011 and 2014 
respectively (PBoC 2011; NHFPC 2014). A 2013 technical standard required 
consent of data subjects for data export (Chander and Le 2014). The cyberse-
curity law would set a general standard across all sectors. Yet, the exact cat-
egorization of data to be protected, as well as the specific limitations on their 
export, have been subject to a to-and-fro between different regulators and 
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stakeholders, as the need for protection is counteracted by both the economic 
harm from excessive limitations as well as the actual ability of government 
to implement and enforce data export rules.
This tension has been on display in the drafting process of the cybersecu-
rity law. The first draft, from July 2015, determined that “critical informa-
tion infrastructure operators” must store both citizens’ personal information 
and “other important data” gathered during their operations within Chinese 
territory. Critical information infrastructure was broadly defined, as “basic 
information networks providing services such as public correspondence 
and radio and television broadcasting; important information systems for 
important industries such as energy, transportation, water conservation, and 
finance, and public service areas such as electricity, water and gas utilities, 
medical and sanitation service and social security; military networks and 
government affairs networks for state organs at the sub districted city level 
and above; and networks and systems owned or managed by network service 
providers with massive numbers of users” (NPC 2015). The term “important 
data” remained undefined. In the second draft, published a year later, it was 
changed into “important business data” (NPC 2016), following suggestions 
from domestic stakeholders (NPC 2016A). Even so, this new term equally 
remained undefined. In response, forty foreign business groups submitted 
a statement asking for change, yet without success (Bloomberg 2016). The 
third draft, from November 2016, omitted the word “citizen,” suggesting all 
personal data collected in China, also from non-Chinese nationals, should be 
stored locally (NPC 2016B, Art. 37). The final, enacted version of the law 
maintained this provision, and reverted to the original formulation of “impor-
tant data,” still without definition. It also refined the definition of critical 
information infrastructure, to “public communication and information ser-
vices, power, traffic, water resources, finance, public service, e-government, 
and other critical information infrastructure which—if destroyed, suffering a 
loss of function, or experiencing leakage of data—might seriously endanger 
national security, national welfare, the people’s livelihood, or the public 
interest” (NPC 2016C).
In April 2017, the first set of draft regulations addressed the export of both 
personal information and important data, setting out conditions under which 
this export was to be prohibited and outlining security review requirements 
for permitted cases (CAC 2017b). These draft regulations also widened the 
scope of regulated subjects: every “network operator,” defined as “the owner 
of a network, a manager, and a network service provider,” would be required 
to store personal and important data locally. Important data was defined for 
the first time, albeit vaguely, as “data that is closely related to national secu-
rity, economic development, and social and public interests, with specific 
reference to national relevant standards and important data identification 
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guidelines.” A separate technical standard on data export refined the defini-
tion, providing a detailed list of specific data and their identifying features 
in twenty-eight industry sectors (TC260 n.d.). Nonetheless, this list is non-
exhaustive, and government departments still retain wide discretion to desig-
nate other data as important. In the end, the 2017 draft regulations were not 
adopted, both due to continuing internal debate and opposition in the WTO 
under the leadership of the United States and Japan (Lu et al. 2018). Simi-
larly, the technical standard still awaits adoption.
Regulatory efforts regained momentum in the spring of 2019, as two 
draft regulations emerged: one on general data protection matters, and one 
on cross-border personal data flows. The former again contained a vaguely 
worded provision on the export of important data, referring the matter 
to either the relevant controlling authority or cybersecurity departments. 
Combining elements from the previous draft regulations and draft standard, 
it defined important data as “data that, if divulged, may directly affect 
national security, economic security, social stability, or public health and 
safety, such as undisclosed government information or large-scale data on 
the population, genetic health, geography, mineral resources, etc. Impor-
tant data generally does not include enterprises’ production, operations, 
and internal management information, personal information, etc. (CAC 
2019c).” For the export of personal data, it referred to the second, separate 
draft document. These personal data export regulations, strongly influenced 
by Europe’s GDPR, required all network operators to conduct security 
assessments before exporting personal data, and to file such operations with 
provincial cybersecurity authorities. Moreover, they sharply curtailed data 
gathering activities by foreign entities, stipulating that “overseas organiza-
tions, in conducting business activities and when collecting the personal 
information of domestic users through the Internet and other means, shall 
fulfill the responsibilities and obligations of network operators in these 
measures through domestic legal representatives or organizations” (CAC 
2019b, Art. 20). At the time of writing, these draft measures have not been 
approved or taken effect.
The tortuous trajectory of data localization over the past years illustrates 
the difficult balance regulators seek to strike. There are, on the one hand, clear 
political and economic incentives to localize Chinese data: it is deemed to 
provide a defence against overseas intelligence gathering, as well as spur the 
development of the Chinese cloud industry. On the other hand, particularly 
when it comes to important data, there are considerable costs to maintain-
ing an overly broad definition as well: enforcement resources might become 
spread so thin that meaningful protection is not achieved, or business is 
throttled through excessive red tape. With the predicted adoption of 5G and 
IoT technologies, these considerations will only grow in complexity.
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Tilting the Playing Field
As indicated above, the Chinese government has sought to raise the domestic 
capabilities of its digital sector through various means, including industrial 
policy and investment. It has, over the years, published highly detailed plans 
for the country’s informatization (State Council 2016), developed special 
funding vehicles and structures for information technology, and provided 
the physical infrastructure it believes necessary. These efforts combine the 
imperative of economic development with a political goal: domestic players 
are seen as more secure and amenable to government control than foreign 
businesses. With this support, and by deftly leveraging the enormous size of 
the domestic market, Chinese technology businesses have become increas-
ingly competitive with foreign counterparts in numerous sectors. This, in 
combination with the growing priority of cybersecurity, has raised expecta-
tions and intentions that indigenous technology might progressively replace 
foreign hardware and software.
In some cases, regulations have mandated domestic content for quite some 
time. For instance, in the area of encryption, China has banned foreign tech-
nology since 1999 (Segal 2016, State Council 1999). In 2007, the Ministry of 
Public Security introduced the first iteration of the multilevel protection sys-
tem (MLPS) for cybersecurity. This categorizes information networks in five 
tiers, depending on the potential harm to public and private interests, as well 
as national security, in case of disruption. Level three and higher networks 
were required to use domestic cybersecurity technology, and retain domestic 
cybersecurity monitoring contractors (MPS 2007, Arts. 21, 11). Banking 
regulators issued standards on “secure and controllable” technology that, in 
many cases, required technology to be acquired from vendors with at least a 
presence in China, have domestic intellectual property rights or use domestic 
encryption tools (Freshfields 2016). However, these regulations were with-
drawn following public protests by US officials, as well as quiet lobbying by 
Chinese banks harboring concerns about being pushed to adopt inferior or 
less secure technology.
A similar to-and-fro was seen in China’s push to indigenize technical stan-
dards. In 2003, the Chinese government mandated that all wireless devices 
sold in China must run WAPI, a domestically developed encryption standard. 
International standardization bodies such as IEEE and ISO all rejected the 
standard, Intel announced it would stop shipments of Centrino chip technol-
ogy, while the US government threatened a WTO suit. It did not take long 
for China to shelve WAPI at an international level. Even so, foreign device 
manufacturers ended up providing support for WAPI domestically, indicating 
the extent to which businesses might comply with Chinese policy, or form 
local partnerships, even if not legally mandated to do so (Ahmed and Weber 
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2018). Efforts to popularize a homegrown 3G standard, TD-SCDMA, floun-
dered as the technology was inferior and was only adopted by a few handset 
makers. This saddled China Mobile, which had been pressured to use the 
standard against its business judgment, with a severe market disadvantage 
(Knowledge@Wharton 2011). Another domestic encryption standard, ZUC, 
fared slightly better: it was approved by the European Telecommunications 
Standards Institute, and adopted as a voluntary standard by the 3G Partner-
ship Project. In late 2011, the adoption of domestic encryption algorithms 
became obligatory in 4G networks, which de facto mandated ZUC use (Mac-
Gregor 2012, 40). However, in 2013, China agreed in negotiations with the 
United States that ZUC compliance would not be a precondition for market 
access (USTR 2014).
The MLPS was incorporated in the cybersecurity law, which also created 
an overlapping mandate to the CAC for critical information infrastructure 
protection. When new draft regulations for the MLPS were published in 
June 2018, nearly all references to domestic technology and operators had 
been removed, with the exception of encryption technology. Instead, the 
document only explicitly required that operation and maintenance of high-
level networks is carried out within Chinese territory (MPS 2018, Art. 29), a 
requirement that was also present in concurrent draft regulations on critical 
infrastructure protection (CAC 2017a). The MLPS regulations also banned 
the unauthorized participation of personnel occupying “critical positions” in 
highly ranked networks, or those providing cybersecurity services to them, in 
foreign “cyber attack and defence events,” or in other words, hacking com-
petitions (MPS 2018, Art. 54). At the same time, the MLPS draft expanded 
the scope of level three networks to not only include networks whose dis-
ruption affects social stability and national security, but also “particularly 
gravely” affects the lawful rights and interests of private actors (MPS 2018, 
Art. 15). The changes in the MLPS do not necessarily constitute a relaxation 
of constraints on foreign technology. First, the second iteration of the MLPS 
shifts from a greater focus on self-reporting toward more government audits 
and scrutiny. Second, a number of supplementary technical standards also 
affect MLPS, and impose more onerous requirements on operators, including 
source code delivery and access control (Sacks and Li 2018, 9–10).
Technical standards for cybersecurity are likely to erect market access bar-
riers more broadly. Over the past years, Technical Committee 260 (TC260), 
which is in charge of developing cybersecurity standards, has published over 
300 standards, many of which have since taken effect. While these standards 
are technically not legally binding, Chinese courts and authorities neverthe-
less see them as best industry practices, giving them de facto a similar effect. 
In other cases, technical standards are incorporated into regulations by refer-
ence, vicariously making them legally binding. The various requirements of 
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this thicket of standards create a range of possible compliance considerations 
for foreign entities. Where they mandate source code disclosure, businesses 
rightly worry about disclosure, leaks, and intellectual property loss. Where 
they mandate data sharing with Chinese government authorities, they may 
break laws elsewhere or contribute to reputational damage. They may require 
developing China-only versions of software and hardware, increasing busi-
ness costs. Ironically, however, this latter element may also limit the export 
potential of Chinese enterprises. Moreover, the vagueness of these standards 
(and, more broadly, the cybersecurity law and its attendant regulations) opens 
the door for uneven enforcement, either for direct political reasons such as the 
trade war, or as fallout of interdepartmental bickering. These points are, by 
the very nature of the system’s opacity, necessarily opaque. What is certain 
is that the extent to which foreign businesses can influence standard-setting 
in China is limited: a limited number of companies, including Microsoft, 
Cisco and Intel, were invited to join TC260 as late as 2016. They are only 
allowed in five of the eight Working Groups, and barred from those address-
ing encryption, classified information system security, and the information 
security standard system. In at least one case, a standard initiative was moved 
from an “open” Working Group to a “closed” one after opposition by the 
former’s foreign members (Sacks and Li 2018).
Chinese measures increasingly clearly show the imprint of Sino-American 
strife, and the US actions against Huawei and ZTE. One example of this is 
the debate that took place in the framework of the security review process 
for critical network products and specialized cybersecurity products, also 
introduced in the cybersecurity law. Draft measures from 2019, which create 
a mandatory security review process for technology used in critical infra-
structure, identify both the possibility of factors such as “politics, diplomacy 
and trade” to disrupt the controllability, security, and supply chain integrity of 
products or services, as well as “situations in which product or service provid-
ers are funded, controlled, etc., by foreign governments” as priority elements 
in cybersecurity reviews (CAC 2019a). Moreover, the Chinese government 
announced it might create an “unreliable entity list,” sanctioning foreign busi-
nesses boycotting or cutting off supplies to Chinese companies for noncom-
mercial purposes. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs explicitly connected the 
actual introduction of this list with the extent to which Sino-American trade 
ties improved (Reuters 2019).
Yet, even if there is broad agreement among Chinese policy makers how 
foreign technology should be managed, the specific way to do so remains 
disputed. The controversy surrounding the adoption of a specific version 
of Windows for government systems provides an instructive example. In 
the summer of 2017, Ni Guangnan, member of the Chinese Academy of 
Engineering and a prominent advocate for the development of indigenous 
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operating systems (Ni 2017B) claimed this version should remain outside 
the government procurement catalogue (Ni 2017), and more broadly, that 
government operating systems should be “indigenous and controllable (Ni 
2017A).” In response, Wang Jun, general engineer at one of the approved 
third party security evaluators, the China Information Technology Security 
Evaluation Centres (CNITSEC), stated that the cybersecurity review regime 
does not discriminate on the basis of nationality. Moreover, Wang indicated 
that replacing Windows with an indigenous alternative would “not neces-
sarily [be] the best choice” (Transpacifica 2017), citing switchover costs, 
software incompatibilities, and software quality as reasons. In contrast, Wang 
hailed the fact that the government edition was developed by a Sino-US joint 
venture, in which Microsoft cooperated with the China Electronics Technol-
ogy Group (CETC), with the aim of providing software better responding to 
user needs and security requirements. Lastly, Wang argued domestic operat-
ing systems might not necessarily provide a more secure alternative, merely 
that the risk profile might be somewhat different. This debate encapsulates 
many of the key points surrounding the technology substitution question in 
China, many of which are nonideological or political. Some businesses, such 
as CETC, care well through technological openness, others would do better 
if foreign competitors were absent from the market. In many cases, foreign 
technology is better than Chinese alternatives, and even a Huawei executive 
has indicated the virtuous effects of competition on innovation and security 
provide a strong reason to maintain openness (Shih 2015). The existing 
installed base of foreign technology and integration with other systems means 
“rip-and-replace” might be very costly.
It is often claimed that the Chinese government uses its close ties to busi-
nesses to advance the cause of national champions. This is especially salient 
in the area of 5G, which lies at the heart of tensions between China and its 
major trading partners. State-owned telecommunications operator China 
Mobile granted over half the contracts for its 5G equipment to Huawei (Li 
2019), and specific policy plans often indicate local content targets in various 
sectors and network systems. Furthermore, state-run media outlets regularly 
target foreign businesses in order to pressure them toward greater compli-
ance, or send political signals. The technology sector is no exception. In 
July 2019, for instance, Apple was targeted on national radio for allegedly 
allowing fake reviews to appear on its App Store (CNR 2019). This com-
pounded an already negative picture for Apple in China: Apple’s smartphone 
share plummeted from a high of 27 percent in 2015 to 5 percent in late 2019 
(Kirton 2019). Huawei not only took 42 percent of the Chinese domestic 
market at that time, it also had surpassed Apple as the second largest smart-
phone manufacturer worldwide. Partly, this may be due to political influence 
and nationalism among Chinese buyers, but the rapidly growing quality and 
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feature set of Huawei’s more competitively priced handsets is likely to be at 
least as important (Rapoza 2019). Moreover, the handset market may provide 
one example of how American trade sanctions might backfire: Huawei has 
prepared by developing or sourcing alternatives for technologies it might not 
be able to access reliably in the future. The Google Android operating system 
is one of these. As a plan B, Huawei developed HarmonyOS, a multi-platform 
system that might replace Android not only in smartphones, but in all kinds 
of connected devices (Hall 2019). Given Huawei’s global market share, this 
would be a severe blow to the existing duopoly of Google and Apple tech-
nology. Even so, it must be remembered that it is not a complete one-way 
street, and openness continues in other areas: British Telecom became the 
first foreign mobile operator to gain a nationwide Chinese operating licence 
in early 2019 (China Daily 2019). Moreover, the difficulties still facing Chi-
nese businesses in gaining parity with their foreign counterparts should not be 
underestimated. China still lags behind in software and hardware components 
ranging from PC operating systems to semiconductors, chip manufacturing 
equipment to business software (Triolo 2019). The most important question 
remains how the decoupling that both the Chinese and American stances 
are likely to cause will impact the highly integrated global digital economy. 
With some observers already warning about an “innovation winter” (Houser, 
forthcoming), sovereignty might come at a high cost.
CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS
China’s conception of cyber sovereignty is primarily defensive and reac-
tive, as it aims to ensure CCP control over processes that, in its view, may 
endanger its leading position. It reflects a legal position, entrenching the 
party-state’s exclusive ability to regulate and police the online world, and 
rejecting any form of foreign interference. But it is not merely a talking point 
in international diplomatic processes or a propaganda slogan for domestic 
consumption. It also refers to the capabilities the leadership deems necessary 
to realize that legal position in actual reality. To this end, it disposes of a set 
of policy, legal and regulatory tools that fall under the categories of territori-
alization, indigenization, and investment.
Within the Chinese policy and academic landscape, cyber sovereignty is 
nearly universally accepted as a foundation for engagement with global cyber 
affairs at a matter of principle, and it thus constitutes an organizing prin-
ciple in domestic cyber governance. Domestic technology use requirements, 
data localization, increasing scrutiny of foreign content and VPNs, security 
standards that privilege domestic players and government procurement and 
subsidy programs are all marshalled in pursuit of sovereignty. Overall, China 
130 Rogier Creemers
has sought to maintain interoperability with the global Internet, at the same 
time as striving to ensure dominance of indigenous online businesses, as well 
as technological autonomy to the greatest possible extent. Moreover, the 
increasing tensions with the United States have fostered a greater sense of 
urgency and unity in Beijing. Nevertheless, there are considerable arguments 
and differing views among different constituencies on important questions 
of how this principle is best realized in practice. How, and in which fields, 
to collaborate with foreign players, the extent to which specific foreign tech-
nologies should be banned from certain fields or merely regulated, and how to 
determine the sort of data that should be nationalized are still open questions.
This trend has not taken place in a vacuum. China’s insistence on cyber 
sovereignty has both been a response to and a catalyst of broader evolu-
tions in global cyber governance. In some cases, other governments have 
recognized the desirability of jurisdictional powers, referring explicitly to 
the sovereignty principle. EU digital commissioner Günther Oettinger, for 
instance, mentioned “digital sovereignty” as an objective for European digital 
policy (Tost 2015). Sovereignty was recognized as applying to states’ use of 
information technologies in the 2013 and 2015 reports of the United Nations 
Group of Governmental Experts (Schmitt and Vihul 2017), and is recognized 
in the Tallinn Manual, a comprehensive expert analysis of how international 
law applies to cyber operations (Schmitt 2017). China is not the only coun-
try to institute data localization policies; the EU’s General Data Protection 
Regulation equally requires local storage of personal data under certain 
circumstances. As governments increasingly assert control over the digital 
sphere, and as national security questions grow increasingly prominent in 
global cyber debates, it seems China’s approach to sovereignty has to be seen 
as part of a complex spectrum. While Beijing’s stance seems clear-cut and 
diametrically opposed to that of the United States and its “like-minded” allies 
in diplomatic discourse, the complexity of the domestic policy and regulatory 
landscape reveals a more nuanced picture.
To a significant degree, the difference in approaches reflects the contrast 
in security concepts between Beijing and its Western counterparts. China pri-
marily defines cybersecurity through the lens of “information security” (CAC 
2016a), and focuses on the potential impact the uncontrolled circulation of 
information might have on political, economic, and social stability. It is thus 
no surprise that content control has historically been the most elaborate com-
ponent of the cybersecurity landscape. American and European governments, 
conversely, have largely defined cybersecurity in technical terms, focusing on 
the integrity, stability, and functioning of information systems and the data 
stored on them. This, in turn, explains the attention these governments have 
directed toward the security of telecommunication networks, and in some 
cases, resorted to banning Chinese suppliers from their domestic markets. It is 
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worth remembering that China, thus far, has not banned specific hardware or 
software makers from its markets. Equally, China puts a far greater emphasis 
on economic development its cyber policy, while the United States stresses 
military, intelligence, and other national security questions relatively more. It 
is likely that these views will converge somewhat over the years, as illustrated 
by greater Western attention to disinformation campaigns and fake news, and 
China’s efforts to establish a cybersecurity review regime. The United States 
seems more amenable to greater state influence over economic affairs, while 
China is building up its cyber military and intelligence capabilities. Yet, even 
that convergence is unlikely to lead to greater cooperation or coordination. 
It is overshadowed by the growing U.S.–China tensions, in which technol-
ogy plays a central role. It seems that, increasingly inevitably, arrangements 
in cyberspace will reflect unadorned great power competition, with interests 
overshadowing values in importance, and political expediency replaces prag-
matic cooperation as a key virtue.
This has important implications on the future development of both the 
development of the digital economy, and of interstate relations pertaining 
to cyber affairs. The global digital economy as it exists today, developed 
since the 1990s in a context where there were few national and international 
regimes on matters ranging from data flows to supply chains. The current pro-
cess of increasing regulatory nationalization inaugurates a new paradigm in 
which multinational companies must operate. One likely scenario is that the 
world will fragment into separate spheres of cooperation with high degrees of 
internal harmonization, and significant barriers between them. An example of 
this is the supply of telecommunications equipment. If China’s push for tech-
nology indigenization is matched by other major states, or leads to reciprocal 
measures, the global market for telecommunications devices may equally 
become segregated along the lines of political alignment. What will be the 
impact on global connectivity, data and information flows is an important 
subject for future research. Yet, the tightrope that China needs to walk is a 
precarious one. In the diplomatic realm, China’s strong insistence on sover-
eignty has contributed to a low level of trust between Beijing and its major 
international interlocutors. It also has, thus far, overshadowed the question 
in which areas, how and for which purposes China can cooperate with other 
states—even those ostensibly more closely aligned—in order to enhance 
cyber governance, continue to stimulate interoperability and innovation, and 
tackle shared issues affecting the global online ecosystem. Yet, in the eco-
nomic realm, greater economic internationalization and technical interoper-
ability is imperative for the flourishing of China’s digital industry. Moreover, 
the global digital economy is, seemingly inextricably, linked with China as a 
manufacturing base and market. With the nature of cyber issues increasing in 
complexity, and tensions increasing in intensity, the way Beijing will seek to 
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preserve this balance, and how its foreign counterparts will respond, will be 
a prime factor shaping outcomes in the decades to come.
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
CAC:  Cyberspace Administration of China
CNNIC:  China Internet Network Information Centre
CNR:  China National Radio
ICANN:  Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
MFA:  Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MII:  Ministry of Information Industry
MIIT:  Ministry of Industry and Information Technology
MOFCOM:  Ministry of Commerce
MPS:  Ministry of Public Security
NHFPC:  National Health and Family Planning Commission
NPC:  National People’s Congress
PBoC:  People’s Bank of China
SARFT:  State Administration of Radio, Film and Television
SCIO:  State Council Information Office
SIIO:  State Internet Information Office
TC260:  Technical Committee 260
USTR:  United States Trade Representative
UN:  United Nations
WIC:  World Internet Conference
NOTES
1. This chapter has been written with the generous support of the Dutch Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs and the NWO (Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research).
2. Members of the technical community and sector institutions such as the Inter-
net Society of China did attend. Given that these organizations function under party 
leadership and maintain direct connections with the bodies in charge of Internet 
governance, this meant that Chinese governmental preferences were still represented, 
albeit indirectly.
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Cyberspace1 is managed by stakeholders from civil society, the private sec-
tor, and, to a lesser degree, by governments. The latter, however, is increas-
ingly asserting its role in cyberspace, leading to a redistribution of power in 
which states are not only competing with other stakeholders, but also among 
each other. All cyberspace users thus face a power struggle between states 
that stands to affect the private sector and civil society, the multistakeholder 
approach to managing Internet resources, and therefore cyberspace writ large.
This chapter appropriates a realist model in international relations—the 
balance of power theory (BOP)—and adjusts it with neoliberal concepts of 
power to help better understand the challenge of stability between states in 
and on cyberspace. It specifically enables the “cybered” international rela-
tions of governments to be analyzed against the backdrop of the complex 
ecosystem of stakeholders. This does not presuppose that states are or should 
be the most important or influential actors in cyberspace. Instead, this chapter 
focuses on state interests. It identifies two conditions of the BOP theory and 
applies them to cyberspace in three different scenarios previously suggested 
by states, and offers one suggestion on the way forward.
THE BALANCE OF POWER
“The greatest need of the contemporary international system is an agreed 
concept of order. In its absence, the awesome available power is unrestrained 
by any consensus as to legitimacy . . . without it stability will prove elusive.”2
The balance of power theory is one of the most enduring and protean 
concepts in international relations.3 It has also sometimes proven to be the 
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battle line between both neorealist and neoliberal interpretations in inter-
national relations scholarship. This largely has been because of different 
interpretations of the term “anarchy” in international relations, and differ-
ent assessments of the propensity of states to actually collaborate, besides 
a fundamentally different assessment of what constitutes “power.” This has 
sometimes amounted to wasted opportunity, since it is possible to apply more 
neoliberal views to BOP, both by stressing the importance of institutions as 
well as including a wider concept of power per se. This is even possible when 
taking many neorealist positions as a starting point.
For instance, a common point of departure for BOP is the basic assump-
tion that states act rationally to maximize their security or power in anar-
chic systems without a higher authority to regulate disputes.4 Robert Jervis 
lists four realist assumptions that constitute the foundation of this premise: 
(i) all states must want to survive, (ii) they are able to form alliances with 
each other based on short-term interests, (iii) war is a legitimate instru-
ment of statecraft, and (iv) several of the actors have relatively equal 
military capabilities.5 The system ensures that any one state’s power will 
be checked by a countervailing (coalition of) power that is alarmed by 
the potential hegemonic threat it poses to the system. From here on, the 
perspectives on the BOP theory diverge: one of them views the active goal 
of states as pursuing strategies designed to maintain the balance, while 
another maintains that it is an automatic consequence of state behavior, 
a side effect.6 As its name implies, the distribution of power, usually 
defined in terms of military capabilities, is central to the BOP theory.7 
In particular, rough parity among several competing actors is frequently 
posed as a necessary feature of such a system. Even though the invisible 
hand of the balance of power regulates the system, states must be moved 
by explicit concerns over a potential hegemon and be ready to counter it 
with checks and balances as they struggle to curb the rise of a potential 
hegemon. As we shall see later, this becomes complicated if one departs 
from the realist definition of power as being purely military and adopts a 
wider understanding of what power may entail.
Fundamentally, the balance of power is based on a compromise—it can-
not satisfy every actor in the international system completely. As Kissinger 
described, “Paradoxically, the generality of dissatisfaction is a condition of 
stability, because were any one power totally satisfied, all others would have 
to be totally dissatisfied. The foundation of a stable order is the relative secu-
rity—and the relative insecurity—of its members.”8 The balance of power 
works best when it keeps one state from predominating and prescribing laws 
to the rest, and prevent the aggrieved parties from seeking to overthrow the 
international order. It does not purport to avoid crises or even wars. Its goal 
is not aimed at reaching peace, but rather moderation and stability.
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Defining Cyber Power
Traditional understanding of the balance of power where states seek to 
survive as independent entities in an anarchic global system can seem par-
ticularly challenged when confronted with the concepts of cyber power. 
In a contemporary world with powerful norms against conquest, states no 
longer fear the same degree of physical extinction. The empirical evidence 
of limited military intervention for balancing purposes attests to the need to 
expand the traditionally military-security notion to include a wider range of 
means—including not only economic but also “soft power” factors.9 Indeed, 
the challenge is that in cyberspace many (but not all) of the traditional realist 
measures of state power do not seem to hold up, and it is, therefore, necessary 
to reconceive of what power means in cyberspace.
Power, however elusive and difficult to measure, goes beyond the physical or 
military supremacy over another. Joseph S. Nye offers guidance by describing 
cyber power as a unique hybrid regime of physical properties (the infrastruc-
tures, resources, rules of sovereignty, and jurisdiction) and virtual properties 
that make government control over the former difficult. Low-cost attacks from 
the virtual or informational realm can impose high impacts and costs on the 
physical layer. The opposite is also true; control over the physical layer can 
have territorial and extraterritorial effects on the virtual layer.10 Daniel Kuehl 
defines cyber power as “the ability to use cyberspace to create advantages and 
influence events in other operational environments and across the instruments 
of power.”11 In line with his distinction between hard and soft power, Nye 
conceptualizes three faces of power: (i) the coercive ability to make an actor 
do something contrary to their preferences or strategies, (ii) agenda setting or 
framing to preclude the choices of another by exclusion of their strategies, and 
(iii) shaping another’s initial preferences so that some strategies are not even 
considered.12 This chapter focuses on the first face, gives a cursory glance at 
the second, and only touches upon the third. This is not a reflection of relative 
importance of the respective faces of power (indeed some scholarship might 
consider the opposite to be the case), but rather a focus on the measurability (or 
at least observability) of the faces of power. It must be noted that none of the 
faces of power are easily quantifiable. There is no question that the measure-
ment becomes abstract. The more indirect the power relation is, the more dif-
ficult measurement becomes—that is, the third face of power is more difficult 
to measure using traditional international relations methods.
The hard power manifestation of the first face of power in cyberspace, 
which comes close to the realist interpretation of power, is the ability to 
infringe on the availability and integrity of data. This can be accomplished 
either through denial of services (e.g., DDoS) or by various methods 
designed to influence data integrity (e.g., destructive malware insertion by 
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various means). To accomplish these activities, some capability is often 
equally required in the non-kinetic field of “espionage”—that is, the abil-
ity to violate the confidentiality of data. This precursor, formally known 
as Computer Network Exploitation (CNE),13 has since been refined to 
include capabilities known as ISR (intelligence, surveillance and recon-
naissance) and OPE (operational preparation of the environment, a.k.a. 
“preparing the battlefield”).14 Thus, it is logical that the capability of states 
to inflict kinetic-effect harm in cyberspace requires (to various extents) the 
ability to conduct intelligence gathering.15 However, the exact nature of 
these “kinetic-equivalent” effects, formally simply known as “Computer 
Network Attack” and now known as “Offensive Cyber Effect Operations” 
(OCEO),16 is in doubt. While some cyber capabilities are reserved for the 
battlefield (e.g., to take out a radar to enable an air strike) and are at least 
somewhat defined and even considered as “cyber fires,”17 other capabili-
ties are less clear. For instance, OCEO targeted at a power grid could of 
course mean “switching off the grid.” But it could also mean “destroying 
the grid” to many different degrees, including to the extent that it was not 
easily reconstitutable. And finally, it could also mean something completely 
different—where, for instance, the power grid is simply repositioned to be 
used as an espionage tool,18 or even as a weapon itself. This lack of clarity 
on what exact capabilities in cyberspace are means that it is very difficult 
to describe comprehensively what the “means” (delivery systems or weap-
ons) are. In some cases, this might seem relatively easy—Stuxnet, Flame, 
Duqu Shamoon, Ouroboros, and Dark Energy, come to mind as examples 
of somewhat classifiable “cyber weapons,” but in other cases, this would be 
much more difficult. For the purposes of arms control or similar, the lack of 
transparency in presumed force deployment and even the method of opera-
tion or intended effects make the task extremely difficult, at least if an “arms 
control treaty” is the goal. At best, a “cyber weapon” remains a weapon sys-
tem of “omni-use” technologies that is extremely difficult for another state 
to verify due to a lack of transparency. Otherwise, however, states are only 
left with the ability to presume—basically to guess—the overall capability 
of another state (albeit at widely variating degrees of detail) without, in 
most cases, being able to detail the exact order of battle, table of equipment, 
tactics, techniques, and procedures or other basic information—unless the 
intelligence assessment is very complete.
Leaving the definitional hurdles aside, the equilibrium of forces or the mili-
tary balance of power in cyberspace is further complicated by characteristics 
unique to these tools:
• The success of an attack is more a reflection of the overall quality of 
defence rather than the quality of offense. An attacker will, therefore, 
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always use the “cheapest” tools available, and not necessarily the most 
advanced.19
• The vast majority of offensive cyber effects can only be deployed using 
civilian intermediaries (networks, products) that also can be part of a neu-
tral or even friendly third nation.
• The difference between imminent preparation for attack (e.g., OPE) and 
simple espionage can be hard to distinguish for the defender, making inad-
vertent escalation much more likely due to a failure to correctly interpret 
intent.
• Offensive capabilities are much cheaper and much easier to develop and 
deploy than the total sum of necessary defensive measures.20
• Unlike conventional weapons, “cyber weapons” can be reused but are also 
perishable—an entire arsenal can be rendered useless without ever being 
used once the vulnerability is patched.21
• These tools are specific—the outcomes are dependent on the victim’s net-
work—and can be immediate or time-delayed. They upend conventional 
ways of response.
• They can also be reverse engineered, weaponized and reused by the victim 
or another party that gets their hands on the technology.22
• They not only undermine the target’s security but also compromise the 
security of other actors using systems with the same vulnerabilities.23
These are just a small range of examples describing how the fundamental 
differences between cyber and conventional weapons greatly complicate the 
process of parsing state offensive cyber capabilities.
But even in the physical world, Kissinger states that “an exact balance is 
impossible, and not only because of the difficulty of predicting the aggressor. 
It is chimerical, above all, because while powers may appear to outsiders as 
factors in a security arrangement, they appear domestically as expressions of a 
historical existence. No power will submit to a settlement, however well-bal-
anced and however secure, which seems totally to deny its vision of itself.”24 
Power is thus conceived and assessed not merely as a mathematical exercise 
(the number of weapons or military capabilities) but takes into account the 
perception of a nation’s leaders, the quality of its strategies, military doctrines, 
and its will to use power effectively. Therefore, the common perception of a 
state’s cyber capabilities, even if founded on incomplete knowledge, can func-
tion as a basis for calculating the respective balance of power.
Legitimacy
A balance of power makes the overthrow of international order physically 
difficult, deterring a challenge before it occurs. A broadly based principle of 
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legitimacy produces reluctance to assault the international order. A stable 
peace testifies to a combination of physical and moral restraints.25
According to Kissinger’s theory, a balance of power is not in itself an ade-
quate basis for order. It is regarded as a minimal condition, but if it becomes 
an end in and of itself, it becomes self-destructive: “a system based purely 
upon power will turn every decision into a contest of strength, whereas the 
essence of stability is the recognition of limits by major actors.”26
If nations desire peace, they cannot seek it directly. Instead, they must 
focus on creating stable relations among nations, which, according to Kiss-
inger, is based on two major conditions: the existence of a balance of power 
and the acceptance of an international system of mediation and legitimacy 
by the major powers—an acceptance he terms “the legitimizing principle” or 
“the principle of legitimacy.” These two terms should be conceptualized as 
conditions that form the basic hypotheses about the ideal conditions for the 
effective functioning of the system.27
This brings us to the second condition of stability—which commonly 
results not from a quest for peace but from a generally accepted legitimacy. 
It means no more than an international agreement about the nature of work-
able arrangements and about the permissible aims and methods of foreign 
policy. It implies the acceptance of the framework of the international order 
by all major powers, at least to the extent that no state is so dissatisfied that 
it expresses its discontent in terms of a revolutionary foreign policy. The 
legitimizing principle reflects the prevailing values of the historical epoch, 
especially how the international order should be organized in a specific con-
text, and captures a general acknowledgment or consensus among the major 
actors in a system on what is considered to be the principal form of organiza-
tion and order.28 This principle identifies the what—the central actors—and 
the how—the types of interactions—in the international system. The peace of 
Westphalia, for example, marked a change in the legitimizing principle from 
feudalism to the system of sovereign nation-states. The legitimizing principle 
is often summarized as a “recognition of limits” by the state. It is important to 
understand that these limitations are not necessarily only legal or institutional 
but also include the understanding of what the actual and normative reality 
means.
In the context of cyberspace, the system for governing global cyber activi-
ties is primarily construed within its technical reality. The various interlock-
ing but separate governance processes that together define cyberspace have 
been described by Joseph S. Nye as forming a “regime complex.”29
This regime complex is only partially influenced by state actors, and by 
bilateral, regional, or multilateral processes. The private sector and civil 
society both generate products, common practices, and norms of behavior 
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largely separate from government involvement, although these developments 
can have significant impacts on state-led processes and discussions on inter-
national peace and security. Despite states’ traditional dominance over all 
questions related to international peace and security, governments make up 
only one out of three actor groups in the overall cyber regime complex, and 
its role within it is no greater than that of the private sector or civil society. 
The state-oriented regimes do not necessarily have the ability to speak on 
behalf of other equally crucial regimes. This creates a situation unique in 
international peace and security, where governments cannot decide on all 
aspects of the international cybersecurity domain itself, as responsibility and 
ownership for this domain is shared with non-state actors.
This could arguably be described as the multistakeholder reality of the 
domain. The multistakeholder model does not go uncriticized. First, there 
are those who say it’s too vacuous a term to describe a chaotic arrangement 
of actors and agreements that works at odds. Second, the exact legitimacy in 
determining the relevant stakeholders, especially from civil society and the 
private sector, is often mentioned as a possible stumbling block. While the 
term does not have a single overriding definition, it does have an implicit defi-
nition. Its core idea is that some issues are too complex and have too many 
independent operational stakeholders to be decided on by one inevitably 
self-interested group and, therefore, require the participation of all stakehold-
ers: civil society (including academia and technical community), the private 
Figure 7.1 “The Regime Complex for Managing Global Cyber Activities.” Source: 
Joseph S. Nye Jr. “The Regime Complex for Managing Global Cyber Activities,” Global 
Commission on the Internet Governance, May 2014. Available at: www.c igion line. org/s 
ites/ defau lt/fi les/g cig_p aper_ no1.p df.
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sector, and governments. For the Internet, this is seemingly grounded in real-
ity. It is the members of civil society (which includes state-funded university 
researchers, as well as corporate engineers working on their own time) who 
write the code of the Internet. It is the private sector that builds and owns 
most aspects of the Internet, ranging from the cables to the services, to prod-
ucts and software which runs on and in it. Government’s role is relatively 
limited in that respect. Its power is manifested through its sovereign rights 
and jurisdiction. While there are fine-tuned differences between the exact 
definition of the multistakeholder approach, for instance, between Western 
nations and China (Russia, by and large, still rejects the term entirely), there 
are more questions of applicability and responsibility. Both definitions, 
however, implicitly agree that the cyberspace domain overall is a multistake-
holder one—even if they disagree on exactly what the respective authorities 
of the actors among each other are, or at what “level” of governance and what 
kind of authority is applicable.
The ability of governments to successfully manage the threat of major 
conflict in cyberspace is, therefore, not only hampered by the rapid develop-
ment of digital technologies but also the dominant role of non-state actors 
in all shapes and forms (attacker, victim, media or carrier of attacks), as 
well as their unclear relationships with the government. Traditionally, 
all questions related to international peace and security occur within the 
governmental remit of states and the UN First Committee, while in reality 
governments only constitute one of three stakeholder groups in the wider 
cyberspace ecosystem. Failure to reach meaningful progress at the multilat-
eral level has led other civil society and industry to become more involved 
in developing rules of the road.30 This is not the first time that this has 
occurred—nongovernmental groups have previously helped reshape global 
discussions on responsible behavior.31 Governments and international orga-
nizations are beginning to recognize the need for industry and civil society 
involvement at the traditionally state-led multilateral level. Initiatives 
such as the “Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace,”32 the “UN 
Secretary General’s High-Level Panel on Digital Cooperation,”33 and the 
civil society and industry consultations of the “UN Open-Ended Working 
Group on Developments in the Field of Information and Communications 
Technologies in the Context of International Security”34 are testament to 
this development.
Finally, there is the question of the ideological connotation of the multi-
stakeholder model itself, opening the door for further neo-corporatist influ-
ence over the governance structure. While many of these points are worthy 
of further examination and debate, there is often the assessment on par with 
liberal democratic systems that it might be one of the worst systems out 
there, but still better than the alternatives. Support for the multistakeholder 
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approach should not just be based on the notion of simply being “inclusive.” 
Instead, they allow for decision- and policy making to be informed and 
shaped by the relevant and authoritative sources. Within the complex con-
text of cyberspace, it’s not an ideology, but a necessity—the removal of the 
private sector and civil society from the Internet governance architecture is 
simply not physically possible.
Given this complex landscape, it is unlikely there can be a singularly 
encompassing entity successfully acting unilaterally across the entire regime 
complex. If, for instance, governments, as an overall actor group, were to 
agree to make definitive changes to the current non-state-dominated Inter-
net governance structures, then there would almost certainly be a strong 
reaction—not only from the private sector but also from the engineers and 
hobbyists who have coded most of the backbone of the Internet. Install-
ing an intergovernmental organization instead of, for instance, the Internet 
Engineering Task Force, would not simply make these volunteers stop work-
ing on Internet technology. Therefore, the most basic reality of the wider 
cyber regime complex is that it is in its own, precarious, multistakeholder 
balance. While states can and may expand their own arrangements among 
each other, certain basic realities of how the domain is managed cannot be 
changed. Nothing that completely goes against the diffused power structure 
of cyberspace can, therefore, be considered viable or “legitimate”—the mul-
tistakeholder approach is, therefore, in effect, the Westphalian System of the 
Internet.
BALANCING POWER IN CYBERSPACE
Thus far, it has become apparent that an equilibrium of state forces in cyber-
space remains elusive because of the lack of a basic understanding of each 
other’s capabilities and doctrines and, therefore, also a minimum amount of 
agreed definitions. Moving beyond power, the legitimizing principle reflects 
the recognition of the limits of states in the prevailing reality of the historical 
epoch. In cyberspace, this arguably can be expressed as the multistakeholder 
approach because of the technical reality of cyberspace that prevents one 
party from deciding universally and unilaterally.
From a state perspective, there are different ways to achieve a balance of 
power. In the next section, the guiding principles will be applied to three 
scenarios proposed by states that roughly correspond to the first three com-
mittees of the UN General Assembly to see how likely they can actually lead 
to a balance of power that upholds to the legitimizing principle. This does not 
mean that the UN is or should be the sole means through which to establish 
international peace and stability in cyberspace. Instead, it offers a starting 
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point to identify initiatives that have been previously proposed by govern-
ments, and one suggestion on the way forward.
First Basket, First Committee Issues
The First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly deals with 
issues of disarmament and international security. As previously mentioned, 
states make up only one of the three actor groups within the overall cyber 
regime complex despite their traditional dominance over all questions related 
to international peace and security in cyberspace, meaning they cannot 
decide on all aspects by itself—ownership is shared with the private sec-
tor and civil society. Yet, the involvement of non-state stakeholders in the 
international state-led processes remains limited at best. The last UN GGE 
Consensus Report (described below) seems to acknowledge the need to 
involve other stakeholders in its conclusions: “while States have a primary 
responsibility to maintain a secure and peaceful ICT environment, effective 
international cooperation would benefit from identifying mechanisms for the 
participation, as appropriate, of the private sector, academia and civil society 
organisations.”35
Using Nye’s cyber regime complex as a point of departure, one of the 
authors expands Joseph Nye’s regime complex to offer an impression of the 
stakeholders and respective processes affecting the political-military dimen-
sion of cybersecurity, a.k.a. “international cybersecurity” or “international 
peace and security in cyberspace” that could be considered UN First Com-
mittee issues.
In the UN context, the First Committee is most concerned with guiding 
responsible state behavior in terms of international peace and security in 
cyberspace. To this end, there have been three major state efforts in the UN.36
 1. The United Nations Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) and the 
Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) on Developments in the Field 
of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of Interna-
tional Security. Since its inception in 2010, the GGE has convened five 
times and issued three consensus reports. Each group had a mandate of 
only one year—which, until now, has been renewed on an annual basis. 
The first consensus report recommended that states consider norms, con-
fidence-building measures (CBMs), and capacity-building initiatives to 
“reduce the risk of misperception” in cyberspace.37 In the second consen-
sus report, major powers explicitly recognized for the first time that the 
application of international law, in particular the Charter of the United 
Nations, is essential to maintaining peace and stability in cyberspace.38 
It also encouraged the development of regional confidence-building 
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measures. The third consensus report outlines voluntary peacetime norms 
states are encouraged to follow. The 2016–2017 iteration failed to reach 
a consensus report. The stumbling block: the application of international 
law to cyber operations.39 In more recent developments, the 73rd Session 
of the UN General Assembly saw proposals from the United States40 and 
Russia41 to create two parallel working groups, a reiteration of the GGE 
and a proposal for a new Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG), within 
the disarmament machinery to develop rules for responsible state behav-
ior in cyberspace, which are widely seen as two competing processes. 
Both processes establish modalities for multilateral engagement, yet the 
OEWG presents a wider scope for consultation with non-state stake-
holders in the private sector and civil society communities. Meaningful 
participation and input is by no means a given, as it is still unclear as to 
what kinds of results these modalities will lead to in practice.
 2. Members of the SCO have circulated a draft international code of 
conduct for information security at the UN General Assembly.42 
Figure 7.2 The Cyber Regime Complex by Stakeholder Group: The “International 
Cybersecurity” Cluster. Source: Alexander Klimburg, “To the GGE and beyond,” UNIDIR 
Cyber Stability Conference Series, 17 July 2016, Geneva. Available at: www.u nidir .ch/f 
iles/ confe rence s/pdf s/loo king- ahead -the- gge-a nd-be yond- en-1- 1173. pdf.
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The code proposes that states voluntarily forego the “use of [ICTs] 
. . . to carry out activities which run counter to the task of maintaining 
international peace and security.” It predominantly focuses on interstate 
cooperation against the use of ICTs to incite the “three evil –isms”—ter-
rorism, separatism or extremism—as well as reinforces a multilateral 
model for Internet governance and the notion of noninterference in the 
internal affairs of states through ICTs. The code has been floated at the 
UN since 2011, but has attracted criticism for its perceived incompat-
ibility with human rights law.43
 3. Finally, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution in 2003, call-
ing on states to build a culture of cybersecurity by encouraging domestic 
stakeholders to be aware of cybersecurity risks and to take steps to miti-
gate them.44
Other multilateral initiatives to enhance international security and stabil-
ity have been agreed outside of the auspices of the UN, most notably, the 
work of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), 
the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and other regional organizations on 
CBMs. In addition, previous efforts have been made toward potential control 
of “intrusion software” by the Wassenaar Arrangement that aimed at “creat-
ing a consensus approach to regulate conventional arms and dual-use goods 
and services.”45 It has forty-one signatories that regulate the export of both 
conventional weapons and dual-use goods, which includes certain categories 
of information systems.46 In 2013, the member states agreed to include cer-
tain categories of intrusion software to this list.47 Although this may bolster 
states against network intrusions, it also significantly impedes the ability of 
information security researchers to exchange findings without risking crimi-
nal proceedings.
Despite these efforts, the year 2017 marked the shortcomings of meaning-
ful interstate efforts to advance norms and legal interpretations to bring inter-
national security and stability. This is just one way to do so. Some experts 
foresee a more fruitful future for operational cooperation—for example, in 
CBMs,48 while others are exploring countering efforts to the proliferation of 
offensive cyber capabilities.49
The most likely application of a balance of power framework could be 
through the field of arms control, which is traditionally the only venue where 
states openly consider trade-offs in their individual security in the name of 
broader peace. It would also be the most difficult to achieve—the last twenty 
years have shown that the arms control discussion in cyberspace has been 
beset with challenges, from applying overtly traditional models of negotiation 
(only including governments) to the inability to even agree on basic terms. 
As noted before, the notion of what constitutes a “cyberweapon” is as open 
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and contentious as the concept behind “cyber power” per se, and there is no 
definition of a cyberweapon or even cyber capabilities that would lend itself 
to negotiations. Russia and China still view cyber threats in fundamentally 
different ways as the United States (e.g., information weapons versus cyber 
tools), making it difficult to establish and enforce such a framework. There 
are some workarounds that have been suggested, such as the focus on sim-
ply regulating certain “effects” rather than trying to define the weapons. 
However, they also stumble over some basic differences in understanding 
of international law. Currently, the open questions in international law, par-
ticularly the status of data as an object,50 are almost as difficult as technical 
understanding of what could comprise a “weapon” in cyberspace, mainly due 
to the dual-use or omni-use nature of many of the potential subcomponents in 
a “cyberweapon,” and the need for the technical community, researchers, or 
the private sector to be able to provide security tools for testing.
The introduction of two competing processes within the First Committee 
neither represent encouraging developments in this regard, signifying that 
divergent views between UN member states, in particular between liberal 
democracies and autocracies, persist even despite progress that may have 
previously been made through the GGE. However, if these hurdles can be 
overcome, the ability to at least agree on a counter-proliferation agreement 
(similar to the Missile Technology Control Regime or the Treaty on the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons) is theoretically possible.51 Such an 
agreement would clarify both concepts and capabilities of signatory states, 
as well as limit the transfer of those capabilities to other actors (including 
non-state actors). If such a treaty neither violated the need of the technical 
community to have simple and easy access to security testing tools, nor set 
a dangerous precedent by trying to “outlaw” individual pieces of code glob-
ally, then it could arguably provide for a much-needed dose of predictability 
among states.
Second Basket, Second Committee Issues
The Second Committee of the United Nations General Assembly focuses pri-
marily on economic and financial issues, and has a strong connection to the 
United Nations Development Programme and the United Nations Economic 
and Social Council (ECOSOC). The council is covered by the schedule 
officers from both the Second and Third Committees. The primary issue on 
the committee’s agenda is the “digital economy”—an issue predominantly 
discussed outside of the auspices of the United Nations, by institutions such 
as the EU, OECD, G20, G7, WEF, to name but a few. The digital economy 
includes specific issues such as digital trade, e-commerce, infrastructure 
development, and industry 4.0.
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In this context, however, a closer look will be taken at law enforcement 
cooperation as a potential approach to establish a balance of power. Admit-
tedly, law enforcement cooperation can also be categorized under the First 
or Third Committee issues. The Budapest Convention on Cybercrime estab-
lished by the Council of Europe and open to third party members is one of the 
most authoritative in this context, but has been criticized because it seemingly 
enforces a Western narrative.52 In response, Russia has reportedly proposed 
a draft convention on countering cybercrime and promoting law enforcement 
cooperation under the auspices of the United Nations, as it apparently believes 
previous conventions threaten the sovereignty of independent states.53
The area of law enforcement cooperation offers some possibilities for pur-
suing a balance of power approach between states. First, in this context, the 
power of states is at least partially framed by the second and the third face of 
power considerations—co-option and conviction of soft power, besides the 
overall perceived coercive “hard power” strength of its suspected military 
and intelligence cyber capabilities. Second, a state can relatively easily ramp 
Figure 7.3 The Cyber Regime Complex by Stakeholder Group: “Law Enforcement” and 
“Civil Rights” Clusters. Source: Alexander Klimburg, “To the GGE and beyond,” UNIDIR 
Cyber Stability Conference Series, 17 July 2016, Geneva. Available at: www.u nidir .ch/f 
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up its engagement in negotiations in this space, but it will be a credible actor 
only if it has a strong reputation in general and in the “rule of law” in particu-
lar—not necessarily the easiest of all criteria to fulfill. Third, it allows states 
to address the issue of malicious non-state actors that impact their national 
security concerns, including, for instance, countering the terrorist use of 
ICTs. Finally, a law enforcement approach that concentrates on mutual legal 
assistance treaties (MLATs), rather than specifying specific crimes, does not 
contradict the legitimizing principle.
The limitations of the benefits of the law enforcement treaty approach to 
achieve a balance of power are based upon a simple understanding of what 
power in cyberspace is. Such a treaty would theoretically have little bearing 
on a state’s ability to conduct offensive cyber operations and, therefore, would 
not impact its “hard power” capabilities, unless the government in question 
clandestinely leverages cybercrime actors to buttress its own governmental 
capabilities. In the latter case, such a treaty would represent a clear loss for 
the cybercrime-supporting side, and a number of governments probably do 
fall into this category, limiting decisively their actual power gains as well.
A law enforcement approach is theoretically possible and more likely to 
succeed than the arms control approach described above and the Internet gov-
ernance approach that will follow below, but it falls short in what it delivers 
for the balancing of states. Although it does not necessarily address the hard 
powers of states, it deals with the contentious issue of non-state actors that 
governments have struggled to manage, and, more importantly, builds confi-
dence among states. A final disclaimer would be that the proposed solutions 
to “double-bad” issues (illegal in both jurisdictions) can be a slippery slope 
for increasingly intrusive surveillance measures that the Western like-minded 
states would not condone.
Third and Fourth Basket, Third Committee Issues
The Third Committee of the United Nations General Assembly focuses the 
social, humanitarian and cultural issues. Most notably, human rights are 
discussed within this committee, and also in other UN institutions, such as 
the Human Rights Council and UNESCO, as well as outside the UN con-
text: the Council of Europe, EU, OSCE, Freedom Online Coalition (FOC), 
IGF, WSIS, APC, Human Rights Watch, and many more. The application of 
international law (including human rights law) has already been established 
by the United Nations, and a human rights-based approach has been reiter-
ated in many other contexts such as the NETmundial Declaration in 2014. 
It is, however, unlikely to create a balance of power among states by and of 
itself as many of the multilateralist countries that promote a state-governed 
Internet through notions such as “cyber sovereignty” remain critical of human 
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rights. Moreover, human rights law governs mainly the relations between 
governments and their citizens. Instead, it needs to be incorporated into other 
approaches.
Finally, there have been several attempts by states to assert power in 
cyberspace by pushing for a state-led Internet governance approach through 
the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) of the United Nations. 
Internet governance is largely treated as a Second Committee issue (primarily 
through ECOSOC and the Internet Governance Forum) but there are options 
to connect it to the Third Committee as well. The IGF has no formal decision-
making power or government policy-making impact, but instead helps to 
coordinate and facilitate among the different Internet governance constituen-
cies. If the Third Committee link to Internet governance can be strengthened, 
this might also reinforce the notion of a rights-based Internet.
The Internet governance regime complex best represents the complexity 
of dealing with the larger issues of managing resources and behaviors in 
cyberspace. It encompasses a wide range of different institutions, from estab-
lished international organizations like the International Telecommunications 
Union (ITU)54 to the critical Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)55 that is 
characterized by its informal structure, and the nonprofit public-benefit cor-
poration known as the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Num-
bers (ICANN).56 Most importantly, the Internet governance ecosystem is 
resolutely representative of the multistakeholder approach, with civil society, 
the private sector and government stakeholders each working more or less 
equally according to their strengths. As such, it is a “proof” of the legitimiz-
ing principle of cyberspace: nothing that is determined about resources and 
behaviors in cyberspace can be legitimate if it fully violates the basic reality 
of how the Internet is actually managed.
As such, a major question of the state’s influence on Internet governance 
was solved by a momentous decision by the Obama administration. The day 
of October 1, 2016 marked a historic moment, when the US government 
officially cut the final strings to its influence over ICANN by handing over 
the IANA function—the management of the root zone file of the Internet—to 
ICANN in its entirety.57 The process of slowly moving the Internet away from 
government influence was arguably part of the basic US approach to the Inter-
net since as far back as the 1980s. A number of steps under various administra-
tions conformed to this principle—slowly moving the Internet “back into the 
Internet community” that gave birth to it, even if that community was heavily 
financed by the US government in its early years. The commitment of the US 
government to fully disinvest itself from the last vestiges of direct control over 
the Internet was given new urgency after the June 2013 Snowden revelations 
and the significant impact this had on US “soft power,” particularly in and 
through cyberspace. Although it marks an awkward bent in realist thinking 
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that a state would voluntary give up power, the Obama administration made 
the assessment that sticking to previous political commitments and “releas-
ing” the last shreds of government control over the Internet confirmed to 
three objectives, namely it reinforced the US soft power when it gave up its 
first “potentially coercive” face of power, to (i) gain a stronger position in the 
second face, that is, in agenda setting or framing, (ii) it confirmed a self-image 
of the United States as a leader of a “Free Internet,” and (iii) it finally rein-
forced the basic legitimizing principle of the Internet altogether: it is run by the 
multistakeholder approach, and no one government can exercise a hegemonic 
position on it. Instead, all states enjoy the same relative power. Therefore, the 
US IANA disinvestment played a significant role in bringing a “balance of 
power” to the Internet governance domain itself.
The internal balance of power within Internet governance means that it is, 
in effect, a poor choice for states to advance their power through this approach 
as it would disrupt the current system and the legitimizing principle. If a state 
tried to do so at the expense of the multistakeholder model, it would conflict 
Figure 7.4 The Cyber Regime Complex by Stakeholder Group: “Internet Governance” 
Cluster. Source: Alexander Klimburg, “To the GGE and beyond,” UNIDIR Cyber Stability 
Conference Series, 17 July 2016, Geneva. Available at: www.u nidir .ch/f iles/ confe rence s/
pdf s/loo king- ahead -the- gge-a nd-be yond- en-1- 1173. pdf.
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with the basic reality of the domain, in which the key technical standard set-
ting bodies, such as the IETF, are resolutely outside of governmental control 
and due to their voluntary nature cannot be co-opted by it. If a state tried to 
expand its power while at the same time maintaining the multistakeholder 
model, it would be limited to very small, incremental increases, thus limiting 
its attractiveness. Restructuring the Internet governance ecosystem to that of 
an intergovernmental structure is, therefore, a poor choice for states to seek a 
different balance of power among states as they already enjoy the same rela-
tive power under the current ICANN structure that respects the legitimizing 
principle of the multistakeholder model.
CONCLUSION: TOWARD A BASKET-
BASED APPROACH FOR CYBERSPACE
This chapter sets out to assess the application of the balance of power theory 
to cyberspace to establish international stability and order. It did so by pursu-
ing a more neoliberal interpretation of power. Two conditions of the balance 
of power theory were applied to three approaches or scenarios that roughly 
correspond to the first three committees of the United Nations General 
Assembly, to see how they could contribute to such a stable environment, 
leading to the following preliminary observations.
Overall, merit can be found in the realist approach to stability and inter-
national order in cyberspace by describing it in terms of compromise and of 
relative security and relative insecurity. By adopting a neoliberal interpreta-
tion of the notion of cyber power, the balance of power theory can be applied 
to certain aspects of cyberspace. Establishing stability in this environment 
hinges upon the acceptance of the framework of the international order by 
all major powers, at least to the extent that no state is so dissatisfied that it 
expresses it in a revolutionary foreign policy. At least for now, the Internet 
governance domain enjoys a balance of power among states in accordance 
with the legitimizing principle. This principle, described as a “recognition of 
limits” by the state, is construed by the technical reality of the domain inhibit-
ing one party from deciding universally and unilaterally, arguably defined as 
the multistakeholder reality in the context of cyberspace.
However, the condition of an equilibrium of forces that lies at the core 
of the balance of power theory is currently impossible to establish as it 
requires states to have a basic understanding of each other’s capabilities and, 
therefore, a minimum amount of agreed definitions as to what constitutes a 
“cyberweapon.” In this context, compared to the other options, an arms con-
trol treaty has most to offer for the balance of power for states in cyberspace. 
If nearly all difficulties could be overcome, it would clarify those concepts 
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of capabilities that are in much need of more transparency. This transparency 
can be delivered in the short term through CBMs, agreements of self-restraint 
or norms, but those fall short in terms of visibility, verification, and rigor in 
the long run compared to the former approach.
Each of the other baskets has its own specific merit, but falls short in estab-
lishing a balance of power for states in adherence to the legitimizing prin-
ciple. Instead, a holistic basket-based approach could serve as an alternative. 
In a thought piece for the Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace, 
Wolfgang Kleinwächter describes the need, dilemmas, and possibilities of 
such an approach.58 Using the context of the “Helsinki Process” of the 1970s 
as a source of inspiration, Kleinwächter identifies four baskets: (1) cyber-
security, (2) digital economy, (3) human rights, and (4) technology. These 
correspond to the previously discussed baskets with the addition of “technol-
ogy.” Each basket includes a different constellation of actors and constituen-
cies involved and, therefore, enjoys different levels of multistakeholder and 
multilateral engagement, as appropriate. Kleinwächter in particular highlights 
the attraction of the Helsinki Process: namely, that the basket-based approach 
is the only way to align the vastly different interests of the two per-dominant 
power blocks and that of the G77, as well as fitting the essential multistake-
holder reality that underpins all aspects of cyberspace.
The baskets are not “joined” or organized in a hierarchical fashion. Instead, 
they are brought together under a decentralized Conference on Security 
and Cooperation in Cyberspace (CSCC) and connected through a system 
of liaisons and mechanisms of reciprocal reporting to increase information 
exchange, cross-fertilization, and eventually, more coherence across these 
topics. Like its historical precedent, each basket is negotiated individually, 
but remains interconnected with the others, allowing asymmetric compro-
mises in the negotiation processes—as the British foreign minister argued in 
1972, “if we don’t lay eggs in the third basket, there will be none in the other 
ones either.” Ideally, over time, the actions of states would balance out across 
all baskets, enabling not only information exchange but also a more concerted 
level of negotiation between states. The conference would aim at drafting a 
“Final Act on Security and Cooperation in Cyberspace” (FASCC), legally 
nonbinding commitments from governments, the private sector, civil society 
and the technical community.59
Fundamentally, the inspiration drawn from the Helsinki Process revolves 
around the same essential complex “bottom-up” nature of negotiations, its 
emphasis on “soft law” (none of the Helsinki agreements have treaty status), 
the strengthening of human rights, and the weak institutional basis (the OSCE 
was set up only in 1995). Furthermore, through the Helsinki Watch groups 
and earlier inclusion of nongovernmental organizations, formal involvement 
and consultation of non-state actors are facilitated. Just like in the 1970s, 
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when the idea to have a discussion about conventional forces in Europe side-
by-side with a human rights discussion, the same “basket-based” approach 
could be applied to the wide variety of issues in cyberspace: International 
peace and security issues, cybercrime (terrorist use of the Internet) and eco-
nomic and development issues, human rights and Internet governance issues. 
These also nicely align with the UN First to Third Committees.
Most importantly, it needs to be pointed out that the Helsinki Final Act did 
not create new norms but reinforced existing norms within the UN charter. It 
provided for an “enhanced explanation” of the Charter, something that could 
be very welcome in the context of cyberspace. It would also help define the 
exact role of the multistakeholder model and its application across the bas-
kets. Just like the original Helsinki Process, it does require the full-fledged 
support of all major powers to get underway—the United States was notably 
hesitant on the Helsinki Process from the very start, and a new Helsinki 
Process might be equally popular, for similar reasons. However, the legally 
nonbinding status here is key—it provides assurances to the doubters that the 
process can be reversed if necessary, while at the same time does not under-
mine existing international law.
A basket-based model inspired by the Helsinki Process could create an 
environment in which all major players can expand their foreign policy inter-
ests in the respective baskets, while leaving room for others to do the same, 
leading to a more stable situation whereby all states are equally (dis)satisfied 
and at the same time respect the legitimizing principle of a multistakeholder 
reality in cyberspace. No matter how likely its success, it needs to be seen as 
a collaborative effort where progress toward stability can be made on several 
fronts.
The basket-based approach is obviously just one approach that need not 
frame a “final answer” to the overarching problem of balancing states’ inter-
ests in cyberspace. But it may form a beginning.
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Cybersecurity has become a key component of national security calling for 
effective international cooperation. As the NATO Secretary-General high-
lighted, “today, a cyber-attack can be as destructive as a conventional attack, 
and practically every conflict has a cyber dimension. So being able to defend 
ourselves in cyber space, is just as important as defending ourselves on land, 
at sea and in the air.”2 A credible international legal framework is a neces-
sary enabler to a peaceful, secure, and stable cyberspace. The application of 
international law to cyberspace is now broadly accepted.3 However, the lack 
of clarity as to how international law applies has fueled debates on the appli-
cation of important areas of international law to cyberspace, such as the law 
of state responsibility, the law of self-defense, and international humanitar-
ian law. Toward maintaining peace and security in cyberspace in line with 
Article 1 of the Charter of the United Nations4 and Article 3 of the North 
Atlantic Treaty,5 there is value in gaining greater clarity on what constitutes 
acceptable peacetime behavior in cyberspace and what actions could call for 
legally justified responses.
Within this context, normative constraints can contribute to preventing 
conflict in cyberspace by promoting stability and the rule of law and by 
facilitating transparency and confidence building between states. States set 
the parameters which form the basis of norms for responsible state behavior 
according to their consistent practice and expressed intentions. States have at 
times been reluctant to establish potentially binding rules when the underly-
ing technology and the corresponding threats to cybersecurity are evolving in 
such a dynamic way. Nevertheless, there has generally been broad consensus 
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and support for the development of voluntary cyber norms themselves in 
order to set some parameters and build trust between states in cyberspace in 
the context of the United Nations.6 These efforts continue to be underway at 
this time of publication. Despite such support for the establishment of vol-
untary norms in cyberspace, reaching agreement on the substance of those 
norms has proven to be difficult at times.7 Without prejudice to ongoing 
discussions at the United Nations and other fora, NATO, bringing together 
twenty-nine sovereign nations for collective defense within the legal frame-
work of the North Atlantic Treaty,8 can potentially add value to this debate. 
The organization provides a forum for daily multilateral discussions and 
exchanges of views on collective security issues, including cyber defense. 
Multilateralism as practiced at NATO is a process of continuous consultation 
based on shared values in the spirit of cooperation.9 NATO also provides a 
venue where member states can express support or alignment with a posi-
tion or with principles expressed by individual allies. The regular meetings 
of heads of state and government provide an opportunity for member states 
to make clear public statements on common security priorities. Since 2008, 
cyber defense has featured prominently in all summit declarations. For exam-
ple, at the Warsaw Summit in 2016, allies affirmed that cyberattacks present 
a clear challenge to the security of the alliance and could be as harmful to 
modern societies as a conventional attack.10 At the Wales Summit in 2014, 
NATO heads of state and government underlined that NATO’s cyber policy 
must reaffirm, “the principles of the indivisibility of Allied security and of 
prevention, detection, resilience, recovery, and defense.”11
NATO is not a state but an international organization. As such, NATO 
does not create international law or voluntary norms that regulate state behav-
ior. There would be little appetite among allies and in the broader interna-
tional community for NATO to lead the global debate on the development 
of voluntary norms for responsible state behavior in cyberspace. That said, 
as a multinational intergovernmental organization, NATO provides a good 
vantage point from which to observe and note emerging state practice. The 
organization has followed with interest the debates in various international 
fora on how to make cyberspace safer and more secure since such efforts 
actually set important parameters and frame policy discussions on collective 
defence. At the Brussels Summit in July 2018, allies affirmed NATO support 
for “work to maintain international peace and security in cyberspace and to 
promote stability and reduce the risk of conflict, recognizing that we all stand 
to benefit from a norms-based, predictable, and secure cyberspace.”12
Written from the perspective of two practitioners, this chapter will begin 
by expanding on the role of norms in the promotion of international peace 
and security, and will then propose four areas within NATO’s mandate where 
allies could potentially contribute to the socialization of broad voluntary 
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norms. The chapter concludes that although states are responsible for norms, 
given the proliferation of cyber threats to transatlantic security, NATO cannot 
but both contribute to and draw guidance from the ongoing debates on the 
development of norms of responsible state behavior and stability in cyber-
space. Furthermore, recent experience in NATO and in other international 
fora has underlined the importance of reinforcing effective enforcement 
mechanisms and potential response options.
NORMATIVE CONSTRAINTS AND CYBERSECURITY
NATO heads of state and government affirmed at the Wales Summit in 2014 
that international law, including international humanitarian law and the UN 
Charter, applies in cyberspace.13 Although there is now general consensus 
on the fundamental role that international law can play in promoting peace 
and stability in cyberspace, questions remain as to how international law 
applies in a cyber context. For example, questions relating to attribution and 
state responsibility, which have always been difficult topics in international 
law, have become even more so given the intrinsically anonymous and 
asymmetrical nature of cyberspace. There are also questions as to whether a 
particular cyber activity is of such a nature to warrant a response, preventa-
tive or defensive. The “below-the-threshold” nature of most malign cyber 
incidents challenges our understanding of what counts as an internationally 
wrongful act which could form the basis of a legally justified response such 
as countermeasures. The lack of clarity in these crucial and contentious areas 
makes it difficult to predict state action in the cyber realm and the existence 
of divergent views among states risks leading to misperceptions and potential 
escalations.14
Several important international initiatives have provided some guidance on 
these and other questions. The development of the two Tallinn Manuals under 
the auspices of the NATO-accredited Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of 
Excellence (CCDCOE) in Estonia has helped identify the key legal issues 
and provides an academic assessment of the application of international law 
to cyberspace. As the development of the manuals was not a process formally 
endorsed by states, experts were free to thoroughly explore the implications 
of legal issues and states had an opportunity to offer comments during the so-
called Hague Process. The manuals have become indispensable desk books 
for lawyers and cyber policy experts. However, although the Manuals help us 
interpret the law, they are not official NATO doctrine and do not constitute 
the law itself.
There has been progress in advancing the norms debate in international fora, 
many of which have largely been aspirational in nature.15 The United Nations 
176 Steven Hill and Nadia Marsan
Group of Government Experts, a United Nations working group of experts 
from member states, was created to study “potential threats in the sphere of 
information security.” The 2016/2017 Group was to consider measures to 
address these threats, including “norms, rules, and principles of responsible 
behavior of states, confidence building measures, and capacity building.”16 
The Group’s failure to arrive at a consensus report and robust substantive 
rules highlighted, for some, the reluctance of states to seriously engage on the 
question of the application of international law in cyberspace. These efforts 
continue at the time of publication under the auspices of two bodies: a Group 
of Governmental Experts and an Open-Ended Working Group.
National initiatives such as the London and the Hague Processes as well as 
recent statements made by NATO allies have contributed to further clarify-
ing some elements of contention on the application of international law to 
cyberspace. A former legal adviser at the US Department of State, Harold 
Koh, set out early in the process that international law applies to cyberspace 
and that the development of common understandings about how these rules 
apply will promote greater stability in cyberspace.17 In 2017, another former 
legal adviser at the US Department of State, Brian Egan, confirmed that from 
the US perspective, the international law of state responsibility supplies the 
needed standards for attributing acts, including cyber acts to states.18 More 
recently, the former UK attorney general Jeremy Wright elucidated the UK 
interpretation of several key components of international law as they apply 
in cyberspace, including on the application of the UN Charter, the unlawful 
intervention on state sovereignty and the corresponding use of countermea-
sures.19 Commemorating one year of the Tallinn Manual 2.0, the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, HE Mr. Stef Blok, affirmed the Dutch 
position that there is no need to develop a new system of international law for 
cyberspace, arguing that the clear application of existing laws in cyberspace 
is the best guarantee of an open, free, and stable Internet in the future.20
These important statements and international efforts have all contributed 
to setting some important parameters for the debate. Indeed, clear national 
statements about the applicable legal framework enhance cyber stability by 
increasing predictability. States, especially those with advanced cyber capa-
bilities, should be “open and clear in setting out the rules” they feel bound by 
since, in doing so, they “demonstrate not just [their] commitment to the rules 
based international order, but also [their] leadership in its development.”21 
States themselves set out the normative constraints that bind them in their 
international relations; domestic sources of “law are found in statutes and 
in court judgments—but there are few of either in international law, instead 
there are treaties, and customary international law formed from the general 
and consistent practice of states acting out of a sense of obligation.”22
Cyber defense is part of NATO’s core task of collective defense, within 
NATO’s broader deterrence and defense posture which was strengthened at 
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the NATO Summit in Wales in 2014. Mechanisms used in deterrence, includ-
ing denial by defense and the development of voluntary norms, are intended 
to dissuade or diminish the likelihood of unacceptable behavior by making 
the costs of the bad actions exceed the benefits to be gained therefrom.23 A 
“norm” is broadly understood as “a collective expectation of proper behavior 
of actors with a given identity.”24 Although norms are not legally binding in 
themselves, “laws can serve as a basis for formulating norms, just as norms 
can be codified by law.”25 In distinguishing between formal international law 
and voluntary nonbinding norms, Brian Egan notes that norms “set out stan-
dards of expected state behavior that may, in certain circumstances, overlap 
with standards of behavior that are required as a matter of international law. 
Such norms are intended to supplement existing international law. They are 
designed to address certain cyber activities by States that occur outside the 
context of armed conflict that are potentially destabilizing.”26
Within NATO’s legal framework of the North Atlantic Treaty, the util-
ity of norms is not so much geared toward inducing a negative impact on 
detractors’ reputation or soft power, but rather toward elucidating how allies 
apply and interpret their commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty in 
cyberspace, thereby increasing predictability and clarifying where collective 
NATO action may be legally justified.
As described above, NATO can provide an important forum for member 
nations to discuss cyber defense. The foundational elements of NATO’s 
approach to cyber defense include a respect for and inviolability of the sover-
eign nature of allies’ cyber defense capabilities, strong political oversight by 
allies, and the requirement for consistency with NATO obligations and inter-
national law. These commitments provide a reassuring environment where 
allies show mutual respect of each other’s sovereignty and need for political 
oversight, while encouraging constant dialogue, cooperation, and assurance 
that threats to cybersecurity will be addressed in line with international law.
In their chapter “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” Mar-
tha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink develop the idea of a three-stage “norm 
life cycle” from norm emergence to norm acceptance to internalization. 
Between the first and second stages, they identify a “tipping point” whereby 
a critical mass of relevant state actors adopt the norm.27 The second stage also 
called “norm cascades” is animated by states and international organizations 
toward increasing legitimacy through institutionalization.28 NATO could act 
as a socialization venue precisely at the tipping point between norm emer-
gence and norm acceptance. Indeed, the multilateralism of the alliance can 
function as an agent of socialization by encouraging states within the alliance, 
by virtue of their identity as members of a group tied by shared values, to 
adopt common policies and to subscribe to the set standards of expected state 
behavior in cyberspace.29 If we look at the timeline of UNGGE decisions30 
and NATO heads of state and government decisions on cyber since 2012, 
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we see that NATO provided an opportunity for a group of nations united by 
shared values to socialize and affirm principles that emerged in other inter-
national fora, the UN GGE in this case. This should not be underestimated as 
what may begin as a general, shared and nonbinding principle can, by virtue 
of state practice and a sense of legal obligation, “crystallize into binding cus-
tomary international law” over time.31
NORMS, DETERRENCE, AND NATO
Within NATO, allies have coalesced on a few fundamental areas that can 
serve as building blocks for the development and particularly the socializa-
tion of norms: the rule of law, restraint, resilience, and mutual cooperation 
and assistance. These areas are well anchored in the North Atlantic Treaty 
and in the most recent Summit Communiques, which supplement the work 
of international expert groups regarding how well-established areas of inter-
national law apply to cyberspace.
Rule of Law
Allies express their commitment to the rule of law in the preamble to the 
North Atlantic Treaty which states that “the Parties to this Treaty . . . are 
determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of 
their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and 
the rule of law.” At the NATO Summit in Wales in 2014, allies recognized 
that “international law, including international humanitarian law and the UN 
Charter, applies in cyberspace.”32 More recently, at the Brussels Summit in 
July 2018, allies reaffirmed their “commitment to act in accordance with 
international law, including the UN Charter, international humanitarian law, 
and human rights law, as applicable.”33
The broad affirmation of the application of the body of international law to 
cyberspace cannot be underestimated. It is the essential starting point toward 
ensuring predictability and stability as it places a duty on states to exercise 
diligence in the application of international law in cyberspace. At the NATO 
Summit in Warsaw in 2016, NATO heads of state and government recog-
nized cyberspace as an operational domain “in which NATO must defend 
itself as effectively as it does in the air, on land, and at sea.”34 Together with 
the commitment to respect the UN Charter and international humanitarian 
law, the designation of cyberspace as an operational domain indirectly rein-
forces the tenet that the general corpus of international law applying in the 
air, land, and sea domains also applies in cyberspace. Although every situa-
tion is unique and states must be able to respond to cyber incidents using a 
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wide variety of means, states have the obligation to act in accordance with 
international law before (jus ad bellum) and during an armed conflict (jus in 
bello) as well as during peacetime.
With the application of international law in cyberspace, it can be inferred 
that there is no immediate requirement to create new legal instruments to 
govern state behavior in cyberspace. Such proposals, including the idea of 
a Digital Geneva Convention35 or of an International Code of Conduct for 
Information Security,36 have raised a number of concerns on the part of some 
states related to enforcement, verification, volatile technological change, and 
fear that tailored instruments may discredit rather than reinforce the interna-
tional legal order.37 With respect to the proposal for an International Code 
of Conduct for Information Security, the primary concern was that such a 
code could potentially enshrine state sovereignty and information control in 
cyberspace.38
Restraint
Flowing from the previous point on the rule of law, NATO discussions and 
statements also support an evolving consensus on the application of the 
principle of restraint in cyberspace. Article 1 of the North Atlantic Treaty 
embodies the principle of restraint which echoes the principles set out in 
Article 1 of the UN Charter: “the Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter 
of the United Nations, to settle any international dispute in which they may 
be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and 
security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international 
relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the 
purposes of the United Nations.”39
At the Warsaw Summit in 2016, allies agreed that they “will continue to 
follow the principle of restraint and support maintaining international peace, 
security and stability in cyber space.”40 States have shown that they gener-
ally respond to cyber incidents at a lesser threshold than would be permitted 
under international law, thereby demonstrating a commitment to restraint and 
de-escalation. Some good examples of such responses include network shut-
down to stop the spread of a particular attack, public attribution, diplomatic 
demarches, economic sanctions, and increased exchanges of information 
with like-minded states. Self-restraint in cyberspace is especially important 
as actions in that realm may have unintended and serious follow-on conse-
quences for other state and non-state actors: “the very newness of cyberwar 
and the fear of unforeseen consequences in unpredictable systems may 
contribute to prudence and self-restraint that could develop into a norm of 
non-use or limited use or limited targets.”41 The importance of self-restraint 
in cyberspace is further highlighted within the context of “broad deterrence,” 
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which includes the notion of entanglement. Entanglement is “the existence 
of various interdependences that make a successful attack simultaneously 
impose serious costs on the attacker as well as the victim.”42
Resilience
At the Warsaw Summit in 2016, allies adopted the Cyber Defense Pledge 
toward strengthening and enhancing the cyber defenses of national networks 
and infrastructures, thereby bolstering the alliance’s resilience to cyber 
threats and enhancing the resilience of the alliance itself. This emphasis 
on cyber resilience was reaffirmed at the NATO Summit in Brussels in 
July 2018, where allies declared that they “are determined to deliver strong 
national cyber defenses through full implementation of the Cyber Defense 
Pledge, which is central to enhancing cyber resilience and raising the costs 
of a cyber-attack.”43
The commitment to resilience is anchored in the North Atlantic Treaty at 
Article 3: “in order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, 
the Parties . . . will maintain and develop their individual and collective 
capacity to resist armed attack.”44 Although Article 3 refers to the capacity to 
resist armed attack, NATO’s approach to cyber defense through the pledge 
has prioritized resilience in peacetime, precisely to prevent armed attacks 
from occurring in the first place. Effective cyber defense and deterrence relies 
on resilience of networks and their capacity to recover.45 Resilience of net-
works deters malicious cyber actors by increasing the effort, raising the risk, 
and reducing the rewards.46
The priority for NATO itself is the protection of the communication 
and information systems owned and operated by the alliance. In light of 
our increasing dependence on information technologies and the escalatory 
potential of state action in cyberspace, the resilience of our cyber networks 
is necessary to limit the damages of any malicious cyber incidents including 
cyberattacks and, correspondingly, reinforce collective defense mechanisms 
themselves. The emphasis on cyber resilience highlights a fundamental ele-
ment of collective defense; that allies’ “interconnectedness means that we are 
only as strong as our weakest link.”47
Mutual Assistance and Cooperation
An important enabler to resilience is mutual assistance and cooperation, 
which is a fundamental principle animating the collective defense engage-
ment of the North Atlantic Treaty.48 Just as for resilience, Article 3 of the 
treaty is the anchor for collective assistance: “in order more effectively to 
achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by 
181International Law in Cyberspace
means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and 
develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.”
As part of efforts to enhance information sharing, allies committed to a 
model memorandum of understanding which sets out arrangements for the 
exchange of cyber defense-related information and assistance to improve 
allies’ cyber incident prevention, resilience, and response capabilities. In 
his chapter “The Cyberhouse Rules: Resilience, Deterrence and Defence in 
Cyberspace,” the current assistant secretary-general for Emerging Security 
Challenges at NATO Headquarters underlined that “cyber defence is a quint-
essential team sport, and the Alliance recognises that it cannot go it alone in 
cyberspace: partnerships are instrumental for strengthening resilience and 
deterrence.”49 This pledge for mutual assistance is a key element toward 
ensuring the resilience of networks and was reaffirmed at the NATO Summit 
in Brussels in July 2018.50
Although NATO has a regional focus, its commitment to collective 
security calls for close cooperation with other international organizations, 
including cooperative relationships with more than forty countries around 
the world and international organizations. For example, in 2016, a Technical 
Arrangement on cyber defense was concluded between the NATO Com-
puter Incident Response Capability (NCIRC) and the Computer Emergency 
Response Team of the European Union (CERT-EU), thereby providing a 
framework for exchanging information and sharing best practices between 
emergency response teams. NATO has also recognized the importance of 
cooperation with the private sector in confronting threats and challenges to 
cybersecurity, especially as industry develops and operates the vast majority 
of networks worldwide. Toward increased cooperation with industry, NATO 
established the NATO-Industry Cyber Partnership at the Summit in Wales in 
2014. This was further reaffirmed at the NATO Summit in Brussels in 2018 
where allies committed to “further develop our partnership with industry and 
academia from all Allies to keep pace with technological advances through 
innovation.”51
CONCLUSION
There is no need to create specific and tailored law to govern state behavior 
in cyberspace. It is more a question of applying and adapting existing law to 
a new and evolving context. Existing multilateral institutions such as NATO, 
working within the clear international legal framework of the North Atlantic 
Treaty, could add value in the process of socialization of voluntary norms 
regulating responsible state behavior in cyberspace, without prejudice to 
ongoing efforts by states either bilaterally or multilaterally.
182 Steven Hill and Nadia Marsan
To complement these efforts, a multilateral organization such as NATO 
could be a vehicle for a driver toward identifying common approaches 
between states. Indeed, multilateral discussions in NATO generally comple-
ment and are coordinated with bilateral efforts. As an alliance of sovereign 
states, NATO has shown that multilateralism and bilateralism can overlap 
in an effective way. National commitments and positions can be much more 
effective from a defense and deterrence perspective when supported more 
broadly by other states. Despite the challenges that broad consultations pres-
ent, multilateralism will continue to be attractive as a force multiplier and as 
a foundation for mutual assistance.
It is argued in this chapter that the alliance’s role in channeling state 
positions regarding voluntary norms for responsible state behavior in 
cyberspace should not be underestimated. NATO’s multilateralism can 
function as a socialization vector by encouraging member states, by virtue 
of their identity as members of an alliance united by shared values, to 
adopt policies and national legislation that are animated by their common 
interests and commitment to a set of fundamental principles including the 
rule of law, restraint, resilience, and mutual cooperation and assistance. 
This, in turn, forms a strong basis for the acceptance and eventual inter-
nalization of certain voluntary norms for responsible state behavior in 
cyberspace.52
The multilateral nature of discussions at NATO enables another funda-
mental characteristic of the organization, which is its ability to learn, change, 
and adapt to emerging security challenges. The former UK attorney general 
Jeremy Wright recently underlined that “one of the biggest challenges for 
international law is ensuring it keeps pace as the world changes. International 
law must remain relevant to the challenges of modern conflicts if it is to be 
respected, and as a result, play its critical role in ensuring certainty, peace 
and stability in the international order.”53 NATO’s ability to adapt has been 
one of its greatest strengths over the years. The ever-shifting power dynam-
ics in cybersecurity are what make setting clear rules, consequences, and 
expectations so difficult. NATO allies, united by shared values and animated 
by a spirit of continuous adaptation, are well placed to contribute to novel 
applications of international law within the parameters set out by the North 
Atlantic Treaty.
Through its broad network of cooperative partnerships, NATO brings 
together many different actors including nations, international organiza-
tions, and industry. As an alliance focused on collective defense, there is 
a prerogative for greater cooperation in cyber defence, including in infor-
mation sharing and the building of expert networks, toward establishing 
a common language, standardized procedures and expertise to ensure the 
resilience of national and NATO systems. It is by encouraging regular 
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high-level interaction between national cyber policy experts, lawyers, aca-
demics, and industry, that we will gain more clarity on the application of 
international law.
The application of international law depends heavily on important politi-
cal factors and will rarely be clarified in a factual vacuum. NATO’s regular 
multilateral cyber defense exercises engage the highest level of government 
decision makers and are crucial to the development of effective capabilities. 
These exercises also provide an opportunity to “test” the application of inter-
national law and clarify national positions in some particularly contentious 
areas, albeit in a virtual and usually classified context. Exercises are also a 
good vehicle for assessing the implementation of practical measures, thereby 
clarifying the range of actions that can form the basis of acceptable responses 
to malicious cyber activity.
With cyber defence now being a fundamental facet of North Atlantic secu-
rity, NATO must continue to be a forum where allies address the collective 
security implications of cybersecurity. NATO supports the establishment of a 
norms-based, stable and secure global cyberspace. NATO does not set norms, 
states do. But with greater cooperation and multilateral dialogue, states could 
begin to take common national positions regarding the limits of appropriate 
behavior in well-defined areas. As such, NATO will continue to provide an 
important forum for multilateral cooperation and engagement in the context 
of cyber defense, which will in turn support and facilitate debates on how 
international law should apply especially in collective defense contexts.
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In the endeavor to establish global cybersecurity norms, China’s Internet 
censorship presents an obstacle for democracies. China, with over 800 mil-
lion Internet users (CINIC 2018), is the largest and least free entity on the 
Internet (Freedom House 2017), but democracies often couple cybersecurity 
norms with Internet freedom. Nevertheless, China and democracies share 
an objective to improve global cybersecurity cooperation in order to make 
the Internet a safer place—both from each other and from the other myriad 
hostile actors—and establishing norms is a primary means of attaining this 
end (Finnemore and Hollis 2016, 436). Using the Operation Aurora cyber 
espionage campaign as a case study, the hypothesis emerges that cybersecu-
rity norm-building between democracies and China is more likely to succeed 
when democracies decouple cybersecurity from Internet freedom, and that 
signaling can address some of the difficulties inherent in this decoupling.
It can be challenging to define cybersecurity norms: many norms already 
exist, many of those norms dovetail, and multiple lower-level norms may, 
together, construct a single, higher-level norm. Martha Finnemore and Dun-
can B. Hollis (2016, 426–427) point out that, while “calls for ‘cybernorms’ 
to secure and govern cyberspace are now ubiquitous,” cybersecurity is actu-
ally “a diverse array of problems.” Yet, they further contend that much of 
the power of norms “lies in the processes by which they form and evolve” 
(Finnemore and Hollis 2016, 427). Aurora provides a novel context in which 
to examine this process. Further, the concept of decoupling here refers to 
democracies working with China to establish mutually beneficial cyberse-
curity norms that are wholly independent from Internet freedom—the 2015 
Obama-Xi cybersecurity pact is one example (Sanger 2016).
Early idealists had hoped that the Internet, by virtue of the unfettered 
access it provided to information, would act as a force of liberal reform in 
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authoritarian states—and, indeed, it might have, had the Internet remained 
free and open (Hwang 2018). Instead, China, via the Great Firewall, retooled 
its domestic Internet into the world’s largest censorship apparatus and, 
despite the efforts of the United States and other democracies, further tightens 
its Internet controls every year (Bloomberg News 2017). China’s refusal to 
adopt domestic or international liberal norms for the Internet presages that 
the cybersecurity norms among democracies will be different from those 
between democracies and China—and from those between China and other 
authoritarian states. Indeed, China has already demonstrated this difference 
in norms by signing a cybersecurity pact with Russia based on sharing Great 
Firewall technology (The Guardian 2016), and by selling censorship technol-
ogy to Iran (Stecklow 2012). In other words, while democracies are building 
cybersecurity norms coupled with Internet freedom, authoritarian states are 
building cybersecurity norms coupled with Internet censorship. The common 
bridge between the two sets is cybersecurity, alone.
Margaret Roberts (2018, 37) defines censorship as “the restriction of the 
public expression of or public access to information by authority when the 
information is thought to have the capacity to undermine the authority by 
making it unaccountable to the public.” Democracies engage in censorship to 
different degrees; the flooding of misinformation during the last US election, 
for instance, has spurred debate on the culpability of Internet companies and 
whether they should censor their users (Reynolds 2018). However, democ-
racies generally have laws defending free speech (Roberts 2018, 15–16), 
whereas China argues for its sovereign right to censor. China’s government 
tells private companies, directly, what to censor (Zhuang 2018). Lu Wei, the 
former head of the Cyberspace Administration of China, said, “I, indeed, may 
choose who comes into my house. They can come if they are friends,” and, 
“Freedom is our goal. Order is our means” (Martina 2015). Thus, censorship 
is a nuanced concept, and contrasting democracies as having Internet freedom 
with China as having Internet censorship is a porous abstraction. Neverthe-
less, for a broad look at cybersecurity norm-building, this abstraction is use-
ful—with the caveat that, as a complex issue, its purpose is to underscore the 
fundamental difference that democracies seek the best approach to informa-
tion freedom, whereas China seeks greater information control.
There are three barriers to decoupling cybersecurity from Internet freedom. 
The first barrier is that democracies view Internet freedom as a human right 
while China does not, which compels democracies to pressure China on 
Internet censorship. Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(1948) recognizes freedom of opinion and expression as a human right, and 
Internet freedom is that right on the Internet. One cybersecurity expert illus-
trates the resistance to decoupling cybersecurity from Internet freedom by 
criticizing the 2015 Obama-Xi cybersecurity pact: “There is nothing in this 
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agreement that addresses Chinese censorship or abuse of human rights. While 
some might argue that those are not issues related to hacking, a government 
that shuts off access to portions of the Internet that allow free communication 
is essentially no different than a party that executes denial-of-service attacks. 
And human rights cannot be left off the table” (Steinberg 2015).
The second barrier is that cybersecurity and Internet freedom are opera-
tionally entangled. To varying degrees, democracies engage in open or col-
laborative cybersecurity, while China uses censorship as a cybersecurity tool. 
From the US Department of Defense’s bug bounty programs (Newman 2017) 
to NATO’s (2018) collective cyber defense in which “allies are committed 
to enhancing information-sharing and mutual assistance in preventing, miti-
gating and recovering from cyber attacks,” Internet freedom is an important 
part of the liberal approach to cybersecurity. On the other hand, China uses 
the Great Firewall’s censorship capabilities for cybersecurity; for instance, 
China used the Great Firewall to crack down on anonymity tools like Virtual 
Private Networks (VPNs) (Lin and Kubota 2018)—which hackers can use to 
hide their location. Conversely, China also uses cybersecurity for censorship 
purposes; for example, one analyst argues that a cybersecurity regulation that 
permits both local and central authorities to search the offices of Internet ser-
vice providers is “designed to more effectively implement China’s censorship 
directives” (Gan 2018).
The final barrier is the moral question of whether this decoupling should 
occur. Do the benefits of greater Internet peace and security outweigh the 
risks of further censorship normalization that might arise from cooperative 
cybersecurity efforts with China? That is, even if democracies can overcome 
the first two barriers to cybersecurity norm-building with China, it is not clear 
that they should. However, both governments and technology companies 
have signaled that this decoupling is already occurring: from the tenuous 
bilateral cybersecurity pacts China has signed with the United States and a 
number of other democracies that make no mention of censorship (Burgess 
2017) to Apple removing censorship-evading apps from its App Store in 
China and Google’s leaked plans to reintroduce a censored version of its 
search engine in China (Doubek 2018).
Robert Jervis (1989, 18) defines signals as “statements or actions . . . issued 
mainly to influence the receiver’s image of the sender.” In order for signals to 
be credible, they must be costly—this cost establishes the sender’s commit-
ment to the signal. During Aurora, most of the costly signaling that occurred 
was the ex post, tying-hands type—commitments that would result in audi-
ence costs if abandoned (Fearon 1997). Simply put, if an actor adopts a stance 
but does not follow through, they suffer reputation loss. James D. Morrow 
(1999, 86) writes, “In international politics, signaling is a way to consider the 
problem of unknown motivation.” Signaling, then, is an important tool in the 
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U.S.-China diplomatic toolbox because it helps to frame the norm formation 
and evolution process.
China has been signaling that it was open to cybersecurity norm-building at 
least since the release of its white paper The Internet in China in 2010, which 
called for multilateral cooperation to combat “the increasingly serious prob-
lem of transnational network crimes” (IOSCPRC 2010). This white paper 
was a by-product of an early clash of incompatible cybersecurity norms: 
Google and the US conflict with China over the Aurora cyber espionage 
campaign. Using this clash as a case study, it appears that signaling offers 
an answer to the first two barriers to decoupling. Specifically, signaling can 
allow cybersecurity norms to cultivate in a separate channel from Internet 
freedom pressures, and it can help identify and extricate the elements of 
cybersecurity bound to Internet freedom or censorship.
THE OPERATION AURORA ATTACKS: BACKGROUND
Google has had a difficult relationship with China beyond the inherent market 
challenges (Madden 2010). It entered China in January 2006 with google.
cn, a censored version of its search engine (CNN 2006). A Google statement 
explained its calculus: “While removing search results is inconsistent with 
Google’s mission, providing no information (or a heavily degraded user 
experience that amounts to no information) is more inconsistent with our mis-
sion” (Crampton 2006). Although Google said it would report to users when 
information was removed from search results (CNN 2006), there was, nev-
ertheless, a widespread belief that google.cn violated the company’s “don’t 
be evil” policy (BBN News 2006). For instance, the following month, a con-
gressional subcommittee on human rights summoned Google—along with 
other Internet companies—to defend their “sickening collaboration,” as the 
subcommittee chairman put it, with the Chinese government (Zeller 2006).
Google’s founders struggled with the choice. Sergey Brin, who claimed that 
his childhood in the authoritarian Soviet Union influenced his views on censor-
ship (Lohr 2010), spent a year with Larry Page weighing the decision to censor 
on their “evil scale” (Walker 2010). Reflecting on it a year later, he said, “On 
a business level, that decision to censor . . . was a net negative” (Martinson 
2007). He also remarked that the company had suffered because of the damage 
to its reputation in the United States and Europe (Martinson 2007). However, 
he eventually defended the moral reasoning behind google.cn, believing that it 
was the best decision for the Chinese people (McManus 2010).
In 2010, Google and the US government clashed with the Chinese gov-
ernment over cybersecurity norms. There were two central issues: China’s 
Aurora cyber espionage campaign and China’s Internet censorship (Lau 
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2010). Although not the first—nor most recent—Chinese cyber espionage 
campaign against the United States (Denning 2017), Aurora’s high degree of 
politicization was unique. As a result, government signaling played a new and 
interesting role in the cybersecurity norm-building process.
The clash began in January 2010, when Google announced the discovery 
of a cyberattack, originating in China, that stole its intellectual property and 
also targeted at least twenty other businesses (Drummond 2010a). Google 
also noted that “a primary goal of the attackers was accessing the Gmail 
accounts of Chinese human rights activists” and that, as a consequence, 
Google would no longer censor google.cn for China (Drummond 2010a). 
Later that day, in an official statement, US secretary of state Hillary Clinton 
(2010b) expressed concern over Google’s allegations and sought an explana-
tion from China. She also announced that she would be giving a speech on 
Internet freedom.
Clinton delivered her speech, “Remarks on Internet Freedom,” nine days 
later. It was a tour de force on the virtues of Internet freedom and coop-
eration. She argued that the Internet—as “a new nervous system for our 
planet”—when free and open, was an unprecedented force for good for 
individuals, societies, governments, and businesses, but that it could also be 
repurposed for oppression—and authoritarian regimes were using it this way 
through censorship. This censorship, she contended, contravened the United 
Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Clinton 2010a).
At its core, Clinton’s speech called for the establishment of global Internet 
freedom and cybersecurity norms, which she coupled together. She stated, 
“New technologies do not take sides in the struggle for freedom and prog-
ress, but the United States does. We stand for a single Internet where all of 
humanity has equal access to knowledge and ideas. And we recognize that 
the world’s information infrastructure will become what we and others make 
of it.” Tying this theme to cybersecurity, she remarked that online commerce 
and intellectual property “are all at stake if we cannot rely on the security 
of our information networks,” that “disruptions in these systems demand a 
coordinated response by all governments, the private sector, and the interna-
tional community,” and, further, that “we have taken steps as a government, 
and as a Department, to find diplomatic solutions to strengthen global cyber 
security.” She also announced that the US Department of State would support 
the development of new circumvention technologies to help evade Internet 
censorship (Clinton 2010a).
The broader issue, Clinton explained, is “whether we live on a planet with 
one internet, one global community, and a common body of knowledge that 
benefits and unites us all, or a fragmented planet in which access to infor-
mation and opportunity is dependent on where you live and the whims of 
censors. Information freedom supports the peace and security that provides a 
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foundation for global progress.” She made a point of speaking directly to the 
private sector, arguing that “censorship should not be in any way accepted 
by any company from anywhere. And in America, American companies need 
to make a principled stand. This needs to be part of our national brand. I’m 
confident that consumers worldwide will reward companies that follow those 
principles” (Clinton 2010a).
Unsurprisingly, she also addressed the Chinese government, asking it to 
conduct a thorough and transparent investigation into Google’s allegations. 
She noted that, while the United States and China had different views on 
Internet censorship, they should “address those differences candidly and con-
sistently in the context of our positive, cooperative, and comprehensive rela-
tionship.” She further warned of censorship’s implications for international 
peace and security: “Historically, asymmetrical access to information is one 
of the leading causes of interstate conflict. When we face serious disputes or 
dangerous incidents, it’s critical that people on both sides of the problem have 
access to the same set of facts and opinions” (Clinton 2010a).
In short, Google and the United States were arguing that China’s Internet 
censorship was a human rights violation. China, however, countered that 
Google needed to obey its laws if it wished to operate there (Fletcher 2010a). 
In agreement with China was J. Stapleton Roy, a former US ambassador 
to China, who said, “I don’t understand their calculation. I do not see how 
Google could have concluded that they could have faced down the Chinese 
on a domestic censorship issue” (Wong 2010). Also siding with China were 
Microsoft Corporation’s Steve Ballmer (2010), who said “we are all subject 
to local laws,” and Bill Gates, who said, “You’ve got to decide: do you want 
to obey the laws of the countries you’re in or not? If not, you may not end up 
doing business there” (Johnson and Branigan 2010).
Furthermore, it is important to note that it is unclear whether human rights 
or, in fact, economics was the deeper motivation for the coordinated Google 
and US response to Aurora. Not doing well in China despite censoring its 
search engine, Google’s best business decision may have been to improve its 
international reputation by sacrificing its China operations for a noble cause 
(Lacy 2010). Similarly, the United States was eager to push back against 
China’s recurring cyber espionage efforts (Metzl 2011). From this perspec-
tive, the issue of human rights served as convenient pressure point to achieve 
other goals.
THE OPERATION AURORA ATTACKS: TIMELINE
Following Jervis’s (1989) definition of signals, the methodology for recog-
nizing signals is to identify, from the narrative of this clash, statements, or 
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actions that were intended to alter another actor’s perception. Thus, a timeline 
of the Aurora conflict follows.
January
On January 12, 2010, Google revealed the Aurora cyber espionage campaign 
to the public, beginning the escalation with the Chinese government (Drum-
mond 2010a). Google announced that they, along with a wide range of other 
businesses, had been hacked (Drummond 2010a). Google claimed that the 
target was both its intellectual property and the e-mail accounts of human 
rights activists, and that the attacks originated in China (Drummond 2010a). 
Later that day, Clinton (2010b) made her statement seeking an explanation 
from the Chinese government. Google and Clinton implied that the Chinese 
government was responsible but had not explicitly assigned blame.
Two days later, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman said that Chi-
nese law prohibits any form of hacking attacks and she emphasized that 
foreign companies needed to respect Chinese law (Fletcher 2010a). She 
declined, however, to answer a question about whether the illegality of 
hacking extended to government hacking (Fletcher 2010a). That same day, 
security researchers at Verisign declared that the Chinese government was 
behind the attack, claiming that “the government of China has been engaged 
for months in a massive campaign of industrial espionage against U.S. com-
panies” (Paul 2010). Security researchers at McAfee also investigated the 
attack, naming it “Operation ‘Aurora’ ” (Goodin 2010a).
On January 18, Google began an investigation into its Chinese employees 
(Branigan 2010), and, the next day, it postponed the launch of two Android 
mobile phones in China (Lee and Buckley 2010). On January 21, Clinton 
(2010a) gave her speech on Internet freedom. The following day, China 
rebuffed Clinton, warning that her words were dangerous to U.S.–China 
relations (Fletcher 2010b). At the World Economic Forum at Davos, Google 
CEO Eric Schmidt remarked, “We like what China is doing in terms of 
growth . . . we just don’t like censorship. We hope that will change and we 
can apply some pressure to make things better for the Chinese people” (Blu-
menstein and Fidler 2010).
February
Google began coordinating with the US National Security Agency to ana-
lyze the attacks, with the objective to better defend against future attacks 
(Nakashima 2010). On February 10, evidence emerged that the attacks were 
still ongoing and had targeted many more companies than Google originally 
estimated (Higgins 2010). On February 12, Brin said that, given the size 
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of the Chinese government, it was not important whether it was behind the 
attacks (Zetter 2010). He also remarked that Google was hopeful that it could 
remain in China and was willing to permit some types of censorship, such as 
for adult content and gambling, but not political censorship (Zetter 2010). On 
February 17, the cybersecurity company iSEC published a report detailing 
the difficulty of defending against Aurora and claimed that it had actually 
targeted over one hundred companies. The next day, investigators linked 
Aurora to two Chinese universities (Goodin 2010b). On February 23, for the 
first time, the Chinese government officially rejected Google’s allegations 
(Graham-Harrison 2010).
March
The United States then considered taking the issue of China’s forcing cen-
sorship on Google to the WTO as an unfair trade barrier (Drajem 2010). On 
March 12, China’s chief Internet regulator insisted Google must obey its laws 
or “pay the consequences” (Pomfret 2010). The state-run news agency Xin-
hua attacked Google’s “intricate ties with the U.S. government” on March 21 
(BBC News 2010). The following day, Google ended its google.cn censorship 
and tested a new strategy of automatically redirecting visitors from google.
cn to google.com.hk, whose servers were located in Hong Kong and so not 
subject to the mainland’s censorship laws (Drummond 2010b). In response, 
an official in China’s State Council Information Office said that Google’s 
move was “totally wrong” and “violated its written promise” (Metz 2010). 
As a result, on March 23, the Chinese government attempted to restrict the 
mainland’s access to Google’s Hong Kong-based servers (Metz 2010).
April–November
On April 20, referencing Article 19 of the Universal Declaration on Human 
Rights, Google launched a new worldwide tool that displayed the number of 
government requests for user data or content removal (Drummond 2010d). 
The Chinese government, on June 8, released the white paper The Internet 
in China defending its Internet policies (Bristow 2010). On June 28, Google 
announced that the Chinese government would not accept its redirect solution 
and would deny the renewal of its business license (Drummond 2010c). Con-
sequently, Google attempted a new strategy, turning google.cn into a static 
webpage that only contained a link to their uncensored Hong Kong-based site, 
rather than forcing an automatic redirect (Drummond 2010c). Google stated, 
“This new approach is consistent with our commitment not to self censor and, 
we believe, with local law (Drummond 2010c).” The new strategy worked: 
on July 9, Google’s China business license was renewed (Drummond 2010c). 
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From that point on, both sides remained relatively peaceable, even after a 
WikiLeaks cable, released on November 28, implicated the Chinese Politburo 
in the Aurora attacks (Shane and Lehren 2010).
THE OPERATION AURORA ATTACKS: SIGNALS
During Aurora, there were roughly four groups of tying-hands signals that 
used reputation as an audience cost. The first signal of significance occurs at 
the beginning of the conflict: Google revealing Aurora to the public and tying 
its hands by announcing the plan to end its censorship. To the international 
community and to its users, Google signaled a recommitment to its “don’t 
be evil” policy. To the Chinese government, it signaled that there were both 
physical and virtual consequences to China’s hostile actions in cyberspace. 
These potential consequences included Google no longer abiding China’s 
censorship laws—possibly even leaving China—and China suffering inter-
national reputation loss.
The second signal was the response of the US government. Google and the 
US Department of State may have coordinated the initial public response to 
occur on the same day for greater impact. From this viewpoint, it was a two-
pronged act of Thomas Schelling’s (1966, 69) concept of compellence, with 
the threat being that the United States would escalate the issue in Clinton’s 
upcoming speech if China did not justify itself before then. China did not, 
and, with Clinton’s speech and the later threat to take the matter to the WTO, 
the United States signaled that it would respond in both the physical and 
virtual spheres to actions that harm its interests in cyberspace. Broadly, the 
United States was tying its hands to a willingness to escalate matters.
The third set of signals was the cumulative reaction of the Chinese govern-
ment. There were four important individual responses: first, the response two 
days after the first statements by Google and Clinton; second, the response the 
day after Clinton’s address on Internet freedom; third, the response after more 
evidence had accumulated linking the Chinese government to the attacks, and 
finally, the publication of The Internet in China, the Chinese government’s 
white paper defending its Internet practices. Each response added something: 
the first, that foreign companies must follow China’s domestic laws; the sec-
ond, that what was best for the Chinese people was China’s concern, and so 
Clinton’s comments were damaging to U.S.–China relations; and the third, 
that Google’s allegations in its January 12 statement were “groundless,” stat-
ing that “China administers its Internet according to law, and this position 
will not change. China prohibits hacking and will crack down on hacking 
according to law” (Graham-Harrison 2010). This was the first time China had 
directly refuted the allegations, over five weeks after Aurora came to light.
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China’s fourth response, the white paper The Internet in China, both 
reiterated and expanded on the messages of the first three responses. Like 
Clinton’s speech, it expressed the importance of international cooperation 
on cybersecurity. The white paper was both China’s version of and ultimate 
response to the speech, and it was an argument for China’s Internet sover-
eignty within its borders. Interestingly, apparently in response to Clinton’s 
call for Internet freedom, it claimed that the Chinese government “guarantees 
the citizens’ freedom of speech on the Internet as well as the public’s right to 
know, to participate, to be heard and to oversee in accordance with the law” 
(IOSCPRC 2010). China was tying its hands to the argument that both the 
United States and China permit Internet freedom in accordance with law, but 
that those laws were different.
The final signals occurred during rapprochement. Because Google and the 
United States confronted China publicly, China had to respond in a way that 
would mitigate its international reputation loss. By emphasizing the illegality 
of hacking and making the issue of censorship a matter of legal compliance, 
China was able to defend its requirements for renewing Google’s business 
license. By permitting Google to adhere to the letter of the law but not the 
spirit, China signaled that, even in sensitive areas like censorship, legal com-
pliance had some flexibility.
The silence that followed the renewal of Google’s business license—
silence that even the new WikiLeaks evidence did not interrupt—signaled 
that both sides were eager to move forward from the clash. China and Google 
continued their tenuous relationship, although China never fully relented: 
it slowed down and intermittently disrupted Google’s services—a form of 
censorship (Roberts 2018, 42)—finally blocking google.com.hk altogether 
in 2014 (Levin 2014). Nevertheless, at the time, Google was able to offer 
a link to an uncensored search engine for users who sought it, and China 
was satisfied that Google capitulated to its regulations. In the end, however, 
all three actors suffered some reputation loss: evidence had implicated the 
government of China in the attack, the international community remembered 
that Google had “spent four years, and earned vast sums of money, operating 
under China’s censorship laws” (Carr 2010), and Clinton’s appeal for global 
Internet freedom had achieved little.
DECOUPLING CYBERSECURITY 
AND INTERNET FREEDOM
Despite working in conjunction, it is clear that Google’s efforts in the Aurora 
conflict were relatively successful, while the United States’ efforts were not. 
To wit, although Google was struggling in a hostile market environment and 
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the victim of cyber espionage, Google’s public retaliation eventually resulted 
in the renewal of its business license without continuing to censor its search 
engine. On the other hand, as powerful as Clinton’s speech and the follow-
ing WTO threat were, the United States did not succeed in compelling China 
to lessen its information controls, in preventing businesses from becoming 
increasingly interdependent with China, or in yielding from China a trans-
parent investigation into Aurora or an admission of wrongdoing. Nor did it 
substantially lessen China’s cyber espionage efforts against the United States 
(Denning 2017). Thus, Google’s actions serve as the better model: Google 
received and responded to China’s signals and made more progress. It is 
important to consider two points, however: first, that without the accompany-
ing pressure from the United States, China might not have been as willing to 
accept Google’s solution; and second, Google’s business interests are minor 
in scope in comparison to the US foreign policy interests.
From the beginning, China signaled that Google could stay by obeying 
China’s laws. Google found it could obey these laws by rerouting traffic to 
its uncensored Hong Kong site, first testing China’s limits with an automatic 
redirect before retreating to a link that required manual effort. Simultane-
ously, Google increased its pressure on China to reduce censorship by add-
ing a reporting tool for government censorship requests—but it added this 
tool separately from its effort to renew its business license. Thus, Google 
overcame the first barrier—that Internet freedom is a human right—to decou-
pling cybersecurity from Internet freedom. Google funneled pressure against 
censorship through a different channel—an unrelated reporting tool, in this 
case—while cultivating a cybersecurity norm of following China’s laws and 
expecting, in return, a more secure operating environment. Google achieved 
this favorable outcome despite its “don’t be evil” policy and Brin’s personal 
enmity toward censorship.
Through its white paper, China signaled that it desired to cooperate on 
cybersecurity relating to “transnational network crimes,” but also that its 
cyber sovereignty commitment was uncompromising (IOSCPRC 2010). 
Clinton signaled a similar intransigence on cybersecurity cooperation, stipu-
lating Internet freedom as an elemental component. The United States made 
its appeal to the international community for Internet freedom, its ambitions 
to create anti-censorship tools, and its threat to take the matter to the WTO 
in conjunction with the appeal for global cybersecurity norm-building. If the 
United States had separated these efforts, as it did during the later Obama-Xi 
summit, it might have made more progress in overcoming the first barrier.
Google’s success, however, illustrates how signaling can help democracies 
pressure China on censorship separately from cybersecurity norm-building; it 
suggests that democracies can decouple the two without giving up on Internet 
freedom. Google’s experience also demonstrated the second barrier—that 
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cybersecurity and Internet freedom are operationally entangled—by working 
with the US government and international security researchers on analyzing 
Aurora. China had, in its white paper, stated that different states have differ-
ent needs for Internet cooperation: “Though connected, the Internet of vari-
ous countries belongs to different sovereignties, which makes it necessary to 
strengthen international exchanges and cooperation in this field” (IOSCPRC 
2010). In other words, it signaled that cybersecurity norm-building requires 
calibrating the norms to those differences. In Google’s case, the expectation 
of not being the target of government-sponsored cyber espionage was not 
contingent on having Internet freedom in China. That is, while Google could 
not expect full operational freedom in China, it could still seek to build a 
norm of operational cybersecurity.
China, by proclaiming that hacking was illegal—despite that it, itself, 
was doing the hacking—signaled that this concept served as a foundation 
to build on, and Google accepted the signal by seeking ways to continue its 
China operations. The secure business environment that China signaled was 
a norm-building effort operationally disentangled from Internet freedom or 
censorship. Perhaps to validate the honesty of this signal, Aurora eventually 
did stop. In contrast, Clinton’s speech operationally coupled Internet freedom 
with cybersecurity, implying that improving global cybersecurity would only 
be possible alongside Internet freedom, and so it did not overcome the sec-
ond barrier. Google’s relative progress here suggests that signaling can offer 
insights into operational disentanglement.
The final barrier to decoupling cybersecurity from Internet freedom is the 
moral component. Even if democracies can decouple the two for norm-build-
ing with China, should they? Although this question will endure, a couple 
points worthy of consideration stand out. The fact that cybersecurity norm-
building is separable from Internet freedom goals, without preventing efforts 
to achieve those goals, is an argument in favor. On the other hand, these 
efforts might be weaker, overall, and so further entrench China’s censor-
ship practices. The condemnation from human rights groups over the recent 
capitulations of US companies to China’s censorship demands illustrates this 
concern (Doubek 2018).
In the Aurora conflict, China offered valuable information through signal-
ing. Although signals can be dishonest (Jervis 1989, 18), China’s renewal 
of Google’s business license, after Google responded to China’s signals, 
demonstrated honesty. Google used these signals to decouple Internet free-
dom—without abandoning it—from cybersecurity norm-building with China, 
as well as to discern the operational requirements of such norms. Conversely, 
the United States showed that not decoupling the two is a dead end. Thus, 
the hypothesis emerges that cybersecurity norm-building between democra-
cies and China is more likely to succeed if cybersecurity is not coupled with 
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Internet freedom, and that signaling can help overcome two of the barriers to 
this decoupling.
Interestingly, the literature on signaling has argued that authoritarian regimes 
are less effective than democracies at sending tying-hands signals with ex post 
costs because the domestic audience costs are lower or obfuscated (Weiss 
2013, 1–2). Jessica Chen Weiss (2013, 2) shows that authoritarian states can 
employ nationalist, anti-foreign protests as a substitute for the way democra-
cies use official statements as tying-hands signals. Yet, during Aurora, China’s 
official statements appeared to be honest signals. The first possibility is that 
the signals were costless but happened to be honest anyway. The second pos-
sibility, which seems more likely, is that the costs were not domestic but rather 
from the international audience. The world was watching, and if China had 
backed down from its stance of being in the legal right, the international politi-
cal and business community’s perception of China would adjust accordingly.
Although China’s authoritarianism might intrinsically restrict the band-
width of potential cybersecurity cooperation, something changed in democra-
cies’ willingness to seek it in the time between Clinton’s speech on Internet 
freedom in 2010 and 2015 Obama-Xi cybersecurity summit. The summit 
occurred while the US Department of State was funding the development of 
censorship evasion tools, and the resulting pact, which temporarily succeeded 
in reducing the frequency of Chinese cyberattacks on the United States 
(Sanger 2016), made no mention of censorship (Brown and Yung 2017). The 
pact, along with China’s other cybersecurity pacts in recent years, overcame 
the three barriers to decoupling and may suggest that democracies are becom-
ing more receptive to the idea. As cybersecurity becomes more important 
to international security, democracies may increasingly view cybersecurity 
norms as independent from others.
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On October 4, 2018, the United Kingdom strongly denounced “reckless” and 
“irresponsible” cyberattacks conducted by the Russian military intelligence 
service against a wide range of targets, including the Organization for the 
Prevention of Chemical Weapons, the United Kingdom’s Foreign and Com-
monwealth Office, and its Defence and Science Technology Laboratory. 
The UK statement emphasized that these attacks were “without regard for 
international law or established norms,” contrasting Russian actions with the 
“united” approach of the United Kingdom, its allies, and the international 
community (UK Government 2018). The UK defence secretary even drew on 
language previously used to describe North Korean cyberattacks (Greenberg 
2017), labeling Russia a “pariah state” (Lambert, Deutsch, and Faulconbridge 
2018).
This extreme rhetoric, portraying cyberspace as a black-and-white compe-
tition between the good guys and the bad, obscures a more complicated global 
context. To understand the true nature of this supposed bipolar division in 
cyber norms, it may be instructive to turn away from the headline-grabbing 
(and undoubtedly illegitimate) activities of Russian intelligence agencies and 
to look at more complex edge cases. States in the Middle East exhibit this 
complexity in abundance, given the variety of conflicts and tensions in the 
region involving both internal struggles and international interventions. More 
specifically, where do Egypt and the six states of the Gulf Cooperation Coun-
cil (GCC)—Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United 
Arab Emirates (UAE)—fit into this picture? Despite their many differences, 
these states share a curious position: on the one hand, their regulations, laws, 
and participation in international institutions place them with Russia, China, 
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and other proponents of cyber sovereignty; on the other, their private sector 
cybersecurity collaborations, intelligence relationships, and offensive cyber 
operations are closely aligned with the United States and Europe.
This chapter argues that this contradictory position has led to two innova-
tions in state responses to global cyber norms. First, these states have devel-
oped deliberately ambiguous national cybersecurity strategies that disguise 
differences between domestic cybersecurity priorities and those of their 
international partners. Second, these states have appropriated international 
norms on cybercrime—specifically the Council of Europe’s Budapest Con-
vention of 2001—in order to counter political opposition and restrict their 
online public spheres through new cybercrime legislation. This chapter has 
three sections. The first section details the contradictory position of Egypt 
and the Gulf states in relation to international cyber norms. The second sec-
tion examines their national cybersecurity strategies, and the third section 
examines their cybercrime laws. Finally, it concludes that these two innova-
tions are closely linked: the cybersecurity practices of these states, especially 
their appropriation of cybercrime laws, illustrates the calculated nature of the 
ambiguity present in their strategy documents. Finally, one caveat is neces-
sary: the research for this chapter was conducted up to August 2018, and 
so developments following this date, including a recent increase in publicly 
available documents, are not factored into the analysis.
A COMPLEX MIDDLE GROUND
Many scholars and policy makers lament the current state of “cyber norms,” 
especially after the failure of the U.N. Group of Governmental Experts to 
agree on the application of international law in cyberspace in 2017 (Grigsby 
2017). The difficulty of reaching global agreement on cyber norms is gener-
ally attributed to a bipolar division in cybersecurity governance, reflecting 
two opposing sets of values. On one hand, there is a group of what experts 
have called “like-minded” states (Kaljurand 2017). This group generally 
includes the United States and European countries, and it believes in an open 
and free Internet driven largely by global market competition with some 
government regulation and civil society observation, known as multistake-
holderism (Savage and McConnell 2015). The second group includes Iran, 
Russia, and China, and prioritizes state control over national “borders” in 
cyberspace with strict governmental limits on content, known as cyber sov-
ereignty (Segal 2018). These differences have been described as the cyber-
space element of a resurgent Cold War, in which neoliberal and democratic 
structures confront information control, authoritarianism, and rule-breaking 
(Ignatius 2016).
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In fact, this picture is much more complex, with a variety of approaches 
to Internet governance in both camps.1 For example, Carr highlights how 
multistakeholder governance masks the exercise of state power, especially 
regarding the diminished role of civil society groups in decision-making 
rather than deliberative fora; what she terms “power plays” (Carr 2015). On 
the other side of the coin, Cornish has shown how the Chinese approach to 
digital sovereignty is in fact much more nuanced than simple blanket control 
(Cornish 2015). Taking this argument further, Raymond and Denardis have 
argued that multistakeholderism is heterogeneous and inchoate, as adminis-
trative and regulatory bodies are routinely captured by specific coalitions of 
both public and private sector actors (Raymond and DeNardis 2015). Instead, 
they identify five overlapping “sets of procedural rules” for Internet gover-
nance: the liberal (“OECD”) view, the authoritarian (“Shanghai Cooperation 
Organisation”) view, a G77 postcolonial view, and technical and corporate 
views. This section argues that Egypt and the Gulf states occupy a hybrid 
position in the simpler bipolar model; however, a similar argument could be 
made regarding Raymond and DeNardis’s fivefold model.
The GCC states and Egypt are not liberal democracies. They have all—to 
varying degrees—adopted a position of quiet cooperation and hostile con-
frontation with the regional cyber powers of Israel and Iran, respectively. 
There are also many wider differences in their economies, societies, and 
access to Internet technologies. There are deep political disputes between 
Egypt and the GCC states, illustrated starkly by the split between Qatar and 
the “quartet” states—Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE—in June 
2017, with Oman and Kuwait taking a neutral position.
Despite their differences, all these states’ approaches to cyber issues exhibit 
some similarities with the authoritarian, cyber sovereignty-focused approach 
of Russia, China, and Iran. Cyber sovereignty emphasizes the strong asser-
tion of territorial boundaries and state control over internal infrastructure, 
transnational connections, and content produced within or by citizens of that 
state. For example, Article 31 of Egypt’s 2014 constitution, drafted after the 
2013 coup and subsequent election of President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi, states: 
“the security of information space is an integral part of the system of national 
economy and security. The state commits to taking the necessary measures 
to preserve it” (The Arab Republic of Egypt 2014). Given the wide powers 
allocated to military and security agencies under this constitution, and the 
censorship practiced under Al-Sisi, it is safe to assume that “the security of 
information space” (‘amn al-fida’ al-mu’alumati) is defined broadly along 
Russian or Chinese lines.
The GCC states have similar outlooks on the control of national informa-
tion, also demonstrated through broad practices of censorship (Dalek et al. 
2018; Haselton 2013). Also, all these states have supported an increased role 
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for the United Nations in cybersecurity regulation and standards (Dourado 
2012). The United Nations is generally the preferred venue for proponents of 
cyber sovereignty because its state-only structures increase the relative power 
of non-Western states. In contrast, multistakeholderism also includes (mainly 
Western) private companies and civil society representatives. Despite occa-
sional reports of bilateral cooperation with Russia and China—for example, 
Egypt’s 2014 intent to work with China on combatting “cybercrimes” (The 
Economic Times 2014)—the United Nations appears to be the main forum 
where these states work together on cybersecurity.
But despite their embrace of cyber sovereignty over multistakehold-
erism, Egypt and the Gulf states work more closely with the “like-minded” 
states than their rivals. This is based on broader security and intelligence 
partnerships: for example, the United Kingdom relies on Oman for signals 
intelligence collection highly valued by its Five Eyes partners (Campbell 
2014a), while Saudi Arabia and the UAE are approved “Third Parties,” able 
to access some U.S. signals intelligence (Campbell 2014b). These links 
extend into cybersecurity, which is a key commercial and diplomatic pil-
lar of the U.K.’s Gulf Initiative (UK Trade & Investment 2013). The UAE 
has allegedly discussed joint “cyber tools . . . to contain and defeat Iranian 
aggression” with a Washington think tank, another sign of potential coop-
eration in the cyber realm (Jilani and Grim 2017). More broadly, there are 
U.K.–Saudi Arabia agreements to develop “strategic cooperation in cyber-
security” (Foreign & Commonwealth Office 2018), and U.S.–Egypt joint 
military exercises including cybersecurity scenarios against a background of 
increased U.S. military aid (Belnap 2018; Malsin 2018). Due to these exten-
sive associations, these states cannot simply be labeled as spoiler forces 
against multistakeholder proponents—a label more appropriately applied to 
Russia, China, and Iran.
Cybersecurity links to Western liberal democracies extend beyond state-to-
state relationships, as the profile of commercial cybersecurity has risen fol-
lowing several significant cyberattacks (Bronk and Tikk-Ringas 2013; Krebs 
2013). Private companies based in the United States and Europe sell a wide 
range of defensive cybersecurity solutions and cybersecurity consultancy ser-
vices to most major companies and government organizations in Egypt and 
the Gulf, which they see as a lucrative market, while arms companies with a 
long-standing presence in the region offer national surveillance and offensive 
cyber capabilities (Shires 2018). In these ways, Egypt and the Gulf states 
present a challenge to bipolar models of Internet governance that presume the 
two sides simply form Cold War-style blocs.
These states’ approach—extensive cooperation despite substantive dis-
agreement—echoes wider contradictions between the normative and strategic 
components of the relationships between Egypt and the Gulf states and their 
209Ambiguity and Appropriation
international allies. In the Cold War, the oil wealth of the Gulf states and 
Egypt’s central position in pan-Arabism and the Israel–Palestine conflict 
motivated the United States and Europe to work with these countries, over-
looking inconsistencies with the rhetoric of worldwide democracy promo-
tion (Chase and Hamzawy 2008). After the Cold War, joint concerns over 
Islamist terrorism and growing arms sales encouraged an equally muted pub-
lic response to human rights violations from allied governments. Both sides 
have attempted to square this circle. International allies argued that influence 
in private was more effective than public condemnation, and that working 
with these regimes was more likely to bring change than breaking away from 
them (van Rij and Wilkinson 2018). The regimes themselves paid lip service 
to democracy and human rights, and activists and social movements made 
some genuine progress (Hosseinioun 2017).
In cybersecurity, the same puzzle presents itself. There has been no indica-
tion of opposition by the US and UK governments to the raft of new cyber-
crime laws. More seriously, their offensive cyber activities do not fall within 
the limits set both rhetorically and in practice by the United States, the United 
Kingdom, and other “like-minded” states, which condemn the destabiliz-
ing use of cyber tools and permit cyber espionage only for narrow national 
security purposes. The GCC split itself was reportedly triggered by a cyber 
operation carried out by contractors working for the UAE, who implanted 
fake text praising Iran on the website of the Qatari national news agency 
(DeYoung and Nakashima 2017). The leaking of private e-mails of the UAE 
ambassador to the United States may have been a Qatari response (Ahmed 
2017). Finally, as part of the ongoing dispute between Canada and Saudi 
Arabia, Israel-manufactured spyware was identified on the devices of Saudi 
dissidents in Canada, and assessed to be controlled by the Saudi government 
(Hubbard and Porter 2018; Marczak et al. 2018). Egypt has conducted simi-
lar cyberattacks on journalists and civil society (Scott-Railton et al. 2017). 
Overall, the contradictions between cyber norms and long-standing security 
alliances have been left unresolved, undermining the force of the norms the 
United Kingdom stresses in regard to states like Russia.
This complex picture, which reflects the broader tensions in these states’ 
historical relationships with Western democracies dating back to the Cold 
War, suggests that a binary understanding of global cyber norms is incom-
plete. Amid deep conflict over basic norms, Egypt and the GCC states have 
maneuvered between two poles while enjoying the tacit, if not explicit, sup-
port of both sides. This suggests that global cyber norms are much more 
complex—and much more entangled with traditional governance practices, 
diplomatic relationships, and strategic concerns—than Western officials may 
like to admit. More broadly, to understand the complexity of cyber norms we 
must look outside the framework of great power competition.
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AMBIGUOUS CYBERSECURITY STRATEGIES
National strategy documents are a key element of the global cybersecurity 
landscape: they are a requirement of many cybersecurity maturity models, 
and international bodies collect and compare cybersecurity strategies from 
around the world. The language of these strategies can be hyperbolic, vague, 
and full of jargon: for example, the Qatari strategy claims that “this is an inte-
grated and holistic approach that will enhance synergies, avoid duplication, 
and maximize resource utilisation in managing the dynamic environment and 
emerging threats in cyberspace” (ictQatar, May 2014, vii). Such language 
is easy to dismiss as mere marketing, with no significant role more broadly. 
Instead, I argue that national cybersecurity strategies in Egypt and the Gulf 
states are ambiguous, reflecting the contradictory position of these states in 
cybersecurity governance.
Ambiguity is a common attribute of international politics outside the 
cybersecurity arena. There are many varieties of vagueness and indetermi-
nacy in the discourse of international politics, some of which are not delib-
erately cultivated; ambiguity can simply stem from lack of knowledge, time 
pressures, or rapidly changing circumstances (especially in cybersecurity). 
However, other ambiguities are entirely purposeful. In Hansen’s extensive 
analysis of ambiguity in European arms control regulations, she notes that 
what Henry Kissinger described as “constructive ambiguity”—ambiguity 
enabling differences between parties to be bridged through the presence 
of several alternative meanings—generally results from heterogeneity and 
resistance within the negotiating parties (Hansen 2016). Cornish has even 
used Kissinger’s phrase to describe potential avenues for dialogue between 
multistakeholder and cyber sovereignty proponents (Cornish 2015). In this 
section, I focus on a more specific version of deliberate ambiguity present in 
cybersecurity strategy documents: ambiguity used by one (state) author to 
disguise deviations from global norms, rather than Hansen’s heterogeneous 
ambiguity used by many negotiating parties to reach an agreement.
To put cybersecurity strategies in context, “national strategies” are them-
selves a peculiar text in this region. National cybersecurity strategies for 
the Gulf states follow broader state policy. All GCC states have long-term 
national plans—the most well-known being Saudi Arabia’s bold “Vision 
2030,” championed by the Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman—and these 
display three broad similarities. First, they claim to refocus the economy from 
extractive industries toward technology and innovation, whether through 
smart cities, e-government, or other skilled sectors such as health and finance. 
Second, they aim to reduce the role of the public sector in all areas of life. 
Third, they aim to reduce high expatriate numbers through extensive train-
ing and preferential treatment for citizens. Egypt has also had many strategic 
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plans both internally and delivered by development consultants. National 
cybersecurity strategies echo these wider characteristics, presenting an image 
of carefully planned cybersecurity governance to their audiences.
The sources are not quite as simple as the phrase “national strategies” 
might suggest, given the lack of availability of many government documents 
in this region. At the time of writing in August 2018, there was only one 
national cybersecurity strategy named as such that has been published in a 
final form in Egypt and the Gulf states, in English or Arabic, that of Qatar. 
Although other cybersecurity strategy documents are now available, espe-
cially through the UN Cyber Policy Portal, they were not included in the fol-
lowing analysis. Instead, I used publicly available documents that are as close 
to national cybersecurity strategies as possible. The sources for this analysis 
are listed in table 10.1.
The object of cybersecurity in these strategies is described variously as 
cyber, digital, information, or electronic security (in Arabic: al-ʾamn al-
sibrani, al-ʾamn al-raqmi, ʾamn al-muʿalumat, or al-ʾamn al- al-ʾiliktruni 
respectively). In other contexts, scholars have argued that this linguistic dif-
ference captures important differences in national approach; for example, the 
societal concerns included in Russian or Chinese concepts of “information 
security” rather than “cybersecurity” (Giles and Hagestad II 2013). However, 
this is too simplistic a conclusion for situations where there are many terms in 
play. The focus of this chapter is on shifts in the scope of cybersecurity, not 
whether such shifts can be captured in a binary distinction between the term 
“cyber” on one hand and “electronic” or “information” on the other.
Table 10.1 Documents Used to Analyze National Cybersecurity Strategies
State Document Available Secondary sources
Egypt National ICT strategy 
2012–2017 (2012)
Yes New Egyptian constitution 
(2014)
UAE National Cybersecurity 
Strategy (NCS) (2014)
No Presentation at RSA conference 
on the strategy (2015), Dubai 
NCS (2017)
Saudi Arabia National Information 
Security Strategy (NISS) 
(2013)
No Draft NISS (2011), National 
Cybersecurity Centre profile 
(2017)
Qatar National Cybersecurity 
Strategy (2014)
Yes N/A
Oman High-Level Cybersecurity 
Strategy and Master 
Plan (2013)
No E.Oman strategy (2010), ITA 
cybersecurity mission and 
goals (2018)
Kuwait National Cybersecurity 
Strategy (2017)
No Announcement and summary of 
NCS (2017)
Bahrain National Cybersecurity 
Strategy (2017)
No NCS summary on TRA website 
(2017), e.Gov strategy (2016)
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First, national cybersecurity strategies generally include only an abstract 
summary of the issue at stake. For example, the Bahrain strategy claims 
to “establish a secure cyber-space (fidaʾ al-ʾiliktruni ʾamin) to safeguard 
national interests and protect the Kingdom of Bahrain against cyber-threats 
(tahdidat al-ʾamn al-ʾiliktruni) to reduce risks” (Government of Bahrain 
2017). In Dubai, this is phrased even more broadly: “The goal is to build 
a more secure information society that is perfectly aware of cyber security 
risks (makhatir al-ʾamn al-ʾiliktruni). One of the key objectives of this strat-
egy is to address any risks, threats or attacks” (Government of Dubai 2017). 
In Saudi Arabia, the strategy aims to build “an effective and secure national 
information security environment (biaʾat ʾamn al-muʿalumat)” (MCIT 
[Saudi Arabia] 2011), while the National Cybersecurity Centre claims to 
“build a resilient and secure cyberspace that protects national and citizens’ 
interests” (National Cyber Security Center 2017). The generalized tone of 
these summaries gives no indication of the cybersecurity priorities of these 
states.
Given this abstract tone, the term “malicious actor” is the most prominent 
characterization of cybersecurity threats in these strategies. For example, the 
Dubai strategy states that “An open and free cyber space provides value . . . 
It is important to protect this value against the risks of malicious activities 
and disruptions . . . Dubai is a major target for malicious actors” (Govern-
ment of Dubai 2017, 9). Qatar also claims that it is “an attractive target for 
malicious actors who seek to cause disruption and destruction” (ictQatar, 3). 
It is worth noting that the adjective “malicious” has several translations. In 
the sentence from the Dubai strategy above, the phrase “malicious actors” is 
replaced by electronic attacks (al-hujumat al-ʾiliktruniyya), while the Qatar 
strategy uses “biased sides” (jihat mughrida) in the sentence above and 
elsewhere “malicious/evil intentions” (nawaya khabitha) for insider threats 
(ictQatar, 4). The latter echoes a similar description for malicious software 
(barmajiyyat khabitha). The term “malicious” thus performs a similar role 
in incorporating a range of cyber threats into a single term in both English 
and Arabic.
Interestingly, these strategies endorse human rights values, especially indi-
vidual freedom and privacy, in an equally abstract style. For example, the 
objectives of Saudi Arabia’s strategy aims to “enable information to be used 
and shared freely and securely,” while the National Cyber Security Centre 
seeks “to realize a safe, open and stable information society” (MCIT [Saudi 
Arabia] 2011, iv, National Cyber Security Center 2017, 12). The Dubai 
strategy desires “a free and secure cyber world,” claiming that “cyber space 
needs to remain open to innovation and free flow of ideas, information, and 
expression,” although “due consideration should be made to maintain the 
proper balance between open technology and the individual rights of privacy” 
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(Government of Dubai 2017, 7, 13). The Qatar strategy claims that their 
“values in cybersecurity” are to “show tolerance and respect,” and embrace 
“the free flow of ideas and information” (ictQatar, 17). In Bahrain, the aim 
is to “maintain the rights and values of individuals” (Government of Bahrain 
2017). This language echoes wider contests over human rights values in the 
region, where alternative institutions are set up to mimic the language of 
genuine human rights bodies.
However, even in the rarefied world of cybersecurity strategies, this 
endorsement of human rights values is qualified by vague references to 
safety and care. The Saudi strategy emphasizes the cultural and economic 
threats of information to the state, although, crucially, these qualifications 
are not made by senior Saudi figures writing in U.S. journals about the Saudi 
cybersecurity strategy, suggesting that such figures present a calculated 
portrayal of abstracted Internet rights and freedoms to their international 
audience (Al-Saud 2012). Other Gulf states offer similar qualifications. In 
Kuwait, “the strategy is primarily intended to promote the culture of cyber-
security which supports the safe and right use of the electronic space” (Arab 
Times 2017), while Qatar aims to “foster a culture of cyber security that 
promotes safe and appropriate use of cyberspace” (ictQatar, 17). In both 
cases, the ambiguity of “safe and right/appropriate” disguises significant 
content restrictions, discussed in the next section. Finally, the Dubai strategy 
states that “cyber space attacks lead to a variety of threats, such as: fraud, 
espionage, terrorism, violation of privacy, and defamation” (Government 
of Dubai 2017, 12). These last two threats mean that “careful use of social 
media” is a “baseline control” that “should be established, maintained and 
supported by Dubai individuals in their implementation,” along with system 
updates, firewalls, and password management (Government of Dubai 2017, 
25). The phrase “careful use” is ambiguous between care in clicking on 
links and sharing potentially infected documents on the one hand, and self-
policing of content on the other.
Egypt’s ICT strategy demonstrates this ambiguity clearly, partly due to its 
publication date in 2012, shortly after the January 2011 revolution and before 
the higher security imperatives initiated by President Al-Sisi from 2013. It 
was then relaunched under Al-Sisi as a 2014–2017 rather than 2012–2017 
strategy, but no other changes were made. On the one hand, it states that 
“Telecommunications Law No. 10 of 2003 . . . contains certain articles that 
require amendment in line with Egypt’s democratic transition that will pro-
mote political openness and protect freedom of expression” (MCIT [Egypt] 
2014, 9). On the other hand, it also qualifies this aim, claiming to “bring 
about the desired balance between the considerations of freedom as a funda-
mental human right and privacy considerations and national security” (MCIT 
[Egypt] 2014, 33). Consequently, “the availability of information [that] could 
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harm national security of Egypt or the exposure of relations with other coun-
tries at risk under the banner of freedom is not acceptable” (MCIT [Egypt] 
2014, 33). Here the national ICT strategy incorporates both an expansive 
definition of national security and an abstract endorsement of human rights 
values: the ambiguity of both masks the significant extent to which Egyptian 
cybersecurity governance differs from U.S. and European states who adopt 
similar language.
On top of this ambiguity, some cybersecurity strategy documents display 
a contradictory orientation to international cyber norms, most relevantly the 
Budapest Convention on Cybercrime (treated further in the next section). The 
Budapest Convention is only referenced in the Omani and Egyptian strate-
gies. In Oman, the Budapest Convention is described as one source among 
many for its cybercrime law:
As the Omani society nowadays witnesses an enormous revolution in informa-
tion technology, it was necessary to set a law that protects networks and devices 
from illegal hacking attempts . . . . The issuance of the Cyber-Crimes Law was 
based on the Budapest Convention as well as local, regional and international 
legislations. (Government of Oman 2018)
This statement portrays the Budapest Convention as a genuine influence, 
although not to the extent that Oman acceded to the convention. However, 
in Egypt the situation is less clear. In the English version of the strategy, the 
draft cybercrime law is explicitly claimed to originate from both international 
and domestic sources, including:
International Telecommunication Union (ITU) recommendations regarding 
cybersecurity; relevant Indian law; the Legislation Management Draft Law of 
the Ministry of Justice; the Decision Support Center Draft Law; the Convention 
on Cybercrime (Budapest Agreement) of the Council of Europe; and “Cyber-
crime,” by information security expert Ahmed El-Sobky. (MCIT [Egypt] 2014, 
35)
Again, the Budapest Convention is presented as an influence on national 
cybersecurity strategy in a similar manner to Oman. However, the Arabic ver-
sion of the strategy strangely omits this paragraph. The most plausible inter-
pretation of this omission is that the English strategy aims to communicate 
internationally that it is based on a range of sources including the Budapest 
Convention, whereas this is not a relevant consideration for an Arabic-speak-
ing audience. If correct, this reading suggests that the Budapest Convention 
is merely utilized by governments to appease international audiences, rather 
than being a genuine influence on their national policy.
215Ambiguity and Appropriation
Finally, the Saudi Arabian strategy contains a similar contradiction 
between domestic and international stances on cybercrime. After claiming 
that Saudi Arabia is “quickly aligning itself with international standards and 
capabilities to detect and respond to cybercrime,” the strategy states:
The NISS makes an important distinction between internal cybercrime laws 
and procedures and the requirements necessary when dealing with these issues 
at the international level. In order to effectively operate on the international 
cybercrime stage, the Kingdom may need to forego a rigid interpretation of its 
own legal standards and procedures and adopt a more flexible legal approach to 
work cooperatively with international partners. (MCIT [Saudi Arabia] 2011, 65)
It explains that this is because “domestic and international, as well as legal 
and cultural challenges arise when dealing with cybercrime and the inter-
pretation of legal standards, procedures and law.” Specifically, Sharia law 
is “applied to some forms of cybercrime,” which “on the international stage, 
will be more difficult” (MCIT [Saudi Arabia] 2011, 66). As in Egypt, the 
Saudi Arabian strategy suggests that international agreements such as the 
Budapest Convention have limited influence on domestic cybercrime law. 
However, it also acknowledges that there are substantial differences in the 
concept of cybercrime between domestic and international levels.
In sum, although cybersecurity strategy documents in Egypt and the Gulf 
states have mirrored the language of human rights and a free and open Inter-
net, this has not been matched by these states’ practices. The abstract tone 
and internationally oriented language of national cybersecurity strategies 
disguises the differences between them and their Western liberal democratic 
allies. Furthermore, although some of these strategy documents acknowl-
edge the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime as an international cyber 
norm—suggesting a Western orientation—closer analysis suggests that this 
acknowledgment is calculated to appeal to an international audience, and 
other documents explicitly argue for deviations from this norm in favor of 
domestic interpretations of cybercrime. In the next section, I examine these 
cybercrime laws in more detail.
CYBERCRIME LAWS
Raʾif Badawi, the creator of the “Free Saudi Liberals” website, was arrested 
by the Saudi authorities on 17 June 2012. He had run the website since 2006 
and had been detained and questioned about its content in 2008. A month 
before his arrest, he used it to declare a celebratory day for Saudi liberals. 
Badawi was charged under the 2007 cybercrime law—among others2—for 
216 James Shires
posts made by him and others on this website (BBC 2015a; 2015b; Al-
Barqawi 2015). He was sentenced to 10 years in prison and 1,000 lashes; the 
first 50 were carried out in January 2015, but after international protests the 
remainder were deferred on health grounds. While recognizing the severity of 
the human rights violations in this incident, this section focuses on a slightly 
different question: is Raʾif Badawi a cybercriminal?
Cybercrime laws were drafted between 2006 and 2018 throughout Egypt 
and the Gulf states. In this section, I argue that these laws consisted of an 
expansion of the scope of “cybercrime” from economic concerns such as 
fraud and espionage to also include political speech online. I first stress that 
“cybercrime” is an English term with no equivalent in Arabic. While many 
professional documents in Arabic use the loan word sibrani (cybercrimes 
would thus be al-jaraʾim al-sibraniyya), this neologism is not used in legal 
terminology. Instead, the legal Arabic equivalents are electronic crimes 
(al-jaraʾim al-ʾiliktruniyya), information crimes (jaraʾim al-muʿalumat), or 
information technology crimes (jaraʾim tiqniyyat al-muʿalumat). The English 
translation of these terms is nearly always “cybercrime.”
The main international norm regarding cybercrime is the Budapest Con-
vention on Cybercrime agreed by the Council of Europe in 2001, considered 
briefly in the previous section. None of the states considered here have 
acceded to the Budapest Convention (accession is available to nonmembers 
of the Council of Europe, while signature is only available to members). At 
the time of writing, there were sixty-four ratifications or signatures/acces-
sions to the Convention, only two of which are in the Middle East: Tunisia 
and Israel (Council of Europe 2018). Consequently, this section argues that 
the wide definitions of cybercrime by Egypt and the Gulf states are not 
a “localization” of this norm, in Acharya’s terms, as these states are not 
“norm-takers”: they have not accepted it as an international norm in the first 
place (Acharya 2004). Instead, it is a more active appropriation of this norm. 
“Appropriation” is a term used by some norm scholars to describe changes 
made by states to norms more generally (Zimmerman 2017, pp. 217–222). 
Here, I use it to specify the expansion of the professional discourse to fit a 
particular cluster of values; namely, a broad definition of national security 
historically prevalent in the region.
First, it should be noted that domestic cybercrime laws emerged against the 
backdrop of a regional agreement on cybercrime: the Convention on Com-
bating Information Technology Offences (jaraʾim tiqniyyat al-muʿalumat) 
by the Arab League (the Arab Convention). This convention was signed in 
December 2010, and it has been ratified by Egypt and all GCC states other 
than Saudi Arabia. The Arab Convention is different in several key ways to 
the earlier Budapest Convention. Hakmeh highlights the similarities between 
the two, claiming that “provisions [of the Arab Convention] are in fact almost 
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the same as those of the Budapest Convention, especially in relation to pro-
cedural powers and international cooperation” (Hakmeh 2017, 11). However, 
the key word here is “almost,” as none of the articles that include political and 
socially controversial content in the Arab Convention (12, 14, 15 or 21) are 
in the Budapest Convention. The Arab Convention is thus a mixture of direct 
influence from the earlier text and additions that repurpose the Budapest 
Convention toward political speech online (Al-Tahir 2015). This is an expan-
sion of, rather than a shift away from, an economic concept of cybercrime, 
as the convention also includes articles on copyright infringement, fraud, and 
electronic payment.
The Arab Spring and near contemporaneous signing of the Arab Conven-
tion was the catalyst for the spread of cybercrime laws in the GCC. Between 
2011 and 2018, Saudi Arabia, Oman, and the UAE all updated earlier laws 
while Egypt, Bahrain, Qatar, and Kuwait implemented new laws (table 10.2).
Like the Arab Convention, several scholars have recognized that these 
cybercrime laws expand the concept of cybercrime to cover political speech 
online (Hakmeh 2018). Hakmeh argues that all GCC countries other than 
Bahrain have “additional offences not foreseen in other legal instruments” in 
their cybercrime laws, and “most GCC cybercrime laws have been subject 
to heavy criticism by human rights organisations for limiting free speech 
and imposing self-censorship on citizens and activists” (Hakmeh 2018, 9). 
Duffy’s 2014 analysis also concludes that these laws put forward wide defini-
tions of “public morals” and “national unity,” which means that many social 
media comments, including any political opposition, could be considered a 
cybercrime (Duffy 2014).
The updated laws all strengthen existing penalties. For example, the 
cybercrime law in Saudi Arabia was updated in 2015 with what was termed 
Table 10.2 Cybercrime Laws in Egypt and the GCC
State
Electronic 
transactions law Cybercrime law
Oman 2008 Penal code amended with chapter on computer 
crime 2001, Cyber Crime Law 2011
UAE 2002 Law No. 2 of 2006, Law No. 5 of 2012 Concerning 
Combating Information Technology Crimes
Saudi Arabia 2007 Anti-Cyber Crime Law 2007, updated 2015
Qatar 2010 Cybercrime Prevention Law 2014
Bahrain 2002 Law No. 60 of 2014 Concerning Information 
Technology Crimes
Kuwait 2014 Law No.63 of 2015 Concerning Combating 
Information Technology Crimes
Egypt 2004 Laws 2015 and 2016 Concerning Electronic Crimes 
discussed by Parliament, approved 2018
218 James Shires
a “naming and shaming” clause for offenders, allowing a name and details 
of their offense to be published in local newspapers with the costs to be paid 
by the person convicted (Al-Sharq Al-ʾAwsat 2015). Similarly, the updated 
Omani law in 2011 has a section explicitly titled “content crimes,” covering 
any use of ICTs to “produce or publish or distribute or purchase or possess 
whatever might prejudice the public order or religious values” (Govern-
ment of Oman 2011). The updated UAE law in 2012 is one of the starkest 
examples, as Article 9 prevents almost any form of online political debate:
Shall be punished by temporary imprisonment and a fine not in excess of one 
million dirhams whoever publishes information, news, statements or rumors on 
a website or any computer network or information technology means with intent 
to make sarcasm or damage the reputation, prestige or stature of the State or any 
of its institutions or its president, vice-president, any of the rulers of the Emir-
ates, their crown princes, or the deputy rulers of the Emirates, the State flag, the 
national peace, its logo, national anthem or any of its symbols. (Government of 
the UAE 2012)
New laws, such as the Kuwait cybercrime law, include very similar provi-
sions to the updated laws above. Human rights organizations argued that 
the Kuwait law was “an effective barrier to critical political speech over the 
Internet” (Human Rights Watch 2015b), and “a direct assault on the right 
to freedom of opinion and belief and the right to freedom of expression” 
(Reporters without Borders 2016). Interestingly, this law had been considered 
even before the Arab Spring: a leaked U.S. cable in 2010 quoted Minister of 
the Interior Sheikh Jabar Al-Khalid Al-Sabah as complaining that “politics 
was hindering progress on . . . many other important bills, including one to 
criminalize cyber crimes” (Wikileaks 2010). The expansion of cybercrime 
in these laws is thus far more than localization of an existing norm: it is the 
active renegotiation of both cybercrime and national security.
Importantly, these cybercrime laws do not just have content provisions in 
their texts but have all been used to target political speech online. In the UAE, 
the cybercrime law was used in 2013 to charge the son of one of ninety-four 
defendants associated with Al-Islah, a political group accused by the UAE 
government of affiliation with the Muslim Brotherhood, after he published 
details about their trial (Human Rights Watch 2013). Al-Islah was then des-
ignated a terrorist group by the UAE in 2014. A prominent political dissident, 
Nasser bin Ghaith, was charged under the cybercrime law in 2016 after he 
criticized the UAE and Egyptian government. In this case, the cybercrime law 
was used to criminalize his claims of mistreatment in an earlier trial as the 
posting of information “intended to damage the UAE” (Human Rights Watch 
2016a). Ahmed Mansoor, a well-known dissident, was also tried under cyber-
crime laws (Al-Jazeera 2018). In 2016, an Omani was jailed for three years 
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after criticizing the UAE’s conduct in the war in Yemen in a Whatsapp audio 
recording (Al-ʿArabi Al-Jadid 2016). After the Qatar crisis in June 2017, the 
UAE attorney general stated that showing sympathy for Qatar online would 
be treated as a cybercrime, resulting in prison sentences between three and 
fifteen years (Al Subaihi 2017).
In Saudi Arabia, the cybercrime law was also used regularly to prosecute 
political opposition. The liberal dissident Raʾif Badawi was sentenced under 
the cybercrime law in 2013 (Human Rights Watch 2012). A year later, the 
head of a human rights organization in Saudi Arabia was also sentenced to 
seven years’ imprisonment under the cybercrime law (Reporters without 
Borders 2014). In 2015, a lawyer who had represented Raʾif Badawi, and 
who founded the rights organization Saudi Monitor for Human Rights, was 
sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment for a range of offenses, including 
some under the new cybercrime law (Human Rights Watch 2014a). Other 
lawyers confirmed the use of the cybercrime law to prosecute the “spread-
ing of rumours” over Twitter in 2017 (Al-Barqawi 2017). Most recently, in 
October 2018, the Saudi Public Prosecution reiterated their willingness to use 
the provisions against spreading rumors in the updated cybercrime law in an 
oblique reference to the alleged murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi 
by the Saudi government in its Turkish consulate (Saudi Gazette 2018).
Kuwait’s cybercrime law was used in 2016 to charge a blogger who 
criticized the emir (FIDH 2016). In Bahrain, the most consistent use of the 
cybercrime law was against Nabeel Rajab, a prominent political activist, who 
led demonstrations in the 2011 protests and has been given prison sentences 
multiple times for his opposition to the government. According to his own 
testimony, he was arrested and interviewed in 2015 and 2016 by the Cyber 
Crimes Department following anti-government tweets, and remained in 
prison at the time of writing (Rajab 2016). His charges included “insulting a 
neighbouring country” in relation to Saudi Arabia (Bahrain Center for Human 
Rights 2017). In Oman, the cybercrime law was used to charge an individual 
who interviewed striking oil workers in 2012 and made other political state-
ments online, although he was then convicted of an older criminal offense—
insulting the Sultan—rather than under the cybercrime law (Human Rights 
Watch 2014b). In 2015, a government critic was sentenced to three years in 
prison for critical blog posts under the cybercrime law (Human Rights Watch 
2015a). The editor of a politically independent newspaper in Oman, Al-
Zaman, was charged under the cybercrime law after an article that criticized 
the judiciary in 2016 (Human Rights Watch 2016b). The newspaper was shut 
down a year later. I identified no instances of Qatar’s cybercrime law being 
used to suppress political opposition. However, human rights organizations 
highlight risks of this law through the example of a poet sentenced to fifteen 
years in prison in 2013 for indirectly criticizing the ruling family (Amnesty 
220 James Shires
International 2014). This poet, Muhammad Rashid Al-Ajami, was pardoned 
in 2016.
Finally, Egypt’s cybercrime law has followed a more contentious path than 
its equivalents in the Gulf states. A draft cybercrime law was first mentioned 
in a government-wide ICT strategy in 2012. In a similar manner to those 
in the Gulf states, this draft law doubled the penalties for those committing 
“information crimes” (jaraʾim al-muʿalumat) with the intent to damage pub-
lic interest or an individual public authority (MCIT [Egypt] 2014, 35). At 
least three further drafts have been proposed since the June 2013 coup, in 
April 2015, May 2016, and June 2018 (Yusif 2016; Negm 2015). One of the 
main sponsors of the 2015 draft, Minister for Communications and Informa-
tion Technology Khalid Negm, claimed that it was in part prompted by the 
Arab Convention (Saad 2015). The 2016 draft then increased the severity of 
the first in a similar way to the updated cybercrime laws in the GCC states, 
increasing the punishments for vaguely defined crimes of harming national 
unity and public morals (Abdelaal 2016). The latest draft was approved by 
parliament in June 2018 (Hassan 2018) and passed into law in August 2018 
(Salama 2018). It is not included in the analysis here, although its provisions 
appear similar. Criticism of the law has focused on its broad definition of 
websites subject to censorship, including any that “threaten national security 
or expose the nation’s security or economy to risk” (Article 7) (ʿAli 2018). 
Critics have also pointed to heavy punishments for privacy infringements of 
public figures, penetration testing practices by security experts, and high data 
management burdens on ISPs, despite insistences by officials that these are 
unintended or at least limited (El-Gundy 2018).
Overall, Egyptian law follows the expansive definitions of cybercrime in 
the other laws above (Miller 2018). Due to the recent approval of this law, 
Egypt has no cybercrime prosecutions at the time of writing. However, as 
Ben Hassine argues, Egypt already uses a variety of anti-terror and anti-
protest laws to control online political activity (Ben Hassine 2016). The 
anti-protest laws are especially successful in this aim, as encouraging or 
inciting people to protest online is a more serious offense in these laws than 
taking part in the protest itself. This focus on protests as a conduit for politi-
cal opposition reflects Egypt’s experience of the January revolution in 2011 
(Abdulla 2014). It also highlights the violent responses of security forces to 
later protests, including the massacre of at least 700 people at Rabiʿa Square 
in 2013, and the regular disappearance and torture of activists and protesters 
since (Guerin 2018).
In sum, this section has demonstrated that the governments of Egypt and 
the Gulf states appropriated the concept of cybercrime to counter political 
opposition. This tactic was combined with a similarly broad definition of 
other key legal terms such as terrorism, and strict anti-protest and media 
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laws. This innovation is important for the global development of cyber norms 
because it demonstrates how states that are not “norm-takers” (who did not 
sign up to the Budapest Convention) nonetheless incorporate such norms into 
their practices in a strategic maneuver, signaling their alignment with the 
norm through national strategy documents and then deviating from the norm 
in their domestic laws.
CONCLUSION
This chapter has argued that the emergence of cyber norms in Egypt and the 
Gulf states is characterized by ambiguity and appropriation. First, I argued 
that these states occupy a complex position in international cybersecurity 
governance, with both strong security ties to multistakeholder proponents in 
the United States and Europe and support for cyber sovereignty measures in 
multilateral forums. Second, these states’ cybersecurity strategy documents 
accommodate the contradictions of this position by adopting an abstract 
and ambiguous description of cybersecurity threats and human rights values 
designed for international consumption. Although this ambiguous tone is 
partly a reflection of the many uses and causes of ambiguity more gener-
ally in international politics, in this case it also disguises the differences in 
conceptions of cybersecurity and cybercrime between these states and their 
international allies. Third, in the turbulent political situation after the Arab 
Spring, cybercrime laws and regional agreements across Egypt and the GCC 
appropriated the concept of cybercrime to provide an additional means to 
criminalize political speech online in an already restricted public sphere. 
These two innovations are closely linked: the cybersecurity practices of these 
states, especially their appropriation of cybercrime laws, illustrates the calcu-
lated nature of the ambiguity present in their strategy documents.
Both ambiguity and appropriation are innovations in state responses to the 
development of global cyber norms that could be analyzed in comparative 
perspective elsewhere. Future work could compare the production of ambigu-
ity and appropriation in other regions with similar contradictory positions in 
global cybersecurity governance or test the logic of the argument presented 
here by exploring whether such maneuvers take place in states without such 
contradictory pressures. This chapter has thus provided an original contribu-
tion to the study of cyber norms, based on a rich empirical analysis of an 
important and largely unstudied region in cybersecurity. It highlights how 
states outside the cyber “great powers” have reached novel horizons in their 
sophisticated engagement with cyber norms, as—through their embrace of 
ambiguity and appropriation—these states participate in the constant under-
mining and redefining of responsible behavior itself.
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NOTES
1. Daniel W. Drezner, “The Global Governance of the Internet: Bringing the 
State Back In,” Political Science Quarterly 119, no. 3 (2004): 477–498; Milton 
Mueller, Andreas Schmidt, and Brenden Kuerbis, “Internet Security and Networked 
Governance in International Relations,” International Studies Review 15, no. 1 
(March 1, 2013): 86–104; Roger Hurwitz, “The Play of States: Norms and Security 
in Cyberspace,” American Foreign Policy Interests 36, no. 5 (September 3, 2014), 
p. 328.
2. Other charges included apostasy and insulting his father. It is unclear from pub-
lic reports in both English and Arabic what combination of charges led to the specific 
sentence imposed, although the apostasy charge is the most severe; it allows capital 
punishment and was advocated by some Saudi conservatives.
REFERENCES
Abdelaal, Mohamed. 2016. “Egypt’s New Cybercrime Law: Another Legislative 
Failure”. Jurist, July 9, 2016. https://perma.cc/HED5-X2G7.
Abdulla, Rasha A. 2014. “Egypt’s Media in the Midst of Revolution”. Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, July 2014.
Acharya, Amitav. 2004. “How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localiza-
tion and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism”. International Organization, 
58(2): 239–275.
Al-Barqawi, ʿAbdallah. 2017. “Mutalabat Bimuʿaqaba Murawaji Shaʾiʿat ‘Al-
Qurarat’ ʿabr Muwaqiʿa Al-Tawassul [Demands to Punish the Promotion of 
‘Low’ Rumours on Social Media]”. Sabq, November 18, 2017. https://perma.
cc/5K8R-SV5G.
———. 2015. “Tanfiz Hukm Al-Jild ʿala Raʾif Badawi Bisubbub ʿibarat Kufriyya 
Wa ʿuquq Walidihi [Sentence of Lashes Imposed against Raif Badawi for Expres-
sions of Unbelief and Insulting His Father]”. Sabq, January 9, 2015. https://perma.
cc/Q99Y-5F39.
Al Subaihi, Thamer. 2017. “Supporting Qatar on Social Media a Cybercrime, Says 
UAE Attorney General”. The National, June 7, 2017. https://perma.cc/K7Y2-8ST5.
Al-Saud, Naef bin Ahmed. 2012. “A Saudi Outlook for Cybersecurity Strategies: 
Extrapolated from Western Experience”. Joint Forces Quarterly, 64: 75–81.
Al-Tahir, Muhammad. 2015. “Taʿliq ʿala Al-Itifaqiyya Al-ʿarabiyya Limukafahat 
Jaraʾim Tiqniyyat Almuʿalumat [Comments on the Arab Convention for Combat-
ting Information Technology Crimes]”. Muʾassasat Huriyyat Al-Fikr Wa Al-Taʿbir 
[Foundation for the freedom of thought and expression], March 12, 2015. https://
perma.cc/DUB8-6END.
ʿAli, ʾIman. 2018. “Nanshura Al-Nus Al-Kamil Liqanun Mukafihat Jaraʾim 
Al-ʾintarnat Baʿad Tasdiq Al-Raʾis Al-Sisi ʿalaihi [We Publish the Complete Text 
of the Law against Internet Crimes After the Ratification of President Al-Sisi]”. 
Al-Masry Al-Yaum, August 19, 2018. https://perma.cc/89P6-KZJ7.
223Ambiguity and Appropriation
Amnesty International. 2014. “Qatar: New Cybercrimes Law Endangers Freedom 
of Expression”. Amnesty International, September 18, 2014. https://perma.
cc/4ZBS-732Q.
Bahrain Center for Human Rights. 2017. “Updates: Arrest and Detention of BCHR’s 
President Nabeel Rajab”. Bahrain Center for Human Rights, August 8, 2017. 
https://perma.cc/39UJ-KBFH.
BBC. 2015. “Saudi Arabian Blogger ‘Flogged’”. BBC News, January 9, 2015. https://
perma.cc/36JH-YJUS.
Belnap, Jeffrey Dallin. 2018. “Bright Star Command Post Exercise Pursues Stra-
tegic Partnership”. U.S. Army Central, September 15, 2018. https://perma.
cc/3GPY-C2CN.
Ben Hassine, Wafa. 2016. “The Crime of Speech: How Arab Governments Use the 
Law to Silence Expression Online”. Electronic Frontier Foundation, April 2016.
Carr, Madeline. 2015. “Power Plays in Global Internet Governance”. Millennium 
43(2): 640–659.
Cornish, Paul. 2015. “Governing Cyberspace Through Constructive Ambiguity”. 
Survival 57(3): 153–176.
Council of Europe. 2018. “Chart of Signatures and Ratifications of Treaty 185: 
Convention on Cybercrime”. European Treaty Series—No.185, August 15, 2018. 
https://perma.cc/7NQM-U764.
Dalek, Jakub, Lex Gill, Bill Marczak, Sarah McKune, Naser Noor, Joshua Oliver, 
John Penney, Adam Senft, and Ronald J. Deibert. 2018. “Planet Netsweeper”. 
Citizen Lab, April 25, 2018.
Dourado, Eli. 2012. “Behind Closed Doors at the UN’s Attempted ‘Takeover of the 
Internet’”. Ars Technica, December 20, 2012. https://perma.cc/TCG3-2LST.
Drezner, Daniel W. 2004. “The Global Governance of the Internet: Bringing the State 
Back In”. Political Science Quarterly, 119(3): 477–498.
Duffy, Matt. 2014. “Arab Media Regulations: Identifying Restraints on Freedom of 
the Press in the Laws of Six Arabian Peninsula Countries”. Berkeley Journal of 
Middle Eastern & Islamic Law, 6(1): 1.
El-Gundy, Zeinab. 2018. “Q&A: Egypt’s New Cybercrime Law ‘Not about Put-
ting Barriers on the Internet’”. Ahram Online, August 20, 2018. https://perma.cc/
QA7T-EFUR.
FIDH. 2016. “Kuwaiti Cyber Crimes Law Silences Dissent: Ongoing Prosecution 
of Sara Al-Drees”. Worldwide Movement for Human Rights, December 12, 2016. 
https://perma.cc/YR93-Q4B8.
Foreign & Commonwealth Office. 2018. “United Kingdom-Saudi Arabia Joint Com-
muniqué”. GOV.UK, March 10, 2018. https://perma.cc/R9C7-LZVC.
Giles, Keir, and William Hagestad II. 2013. “Divided by a Common Language: Cyber 
Definitions in Chinese, Russian and English”. In: 2013 5th International Confer-
ence on Cyber Conflict, K. Podins, J. Stinissen, and M. Maybaum (eds.). Tallinn: 
NATO CCDCOE, 2013.
Government of Bahrain. 2017. “Kingdom of Bahrain—EGovernment Portal Cyber-
security Strategy”. eGovernment Portal, October 3, 2017. https://perma.cc/RSL4-
FPJA (ENG), https://perma.cc/NNP2-CGBJ (AR).
224 James Shires
Government of Dubai. 2017. “Dubai Cyber Security Strategy”. Dubai Electronic 
Security Center.
Government of Oman. 2011. “Royal Decree No 12/2011 Issuing the Cyber Crime 
Law”. Government of Oman.
———. 2018. “Information Security—Omanuna Portal”. Omanuna, 26 March 2018. 
https://perma.cc/8VYS-5KSW.
Government of the UAE. 2012. “Federal Decree-Law No. (5) of 2012 On Combat-
ing Cybercrimes”. Official Gazette, Issue 540 (unofficial English translation), 13 
August 2012.
Greenberg, Andy. 2017. “North Korea’s Sloppy, Chaotic Cyberattacks Also Make 
Perfect Sense”. Wired, June 15, 2017. https://perma.cc/A5QK-PHPH.
Guerin, Orla. 2018. “The Shadow over Egypt”. BBC News, 23 February 2018. https://
perma.cc/B5UW-PZKE.
Hakmeh, Joyce. 2017. “Cybercrime and the Digital Economy in the GCC Countries”. 
Chatham House—The Royal Institute for International Affairs, June 2017.
———. 2018. “Cybercrime Legislation in the GCC Countries—Fit for Purpose?” 
Chatham House—The Royal Institute for International Affairs, July 2018.
Hansen, Susanne Therese. 2016. “Taking Ambiguity Seriously: Explaining the Inde-
terminacy of the European Union Conventional Arms Export Control Regime”. 
European Journal of International Relations, 22(1): 192–216.
Hassan, ʿAbd Al-Basir. 2018. “Majlis Al-Nuwab Al-Misri Yaqirru Qanun Mukafahat 
Al-Jarimat Al-ʾiliktruniyya [Egyptian Parliament Decides on Cybercrime Law]”. 
BBC News, June 7, 2018. https://perma.cc/5DWF-Y64S.
Hubbard, Ben, and Catherine Porter. 2018. “Saudi Arabia Escalates Feud With 
Canada Over Rights Criticism”. The New York Times, October 10, 2018. https://
perma.cc/8H5W-MGGD.
Human Rights Watch. 2012. “Saudi Arabia: Free Editor Held Under Cybercrime 
Law”. Human Rights Watch, July 16, 2012. https://perma.cc/3EEJ-XYXJ.
———. 2013. “UAE: Unfair Mass Trial of 94 Dissidents”. Human Rights Watch, 
April 3, 2013. https://perma.cc/43WC-NSG2.
———. 2014a. “Saudi Arabia: 15-Year Sentence for Prominent Activist”. Human 
Rights Watch, July 7, 2014. https://perma.cc/8QNA-8U4K.
———. 2014b. “Oman: Rights Routinely Trampled”. Human Rights Watch, Decem-
ber 18, 2014. https://perma.cc/66TQ-TDS6.
———. 2015. “Kuwait: Cybercrime Law a Blow to Free Speech”. Human Rights 
Watch, July 22, 2015. https://perma.cc/265U-VVAB.
———. 2016. “Oman: Journalists Arrested for Criticizing Judiciary”. Human Rights 
Watch, August 5, 2016. https://perma.cc/FX3Y-6RBR.
———. 2016. “UAE: Free Two Jailed for Criticizing Egypt”. Human Rights Watch, 
May 15, 2016. https://perma.cc/JJX2-RNGR.
Hurwitz, Roger. 2014. “The Play of States: Norms and Security in Cyberspace”. 
American Foreign Policy Interests, 36(5): 322–331.
ictQatar. 2014. “Qatar National Cyber Security Strategy”. Government of Qatar, May 
2014.
Ignatius, David. 2016. “The Cold War Is Over. The Cyber War Has Begun”. Wash-
ington Post, September 15, 2016. https://perma.cc/G2TK-NNAL.
225Ambiguity and Appropriation
Kaljurand, Marina. 2017. “An Interview with Marina Kaljurand, Former Minister 
of Foreign Affairs”. Journal of Complex Operations, December 21, 2017. https://
perma.cc/K7F8-9MNX.
Khalid Negm. 2015. “Draft Law Concerning Electronic Crimes”. Leaked draft avail-
able on Scribd, April 2015. https://perma.cc/H4BS-VLGQ.
Lambert, Lisa, Anthony Deutsch, and Guy Faulconbridge. 2018. “West Accuses 
“pariah State” Russia of Global Hacking Campaign”. Reuters, October 5, 2018. 
https://perma.cc/YF3L-LV3N.
Malsin, Jared. 2018. “U.S. Releases $195 Million in Military Aid to Egypt”. The Wall 
Street Journal, July 25, 2018. https://perma.cc/Y7EY-F7UD.
Marczak, Bill, John Scott-Railton, Adam Senft, Ronald J. Deibert, and Bahr Abdul 
Razzak. 2018. “The Kingdom Came to Canada: How Saudi-Linked Digital Espio-
nage Reached Canadian Soil”. Citizen Lab, October 1, 2018.
MCIT (Egypt). 2012. “National ICT Strategy 2012–2017: Towards a Digital Society 
and Knowledge-Based Economy”. MCIT, 2012.
———. 2014. “Publications—Egypt’s ICT Strategy 2014–2017”. Ministry of Com-
munications and Information Technology. https://perma.cc/X6G3-WT3F.
MCIT (Saudi Arabia). 2011. “National Information Security Strategy”. Ministry of 
Communications and Information Technology, January 2011.
Miller, Elissa. 2018. “Egypt Leads the Pack in Internet Censorship Across the Middle 
East”. Atlantic Council, August 28, 2018. https://perma.cc/8DAC-LXYW.
Mueller, Milton, Andreas Schmidt, and Brenden Kuerbis. 2013. “Internet Security 
and Networked Governance in International Relations”. International Studies 
Review 15(1): 86–104.
National Cyber Security Center. 2017. “Profile—Introducing the National Cyber 
Security Center”. Governnment of Saudi Arabia.
Rajab, Nabeel. 2016. “Letter From a Bahraini Jail”. The New York Times, September 
4, 2016. https://perma.cc/HH4R-6WZP.
Raymond, Mark, and Laura DeNardis. 2015. “Multistakeholderism: Anatomy of an 
Inchoate Global Institution”. International Theory, 7(3): 572–616.
Reporters without Borders. 2014. “Cyber Crime Law Used Again to Silence Dissi-
dent Voices”. July 1, 2014. https://perma.cc/2M9U-S5E2.
———. 2016. “New Cyber Crimes Law Restricts Free Expression and Targets 
Online Activists”, January 21, 2016. https://perma.cc/M9ZB-6VRH.
Rij, Armida van, and Benedict Wilkinson. 2018. “Security Cooperation with Saudi 
Arabia: Is It Worth It for the UK?”. The Policy Institute at King’s, September 2018.
Saad, Ragab. 2015. “Egypt’s Draft Cybercrime Law Undermines Freedom of Expres-
sion”. Atlantic Council, April 24, 2015. https://perma.cc/9ATE-HNNA.
Salama, Samr. 2018. “Barlimani Yuʾakid ʾ an Qanun Mukafihat Jaraʾim Al-Mu’alumat 
Al-Jadid Yauqif Al-Jaraʾim Al-ʾiliktroni [Parliament Confims That the New Law 
against Information Crimes Stops Electronic Crimes]”. Al-Masry Al-Yaum, August 
19, 2018. https://perma.cc/D6HS-DFG4.
Savage, John E., and Bruce W. McConnell. 2015. “Exploring Multi-Stakeholder 
Internet Governance”. EastWest Institute, January 2015.
Segal, Adam. 2018. “Year in Review: Chinese Cyber Sovereignty in Action”. Coun-
cil on Foreign Relations, January 8, 2018. https://perma.cc/L3UB-CDEN.
226 James Shires
Staff Report. 2015. “Al-Shura Al-Saʿudi Yudifu ʿaqubat Al-Tashhir ʾila Nizam 
Mukafahat Al-Jaraʾim Al-Muʿalumatiyya [Saudi Council Adds Naming and Sham-
ing Punishment to the Cybercrime Law]”. Al-Sharq Al-ʾAwsat, March 18, 2015. 
https://perma.cc/4QXP-Y8JR.
———. 2016. “Omani Jailed for Insulting UAE on Whatsapp”. Al-ʿArabi Al-Jadid, 
February 29, 2016. https://perma.cc/2ULR-LTFQ.
———. 2017. “CAIT Chief Briefs HH the Amir on National Cybersecurity Strat-
egy—Vision to Protect Kuwait’s National Interest”. Arab Times, July 31, 2017. 
https://perma.cc/KTQ7-GW8G.
———. 2018a. “5-Year Jail, 3 Million Fine for Rumormongers”. Saudi Gazette, 
October 13, 2018. https://perma.cc/3D68-SFJC.
———. 2018b. “UAE Rights Activist Ahmed Mansoor Put on Trial in Abu Dhabi”. 
Al-Jazeera, April 18, 2018. https://perma.cc/8MWW-JCMV.
The Arab Republic of Egypt. 2014. “Egypt’s Constitution of 2014”. Constitutepro-
ject.org, translated by International IDEA.
The Economic Times. 2014. “China, Egypt Sign Strategic Partnership Agreement”, 
December 24, 2014. https://perma.cc/G5M4-KPHW.
UK Government. 2018. “UK Exposes Russian Cyber Attacks”, October 4, 2018. 
https://perma.cc/6UTX-TXYC.
UK Trade & Investment. 2013. “Cybersecurity: The UK’s Approach to Exports”. UK 
Government, April 2013.
Wikileaks. 2010. “US Embassy Kuwait City—Kuwait Interior Minister Sounds 
Alarm on Iran; Offers Assurances on GITMO Returnees and Security”. Wikileaks 
Public Library of US Diplomacy, February 17, 2010. Public Library of US Diplo-
macy. https://perma.cc/A79J-WF2E.
Yusif, Muhammad. 2016. “Al-Watan Tanshuru Nus Qanun Al-Jarimat Alʾiliktruniyya 
ʾamam Al-Nuwab [Al Watan Publishes the Text of the Electronic Crimes Law 
before Parliament]”. Al-Watan, May 11, 2016. https://perma.cc/KAX8-SUQH.
Zimmermann, Lisbeth. 2017. Global Norms with a Local Face: Rule-of-Law Promo-
tion and Norm Translation. Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University 
Press.
227
The world has been witnessing unprecedented intelligence revelations ever 
since the whistleblower Edward Snowden took on his role in the summer of 
2013. What started off as an affair concerning the National Security Agency 
(NSA) and the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), quickly 
evolved in a debate that transcended the Anglo-American context of security 
breaches and fundamental rights intrusions, and established itself as a long-
lasting point on the policy agendas of most liberal states. Governments and 
agencies caught in the act had to regroup to regain public trust, and to do 
so quickly. What followed was a wave of inquiries (UK 2015; DoD 2013) 
and committees (Bundestag 2014), further disclosures induced by govern-
ment officials to strengthen counter-narratives (Schulze 2015, 211), eventu-
ally crowned with the adoption of legislation amendments concerning the 
intelligence sector. In other words, regulation was called to the rescue in an 
intelligence crisis that seemed omnipresent. However, as limitations proved 
difficult (Boeke 2017) or even impractical, the formal re-evaluation of the 
controversial intelligence methods led to their (renewed) codification.
At the same time, the increasing legalization of intelligence practices, a 
phenomenon sometimes referred to as “intelligence legalism” (Schlanger 
2015), has been gaining a foothold internationally as well (Deeks 2016, 13). 
The taboo of talking about intelligence methods and rationales has been 
lifted, and with it a possibility has arrived to further evaluate them and their 
impact. In light of this, international actors of all shapes and sizes have been 
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increasingly concerned with the systematic application of (binding and non-
binding) norms to intelligence practices (Deeks 2016, 17). While states, for 
instance, used to only occasionally make use of international rules to contest 
other states’ intelligence mischief, international law (and international human 
rights law in particular) (Cole 2013; Borger 2013; Gallagher 2013; Scheinin 
2014) has been enjoying quite the comeback in recent scholarship (Buchan 
2016; Kittichaisaree 2017). Further, the United Nations Group of Govern-
mental Experts (UNGGE) cyber-norms process (United Nations 1999), 
although indirectly related to intelligence activities, paved the way for further 
exploration of international norms applicable to the world’s second oldest 
profession and its particularities in cyberspace. Scholars have been thus piec-
ing together the intelligence practices puzzle in the cyber domain, putting 
forward the existence of a cyber norm on counterespionage and a cyber norm 
prohibiting economic espionage (Libicki 2017), to name just a few.
This chapter aims to add to the cyber-norms scholarship by tracing the 
evolution of an international cyber norm on foreign bulk data collection (as 
opposed to data collection by means of more targeted and/or solely domestic 
intelligence-gathering methods). What is more, by looking into recent leg-
islative developments in Germany, France, and the United Kingdom (UK) 
covering that very same intelligence methodology, the present contribution 
purposes to also make the case that the cyber norm on foreign bulk data col-
lection has been already “fortified” in black letter law. This approach offers 
a unique opportunity to test in practice theoretical international relations (IR) 
concepts on international norms development and to contribute to under-
standing which norms become law and how exactly by exploring the con-
nection between the proliferation of leaks and expanding legalization (Deeks 
2016, 13). Last but not least, by focusing on the role of the intelligence agen-
cies, this contribution makes the implicit claim that the debate on norms for 
responsible behavior in cyberspace needs to cast a wider net to consider not 
only top-down but also bottom-up approaches to regulation.
When speaking of the normative capacity of the intelligence agencies at 
hand, pinpointing the norm is only half of the story. To complete the circle, 
one needs to ask not only whether the agencies promote their own norms and 
what their impact is on (cyberspace) regulation practices, but to also look into 
how and what power dynamics make that possible. This chapter thus argues 
that the other side of the coin is the normative power (Manners 2002) of the 
intelligence agencies, which makes itself particularly noticeable in the “legiti-
macy narrative” many of the agencies adopt defending their behavior (their 
norms) in the post-Snowden era. What that approach accomplishes is to add to 
our understanding of the role of the intelligence agencies in world politics and 
regulation on the one hand, while contributing to the conceptions of normal 
in IR scholarship on the other. Thus, following Manners’s conceptualization, 
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this chapter puts forward that to see the intelligence agencies as a normative 
power internationally is not “a contradiction in terms” (Manners 2002, 236), 
but a natural complementation of the normative process.
The main reasons for choosing to look into foreign bulk collection prac-
tices are threefold. For one, the oversea focus intends to circumvent the 
heated domestic debates on the checks and balances that pertain (at least to a 
certain extent) to rather specific domestic contexts, and have already enjoyed 
the attention of a number of scholars and practitioners. Second, by focus-
ing on intelligence practices that cross national borders by default, thematic 
priority can be given to their relevance for both the ongoing debate on inter-
national cyber norms and for the emerging normative framework relating to 
cyber espionage activities. Last, bulk data is the epitome of the information 
age; it is what the information society in many instances thrives on, but also 
fears. This contribution thus takes on the opportunity to look further into the 
normative implications of bulk data collection.
The choice to look into the legislative developments of Germany, France 
and the United Kingdom bears on the following points. For one, it allows 
to consider both common and civil law traditions. Second, their intelligence 
practices (and alliances) prior to the respective intelligence reforms are well 
documented by primary sources, which provide for a good ex ante—ex post 
normative comparison. One can thus trace the behavioral norms the intel-
ligence agencies were abiding by prior to the leaks, whether and how those 
were codified, and contrast them to current practices and legal frameworks. 
Further, the consideration of the normative developments in Germany, France 
and the United Kingdom covers a number of intelligence contexts—the 
United Kingdom as one of the initial driving forces behind the Five Eyes and 
its role as a bridge between Europe and United States; Germany, which is 
particularly interesting for being marked by its Stasi past and thus bound by 
very restrictive domestic rules regarding surveillance; and last but not least 
France for its rather silent development of one of the most comprehensive 
bulk collection mechanisms able to match the Five Eyes’ ambitions long 
before other “elite” intelligence actors were able to do so. In addition, as the 
revelations and other public sources give away, all three countries are affili-
ated with the Five Eyes in different capacities—an interaction governed by its 
own diplomacy, elaborate agreements and countless treaties (Aldrich 2004, 
739), creating an indisputable community culture.
The present contribution continues as follows. Section II briefly makes 
some terminology references and gives a few prominent examples of bulk 
collection which were brought to light mainly by Snowden. Section III evalu-
ates those through the lens of IR norms scholarship to pinpoint the norma-
tivity in the agencies’ behavior. Section IV presents evidence of how these 
methods have been fortified in legal instruments. Section V takes on the task 
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to trace the normative power of the intelligence agencies, followed by some 
concluding remarks on norms and actorship in the international system.
“TAKING THE DATA STRAIGHT FROM THE TUBES”—
SOME NECESSARY CONTEXT AND TERMINOLOGY
Information collection in bulk has been central to the debate in the post-
Snowden era. Naturally, definitions of the practice differ according to juris-
diction and operational context (see, for instance, Anderson 2016, 1, 2 as 
an example of the UK context). As a rule, bulk collection refers to an intel-
ligence collection practice by which vast amounts of data (both content and 
metadata) are acquired for multiple purposes/databases without a “determi-
nant” (Boeke 2017, 312), that is to say without aiming at a particular target, 
be it a geographical location or an individual. Leaving the domestic context 
aside, it is a standard feature of the foreign intelligence portfolio of almost 
any intelligence or national security agency and falls by default under its 
respective signals intelligence (SIGINT) capabilities. As such the practice 
is exercised on the premise “first collect, then select” (Boeke 2017, 312), 
hence the familiar-sounding metaphor of the haystack and the needle. For 
the sake of simplicity, the rest of this article uses “bulk data collection” 
or “bulk collection” as references to the collection of both content and 
metadata unless otherwise specified. Further, the terms are used to denote 
communications taking place entirely abroad, as well as communications 
originating/ending in the intercepting country. Consequently, a foreign fac-
tor is always implied.
As Snowden’s revelations developed in time and scope, it became increas-
ingly clear that a number of states had been making use of bulk collection 
methods (Inkster 2014, 57), either unilaterally or in peer cooperation. Valu-
able insights on the subject were delivered by leaks relating to the NSA’s 
Special Source Operations (SSO) division, the crown jewel of the agency 
(Electrospaces 2014b). Documents pertaining to the SSO allow a rare peek 
into the collection practices of a number of the NSA’s oversea partners 
including the GCHQ, the German Federal Intelligence Service (Bundesnach-
richtendienst or BND) and the French General Directorate for External 
Security (Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure or DGSE) (Electro-
spaces 2014a). While those liaison relationships necessarily vary in scope, 
durability, and authorization, they also hold commonalities when it comes to 
obtaining communications data in bulk. As will be explained, the common 
features of their operational practices are particularly telling for the intelli-
gence community’s culture and corresponding intelligence collection norms. 
The following examples illustrate the agencies’ methodology.
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Operation TEMPORA allowed GCQH to tap into the fiber optic cables 
that carry Internet data in and out of the United Kingdom and to collect it 
in bulk (MacAskill et al. 2013). By exploring the United Kingdom’s unique 
geographical advantage and placing interceptors on the approximately 200 
transatlantic cables where they come ashore (Shubber 2013), GCHQ has not 
only managed to secure a direct access to vast amounts of Internet data, but to 
do so on a scale that ranked it first in that regard among its partners the Five 
Eyes (Shubber 2013). The process has been facilitated by secret partnerships 
(voluntary or forced) with the companies that operate the cables (MacAskill 
et al. 2013; Obermaier et al. 2014). The legal framework for the collection 
appears to have been the rather broad provision of s8 RIPA 2000 (Shubber 
2013). The latter allows the Foreign Secretary to issue certificates for broad 
interception of data categories relating to terrorism, organized crime, and so 
on. Inception pertains to entirely foreign communications, but also to com-
munications whereby one of the communicating parties (either the receiver 
or sender) is on UK soil.
France and Germany’s involvement in bulk data collection is evidenced 
for one thing by the RAMPART-A program (Gallagher 2014; Information.
dk 2014). The leaked material pertaining to the program show that the NSA 
considers France and Germany “third party” countries—strategic partners 
outside of the Five Eyes (“second parties”) providing access to transition 
cables and hosting equipment. The majority of the RAMPART-A missions 
are carried out by its partners “under the cover of an overt COMSAT effort,” 
implying that the tapping takes place at Cold War eavesdropping stations in 
the intercepting countries (Gallagher 2014).
Besides additional leaks, France’s engagement in bulk intelligence collec-
tion is further substantiated by a handful of investigative reports that trace 
the practice back to 2008 (Tréguer 2017, 2). The latter confirm the involve-
ment of the telecommunications operators Orange and the Alcatel-Lucent 
group as facilitating the French DGSE’s access to about two dozen undersea 
communications cables (Tréguer 2017, 2). Designated teams within the com-
panies would manage the so-called landing stations, where the submarine 
cables touch French shore and would forward the data caught in transit to the 
DGSE’s systems in Paris (Follorou 2014). Although lacking an actual legal 
framework, intelligence officials familiar with the practices have argued that 
the practices were not illegal, but operated rather in the grey zones of the law 
(Follorou and Johannès 2013).
The German BND in turn is known to have (jointly with the NSA) run the 
EIKONAL bulk interception program (Electrospaces 2014c)—the tapping 
into Deutsche Telecom cables (Biermann 2014). Sources confirm that the 
NSA has provided the equipment for the interception in 2003 (Electrospaces 
2014c). The operation was ended in 2008, although the explanations put 
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forward in that regard differ. Legal authorization for the tapping of the transit 
cables has been provided by the G10-commission, which is required to step 
in once the collection of G10-data—communications data originating/ending 
in Germany and thus affecting nationals— is involved. Enabling statutes for 
fully foreign data traffic seems to have been of a lesser concern (Electro-
spaces 2015). EIKONAL and the agency’s foreign partnerships aside, once 
the BND had learned how to collect Internet traffic from fiber optic cables, 
G10-orders were used to extract communications from about twenty-five 
domestic and foreign Internet service providers that made use of the DE-CIX 
cables positioned in Frankfurt (Electrospaces 2015).
The following section examines the examples from a normative perspective.
ALL ABOARD! GETTING ON THE 
NORMATIVE BANDWAGON
Norms are built by actors that have strong ideas about appropriate behavior 
in their community (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 896). What is appropriate 
in turn is very much linked to the role the actors in that community are per-
forming (Sunstein 1996, 903). Norms are thus often role-specific (Sunstein 
1996, 921). Consequently, evaluating the intelligence practices discussed 
above through the lens of IR norms literature mandates looking into them 
by adopting an inwards perspective and finding that shared understanding of 
the appropriateness of bulk collection within the community. Said communal 
perspective is particularly valuable when thinking of regulation in terms of 
bottom-up influences (as presently looking into the influences of substate 
entities on international cyber norms) that play out on the national and ulti-
mately on the international level as well.
As the previous paragraph hints, the conventional wisdom holds that a 
norm is a standard of appropriate behavior for actors with a particular iden-
tity (Katzenstein 1996, 5; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 891; Finnemore and 
Hollis 2016, 438). This section thus focuses on highlighting the behavioral 
standards that give away the normative nature of bulk data collection for the 
intelligence community.
It appears that upon developing the necessary technological tools and 
know-how, all three agencies not only carry out extensive bulk collection 
programs but also operationalize the collection (their behavior) in a very 
similar way—by casting a wide net for foreign communications data and 
tapping into the accessible fiber optic cables. This regularized, standardized 
behavior exercised on a large-scale and without real-time constraints runs 
like a red thread through the examples above. The fact that the practice is not 
contested within the intelligence community, but seen as appropriate to serve 
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SIGINT purposes, encouraged through data-sharing partnerships such as the 
ones revealed through the NSA documents, and thus rather taken for granted 
with the attitude “Everybody does it,” indicates norm-conforming behavior 
on the part of the GCHQ, the BND, and the DGSE. In IR terminology, this 
is one of the best examples of norm-internalization (Finnemore and Sikkink 
1998, 895).
Note that the quality of the norm itself, that is, whether outsiders perceive 
it as good or bad, is not decisive, as long as the community that exercises 
it deems it appropriate or as inevitable to accept it (Finnemore and Sikkink 
1998, 892). Put simply, the post-Snowden outrage does not abolish the bulk 
collection norm. It rather illustrates that the intelligence norm appeared to 
be in direct competition with strongly held by other actors’ domestic norms 
on privacy and transparency of governmental agencies. Norm competition, 
however, is not unusual. New norms come into being in highly contested 
normative spaces, and while creating alternative perceptions of both inter-
ests and appropriateness, they clash with other such standards (Finnemore 
and Sikkink 1998, 897). Cyberspace is by no means a normative vacuum 
(Finnemore and Hollis 2016, 444). The extensive communication among dif-
ferent stakeholders upon the emergence of the bulk collection norm, accom-
panied by a strong and versatile rhetoric that aimed at justifying the contested 
behavior, on the contrary made the norm traceable and evidenced its develop-
ment (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 892). It further means that once the leaks 
were out there and the necessary damage control by the use of a changed 
intelligence narrative and extensive communications was done, there was less 
fear the agencies’ reputations would be additionally challenged—something 
Sunstein calls “social sanctions” (Sunstein 1996, 915) or in this case pre-
empting them. Society’s tolerance of the practices was secured, reputational 
costs lowered and thus the road ahead cleared for further fine-tuning of the 
bulk collection norm. That standing not only reinforced the norm within the 
intelligence community under scrutiny, but also paved the way for an ever-
increasing number of agencies to join the bulk data collection “bandwagon” 
(Sunstein 1996, 930). This has had a profound knock-on effect in the legisla-
tive processes discussed below.
THE FORTIFIED CYBER NORM OF 
FOREIGN BULK DATA COLLECTION
A number of comprehensive intelligence reforms saw the daylight since 
2013 and the ones that recently took place in France, Germany, and the 
United Kingdom are of particular interest here. As research into these par-
ticular legislative processes and their outcomes yielded, the contested bulk 
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collection—once resting on wobbly legal grounds if at all—has found its way 
into the statutes of these countries. The following subsection briefly presents 
these developments in a chronological order before moving to evaluate their 
meaning in the normative process.
The French Intelligence Act (FIA) (France 2015b), adopted on 24 July 
2015, is the result of a long-deliberated intelligence reform.1 The law is con-
sidered the most extensive piece of legislation relating to French surveillance 
practices, creating entirely new sections in the Code of Internal Security 
and finally legalizing already operational intelligence practices (Tréguer 
2016, 2017). The FIA significantly broadens the intelligence community’s 
collection capacities with regard to communications’ content and metadata. 
In November of the same year, the reform was rounded off with the law on 
“International Surveillance” (France 2015a)—now also part of the Code of 
Internal Security, which focuses on international communications exclu-
sively. The latter term is broadly defined to encompass both communications 
going in and out of the country (Tréguer 2016). Article L.854-2-I stipulates 
which network infrastructures are to be targeted for large-scale, bulk intercep-
tion and authorizes among other things tapping into international undersea 
cables.
The United Kingdom followed suit by introducing the Investigatory Pow-
ers Act (IPA) in 2016 (UK 2016). The piece of legislation is understood to 
expand electronic surveillance powers for both law enforcement and intel-
ligence actors. The competences outlined in the bill replace communications 
interception and retention powers codified by the Regulation of Investigatory 
Powers Act (RIPA) 2000, the Telecommunications Act (TA) 1984, the Data 
Retention and Investigatory Powers Act (DRIPA) 2001 and sixty-five other 
statutes (Anderson 2016). Further, IPA introduced new computer network 
exploitation powers and the ability to require retention of Internet connec-
tion records (Anderson 2016, 7). Its Part 6 and the corresponding Chapter 
1 and 2 deal with bulk interception and bulk acquisition. The provisions on 
bulk interception replace the unclear provisions of s8 (4) RIPA and focus 
on “overseas-related communication,” meaning communications sent or 
received by individuals outside the United Kingdom. The bulk acquisition 
powers (requiring a telecommunications provider to retain communications 
and disclose them pursuant to a warrant) expand the practices regulated by 
s94 TA that prior to the introduction of IPA was a well-kept secret (Ander-
son 2016, 29). The latter rules, however, affect individuals within the United 
Kingdom as well.
By December 2016, Germany’s new surveillance laws were also on the 
books. The reformed BND Law introduced a number of significant new pro-
visions with regard to the collection of foreign intelligence and international 
intelligence cooperation (Bundestag 2016). In its current form, the BND 
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Law complements the BND’s collection powers by updating its strategische 
Fernmeldeaufklärung (strategic surveillance) capabilities. Adding to the 
agency’s already existing operational powers regarding communications to 
and from Germany, sections 6–18 of BND Law codify for the first time the 
interception of communications that have both their origin and destination 
abroad (Wetzling 2017, 4, 5; Bundestag 2016). In that context, the amended 
intelligence framework covers the authorization, collection, handling, trans-
fer and oversight of content and metadata the BND acquires in bulk. It is 
estimated that even prior to the legislative changes, that is to say before the 
existence of a proper enabling statute, the bulk collection practice made up 
to 90 percent of the BND’s overall strategic activities (Löffelmann 2015, 1). 
Further, the reform allows the BND to explicitly direct intelligence operations 
at EU member states and EU institutions for the purpose of gathering informa-
tion relevant to the country’s foreign policy and security (Chase 2016).
For the sake of completeness, it should be noted that all pieces of legisla-
tion introduced above have generated significant public debates (Cobain 
2018). They have further been and continue to be regularly challenged in 
front of judicial and other platforms by civil society groups as failing to meet 
international human rights and surveillance standards (ECJ 2016; Heathman 
2016; Bowcott 2016; NewsWire 2018; Chase 2016).
Scholars conceptualizing the final stages of normative processes argue 
that institutionalization portrays the broad domestic receptiveness to a norm 
(Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 906)—that the latter has been evaluated as 
successful (Florini 1996) to tackle ongoing societal challenges, and that put-
ting it into binding legal instruments establishes that particular behavior as 
the credible solution for future references (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). 
Thus, when prevailing norms are fortified by legal requirements (Sunstein 
1996, 923), the law has a rather expressive function—it stipulates the social 
value of the norm encouraging it to move in a particular direction (Sunstein 
1996, 953).
The above legislative summary exemplifies that the emerging bulk col-
lection norm has reached a further phase in the normative process and it has 
become institutionalized (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 900) in specific sets 
of rules. The intelligence agencies studied here have thus not only developed 
a cyber norm on bulk collection, a norm that guides their communal practice 
in that regard, but have also made sure to appeal through their norm-entrepre-
neurial efforts (although reluctantly in the immediate post-Snowden climate) 
to the contemporary political context and its inherent security challenges. 
This has made the norm dismissal more difficult (see on the matter Keck and 
Sikkink 1998).
A few words need to be added here on the fact that this contribution puts 
forward the existence of an international cyber norm on bulk collection, 
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while drawing from national institutionalization examples to substantiate it. 
This approach goes to the core of the fundamental question where interna-
tional norms come from and implicate the relationship between domestic and 
international norms as well. International norms must always work their way 
through domestic structures (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 893), but the pro-
cess is known to work the other way around too—domestic norms also influ-
ence the emergence of widely recognized, international standards. Domestic 
norms are intrinsically bound with the international scene’s contemporary 
dynamics that inevitably intervene in the local realm as well.
THE POWER OF NORMS MEETS NORMATIVE POWER
This chapter so far dealt with establishing an international cyber norm on 
bulk data collection developed and promoted by the intelligence agencies, a 
norm that later became officially codified by a number of governments plac-
ing a bet on the norm’s legitimacy. It thus made a strong case for studying the 
international norms developed by substate agencies and their impact.
While that in itself is a curious phenomenon to trace and to learn from, it 
nevertheless leaves the normative puzzle at hand incomplete, as it does not 
tell us where that normative impact comes from. Thus, to specify the argu-
ment further, this section looks into the means and mechanisms the intelli-
gence agencies studied here use to diffuse norms in the international system 
and to influence other actors.
Establishing norms for the international community implies the capacity 
to develop new behavioral standards and to portray them as appropriate for 
others. This is the mission of “norm entrepreneurs” (Sunstein 1996) put in 
a nutshell. Once such a pursuit has been successful, the newly established 
norm dictates what is normal in a particular context. Not that long ago, Man-
ners studied that very capacity and came to the conclusion that “the ability to 
define what passes for ‘normal’ in world politics is extremely rich” (Manners 
2002, 236). He termed it “normative power”—the power to shape what can 
be considered normal in international life (Manners 2002, 239)—and made 
a proposition that international relations are often shaped by forces beyond 
traditional IR power structures, by a power that works through ideas and 
opinions (Diez 2005, 615) using norms in instrumental ways. This notion, 
however, while seen as a valuable addition to the concept of soft power, has 
found little resonance in the analysis of power dynamics brought about by 
other (nontraditional) international actors, like the intelligence agencies at 
hand. This state of affairs is surprising, as unlike other concepts of power 
in IR, normative power focuses much more on cognitive processes and 
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ideational impacts than on institutions (Manners 2002, 239), and is as such 
particularly suitable to look into actors without state-like features.
The most important factor shaping the international role of the intel-
ligence agencies as normative actors is not what they are, but what they 
do and what they say. As the previous sections dealt with what they do, 
in the following we touch upon what they say in more detail. Of course, 
just because a behavior can be labeled normative does not mean that all 
actors exercising it are normative powers. The crucial point is the ability 
to frame the responses of others (Kavalski 2013, 250). The post-Snowden 
reality delivers an example of exactly that—of the agencies’ ability to 
change other actors’ perception of, and response to, their norm of bulk 
data collection. The agencies (or rather their senior officers) and other 
related figures used a particular rhetoric to support a claim of urgency 
in their actions, induce credibility, and to thus normalize the practice. 
Covering a number of topics from the importance of counterintelligence 
efforts, the success of surveillance missions to track terrorists and to thwart 
plots (Sullivan 2013), the financial damage suffered by national security 
institutions that continues to grow five years after Snowden (Riechmann 
2018), to even systematically downplaying the leaks where appropriate or 
proposing long-term privacy regulation solutions that would appeal to the 
public (Schulze 2015, 211), the strategy palette is rich in colors. The exact 
use of strategies corresponds to the escalation of the leaks (Schulze 2015, 
211). Studies looking into the media coverage of the revelations confirm 
that the rhetoric has been successful. They illustrate that the media has 
largely picked up the “normalization trend” and appeared to report on 
bulk collection issues with reference to concerns over national security, 
while minimizing the attention given to individual rights (Wahl-Jorgensen, 
Bennett, and Taylor 2017, 740, 741). This finding feeds into Kavalski’s 
conceptual qualification of normative power—it shows the intelligence 
agencies as agents of change, and what is more, is recognized as such by 
others (Kavalski 2013, 247). They have gained a position of credibility 
(Zupančič and Hribernik 2014, 79) by understanding the importance of 
interaction and instrumentalizing it.
In light of the above, it does not seem too far-fetched to suggest that the 
agencies’ normative power has to do with their role and the context in which 
it is carried out, the particular community culture and the professional norms 
that result from it, supported by the successful framing of their missions and 
practices in the post-Snowden debates. Normative power is thus a way to con-
ceptualize their toolbox. The latter is complemented by IR norms scholarship 
that tells us what is in there by studying the agencies’ behavior and promoting 
understanding of its meaning (Finnemore 1996, 2).
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CONCLUSION
This contribution embarked on a journey to make various claims. It dove into 
the complex debate on international cyber norms and made the case that the 
basis of what is deemed appropriate internationally may also arise among 
actors other than states—the intelligence agencies. It did so by studying their 
bulk collection practices, attempting to place some of Snowden’s leaks in nor-
mative context and meaning. While the intelligence community did not have an 
interest to make its norms public, upon inevitably finding itself in the spotlight 
and setting irreversible precedents, it made the best of it—gained the states’ 
support and pushed the norm on bulk data collection further. The agency’s 
capacity to do so reflects their normative power—something assigned so far 
to rather state-like structures only. The chapter thus hopes to have identified 
various areas for future research—the involvement of substate agencies in 
international regulation efforts, and the basis on which such efforts may propel.
NOTE
1. Up until that date, France was one of the few Western democracies without a 
legal framework pertaining to the intelligence agencies. The latter’s mandates were 
based on executive decrees and decisions in combination with other pieces of legisla-
tion such as the 1991 Wiretapping Act.
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BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN: Einsetzung Eines Untersuchungsausschusses.”
———. 2016. Gesetz Zur Ausland-Ausland-Fernmeldeaufklärung Des Bundesnach-
richtendienstes. Bonn: Bunderstag. http: //www .bund esger ichts hof.d e/Sha redDo cs/
Do wnloa ds/DE /Bibl iothe k/Ges etzes mater ialie n/18_ wp/BN D-Ges etz/b gbl.p df?__ 
blob= publi catio nFile .
Chase, Jefferson. 2016. “Germany Reforms Its Main Intelligence Service.” Dw.Com, 
2016.
Cobain, Ian. 2018. “UK Has Six Months to Rewrite Snooper’s Charter, High Court 
Rules.” The Guardian, 2018. https ://ww w.the guard ian.c om/te chnol ogy/2 018/a 
pr/27 /snoo pers- chart er-in vesti gator y-pow ers-a ct-re write -high -cour t-rul es.
Cole, David. 2013. “We Are All Foreigners: NSA Spying and the Rights of Others.” 
Just Security, 2013.
Deeks, Ashley. 2016. “Intelligence Services, Peer Constraints, and the Law.” In 
Global Intelligence Oversight—Governing Security in the Twenty-First Century, 
edited by Zachary K. Goldman and Samuel J. Rascoff, 3–36. New York: Oxford 
University Press.
Diez, Thomas. 2005. “Constructing the Self and Changing Others: Reconsidering 
`Normative Power Europe’.” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 33 (3): 
613–636.
DoD. 2013. “DoD Information Review Task Force-2: Initial Assessment- Impact 
Resulting from the Compromise of Classified Material by a Former NSA Contrac-
tor.” https ://ns archi ve2.g wu.ed u/NSA EBB/N SAEBB 534-D IA-De class ified -Sour 
ceboo k/doc ument s/DIA -48.p df.
ECJ. 2016. Judgment in Joined Cases C-203/15 Tele2 Sverige AB v Post-och tele-
styrelsen and C-698/15 Secretary of State for the Home Department v Tom Watson 
and Others.
Electrospaces. 2014a. “NSA’s Foreign Partnerships.” Electrospaces.Blogpost.Com. 
2014. https ://el ectro space s.blo gspot .com/ 2014/ 09/ns as-fo reign -part nersh ips.h tml.
———. 2014b. “Slides about NSA’s Upstream Collection.” January 17, 2014. https ://
el ectro space s.blo gspot .com/ 2014/ 01/sl ides- about -nsas -upst ream- colle ction .html .
———. 2014c. “The German Operation Eikonal as Part of NSA’s RAMPART-A 
Program.” Electrospaces.Blogpost.Com. 2014. https ://el ectro space s.blo gspot .com/ 
2014/ 10/th e-ger man-o perat ion-e ikona l-as- part- of.ht ml.
———. 2015. “New Details About the Joint NSA-BND Operation Eikonal.” Electro-
spaces.Blogpost.Com. 2015. https ://el ectro space s.blo gspot .com/ 2015/ 05/ne w-det 
ails- about -join t-nsa -bnd. html. 
Finnemore, Martha. 1996. “Defining State Interests.” In National Interests in Interna-
tional Society, 1–33. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Finnemore, Martha, and Duncan B Hollis. 2016. “Constructing Norms for Global 
Cybersecurity.” American Journal of International Law 110. https ://do i.org /10.5 
305/a merji ntela w.110 .3.04 25.
Finnemore, Martha, and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. “International Norm Dynamics and 
Political Change.” International Organization 52 (4): 887–917. http://www.jstor.
org/stable/2601361.
240 Ilina Georgieva
Florini, Ann. 1996. “The Evolution of International Norms.” International Studies 
Quarterly 40 (3): 363–389.
Follorou, Jacques. 2014. “Espionnage: Comment Orange et Les Services Secrets 
Coopèrent.” Le Monde, 2014.
Follorou, Jacques, and Franck Johannès. 2013. “Révélations Sur Le Big Brother Fran-
çais.” Le Monde, July 4, 2013. https ://ww w.lem onde. fr/so ciete /arti cle/2 013/0 7/04/ 
revel ation s-sur -le-b ig-br other -fran cais_ 34419 73_32 24.ht ml.
France. 2015a. LOI N° 2015–1556 Du 30 Novembre 2015 Relative Aux Mesures de 
Surveillance Des Communications Électroniques Internationales (1). France: https 
://ww w.leg ifran ce.go uv.fr /eli/ loi/2 015/1 1/30/ DEFX1 52175 7L/jo /text e.
———. 2015b. LOI N° 2015–912 Du 24 Juillet 2015 Relative Au Renseignement 
(1). France.
Gallagher, Ryan. 2013. “After Snowden Leaks, Countries Want Digital Privacy 
Enshrined in Human Rights Treaty.” Slate.Com, September 2013. https ://sl ate.c 
om/te chnol ogy/2 013/0 9/art icle- 17-su rveil lance -upda te-co untri es-wa nt-di gital -priv 
acy-i n-the -iccp r.htm l.
———. 2014. “How Secret Partnerships Expand NSA’s Surveillance Dragnet.” The 
Intercept, June 19, 2014. https ://th einte rcept .com/ 2014/ 06/18 /nsa- surve illan ce-se 
cret- cable -part ners- revea led-r ampar t-a/. 
Heathman, Amelia. 2016. “EU Court Deals Major Blow to UK’s Controversial 
Snooper’s Charter.” WIRED, 2016.
Information.dk. 2014. “NSA ‘Third Party’ Partners Tap the Internet Backbone in 
Global Surveillance Program,” June 19, 2014. https ://ww w.inf ormat ion.d k/udl 
and/2 014/0 6/nsa -thir d-par ty-pa rtner s-tap -the- inter net-b ackbo ne-in -glob al-su rveil 
lance -prog ram.
Inkster, Nigel. 2014. “The Snowden Revelations: Myths and Misapprehensions.” 
Survival 56 (1): 51–60. https ://do i.org /10.1 080/0 03963 38.20 14.88 2151. 
Katzenstein, Peter J. 1996. “Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Secu-
rity.” In The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, 
edited by Peter J. Katzenstein, 1–32. Columbia University Press. https ://bo oks.g 
oogle .nl/b ooks? id=bP jkBhK WBOsC &dq=t he culture of national security norms 
and identity in world polit ics&h l=nl& sourc e=gbs _book _othe r_ver sions .
Kavalski, Emilian. 2013. “The Struggle for Recognition of Normative Powers: Nor-
mative Power Europe and Normative Power China in Context.” Cooperation and 
Conflict 48 (2): 247–267. https ://do i.org /10.1 177/0 01083 67134 85386 .
Keck, Margaret E., and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy 
Networks in International Politics. Cornell University Press.
Kittichaisaree, Kriangsak. 2017. “Cyber Espionage.” In Public Internatinal Law of 
Cyberspace, 233–62. Springer.
Libicki, Martin. 2017. “The Coming of Cyber Espionage Norms.” In 2017 9th Inter-
national Conference on Cyber Conflict (CyCon), 1–17. Tallinn: IEEE.
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Over the past two decades, the public domain has experienced far-reaching 
phases of reconstitution (Ruggie 2004). Forces of globalization and techno-
logical advancement have added new degrees of complexity to international 
affairs and have given rise to a pluralization of actors. Polymorphous non-
state actors have come to inhabit central areas of international steering and 
policy-making, including among others, cybersecurity.
A realm of rising political, economic, and cultural relevance, cybersecurity 
has been subject to considerable non-state actor engagement. Non-state actors 
have been key contributors to the development and expansion of cyberspace. 
In addition to producing hard- and software and providing technological 
services, they have also come to contribute to the development of global 
cybersecurity norms. Their normative contributions have, however, received 
little academic attention so far (Hall and Biersteker 2002; Ruggie 1993). 
With a view to addressing this deficiency, this chapter seeks to uncover the 
parts played by non-state actors in processes of international cybersecurity 
norm-construction.
Drawing on secondary academic literatures in the fields of international 
relations and international law, as well as primary case materials, this chap-
ter claims that non-state actors have come to exert considerable clout over 
endeavors of international norm-construction, particularly as active propos-
ers of norms of responsible behavior for state and non-state actors, and 
contributors to the emergence of international custom. As non-state actors 
continue to make their voices heard in debates about appropriate conduct 
in cyberspace, it is important to shed light on their contributions with a 
view to better understanding current practices and frames of international 
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cybersecurity governance. The discussions of the roles of non-state actors 
are exemplary rather than comprehensive but help identify key features and 
developments.
The term non-state actors comprises and refers to a great number of differ-
ent agents, including among others, multinational enterprises, academic com-
munities, non-governmental organizations, as well as civil society entities, all 
of which would warrant their own in-depth analysis. Rather than engaging in 
single case studies, this chapter seeks to identify common threads of norma-
tive engagement across a broad variety of non-state actors.
The remainder of this chapter is organized along three sections. The first 
section summarizes key literatures related to the topic under investiga-
tion, recaps important developments, and specifies central concepts such as 
non-state actors and norms. The second section examines and appraises the 
contributions of non-state actors to processes of international cybersecurity 
norm-construction. Finally, the third section sums up the findings and high-
lights avenues for further research.
LITERATURE REVIEW
The advent of non-state actors on the international plain has presented state-
oriented scholarly disciplines, including international law and international 
relations, with formidable theoretical and practical challenges. Non-state 
actors have added new layers of complexity to traditional (hierarchical) 
schemes of international ordering and have challenged conventional sources 
of agency. Yet, in order to “understand how change occurs in the world pol-
ity, [it is necessary] to unpack the different categories of transnational actors 
and understand the quite different logic and processes in these different cat-
egories” (Keck and Sikkink 1999, 99).
Defined in the negative, the term non-state actors constitutes a residual 
category that comprises a broad range of actors other than states (Bianchi 
2011). It encompasses both bene- and malevolent individuals and entities. 
According to Wagner, it is impossible to identify these entities “by common 
sociological features as they include, inter alia, international organisations, 
corporations, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), de facto regimes, 
trade associations, and transnational corporations, terrorist groups and trans-
national criminal organisations” (Wagner 2009). To somewhat narrow the 
group of possible subjects of inquiry, this chapter only considers the contribu-
tions of benevolent non-state actors to processes of international cybersecu-
rity norm development, that is, the contributions of those that actively seek to 
promote appropriate conduct in cyberspace and aspire to improve the overall 
state of global cybersecurity.
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Debates about the need for rules of the road regulating the conduct of state 
and non-state entities in cyberspace have acquired increasing prominence 
over the past decade. In the face of proliferating cybersecurity incidents and 
reluctance on the parts of governments to agree on and enact legally binding 
rules at the global level, less formal, norms-based discussions have emerged 
as alternative pathways to formal regulation.1 In contrast to binding legal 
statutes, norms as understood here denote voluntary “standard[s] of appropri-
ate behaviour for actors with a given identity” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 
891). They define legitimate social purposes that enable and constrain the 
behavior of international actors (Florini 1996). “What distinguishes norms 
from other social facts (e.g., customs, traditions, values, or fashions) is their 
prescriptive quality, the sense of oughtness attached to them. . . . They are 
‘prescriptive generalization’. Or, in Onuf’s more extended definition, norms 
(or rules) ‘address some class of agents, describe some class of actions as 
appropriate conduct for those agents, and link agents and standards with 
ought-statements: agents ought to behave in accordance with standards’” 
(Sandholtz 2017, 2).
Since the late 1990s, norms have figured prominently across a great vari-
ety of research agendas and have witnessed extensive theorization (Keck 
and Sikkink 1999; Sandholtz 2017; Winston 2017). Constructivist interna-
tional relations scholars, in particular, have made important contributions 
to advancing analytically more rigorous understandings of international 
norms and the roles of non-state actors in changes to normative ideas. 
Ideational efforts conducted by non-state actors have been subsumed under 
the analytical umbrella of norm entrepreneurship. Norm entrepreneurship 
refers to activities conducted by agents with a view to persuading others 
to adopt new standards of appropriateness and change social understand-
ings (Sjöström 2010; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). Agents engaging in 
norm entrepreneurship, so-called norm entrepreneurs, typically promote 
new understandings of appropriate conduct and mobilize other entities or 
network of entities to support their normative ideas. These coalitions then 
“bring pressure to bear from above (transnationally) and below (domesti-
cally)” and help the norms advocated to cascade, and eventually become 
internalized into domestic and international legal codes and institutions 
(Sandholtz 2017, 2).
A field of growing political importance and social relevance, cybersecurity 
has seen a number of noteworthy initiatives relating to the creation of inter-
national norms (Nye 2018; Hinck 2018). Discussions concerning the creation 
of rules of the road to curb malicious behavior in cyberspace can be traced 
back to the mid-1990s. In 1996, the Council of the European Union endorsed 
a proposal put forward by the French government for a Charter for Interna-
tional Cooperation on the Internet (Mačák 2017). At the time, “the French 
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Minister for Information Technology expressed hope that the initiative would 
lead eventually to an accord comparable to the international law of the sea” 
(Wu 1998, 660). The French proposition was followed by a Russian bid in 
the remit of the UN General Assembly, which sought to ban information 
weapons and their use by way of enacting legally binding rules. Moscow’s 
draft resolution emerged in consideration of a perceived Western dominance 
of the ICT landscape, and gave rise to more institutionalized international 
discussions.
In reaction to Russia’s proposal of 1998, and as a result of concerns over 
the appropriateness of legally binding provisions, particularly on the parts 
of Western states, the UN GA’s First Committee called to life a Group of 
Governmental Experts to study existing and emerging threats emanating from 
the digital realm and possible normative measures to address them. The first 
of a total of five groups met in 2004. While the UN GGEs meeting between 
2009 and 2015 managed to issue non-binding consensus reports, the groups 
convening between 2004–2005 and 2016–2017 did not produce correspond-
ing documents (Väljataga 2017).
Subsequent to the 2016–2017 UN GGE’s inability to agree on a con-
sensus report, and following major cybersecurity incidents of transnational 
magnitude, including WannaCry and Petya/NotPetya, there has been a 
noticeable surge in the number of non-state initiatives directed at foster-
ing responsible behavior in the virtual domain (Hern 2017). Examples 
include, among others, the University of Leiden’s and ICT4Peace Founda-
tion’s co-sponsorship of a Global Commentary on Voluntary, Non-Binding 
Norms for Responsible State Behaviour in the Use of Information and 
Communications Technology, Microsoft’s proposal for a Digital Geneva 
Convention, its adoption of a Cybersecurity Tech Accord, its initiation of 
a Digital Peace Now campaign, and its support of the Paris Call for Trust 
and Security in Cyberspace, Siemens’ conclusion of a Charter of Trust, as 
well as the Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace’s (GCSC) 
calls for the Protection of the Public Core of the Internet, the safeguarding 
of electoral infrastructures, and the release of the Singapore Norms Package 
(Smith 2017b, 2018; Siemens 2018a; Global Commission on the Stability of 
Cyberspace 2017a; ICT4Peace Foundation 2018; Global Commission on the 
Stability of Cyberspace 2018a).
In what follows, the activities of these actors are highlighted in more detail. 
Against the background of lacking political agreement at the intergovern-
mental level and a halting emergence of international hard law directed at 
addressing the challenges pertaining to nefarious conduct in the digital realm, 
efforts led by non-state actors deserve particular analytical attention in terms 
of fostering international peace, security, and stability.
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THE NORMATIVE CONTRIBUTIONS 
OF NON-STATE ACTORS
Non-state actors have been central to the growth and spread of ICTs.2 As 
operators of key network infrastructures, developers of products and suppli-
ers of services, they have made important contributions to the “international 
[. . .] architecture for the governance of cyberspace” (Radu 2014, 4). Apart 
from acting as executors of public initiatives (e.g., public-private partner-
ships), they have also been seen to drive normative agendas.
The subsequent paragraphs summarize the norms-based activities con-
ducted by some of the most vocal proponents for rules of the road for cyber-
space. The selection of relevant initiatives was informed by substantive as 
well as temporal considerations. Only proposals by benevolent non-state 
actors, and only proposals launched post-2017 were selected for examination.
The ICT4Peace Foundation
Since its inception in the context of the United Nations World Summit on the 
Information Society in Geneva and Tunis in 2004, the ICT4Peace Founda-
tion has actively stipulated the peaceful use and employment of ICTs and 
new media. Against the background of rapidly emerging threats and acts of 
cybercrime and -sabotage, in 2011, the ICT4Peace Foundation publicly called 
for a Code of Conduct for Cyberconflicts (Stauffacher, Sibilia, and Weekes 
2011). The corresponding report titled Getting Down to Business: Realistic 
Goals for the Promotion of Peace in Cyberspace maintained that
nations . . . need to examine and assess the need for modifying existing laws 
to address cyber-specific issues. At both . . . national and international levels, 
taskforces need to be established including all the key players to exchange 
information, provide early warning and explore possible solutions to existing 
or future challenges. (Stauffacher, Sibilia, and Weekes 2011)
With the intention of building on the outcomes of the UN GGEs, most 
recently, the ICT4Peace Foundation has, in a joint initiative with Leiden 
University’s Program for Cyber Norms, co-sponsored the publication of a 
Global Commentary on Voluntary, Non-Binding Norms for Responsible State 
Behaviour in the Use of Information and Communications Technology, which 
brings together comments and guidance for understanding and operational-
izing the recommendations contained in the UN GGE reports of 2010, 2013, 
and 2015 (Tikk et al. 2017; ICT4Peace Foundation 2017; Adamson 2017). 
Furthermore, ICT4Peace has commissioned a series of cyber-norms blog-
posts commenting on developments in the field, and has actively participated 
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in UN GGE and UN OEWG consultation meetings with a view to contribut-
ing to the promotion of peaceful settlements of disputes in cyberspace (Tikk 
2019; ICT4Peace Foundation 2019).
Microsoft
Among the first corporate stakeholders to instigate debates about responsible 
conduct in cyberspace was Microsoft (Betz 2015). Following preceding 
efforts in 2013, 2014, and 2016, in February 2017, Microsoft president and 
chief legal officer Brad Smith introduced the idea of a Digital Geneva Con-
vention to Protect Cyberspace (Smith 2017a; Microsoft 2013; McKay et al. 
2014; Charney et al. 2016). Grounded in the belief that deep-rooted collabo-
ration among states, and between states, the private sector and civil society 
is needed to curb nefarious doings in the digital realm, the convention as 
outlined by Smith, asks governments to “come together, affirm international 
cybersecurity norms that have emerged in recent years, adopt new and bind-
ing rules, and get to work implementing them” (Smith 2017b). Furthermore, 
it pleads global technology companies to behave as neutral actors, and rec-
ommends the setting-up of an independent non-governmental organization 
capable of investigating and publicly attributing (nation-state) cyberattacks 
(Smith 2017b; Maurer and Taylor 2018).
Microsoft’s call for a Digital Geneva Convention to Protect Cyberspace 
was succeeded by the unveiling of a Cybersecurity Tech Accord among 
leading industry partners in April 2018 (Smith 2018). In September 2018, 
Microsoft unveiled a Digital Peace Now campaign, which calls on citizens 
to protect cyberspace, for example, through measures of cyberhygiene, and 
urges governments to refrain from endangering the global digital environ-
ment. Only two months later, in November 2018, it supported the release 
of the Paris Call, a multistakeholder initiative seeking to safeguard peace 
and security in the virtual realm by means of nine principles, including 
the prevention of nefarious interference or theft of intellectual property by 
foreign actors, the condemnation of hack-backs, and the securing of sup-
ply chains (Ministère de l’Europe et des Affaires Étrangères 2018). So far, 
the Paris Call has been acceded to by more than 1000 supporters: 78 gov-
ernments, 29 public authorities, 343 civil society organizations, and 633 
private sector entities (Ministère de l’Europe et des Affaires Étrangères 
2018).
Siemens
Two months before the launch of Microsoft’s Cybersecurity Tech Accord, 
Siemens, together with eight partner corporations, issued a Charter of Trust 
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for a Secure Digital World (Siemens 2018a). Adopted at the sidelines of the 
2018 Munich Security Conference, the charter calls for binding rules, and 
postulates ten principles ranging from ownership of cyber and IT security, 
responsibility throughout the digital supply chain, security by default, user-
centricity, innovation and co-creation to education, certification for critical 
infrastructure and solutions, transparency and response, regulatory frame-
work, and joint initiatives (Siemens 2018b; Hinck 2018; Kaeser 2018).
Calling for binding legal rules, the charter recognizes that
in order to keep pace with continuous advances in the market as well as threats 
from the criminal world, companies and governments must join forces and take 
decisive action. This means making every effort to protect the data and assets 
of individuals and businesses; prevent damage from people, businesses, and 
infrastructures; and build a reliable basis for trust in a connected and digital 
world. (Siemens 2018a, 1)
In contrast to the politically worded norms advanced as part of the Digital 
Geneva Convention or the Paris Call, the areas of activities identified by 
the charter signatories are skewed toward key tenets of responsible product 
development and engineering practices (Horenbeeck et al. 2019).
Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace (GCSC)
A year prior to the postulation of Siemens’ Charter of Trust for a Secure 
Digital World, the Munich Security Conference (2017) saw the inauguration 
of the Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace (GCSC), a multi-
stakeholder consortium composed of regionally diverse scholars, CEOs, and 
(former) policy makers. The commission’s expressed goal is the development 
of “proposals for norms and policies to enhance international security and 
stability and guide responsible state and non-state behaviour in cyberspace” 
(Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace 2017b). Composed of 
twenty-eight commissioners and supported by a research team and a govern-
mental advisory network, the GCSC draws on a rich pool of technical and 
political expertise. According to one of its commissioners, Dr. Wolfgang 
Kleinwächter, “the GCSC has the potential, to become a trusted source of 
inspiration for global internet policy making in the 2020s” (Kleinwächter 
2017).
The GCSC has convened several times along major Internet policy meet-
ings, including the Munich Security Conference, CyCon, Black Hat, the 
Global Conference on Cyber Space, GLOBSEC, ICANN, EuroDIG, UNI-
DIR, and G20. During one of its early meetings in November 2017, the GCSC 
issued its first norm, A Call to Protect the Public Core of the Internet, which 
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states: “Without prejudice to their rights and obligations, state and non-state 
actors should not conduct or knowingly allow activity that intentionally and 
substantially damages the general availability or integrity of the public core 
of the Internet, and therefore the stability of cyberspace” (Global Commis-
sion on the Stability of Cyberspace 2017a, 1). The proclamation of the norm 
drew considerable attention from the international community and the norm 
has since made its way into a number of political fora, including the Paris 
Peace Forum, and the European Union (Global Commission on the Stability 
of Cyberspace 2019; Ministère de l’Europe et des Affaires Étrangères 2018). 
According to some observers, including the Electronic Frontier Foundation’s 
global policy analyst, Jeremy Malcolm, “the idea of a duty on stakeholders 
not to attack the internet’s core technical infrastructure has the potential to 
become an influential and important guiding principle for policymakers and 
business leaders” (Malcolm 2017).
The concept of the public core as advanced by the GCSC was first articu-
lated by associate professor of Security and Technology, Dennis Broeders, in 
a study published by Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy 
(Broeders 2016). The study argued for the establishment of an international 
norm directed at protecting “the internet’s public core—its main protocols 
and infrastructure, which are a global public good . . . against unwarranted 
intervention by states” (Broeders 2017, 367).3
Since the publication of its first norm, the commission has issued seven 
further norms addressing issues such as product tampering, the commandeer-
ing of botnets, and the creation of a vulnerability equities process (Global 
Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace 2018b).
NON-STATE ACTORS AS SHAPERS OF 
CUSTOMARY STANDARDS OF RESPONSIBLE 
BEHAVIOR IN CYBERSPACE
The cases introduced above demonstrate that non-state actors have come to 
insert their voices in debates about responsible behavior in cyberspace. They 
have taken seats at political tables and have started to behave as diplomatic 
protagonists. Their proposals are deliberately targeted at the international 
level and consciously employ policy-oriented language. Naming norms-
based endeavors Charter, Accord, or Convention underscores the underlying 
political ambitions of these efforts.
In terms of agency, the norm-building activities conducted by non-state 
actors reflect a substantial extension of their traditional authority. From a 
structural point of view, they suggest a shift in global regulation from state-
centric forms of steering toward new non-territorial, multi-actor modes of 
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governance (Scherer, Palazzo, and Baumann 2006, 506). In international rela-
tions and international law, states have long enjoyed (and continue to enjoy) 
conceptual and analytical preeminence apropos enacting and enforcing global 
rules (Bianchi 2011; Noortmann, Reinisch, and Ryngaert 2015). Among 
a select number of personae endowed with international legal personality, 
states have been considered the main bearers and creators of international 
rights and duties, and as a result have been ascribed key value allocation 
authority (Klabbers 2003, 55; Thirlway 2014). Positivist interpretations of 
international law maintain that international norm-making capabilities sit 
with states who lay down “shared boundaries of acceptable conduct in inter-
national [affairs]” (Mačák 2017, 2). However, in the context of cybersecurity, 
traditional conceptions of how norms and values come about and achieve 
legal status appear to be at odds with empirical realities.
With the intention of responding to the inadequacies posed by positivist 
interpretations of international law, a group of legal scholars has promoted 
the idea of Global Administrative Law (Krisch and Kingsbury 2006). Global 
administrative law offers a useful lens through which to contextualize the 
norm-stipulating activities of non-state actors and highlight their contribu-
tions.4 Conceptually, it is closely related to notions of global governance.5 
Global administrative law refers to an emerging body of law which takes into 
account that a great number of global legal rules, principles, and institutional 
norms are shaped by administrative processes “that implicate more than 
purely intra-state structures of legal and political authority” (Kingsbury and 
Donaldson 2011, para. 1). It “acknowledges the informality of global admin-
istration, the diffusion of decision making in a multi-level system and the 
strong influence of private elements in global administration” (Andjelkovic 
2006, 58).
According to Kingsbury, Krisch and Stewart, five different types of admin-
istrative processes can be distinguished, all of which can give rise to the 
emergence of global legal rules, principles, and institutional norms:
 1. Administration by formal international organizations;
 2. Administration based on collective action by transnational networks of 
cooperative arrangements between national regulatory officials;
 3. Distributed administration conducted by national regulators under treaty, 
network, or other cooperative regimes;
 4. Administration by hybrid intergovernmental–private arrangements;
 5. Administration by private institutions with regulatory functions (Kings-
bury, Krisch, and Stewart 2005, para. 20).
Of particular relevance for the purposes of this chapter are administrative pro-
cesses conducted by private protagonists. Whether through company policies, 
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dedicated normative initiatives or technical standard-setting, non-state actors 
have contributed substantially to global administrative processes pertaining 
to cybersecurity and have helped shape global practices and culture. The 
GCSC’s institution-crossing policy efforts to enhance international security 
and stability and guide responsible state and non-state behavior in cyberspace 
or Siemens’ and Microsoft’s propagation of technical security standards are 
but a few examples in this regard (Global Commission on the Stability of 
Cyberspace 2018c; European Parliament 2018, para. 48). The same can be 
said about the interpretation and implementation guidelines issued by ICT-
4Peace and Leiden University’s Program for Cyber Norms apropos the norms 
contained in the 2015 UN GGE recommendations.
While contested in terms of legal status, these practices have the potential 
to constitute important determinants for the emergence of international cus-
tom pertaining to cybersecurity. According to traditional notions of custom-
ary international law, binding habitus requires the presence of two elements: 
(1) consistent state practice and (2) opinio juris (Wex Legal Dictionary 
2018).6 Although the practices advanced by non-state actors in the context of 
international peace and security in cyberspace fit only imperfectly into con-
ventional frameworks of customary international law (as they are not state-
driven), their law-like normative and custom-inspiring effects should not be 
discounted. Global administrative law helps acknowledge these custom and 
culture-shaping contributions of non-state actors as it lends credence to the 
idea of non-state actors possessing legislative qualities, that is, having inter-
national legal personality (Andjelkovic 2006).
Custom never emerges instantaneously or fully formed. Rather, it rep-
resents the product of repeated interactions and exchanges across different 
institutional contexts and among different entities over time (Finnemore 
and Hollis 2018). As many regulatory functions are increasingly constituted 
and performed outside formally public, governmental structures, the norm-
advancing activities conducted by non-state actors as well as their political/
diplomatic engagement, if sustained over time, have the capacity to act as 
mold shells for the emergence of customary red lines apropos responsible 
behavior in the digital realm. By lining out and verbally enforcing normative 
standards vis-à-vis acceptable conduct in cyberspace, non-state actors can 
curb the potential for malicious, norm-opposing behavior to become widely 
accepted, including among sovereign parties. Indeed, as sovereign entities 
continue to grapple with questions around the applicability of international 
law to the virtual sphere, the norm-stipulating practices of private protago-
nists can serve as important sources of input and incubators of customary 
principles ad interim.
The norm-promoting efforts of non-state actors can effectively be under-
stood as signals of disapproval of certain malicious activities in cyberspace, 
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for example, the targeting or deliberate destruction of critical (information) 
infrastructure. These signals, in turn, have the potential to incite counter-
actions among different parties (including states) and give rise to shared 
boundaries of acceptable conduct in cyberspace. Furthermore, the practices 
advanced by non-state actors may provide a model which other protagonists 
in global administration find persuasive to follow and/or cost-effective to 
emulate (Kingsbury and Donaldson 2011, para. 26).
CONCLUSION
A decade ago, the protection of critical systems and network infrastructures 
was considered a topic of low politics, one mainly concerning technical 
experts (Malcolm 2017). Today, cybersecurity has become a matter of high 
politics. It has become top of the agenda for a wide circle of stakeholders, 
including government officials, community leaders, and CEOs. The exorbi-
tant increase in the number of users and processes relying on digital infra-
structures since the 1990s has gone hand in hand with a surge in the number 
of vulnerabilities and insecurities. The rising tide of threats to the stability and 
future development of cyberspace has led many observers to call for rules and 
norms to secure the digital environment.
Against the background of progress-inhibiting contention at the inter-
governmental level, this chapter has analyzed the contributions of non-state 
actors to projects of international cybersecurity norm-construction. It has 
argued that non-state actors have come to exert considerable influence, par-
ticularly as active stimulators of norms and shapers of customary standards 
of responsible behavior in the digital realm.
The normative efforts introduced as part of this chapter indicate that tra-
ditional conceptions wherein international standard-setting was seen as the 
exclusive purview of sovereign actors are fading.
The international societal body is changing at a rapid rate and new actors in 
international law are emerging and gaining prominence. Scholars and prac-
titioners have to think fast to keep pace with global change. As a result, the 
theoretical discourse is sometimes lost in the attempt to provide a satisfactory 
explanation of legal processes in a changing and unpredictable world. (Bianchi 
2009)
With the intention of better understanding and classifying the norm-stipulating 
activities of non-state actors in the context of international peace and secu-
rity in cyberspace, this chapter turned to global administrative law. Global 
administrative law recognizes that “much administration is taking place in 
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what might be thought of as a global administrative space, involving blurring 
of national and international, and public and private, dimensions” (Kingsbury 
and Donaldson 2011, para. 1). It also appreciates and helps conceptualize the 
law-like normative and custom-inspiring practices of non-state actors.
Irrespective of their ontological infancy and their loose connection 
among each other, the norm-promoting activities of non-state actors 
as well as their political commitment, if sustained over time, have the 
capacity to act as mold shells for the emergence of international custom 
pertaining to responsible behavior in cyberspace. Given the reluctance of 
states to actively present their views on where the thresholds are, non-state 
actor engagement is critical apropos effectuating responsible behavior in 
cyberspace (Vihul 2013). Although not endowed with formal law-making 
authority under positivist notions of international law, the work of non-
state actors such as ICT4Peace Foundation, multinational technology 
firms, including Microsoft and Siemens, or the Global Commission on 
the Stability of Cyberspace is exceptionally important in terms of lining 
out and shaping the outer (non-legal) boundaries of acceptable conduct in 
cyberspace (Vihul 2013).
Furthermore, as non-state actors continue to be concerned about “the imme-
diate and future threats to their critical services and infrastructures, [result-
ing] from the misuse of information and communications technologies,” and 
seek diplomatic engagement, it is important to reconsider existing forms 
of interaction and cooperation among governmental and non-governmental 
entities (Melissa Hathaway in Hampson et al. 2017, 5). The norm-building 
activities of non-state actors point to a need for more collaborative forms of 
governance, in which the former participate in joint steering efforts and share 
responsibilities with sovereign authorities (Healey 2018, 1:1).
NOTES
1. “The main goals for agreeing on norms are believed to include increased pre-
dictability, trust and stability in the use of Information and Communication Technolo-
gies” (Osula and Rõigas 2016, 11).
2. Contrary to earlier communication technologies, and despite its emergence in 
a politically predicated context, sovereign actors initially displayed little inclination 
toward enacting measures of control over cyberspace. Operation and management of 
the infrastructure were, for the most part, left to the experts who had contributed to 
its development, including, among others, Barry M. Leiner, Vinton G. Cerf, David 
D. Clark, Robert E. Kahn, Leonard Kleinrock, Daniel C. Lynch, Jon Postel, Larry 
G. Roberts, and Stephen Wolff. Oversight was informal and reflected the academic 
context within which the digital realm had arisen.
3. According to Broeders the public core “does not comprise the whole of the 
internet or even enter into the content layer of the internet but is limited to the logical 
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and physical infrastructural layers of the core internet. It is deliberately a ‘lowest 
common denominator approach’ that aims to keep the concept of the public core as 
close as possible to the minimum that is needed to protect the functionality of the 
internet,” see (Broeders 2017, 367).
4. “Underlying the emergence of global administrative law is the vast increase in 
the reach and forms of transgovernmental regulation and administration designed to 
address the consequences of globalised interdependence in such fields as security, . . . 
banking and financial regulation, law enforcement, telecommunications, . . . intellec-
tual property” (Kingsbury, Krisch, and Stewart 2005, 16).
5. With regard to the governance of global networks, Drake considers global gov-
ernance to be “the development and application of shared principles, norms, rules, 
decision-making procedures, and programs intended to shape actor’s expectations and 
practices and to enhance their collective management capabilities in world affair,” see 
(Drake 2008, 8–9).
6. “Opinio juris denotes a subjective obligation, a sense on behalf of a state that it 
is bound to the law in question. The International Court of Justice reflects this stan-
dard in ICJ Statute, Article 38(1)(b) by reflecting that the custom to be applied must 
be accepted as law” (Wex Legal Dictionary 2018).
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INTRODUCTION: MICROSOFT HITS 
THE DIPLOMATIC CIRCUIT1
The “existing and potential threats in the sphere of information security are 
among the most serious challenges of the twenty-first century,” stated the 
United Nations Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the 
Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International 
Security (UN GGE) in its first report, published in 2010. Almost ten years 
later, it has become clear that the use of networked technologies to conduct 
espionage, sabotage, and subversion (Rid 2013) is a major feature of contem-
porary global politics (Kello 2017). How this behavior should be governed at 
the global level has been a major point of international contention, and efforts 
to develop “cyber norms” of conduct via established international institu-
tions, bilateral summits, and other conventional forms of diplomacy have 
failed to resolve many fundamental disagreements between key states such 
as the United States, Russia, and China (Grigsby 2017; Segal 2017; Lantis 
and Bloomberg 2018; Henriksen 2019). How should the laws of war apply? 
What kinds of intrusions can be considered an armed attack? What type of 
networks are fair-play for military cyber commands and intelligence agen-
cies, and what others are off limits?
Unsatisfied with the tenor of the government-led discussion on these issues, 
Microsoft president Brad Smith proposed a “Digital Geneva Convention” at 
the RSA Conference in March 2017, calling on states to renounce cyberat-
tacks on the private sector (Smith 2017b, 10). Smith’s speech also called 
upon tech firms to rally together in support of the cause by not collaborating 
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with governments in cyberattacks, thereby acting as a neutral “Digital Swit-
zerland” (Smith 2017b, 12). In a related initiative from April 2018 onwards, 
Microsoft has led a coalition of corporations proposing principles of respon-
sible behavior in cyberspace for the private sector.2 The Cybersecurity Tech 
Accord, which now has 110 industry members,3 is a burgeoning industry 
alliance that appears to be exerting significant influence as a global policy 
entrepreneur on digital security issues.
In November 2018, the French government presented the “Paris Call for 
Trust and Security in Cyberspace” (France Diplomatie 2018), an multistake-
holder initiative closely planned with Microsoft, but lacking the main cyber 
powers (Uchill 2018), “teeth” (Matsakis 2018), and ambition compared to 
the original Digital Geneva Convention proposal (Baker 2018). In this pro-
cess, Brad Smith has become a global “cybersecurity statesman” of sorts, 
rubbing shoulders with world leaders, and earning valuable legitimacy as a 
policy advocate and trusted voice on digital security matters (Gorwa and Peez 
2019a, 2019b).
Microsoft’s multifaceted initiative—“unapologetically enter[ing] the polit-
ical sphere” (Jeutner 2019, 170)—warrants a close examination as a novel 
exertion of corporate influence in international politics. To this end, this 
chapter will examine the emergence, guiding principles, and participants of 
Microsoft’s various cybersecurity-related initiatives, with a particular focus 
on the Tech Accord. It will proceed as follows. First, we outline the accord’s 
core normative scope and ambitions, its specific pre- and proscriptions, the 
involved actors, and norm addressees (Section 2). We then ask and answer 
three further questions. Why did Microsoft take this step, devoting resources 
and political capital to an apparent cyber norm-building campaign? Why has 
Microsoft chosen the “accord” design and employ the language of interna-
tional humanitarian law throughout its campaign (Section 3)? Finally, why do 
certain firms choose to sign on to the accord, and who has joined (Sections 
4 and 5)?
By answering these questions, this chapter contributes to the recent schol-
arship on the role of companies in shaping cyber norms (Hurel and Lobato 
2020, 2018) in a number of ways. We examine Microsoft’s potential moti-
vations for setting up the accord, contextualizing it within the company’s 
2007–2013 involvement with the U.S. National Security Agency’s (NSA) 
PRISM program and the subsequent PR and consumer trust fallout as one 
potential reading. Applying literature on international business in global 
politics, we further identify elements of a “levelling the playing field” strat-
egy and trace Microsoft’s actions using an amended “spiral model” of norm 
entrepreneurship. Next, we explain the accord’s design as a nonbinding code 
of conduct through its flexible and performative benefits, and question the 
initiative’s appropriation of the language of international humanitarian law. 
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Finally, we present the first descriptive analysis of the Tech Accord’s 110 
members, and examine the possible instrumental motivations of signatories 
by collecting and analyzing their public statements regarding accord mem-
bership. We argue that most firms—smaller ones, in particular—attempt to 
cast themselves as innovative “global players” and as impactful technology 
companies, “bandwagoning” alongside Microsoft.
WHAT IS THE CYBERSECURITY TECH ACCORD?
Microsoft president Brad Smith raised eyebrows in Silicon Valley and 
beyond when he delivered a keynote at the 2017 RSA security conference 
that called on states to sign a “Digital Geneva Convention” (DGC), renounc-
ing cyberattacks on the private sector and users, and on companies to not be 
complicit in such attacks (Smith 2017b). This latter pledge was reformulated 
as the four-point Cybersecurity Tech Accord and launched in April 2018 by a 
group of thirty-four technology companies, including not only giants such as 
Microsoft and Facebook, but also a diverse group of international telecoms, 
hardware manufacturers, open-source software providers, and cybersecurity 
threat intelligence companies. The group has since grown in geographic and 
industry scope to a total of 110 countries, as Microsoft has embarked on a 
whirlwind global policy advocacy tour.
While Smith’s original “Digital Geneva Convention”—certainly the cen-
trepiece of the RSA speech—called for six commitments, the accord fea-
tures four (see table 13.1). Smith’s speech contained elements of what was 
later launched as the Cybersecurity Tech Accord, then under the heading 
of a “global tech sector accord” to supplement the DGC proposal (Smith 
2017b). While Smith clearly envisioned the DGC to be a company-led pro-
cess, the main target was still governments. The pledges were formulated 
as items governments would agree to, with commitments ranging from 
not “targeting tech companies, private sector, or critical infrastructure” to 
engaging in “nonproliferation activities [for] cyberweapons.” Responding 
to the feasibility of the DGC in November 2018, Smith described it as a 
“long-term aspiration” (Smith 2018). The Tech Accord is more modest 
than the DGC and RSA speech proposal, extending four “core values” to 
be enacted by companies: no offense, stronger defence, capacity building, 
and collective action (Tech Accord 2018a). A notable feature is that accord 
members pledge not only to protect their own customers but also each 
other’s.
Drawing upon Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink’s seminal 1998 
article, we define international norms as “standards of appropriate behav-
iour for actors with a given identity” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 891; 
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see also Katzenstein 1996, 5). Early foundational work by Sikkink and Mar-
garet Keck on non-state actors and norms focused primarily on grassroots, 
transnational advocacy networks (Keck and Sikkink 1998). The authors 
examined the tactics such networks employ in their attempts to affect 
Table 13.1 Commitments and “Common Values” as Proposed by Brad Smith in 2017, 
and Their Equivalents in the 2018 Tech Accord (Authors’ Systematization, Numbers in 
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domestic and international policy making. Traditionally, multinational cor-
porations (MNCs) were discussed in the context of the adversarial role they 
took in relation to these grassroots networks (see also Wolf, Deitelhoff, 
and Engert 2007). The Tech Accord provides an interesting example of a 
reversal of this process, with MNCs engaging in their own transnational 
advocacy and norm-building, which—save for the Paris Call—has been 
largely separate from civil society and other non-state actors. As Hurel and 
Lobato (2020) have fruitfully explored for the Tech Accord case, a critical 
addition to this literature covers corporate entities as norm entrepreneurs 
(Wolf, Deitelhoff, and Engert 2007; Deitelhoff and Wolf 2013; see also 
Flohr et al. 2010).
Each accord principle consists of a brief one- or two-sentence explanation, 
but it is clear that the accord is aimed at companies, rather than at govern-
ments. Two of the four principles are relatively uncontroversial: Collective 
action calls for companies to “build on existing relationships and together 
establish new formal and informal partnerships with industry, civil society 
and security researchers to improve technical collaboration, coordinate 
vulnerability disclosures, share threats”—a practice which is already char-
acteristic of the cybersecurity industry and is commonplace among certain 
vendors and firms (de Fuentes et al. 2017). Capacity building is even vaguer, 
and “may include joint work on new security practices and new features the 
companies can deploy in their individual products and services” alongside a 
pledge to help businesses protect themselves from digital threats (of course, 
many of the companies sell products marketed for this exact purpose). The 
two more compelling points are those which are more directly related to the 
original Digital Geneva Convention subject matter of cyberattacks: no offense 
and stronger defence.
According to no offense, accord signees “will not help governments launch 
cyberattacks against innocent citizens and enterprises, and will protect against 
tampering or exploitation of their products and services through every stage 
of technology development, design and distribution.” One major story from 
the Snowden disclosures described how the U.S. National Security Agency 
was intercepting routers and other network infrastructure made by Cisco (a 
signee) mid-transit, reprogramming their firmware to record network traf-
fic and report it back to NSA, and then repackaging them into their original 
boxes and sending them off to their final international destination (Schneier 
2015). In this context, this point could be seen as a pushback against the U.S. 
national security apparatus, although it is unclear whether companies such as 
Cisco were aware of this practice (the business maintained it was not). But the 
language notably does not mention that these companies cannot help states 
engage in cyberattacks against other states (only against “innocent citizens 
and enterprises”).
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Stronger defence involves a commitment to “protect all customers 
globally regardless of the motivation for attacks online.” It allows one to 
imagine an interesting hypothetical scenario where a cloud provider (such 
as Microsoft), based in the United States, has to protect servers rented 
by customers in a country that is a current U.S. adversary from an intru-
sion effort orchestrated by the NSA or another “Five Eyes” agency. It is 
exactly this scenario, in which the technology company would be caught 
between its interests in serving foreign customers as a global business 
and the national security or espionage-related interests of domestic intel-
ligence agencies that seemed to underlie Smith’s original desire to become 
a “neutral Digital Switzerland.” Post-Snowden, it is no longer acceptable 
for technology companies to be seen publicly as working with intelligence 
agencies to provide behind-the-scenes access to data. The framing of the 
accord around “cyberattacks” seems to elide the reality that many of the 
same effects can be achieved completely legally via government access 
requests (via for instance, the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 
or FISA court), and in many cases, technology companies that host third-
party user data comply with these requests. While an acknowledgment of 
these government access requests is missing from the Tech Accord, it is 
discussed by some of the 110 companies that signed on, 40 of whom pub-
lished their own blog posts or statements discussing the accord and their 
reasons for joining (tables 13.2 and 13.4). The cybersecurity company 
Avast, for instance, noted that the accord was particularly important “at 
a time when world governments are frequently pushing hard for access to 
user data” (Avast 2018).
Table 13.2 Cybersecurity Tech Accord Members by Industry Sector and by Whether 
a Press Release Was Issued (as of July 25, 2019)
Sector Examples
Tech Accord members Press releases
Count






Information security FireEye, RSA 38 36% 19 50%
IT Aliter, Cognizant 20 19% 7 35%
Software Microsoft, Intuit 17 16% 4 24%
Cloud Cloudflare, Oracle 8 8% 2 25%
Telecom KPN, Orange 8 8% 2 25%
Hardware Dell, HP 6 6% 2 33%
Platform Facebook, GitHub 5 5% 2 40%
Misc. WIPFLI, Nielsen 5 5% 2 40%
Industrial Rockwell, Hitachi 3 3% 0 0%
Sum  110  40 36%
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WHY DID MICROSOFT START THE ACCORD?
Why, of all companies, is Microsoft devoting substantial financial and 
political resources to the development of cyber norms? The Tech Accord has 
drawn significant media coverage, but little critical analysis to date. Recently, 
Hurel and Lobato argued that the efforts demonstrate an “an attempt to influ-
ence global public policies on cybersecurity” (Hurel and Lobato 2018, 61), 
and fruitfully applied the IR framework of corporate norm entrepreneurship 
to the Microsoft case (Hurel and Lobato 2020). Analyses of the Tech Accord 
have been primarily grounded in the international cybersecurity norms lit-
erature, which covers the narrow field of cyber conflict (e.g., Finnemore and 
Hollis 2016; Grigsby 2017), the broader field of Internet governance and 
architecture (e.g., Mueller 2010; DeNardis 2014), as well as the intermediary 
space of cybersecurity. This section applies further IR corporate norm entre-
preneurship literature to the case of the Tech Accord, showing that Microsoft 
is indeed a paradigmatic case for such efforts.
We argue that past work on the Tech Accord has failed to account for 
Microsoft’s recent past and possible readings thereof, and present one such 
reading. In 2007, ten years before Smith’s keynote, Microsoft became the 
NSA’s very first partner in the PRISM program, which involved close col-
laboration with the government agency to provide clandestine access to sen-
sitive, encrypted user data (The Guardian 2013a; Landau 2014, 62–64). In 
2013, PRISM came to public attention through the Edward Snowden disclo-
sures. Within a few short years, Microsoft has switched from being engaged 
in the NSA’s surveillance program to aggressively spearheading an initiative 
to “make the internet a safer place, (. . .) and [retain] the world’s trust” (Smith 
2017a). We argue that in order to fully understand Microsoft’s remarkable 
current push and role as a corporate norm entrepreneur, this recent history 
must be considered in detail. The primary factor here is not the actual depth 
of NSA cooperation, but rather the perceived breach of consumer trust.
Annegret Flohr and colleagues hypothesize that the more vulnerable a 
company is to a loss of reputation, the more likely it is to engage in norm 
entrepreneurship initiatives (Flohr et al. 2010, 82). They show empirically 
that companies with business-to-consumer transactions (rather than business-
to-business transactions) are far more likely to engage in norm entrepreneur-
ship (Flohr et al. 2010, 85–94). Over 80 percent of all desktop computers use 
the Windows operating system (StatCounter 2018), a high rate of interaction 
with end users. By the firm’s own account, two billion people use Microsoft 
products (Smith 2018). Microsoft representatives address this rationalist 
explanation by stating that “what is good” for shareholders in this case is 
also “what is right,” by asserting a seamless overlap of Microsoft’s business 
interests and the greater societal good in cyber-norms matters. This, coupled 
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with the PR fallout from the Snowden revelations, and the waning position 
of Microsoft as a meaningful corporate player (relative to Google, Facebook, 
Amazon, and Apple) makes Microsoft a likely candidate for corporate norm 
entrepreneurship.
Nicole Deitelhoff and Klaus Dieter Wolf make three further particularly 
relevant points for the case of cyber norm entrepreneurship. First, they argue 
that corporate involvement in “governance in the post-national constellation” 
is generally strong (Deitelhoff and Wolf 2013, 222). The realm of cyberspace 
is emblematic of this setting. Therefore, Deitelhoff and Wolf’s work provides 
a fitting theory to apply to the Microsoft-led case of norm entrepreneur-
ship. Second, the authors amend Risse et al.’s five-phase “spiral model” of 
state norm socialization (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999) to fit the corporate 
context. The adjusted “spiral model” contains the following steps in which 
businesses deal with human rights norms: (1) denial and “quiet complicity,” 
followed by typically unsuccessful (2) tactical concessions, leading to (3) 
growing norm acceptance and institutionalization, potentially followed by (4) 
corporate norm-setting in order to achieve a level-playing field with noncom-
pliant competitors, and finally (5) ongoing rule-consistent behavior, norm-
setting and norm development (Deitelhoff and Wolf 2013, 231–234). Third, 
and more broadly, the authors find that corporate norm entrepreneurship is 
often primarily driven by “rationalist calculations regarding the re-definition 
of fundamental business interests” (Deitelhoff and Wolf 2013, 237). In other 
words, when companies “proactively engage in norm-setting,” they are 
mainly guided by the aim of minimizing losses by bringing competitors who 
are not adhering to the norm in question into the fold—“levelling the play-
ing field” (Zadek 2004; Deitelhoff and Wolf 2013, 237). This assumption is 
particularly worth examining in the Microsoft and Tech Accord case.
The remainder of this section proceeds along these three steps. While 
Hurel and Lobato state that “governments usually look to the ICT industry 
to prevent, detect, respond to, and recover from cyber attacks” (Hurel and 
Lobato 2018, 62), governments have also long looked to tech corporations for 
access to private user data. In the following, we examine this interaction as a 
key mechanism in understanding Microsoft’s ongoing Tech Accord efforts.
A critical element in the call for cyber norms is the difficulty of governing 
cyberspace in the first place. Cyberspace is today generally considered quasi-
regulated space (Jakobi 2013; however, also see Jeutner 2019) and corporate 
entities are, therefore, crucial actors in this “area of limited statehood,” a 
realm where “the state lacks governance capacities in different sectors or over 
certain periods” (Börzel and Deitelhoff 2018, 250). Where state governance is 
limited, corporations are both commonly normatively expected to get involved 
and empirically more likely to do so (Deitelhoff and Wolf 2013; Börzel and 
Deitelhoff 2018). The concept of “limited statehood” fits the online context 
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in many ways—there are few binding rules and governance mechanisms in 
cyberspace, and the covert nature of cyber activities leads to great difficulties 
in enforcing any such rules (Kello 2017). The challenges faced by the state-
driven and UN-based Group of Governmental Experts (UN GGE, see Grigsby 
2017; Henriksen 2019) and the subsequent push by Microsoft and others to 
establish a loose set of rules for cybersecurity can, therefore, be seen as an 
attempt to introduce corporate-led norms into the relatively loosely governed 
area of cyberspace. This presents a difference in both norm entrepreneurs and 
norm addressees compared to the UN GGE, with corporations acting as both 
entrepreneurs and addressees. The relatively under-regulated nature of the 
Internet gives accord signees a—perhaps convincing and reasonable—claim 
to set cyber policy and standards (Hurel and Lobato 2020, 303–5).
Next, we apply Deitelhoff and Wolf’s amended five-step explanatory 
spiral model for the business context to the case of Microsoft and the Tech 
Accord. This examination will seek to cover the ten years preceding the pre-
sentation of the accord. We argue that Microsoft’s cooperation with the NSA 
on PRISM is a source of the company’s norms initiative ten years later. As 
PRISM’s first partner, Microsoft provided the U.S. government with access 
to U.S. and foreign nationals’ data. While the NSA did not have blanket 
access to user data (as was reported at times, and has been widely misunder-
stood), the close cooperation between Microsoft and the NSA on FISA orders 
for foreign nationals’ data was nonetheless a major revelation among the 
Snowden disclosures in July 2013 (Washington Post 2013). The fact that the 
number of Skype calls collected by the NSA tripled after Microsoft acquired 
the company in 2012 seems to indicate unusually close cooperation between 
the NSA and Microsoft (The Guardian 2013a; Der Spiegel 2013). Once the 
extent of the PRISM program had been revealed, many companies ardently 
denied any wrongdoing or responsibility (New York Times 2013). Deitelhoff 
and Wolf identify complicity in government human rights violations as a 
common point of departure of human rights socialization in the corporate 
sector. Microsoft’s complicity in the broad targeting of foreign nationals’ 
privacy with limited legal process fits this first step.
The second step on the way to norm entrepreneurship are “tactical conces-
sions.” Such concessions are driven by the strength of the newfound opposi-
tion to the company and its “social and material vulnerability” (Deitelhoff and 
Wolf 2013, 228, 231). At the time of the Snowden disclosures, the company’s 
marketing campaign stated that “Your privacy is our priority” (The Guardian 
2013a; Der Spiegel 2013). The PR fallout was swift, and the vulnerability of 
a corporation so intimately linked to its users’ lives was high in the face of 
the perceived immense breach of trust. Consequently, many of the implicated 
firms turned to public norm entrepreneurship strategies. In December 2013, 
Microsoft, Apple, Google and others published an open letter to President 
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Barack Obama and the U.S. Congress, containing five “reform principles” 
to reign in government surveillance. They stated that “the balance in many 
countries has tipped too far in favor of the state and away from the rights 
of the individual.” Brad Smith, then Microsoft’s general counsel, put the 
responsibility for decreasing user trust squarely on the U.S. government’s 
shoulders: “Governments have put this trust at risk, and governments need to 
help restore it” (The Guardian 2013c). In this way, Microsoft sought to high-
light their compliance with civil liberty norms, a “regular instance of tactical 
concessions” (Deitelhoff and Wolf 2013, 230).
The third step—“norm acceptance and institutionalization”—is difficult to 
separate from concessions. The open letter was accompanied by an industry-
wide push for stronger encryption and peer review of application code (The 
Guardian 2013b, 2013c). More antagonistically, Brad Smith compared gov-
ernment surveillance of its servers to “sophisticated malware or cyber attacks” 
in December 2013 (The Guardian 2013b). Microsoft had now accepted and 
firmly, publicly committed to higher standards, and to no longer providing 
broad access to user data. Thereby, the company had moved from long-term 
NSA cooperation to public support for civil liberties online to sharp public 
criticism of U.S. government practices (see also Hurel and Lobato 2020).
Fourth, this leads to what Deitelhoff and Wolf call “a curious and unex-
pected side effect”—the potential transformation of “norm-takers into norm-
makers.” Rather than using discursive tactics such as shaming, Deitelhoff 
and Wolf argue that companies often change their own behavior and lead by 
example, forging “collective self-commitments” (Deitelhoff and Wolf 2013, 
231–232). The Digital Geneva Convention, Tech Accord, and Paris Call ini-
tiatives in 2017 and 2018 are examples of such commitments, as are the com-
pany’s “Transparency Centres,” the “Defending Democracy Program,” and 
their “Digital Crimes Unit” (see Hurel and Lobato 2020). Through this lens 
and perhaps somewhat favorably, Microsoft’s pushes can be interpreted as a 
genuine effort to drive and advance cyber norms as part of the “groundswell 
of private leadership” (Matsakis 2018) in this realm from 2014 onwards. 
In the absence of effective state-led international agreements and therefore 
the presence of “unregulated space,” tech firms such as Microsoft may feel 
empowered to be more proactive and take the lead in norm and agenda set-
ting, exemplified by the firm’s activities as a “quasi-diplomatic actor” (Hurel 
and Lobato 2018) adopting the vocabulary of international relations.
Fifth, looking into the future, “companies often struggle to commit public 
actors (. . .) to comply with human rights,” particularly in settings of “limited 
statehood more generally” (Deitelhoff and Wolf 2013, 235). This does not 
bode well for common cybersecurity norms, and may indeed be the reason 
why Microsoft toned down the “Digital Geneva Convention” language in 
the first place (see Smith 2018). The voluntary nature of the accord makes it 
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increasingly open to interpretation and selective application, raising the ques-
tion of whether there is any sort of perceived accountability for adhering to 
its principles at all (Deitelhoff and Wolf 2013, 238). Hurel and Lobato point 
out that these formal initiatives are only “the tip of the iceberg” (Hurel and 
Lobato 2020, 292), with Microsoft’s norm-making also taking hold through 
its technical services and policy development, not only explicit public 
advocacy.
Finally, Deitelhoff and Wolf’s observation of attempts to “level the playing 
field” are particularly apt for the Tech Accord. As this section has illustrated, 
Microsoft was prominently exposed as an early NSA collaborator in the wake 
of the Snowden revelations. Following this logic, as a particularly exposed 
global company (see above), Microsoft had little choice but to go on the 
offensive and enter the fray as a norm entrepreneur by “mak[ing] the case 
(. . .) to retain the world’s trust” (Smith 2017a, 13)—though not explicitly in 
connection to the Snowden affair. Microsoft has attempted to do this through 
adhering to a self-written code of conduct, the Cybersecurity Tech Accord. 
This code comes alongside a somewhat more skeptical approach to coopera-
tion with governments post-Snowden. Following the commercial necessity 
of minimizing losses, Microsoft has since attempted to bring tech sector 
competitors into the fold of also adhering to these higher standards of user 
protection. As an industry leader, Microsoft is well poised for such a push. 
This amounts to “levelling the playing field”—that is, bringing competitors 
up to Microsoft’s voluntary standards regarding both governmental coopera-
tion and general cyberattack prevention. Smith himself has chosen his words 
similarly, describing the Tech Accord in part as an attempt to “create a floor” 
to prevent a “race to the bottom” (Smith 2018) regarding offensive coopera-
tion with states in cyber affairs.
In conclusion, owing to its early norm entrepreneurship efforts and the 
absence of major players from the accord (see Section 4), Microsoft has 
effectively assumed the role as a key spokesperson for tech firms in the cyber-
norms debate, thereby creating part of the present-day cyber-norms environ-
ment. This, we argue, goes beyond merely carving out a place for themselves 
within the cybersecurity landscape (Hurel and Lobato 2020). Microsoft has 
not only aimed for a seat at the table, but for the seat at the head of the table 
as the cyber-norms effort grows with initiatives such as the Paris Call.
WHY ARE OTHERS JOINING THE ACCORD?
This section critically analyses the Cybersecurity Tech Accord itself, focus-
ing on the benefits to corporate actors of (1) appropriating of the authoritative 
language of international humanitarian law without any of its commitment, 
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and (2) a broad, nonbinding code of conduct open to PR “spin” on behalf of 
the signatories.
Smith’s 2017 Digital Geneva Convention launch was part public rela-
tions pitch (“last year we added Advanced Threat Protection for Microsoft 
Exchange Online”) and part plea (“those of us in the tech sector need to act 
collectively to better protect the internet and customers everywhere from 
nation-state attacks”). The heavy reliance on international humanitarian 
law analogies was a guiding theme throughout the original Digital Geneva 
Convention speech in particular (Smith 2017b). Smith seemed to be directly 
equating private, profit-maximizing technology firms with humanitarian 
organizations such as the Red Cross, arguing that just “as the Fourth Geneva 
Convention relies on the Red Cross to help protect civilians in wartime, 
protection against nation-state cyber attacks requires the active assistance of 
the tech sector” (Smith 2017b). Smith’s 2017 proposal was critiqued for its 
sloppy use of the Geneva Convention metaphor: While perhaps a useful men-
tal image, casting oneself in a similar mold as the International Committee of 
the Red Cross (ICRC), a three-time recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize, offers 
clear reputational benefits (see also Jeutner 2019, 168). The subsequent 2018 
Tech Accord announcement backed away slightly from the Switzerland-
related metaphors, as has the branding of the accord. Nonetheless, Microsoft 
continues to use the semantics of international politics in its broader policy 
initiatives (Hurel and Lobato 2018, 68), for example, through its “Digital 
Diplomacy” team (formerly “Global Security Strategy and Diplomacy”).
Although consistently discussed as a matter of cyber norms, with norms 
generally defined as “shared understandings” (for a review, see Niemann and 
Schillinger 2017), the tenets of the accord seem to be neither particularly 
shared nor well-understood among the signatories. Given that the public-
facing accord is short on detail (comprised of only four points and eight 
sentences total), it is unsurprising that company statements have varied sig-
nificantly in how they interpreted the nature and purpose of the Tech Accord. 
A number of companies stated that they viewed the Tech Accord as an effort 
to “fight cybercrime” (ESET 2018; Gigamon 2018). Others viewed it as 
an “alliance” (Avast 2018), with some even invoking it as a tech-company 
equivalent of NATO’s Article 5 collective defence provision (KoolSpan 
2018). The accord’s August 2018 endorsement of the “Mutually Agreed 
Norms for Routing Security,” an initiative launched in 2014 by the Internet 
Society (ISOC), shows that the Tech Accord indeed does not only seem to be 
a set “Accord” but also a loose consortium or alliance that will continue to be 
involved in evolving Internet governance and technology initiatives.
Unlike the Global Network Initiative (GNI) for preventing censorship 
and protecting privacy online, or past efforts to bring together technology 
companies with an overarching human rights goal, there are no publicly 
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accessible governance mechanisms or accountability frameworks which 
govern the accord (perhaps because this initiative does not feature any civil 
society or nonindustry stakeholders). Transparency is summarized in a 
single line, promising that “we will also report publicly on our progress in 
achieving these goals”—a far cry from the comprehensive GNI governance 
charter which details the GNI legal structure and board, along with the 
detailed requirements for the independent-third party assessments that are 
undertaken every two years to ensure compliance with the GNI principles 
(Global Network Initiative 2017). Because the accord is nonbinding, and 
does not have any clear governance mechanisms, it seems as if it can be, to 
modify Alexander Wendt’s famous formulation, ‘what companies make of 
it’ (Wendt 1992).
WHO HAS JOINED THE ACCORD?
To further analyze the Tech Accord’s membership, we compiled a list of 
all members by industry sector,4 primary world region, date of joining, and 
whether they issued a press release upon joining.5 In order to better assess 
why firms would opt to join the accord, we examined their public justifica-
tion for doing so, compiling all public statements released by its members. 
The available blog posts, statements, and press releases were downloaded and 
assessed for major themes.
The list of signatories is diverse. It includes major platform companies 
(Facebook, LinkedIn), international telecoms (BT, Telefonica), cybersecu-
rity threat intelligence companies (FireEye, F-Secure, TrendMicro), and PC 
manufacturers (Dell, Hewlett Packard). Other members include the online 
payments company Stripe, an enterprise technology company specializing in 
Tax software (Intuit), and the market research firm Nielsen. By July 2019, a 
total of 110 companies had pledged to “protect and empower civilians online 
and to improve the security, stability and resilience of cyberspace” (Tech 
Accord 2018a).
The tabulation of member statements by line of business and whether they 
issued a press release (table 13.2) shows that information security firms are 
most likely to have issued press releases regarding their joining the other 
firms. Fifty percent of all companies coded as information security firms have 
issued statements, compared to 29 percent of all remaining firms.
Examining the stated reasons for joining, it is immediately apparent that 
companies take advantage of the accord to “bandwagon”—proclaiming 
themselves as innovative, champions of security, and as impactful technol-
ogy companies alongside Microsoft. This trend was most clear for smaller 
and less influential firms, eager to name themselves as part of a select group 
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of globally recognized organizations (emphases added throughout). For 
instance, Avast, a Czech provider of antivirus software, “joined Microsoft, 
Facebook, Cisco, and thirty other tech giants in what is being considered a 
‘Digital Geneva Convention’” (Avast 2018); Spanish telecommunications 
provider Telefónica could brand itself “among leading tech companies which 
pledge to fight cyberattacks” (Telefónica 2018); the Romanian antivirus 
vendor Bitdefender could announce having joined the accord with “30 other 
important players who have shaped technology throughout the years” (Bit-
defender 2018); and the Japanese threat intelligence company Trend Micro 
suggested that the accord “demonstrates a commitment by key industry play-
ers like us” (Trend Micro 2018).
Furthermore, the Tech Accord—steered by Microsoft—seems to have 
pursued a regional strategy of expansion in late 2018 and early 2019 
(table 13.3). The two initial waves of membership primarily included firms 
from the United States and Western Europe. In September 2018, eight East-
ern European firms signed on, followed by the first firms from the South 
America (Argentina and Chile) in November 2018 and January 2019. This 
finding could be a starting point for research on “how the company develops 
relations with Global South countries,” broadly conceived (Hurel and Lobato 
2020, 306; see also Tech Accord 2018b). Since March 2019, new members 
have once again mainly been from the United States and Western Europe. 
The complete absence of firms from states such as China, Russia, and Israel 
indicates that beyond norms for guiding corporate activity in the cyber realm, 
norms regarding public-private partnership and the relation of the state to its 
citizens are at stake.
Finally, combining the regional and publicity perspectives, European tech 
firms seem to be far more keen than their U.S. counterparts to publicly align 
themselves with the Tech Accord, Microsoft, and cybersecurity advocacy 
more broadly (table 13.4). While 62 percent of European members issued 
press releases, only 24 percent of U.S. firms did. This may be because the 
Microsoft brand might have greater currency in Europe than in the United 
States, or due to greater anticipated benefits of aligning oneself with user data 
protection in Europe compared to the United States.
Other than Microsoft, the leading organizer, none of the largest and poten-
tially most impactful members—Facebook, Oracle, and Cisco—released 
a statement. The role of these major firms within the accord needs to be 
explored in further research, along with key unanswered questions about 
the lack of certain major firms that seemingly refused to join (most notably, 
Google). If the proscriptions of the accord are so flexible, why not join? 
Meanwhile, in the absence of other major players, Microsoft now appears 
to have taken up the role of spokesperson for the tech industry in this cyber-
norms process.
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The accord is both performative and flexible, allowing smaller firms 
to label themselves as meaningful changemakers and innovators, while 
also potentially allowing larger firms to point to the accord as a token 
of their goodwill without any meaningful commitments or enforcement 
mechanisms. If the goal of the Tech Accord is assembling a broad coali-
tion of companies, it is worth pointing out that such flexibility certainly has 
advantages: It lowers the barriers for entry, perhaps setting the stage for an 
increasingly rigid process to come (for a policy maker perspective, see Lété 
and Chase 2018).
CONCLUSION: NEITHER SHARED 
NOR UNDERSTOOD?
With this chapter, we have sought to trace the evolution of Microsoft’s norm 
entrepreneurship from 2013 Snowden revelations to the 2017 Digital Geneva 
Convention speech to the 2018 Cybersecurity Tech Accord initiative. We 
have explored the potential motives shaping Microsoft’s behavior as the cre-
ator of the accord, unpacked the proscriptions of the accord itself, analyzed 
public statements issued by signatories to better understand why so many 
firms have joined, and tabulated its members along various characteristics. 
At 110 members, it is steadily growing and provides insightful precedent as 
an informal, potentially powerful coalition of non-state actors in the cyber-
norms debate.
We show that Deitelhoff and Wolf’s rationalist argument for why corpora-
tions may become norm entrepreneurs seems plausible for the Tech Accord 
and Microsoft case (Deitelhoff and Wolf 2013, 237). The accord may be 
an attempt to bolster user trust in the companies’ data protection measures, 
a value that has been at the forefront of user demands since 2013. So will 
this lead to a catalogue of do’s and don’ts, a cohesive alternative vision for 
responsible behavior in cyberspace? Under the commonly accepted definition 
of norms as “shared understandings” (see Niemann and Schillinger 2017), the 
accord’s provisions and very organizational nature seem neither shared nor 
understood. Despite the apparent novelty of the initiative, and its ongoing 
endorsement by scholars frustrated with the current poor state of cyberse-
curity norms discourse (see, e.g., Tworek 2017; Korzak and Lin 2018), as 
it stands, the accord offers all the PR potential and heavyweight legitimacy 
and very little of the normative obligation of the international legal language 
Microsoft has emulated.
Nonetheless, the rationalist and instrumental accounts do not fully explain 
the accord, and the goal of profit maximizing “does not rule out the exis-
tence of underlying notions of appropriate business behaviour” (Deitelhoff 
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and Wolf 2013, 237). Less than half of the accord’s signees have issued 
statements on their joining (tables 13.2 and 13.4), and the biggest, most 
important members (Facebook, Cisco, LinkedIn, Hewlett Packard, Dell, and 
others) have been oddly silent regarding the accord, casting some doubt on 
the assumption of the accord as purely a PR exercise. If all firms are simply 
seeking to improve their public image through participation, why would they 
not issue a statement? The importance of individuals such as Brad Smith in 
driving change may come into play here and is worth exploring further—
good-faith commitment to the principles of user privacy and data protection 
has been traced back to the idealism, ideology, and the institutional culture 
of the American technology industry (see, e.g., Turner 2008). Another major, 
unexplored question is why certain major industry players (such as Google) 
are missing, seemingly having refused to sign on to the accord.
Overall, the Tech Accord demonstrates several novel characteristics which 
provide a major departure from past norm-building efforts in the cyber realm. 
It is led by different stakeholders (i.e., tech companies rather than states), and 
seems to have virtually no external buy-in from civil society, nongovern-
mental organizations, or other key actors in international cyber governance. 
However, it seems to be positioning Microsoft as a responsible cyber actor, 
offering legitimacy for future endeavors, such as the November 2018 Paris 
Call, which does feature broader civil society participation. Microsoft’s tac-
tics can also be interpreted as an attempt to frame the company as a “quasi-
diplomatic entity” (Hurel and Lobato 2018, 71), from their spearheading of 
the Tech Accord to the branding of a “Global Security Strategy and Diplo-
macy Team,” and a way to exercise political influence in a potentially novel 
way. Watching how this process unfolds will be important for cybersecurity 
and international norms scholars, and those studying the role of technology 
and technology companies in politics more broadly.
Notwithstanding the general pessimism and in the cyber community 
regarding the future of common cyber norms, international norms often start 
as informal, loose standards and progress to more firm rules—both legally 
and socially.
Table 13.4 Cybersecurity Tech Accord by World Region and by Whether a Press 
Release Was Issued (as of July 25, 2019)
 Tech Accord members Issued a press release Share
US 63 15 24%
Western Europe 24 15 63%
Eastern Europe 15 9 60%
Asia 4 1 25%
South America 4 0 0%
Sum 110 40 36%
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NOTES
1. We thank Nicole Deitelhoff, Florian Egloff, Xenija Grusha, and the PRIF PhD 
colloquium for their helpful comments and suggestions. A previous version of this 
paper was presented at the inaugural the Hague Program for Cyber Norms Confer-
ence, November 5–7, 2018. Many thanks to Dennis Broeders, Corianne Oosterbaan, 
and the rest of the Hague Program’s team for putting this collection together, and for 
their assistance in turning our initial paper into this book chapter.
2. Industrial manufacturer Siemens has initiated a cybersecurity “Charter of Trust,” 
though with fewer members—16—and less public fanfare (as of July 25, 2019).
3. As of July 25, 2019, the Tech Accord website lists 111 members. Two com-
panies originally announced as joining are now no longer listed, CA Technologies 
and Symantec (both joined in April 2018). One company currently listed was never 
announced in a press release, Sharp. For consistency, all three have been omitted from 
the data used in this paper, resulting in a final list of 110 members.
4. We assign one sector per company, opting for the most significant sector if 
a company is involved in multiple lines of business. For example, the Japanese 
conglomerate Hitachi is coded as “Industrial,” though it also produces consumer 
electronics, and Microsoft is coded as “Software” while also offering cloud services. 
Sectors are defined as follows.
IT: general IT services, web/app development, call centers
Information security: vendors, threat intelligence, security solutions and soft-
ware (e.g. antivirus)
Telecom: telecommunications firms, internet service providers
Platform: platform companies, social media, online marketplaces
Industrial: heavy machinery, industrial equipment
Software: content management software, tax software, operating systems, apps
Hardware: personal computers, routers, networking and computing hardware
Cloud: web hosting, data storage, cloud services
Misc.: residual category
5. Press releases were searched via online queries for “Tech Accord” + [com-
pany name]. We assume that there are no language or translation problems with this 
approach, as the query is not specific to the English language.
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In 2016, a mantra, “There’s no national security without cybersecurity,” took 
hold within Microsoft and started to seep into the public discussion. We were 
hardly alone with this recognition. As German conglomerate Siemens AG 
predicted succinctly, “Cybersecurity is going to be the most important security 
issue of the future.” Clearly, any issue that would be fundamental to national 
security would propel the tech sector even more squarely into the world of inter-
national diplomacy. (Smith and Browne 2019, 110)
In February 2017, Microsoft called for the establishment of a Digital Geneva 
Convention, as a direct response to the expansion of state-sponsored cyber-
attacks. According to the company’s president, Brad Smith (2017), such 
commitment should be of utmost importance for maintaining peace and 
stability in cyberspace, given that “nation-state hacking has evolved into 
attacks on civilians in times of peace.” It is now common sense that most 
of the contemporary infrastructure that anchors the Internet is owned by 
private actors (Abbate 1999; Kitchin 2014; Musiani et al. 2016). This also 
means that potential targets include datacenters, servers, and devices; that is, 
the infrastructures owned by Microsoft and its industry peers as well as the 
data from its customers. While the Digital Geneva Convention was then met 
with different degrees of enthusiasm and skepticism by diplomats, scholars, 
and governments alike (Grigsby 2017; Interview, October 2019), as Brad 
Smith noted, “[a]t least we had succeeded in sparking a new conversation” 
(2019, 83).
The call for the Geneva Convention is not the first nor the last effort 
from the private sector to secure their infrastructure against state-sponsored 
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Call for Trust and Security, the CyberPeace Institute and engagement with 
governments—bilaterally or via international organizations—(Barrinha and 
Renard 2018), suggest that, at least, when it comes to cyberspace, companies 
have devised distinct regulatory and organizational strategies to build their 
legitimacy to negotiate with states. Of particular interest is the fact that their 
legitimacy as political actors is once again being debated.2 What is more: 
Microsoft’s involvement with the cyber norms-making has reanimated much 
of the talk on norms and private governance, as it becomes evident from the 
number of recent debates on this topic.3
We take the contestation over Microsoft’s legitimacy as norm entrepreneur 
as an entry point to the discussion of how global cybersecurity governance 
unfolds in practice and how, instead of focusing on either the “public” or “pri-
vate” aspects of it, cybersecurity governance happens in a grey zone of con-
tinuous contestation and negotiations over who can engage in norms-making, 
how norms are made and what counts as norm. In a previous study, we paid 
attention to the first question, looking at how private actors shape cyberse-
curity by means of public-private partnerships, lobbying, and self-regulation 
(Hurel and Lobato 2018). Now, we take a step further and look at how 
organizational complexity might highlight different modalities of exerting 
influence on public policy and engage in an interdisciplinary effort to portray 
the socio-technical arrangements (both intra-organizationally and interna-
tionally) as parts of a norms-making continuum. This exercise is relevant to 
the study of power, influence, agency, and authority in global cybersecurity 
governance, as it allows us to grasp the specific organizational, technical, and 
material arrangements that support the practices of stakeholders to negotiate 
their conditions of engagement in cybersecurity governance. Furthermore, 
these strategies allow us to deepen the critique of who produces norms so as 
to address the ontological problem of what it is to produce a norm.
In this chapter, we seek to provide two major contributions to the ongoing 
debate on cyber norms. The first contribution is with respect to how norms are 
usually conceived within this debate. Rather than being contained in the writ-
ten text (law and regulation), norms extend to the processes (see Finnemore 
and Hollis 2016) of negotiation that happen until it reaches its “final” (writ-
ten) and also to the agencies, resources, and organizational and technological 
structures that are mobilized in order for it to reach widespread public debate. 
The “expectations of behavior” that are a necessary component of norms also 
come in different forms, including through an infrastructure of access estab-
lished to promote values such as transparency and trust (e.g., Transparency 
Centers). The second relates to the understanding of how global cybersecurity 
governance unfolds in practice and which agencies count as legitimate in 
the process of negotiating cyber norms. As we argue, the question of who’s 
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agency should count in cybersecurity norms development is also indisso-
ciable from the question of how norms-making processes are perceived and 
conceptualized.
We look specifically at Microsoft as a case composed by a plethora of 
dimensions, including a somewhat intriguing diplomatic engagement. In 
spite of its global reach, the company has consistently expanded the legal 
and policy engagement, developed an extensive list of cyber norms-specific 
documents, and invested in international cybersecurity initiatives (to name 
a few), all of which come together with promoting security of their services 
and products. These and other dynamics have raised important questions as to 
what kind of role the private sector plays in global cybersecurity governance. 
Some scholars have referred to these continuous efforts as “tech diplomacy” 
or “corporate foreign policy” (Economist 2019). We argue that such develop-
ments have resurfaced (see Hurel and Lobato 2018; Gorwa and Peez 2018) 
important discussions related to the different modalities of engagement of the 
tech sector in shaping and taking part in global/international cybersecurity.
We purposefully make use of the term “norms entrepreneurship” to engage 
with a more critical discussion of what constitutes as norms-making in 
cybersecurity governance while simultaneously proposing a different starting 
point to the discussion, that is, the formal and informal practices within the 
private sector. This task is guided by the questions of how can we understand 
the role of private actors in cybersecurity governance and what it has to 
say about norms promotion. Methodologically, we draw on an analysis of 
Microsoft’s practices that could be traced from qualitative interviews con-
ducted with company’s representatives from different parts of the world, the 
analysis of policy documents published by its Diplomacy Team, information 
circulated in press releases and media headlines, and participant observation 
in different international and regional cybersecurity events. In the first sec-
tion of this chapter, we assess different bodies of literature to conceptualize 
private governance and question whether there is something unique to be 
said about Microsoft’s engagement in cybersecurity governance. Second, we 
provide an in-depth discussion on the role of technical mediation and organi-
zational complexity as constitutive elements of corporate agency and norms-
entrepreneurship in cybersecurity. Third, we engage with a more theoretical 
discussion on “how norms become norms,” exploring the ways in which 
Microsoft engages in “diplomatic” practices. With this, we expect to provide 
a contribution to the existing IR literature on norms and private governance 
by showing how negotiations over who’s a legitimate norm entrepreneur also 
depend on an overlap or blur in the line dividing the public/private, and to 
ongoing discussions on cyber norms, by raising the question of what counts 
as a norm and how norms are built-in practice.
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FROM NORM TO NORMATIVE ARRANGEMENTS: 
PRIVATE GOVERNANCE AS A FRAMEWORK
Norms are fundamental international institutions that both describe and 
prescribe action in this world (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Onuf 1989; 
Wendt 1992; 1995). As such, norm advocacy is an important formal dimen-
sion of international governance in the most distinct spheres of international 
life—cybersecurity being no exception. It presents a way of compromising 
states and biding their behavior to particular technical, professional, and 
political agreements as to which actions to take to avoid, mitigate, and over-
come threats and risks in cyberspace. There has been far less attention to 
this dimension of private governance in cybersecurity scholarship.4 As we 
argued elsewhere (Hurel and Lobato 2018), IR literature on norms presents 
an important first step to approach this gap. But it is not enough, for it offers a 
far less nuanced perspective on how different kinds of private groups engage 
with shaping international norms of behavior for state actors.
In this chapter, we look at private governance as a way to emphasize the 
distinct normative arrangements that might come with corporations taking 
the stage in norms promotion. This requires us to revisit and question how 
norms promotion has been conceptualized thus far (sections two and three) 
so as to encompass a multiplicity of ways in which values are communicated 
with more established interlocutors in the field of norms-making. What fol-
lows is an exercise to first single out the ways in which corporate action has 
already been conceived in global governance, management, and media and 
communications studies, followed by a discussion on the relevance of look-
ing at Microsoft as a case that is both sui generis when compared to what has 
been addressed by scholars across different disciplines and unique in its own 
organizational, situational, and contextual dynamics. Cases such as Microsoft 
call for an approach to cyber norms-making that is able to encompass the 
modularity, or perhaps, blurriness between its sui generis/unique character. 
Private governance allows us to approach this complex enmeshment between 
social, technical, material, and discursive arrangements that configure how 
the company influences and engages in cybersecurity governance.
Private governance is not typically recognized as a dimension of public 
policy making, despite the indisputable role of private actors in designing 
formal and informal rules for products, establishing sectoral regulation in 
tech, certifying professional competency and setting technical standards that 
impact society at large (Hall and Biersteker 2002; Rudder, Fritschler, and 
Jung Choi 2016). In cybersecurity, private actors have recognizably played 
a fundamental role in ensuring operational and technical security, as they 
help to set standards, determine authentication and trust mechanisms for both 
infrastructures and services, provide expertise, develop software, hardware, 
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as well as hold considerable knowledge on cybersecurity risks and threats. 
However, their role in shaping formal and informal rules of behavior in 
cyberspace remains undertheorized.
Scholars in international relations5 and management studies have long 
emphasized the role of private actors in a number of global governance fields 
(Strange 1998; Gilpin 1976; Avant 2005; Abrahamsen and Williams 2009; 
Leander 2010). Drawing from the end of the Cold War, many of the early 
IR literature on private governance focused on the effects of globalization 
and the need for new mechanisms and perspectives to cope with transna-
tional challenges, jurisdiction, and international flows (Benz et al. 2007). 
This opened up an avenue for thinking “beyond the state” or what has been 
referred to as “governance without government” (Rosenau and Czempiel 
1992) and a move from “government to governance” (Mayntz 2003). On the 
one hand, this perspective opens up the possibility for considering the agency 
and influence of actors other than states. On the other hand, it is important 
to note that this was also a period where the global market was opening up 
and with many countries, especially the United States, favoring competi-
tion and privatization of the public realm. Fuchs (2007) suggests that these 
were important enablers to the consolidation of, at least, three dimensions 
of business as an actor in global governance: instrumental power (lobbying, 
campaign, and party finance), structural power (capital flows as enablers 
to agenda-setting power, self-regulation, and PPPs), and discursive power 
(legitimation and political authority).
Management studies, on the other hand, has explored extensively the role 
of corporate governance and the development of further mechanisms of 
behavior, such as Corporate Social Responsibility (Bies et al. 2007; Mason 
and Simmons 2014). These mechanisms attempt to outline some of the politi-
cal roles and responsibilities that companies should undertake. Literature on 
CSR also focuses on “how corporations facing governmental deficits can 
solve public problems independently or through multistakeholder initiatives 
to improve social welfare” (Westermann-Behaylo, Rehbein and Fort 2015, 
389). This view resonates with a “governance without government” view 
that is rooted in self-regulation and privatization of different public services. 
It portrays the private sector as a necessary actor and as an intervenor that 
will ultimately produce positive outcomes in this exercise of “filling the gaps” 
where and when government fails to do so. This view holds the assumption 
that in a globalized world, business is better positioned to work as global 
interlocutors—combining the creation of value for their shareholders and for 
society (see Garriga and Melé 2004).
What is interesting in this particular approach to corporate governance 
within management studies is that, whereas it rightly points to an increase in 
private actors’ competencies in a number of relevant governance themes, it 
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misses the fact that they do not act only where and when governments fail. 
The 1980s opening of global markets also enabled an increase in the “spaces” 
in which companies could act by means of the delegation of a number of state 
competencies to the private sector (privatization) as well as the incorporation 
of market rationales into government functions (marketization), a number 
of new fields of intervention and competition opened to private companies 
(Bevir 2009; Crouch 2004). However, rather than meaning that corporations 
would “fill the gap” left by governments, this opening up provided for new 
spaces for contested and negotiated governance, that is to say, in which cor-
porations and government actors had to, at all times, negotiate their own roles 
in it. What is more: with the so-called revolving door between public and pri-
vate sectors (which was observable also from the professional backgrounds of 
part of our interviewees at Microsoft), part of the negotiations likely benefit 
from a shared understanding and grammar about what kinds of approaches 
and issues should be prioritized in public policy and how. Thus, rather than 
taking place in the absence of “public” governance, “private” governance is 
often deeply intertwined with it (Lobato 2016).
In this sense, contemporary private governance presents us with important 
challenges. First, it is difficult to define the boundaries of private groups’ 
decisions that make it into public policy. Whereas private organizations make 
policies that affect the larger public, their rule-making functions often remain 
concealed by a variety of forms they take—which includes trade associa-
tions, not-for-profit organizations, and public policy teams within for-profit 
enterprises. Second, their operations can result in a lack of transparency, 
accountability, and legitimacy that is required of governments, despite the 
fact that private groups make and enforce rules that bind people to follow 
them, just like governments’ laws and regulations (Rudder, Fritschler, and 
Jung Choi 2016).
Notwithstanding these challenges, this is a significant area of cybersecurity 
governance that deserves further scrutiny. Despite the often tacit recogni-
tion of private groups’ role in shaping cybersecurity, there is scant empirical 
analysis on how this happens and through which venues.6 This might possibly 
be due to a difficulty in accepting that companies’ practices, such as lobbying, 
and principles-based action, including norms promotion, are not mutually 
excluding. Companies are very often analyzed under the terms of rational 
choice theory: they are usually seen as rational actors, acting on a cost-benefit 
based evaluation, rather than by any “common good” incentives. Claims of 
companies acting on moral or normative grounds are promptly criticized 
either because corporations cannot be morally distinguished from the human 
beings that constitute them (Rönnegard 2015) or because companies, even 
when acting on social ends, are seen to do so exclusively to maximize profits 
(Friedman 2007). And when companies are recognized as possibly acting on 
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some kind of normative or social grounds, it is argued that, when doing so, 
they are not reduced to the actions and interests of their members. The chal-
lenge is, therefore, one of continuously attempting to locate agency amid a 
complex and evolving organizational structure in a context where perhaps 
that is not possible.
When it comes to cybersecurity, the increasing digitization of society and 
governments’ reliance on informational infrastructures (cloud computing and 
data centers) provides a significant element to thinking about norms entre-
preneurship and private governance, more generally. Business models are in 
constant development and this includes, but is not restricted to the (i) diversifi-
cation of services and products, (ii) continuous organizational flexibility (new 
teams, posts) and (iii) key leadership influence. It plays a fundamental part in 
understanding the socio-technical dimension of private governance of actors 
such as Microsoft. The development of solutions and services requires care-
ful consideration as it embeds specific protocols and functionalities that are 
selected to maintain a secure ecosystem. On the one hand, these arrangements 
prescribe what kind of security is “desirable” and “available” for consumers 
(public or private) (Hurel 2018) through technical architectures, protocol 
specifications, and security control mechanisms. Media and Communications 
scholars have drawn on science, technology and society studies to expose 
emerging dynamics of power of platforms and infrastructures (Kitchin 2014; 
Gillespie 2017; Plantin et al. 2017; Gorwa 2019). They consider protocols, 
algorithms, infrastructures, technical systems as an integral part of the gov-
ernance of and by platforms. On the other hand, the development of products 
and services happens within a wider framework of overarching principles 
(trust and security), objectives and/or company strategies.
Understanding how corporate actors promote norms in cybersecurity, 
therefore, requires an integrated perspective between the socio-technical, 
organizational, and political arrangements. As the following sections show, 
the visibility of these configurations is indispensable and perhaps indisso-
ciable in understanding private influence in cybersecurity governance, in gen-
eral, and norms-entrepreneurship, in particular. As one of our interviewees 
suggested, the global and diplomatic engagement is part of a continuum of 
what is done and advocated for on the enterprise side of the company. Though 
often-invisible to cyber-norms discussions, these arrangements provide the 
conditions of existence for the big tech companies to exert influence and 
maintain their engagement nationally, regionally, and globally with different 
stakeholder groups.
As this chapter seeks to illustrate, norms-making and entrepreneurship 
are not restricted to echoing or proposing new terms or international norms; 
rather, it encompasses a complex negotiation of the values and services and is 
enabled by continuous organizational flexibility and key leadership influence. 
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Therefore, delving into the practices of companies and showing how complex 
structures of governance work offers us a privileged take on how different 
kinds of norms are produced and negotiated. It also allows us to go deeper 
into the different practices adopted by the company so as to show that norms 
may come in a variety of shapes—the Tech Accord and the Digital Geneva 
Convention are but the tip of the iceberg; contemporary corporate entrepre-
neurship also comprises voluntary self-commitments in reaction to public 
expectations, rather than simply being a response to “delegated tasks” (Hurel 
and Lobato 2018, 67).
Unlike other big tech companies, Microsoft engages as much in platform 
governance7—by embedding compliance within their platform, for example, 
making sure that it is not being used to violate intellectual property, and so 
on—as they seek to establish room for themselves as both industry leaders 
and government interlocutors (Interview, September 2019). When asked 
about why would a company get involved with cyber norm promotion, an 
interviewee answered that global companies should be able to put govern-
ments to talk and that it is impossible for governments to do it all [the gov-
ernance work in cyberspace] by themselves. At the same time, however, s/
he emphasized that it is of fundamental importance that governments and 
companies act together in combating cybercrime, for example, and that cor-
porations are unable to pursue this task by themselves (Interview, September 
2019). Also part of Microsoft’s business strategy (Interview, October 2019), 
norms become important meaning settlers and indicators of commitment 
between parties. In addition to engaging in lobbying with national govern-
ments, the company has for some time now raised interest for its explicit 
advocacy on norms of state behavior in cyberspace (Smith 2017). As we will 
explore in detail in section three, such engagement means that, despite obvi-
ous resistance and suspicion on the part of governments (and diplomats the 
most), the company is effectively there (in the meeting room) when it comes 
to discuss and negotiate action and norms with states.
Several times when conducting this research, we were met with the ques-
tion of why we were looking at Microsoft, or if, due to its open advocacy 
and engagement with norms promotion, this would not be an exceptional 
case rather than a pattern, or even whether we could provide any valuable 
generalization from this case. Particularly interesting about Microsoft’s 
case is that, because it is sui generis and not (yet) followed by its peers in 
the private sector when it comes to openly carving out a space for itself as 
a legitimate interlocutor in norms debate, it offers us with a yet underex-
plored perspective on potential new unfoldings of private practices in global 
governance. While they indeed embrace much of the patterns for private 
action that are identified by specialized literature—hybridization, revolving 
door, reliance on PPPs, increased participation in decentralized governance 
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processes, for example, via platform governance, and so on—they also 
bring to the analysis a unique take on the way in which the organization’s 
complexity—that is, the structures, people, technologies, and processes, that 
hold them together—makes it into the construction of this particular kind of 
legitimation that might be very similar and yet quite distinct from traditional 
corporate lobby, and what is more, substantially affect how we conceive 
norms. It is the curiosity with the kinds of practices that become part of 
cybersecurity governance by means of Microsoft’s actions that moves us. 
Thus, rather than the question of why Microsoft is doing this, what interests 
us the most is the question of how they are doing it—and what it means for 
cybersecurity governance.
CYBER NORMS AND TECHNICAL/
TECHNOLOGICAL MEDIATION
An immediate consequence to the endeavor of singling out Microsoft yields 
an important question of whether there is something special about the com-
pany and how it operates. We argue that yes, there is. Not necessarily because 
Microsoft is a stand-alone case, but because perhaps the inquiry and study of 
norms and governance in cybersecurity requires more attention to particular 
socio-technical, organizational, and political arrangements and their role in 
shaping cybersecurity. We argue that unique dispositions within Microsoft 
(e.g., product, change in business model, organizational history and struc-
ture and leadership) provide an incrementally dynamic setting for specific 
modalities of influence, legitimacy-making and norms-setting to emerge. 
This arrangement includes a combination of practices—discourses, service 
provision, technical arrangements, knowledge and expertise—that support 
and configure norms-making and their capacity to engage in norms-entrepre-
neurship in cybersecurity.
It can be said that Microsoft’s efforts to become a legitimate actor in 
cybersecurity norms-making depend on a double mobilization: the first is the 
assembling of an organizational structure that provides a seemingly compre-
hensive narrative not only to the task of engaging with governments (thus, 
including but not being restricted to government relations departments), but 
also to its “global” engagement with the topic of norms-making (e.g., Diplo-
macy Team). Of course, this coherence might be only apparent (e.g., it might 
be that most of the “diplomatic” work stems from the presidency). However, 
it matters that “public-facing” structures are able to hold within the broader 
attempt to fit the company’s efforts on a coherent framework of action. This 
first mobilization has been and will continue to be explored continuously 
throughout the chapter.
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The second mobilization, in turn, corresponds to the expectations over cer-
tain kinds of desired (state) behavior that are embedded in both their modes 
and infrastructures of engagement with governments (e.g., via Transparency 
Centers, its Digital Crimes Unit) and technological services—including the 
kinds of shifts in business strategies that have been adopted in the past years. 
Considering both these dimensions, we now turn to an examination of how 
technical, technological, and organizational affordances are productive of 
norms and advance the claim that norms are also embedded in the kinds of 
technical and technological mediations in place when the company interacts 
with states.
A Little Bit of Organizational Complexity
Microsoft works to socialize a common understanding of security concerns 
between tech companies (e.g., Business-to-Business security solutions) and 
governments—through activities that range from public-private partnerships 
(PPP) to a more direct engagement in proposing and influencing policy 
development. In what follows, we highlight three ways in which associations 
between the technical and organizational initiatives characterize Microsoft’s 
normative influence on cybersecurity.
First, they do so by providing technical expertise and services. As a big 
tech company, Microsoft has developed a suite of services and products that 
aim at providing effective protection of infrastructures and data sets, promote 
the stability, resilience and security of systems, and facilitate logistics and 
data management. Concerns at the enterprise level seek to address issues 
related to authentication, trust, identity and access management, interoper-
ability, and incident detection and mitigation. This perspective frames secu-
rity as a service, as a set of techniques, and as expert knowledge about threats 
and vulnerabilities.
The provision of security services for governments takes the form of pub-
lic-private partnerships and is contextualized in a customer-company rela-
tion. However, a “business-as-usual” approach to PPP has raised significant 
amounts of critique related to the expected role of governments as legitimate 
actors for providing security. Further concerns include the risk of incurring 
on a market-driven approach to cybersecurity (Carr 2016)—or “privatisa-
tion of security” (Avant 2005)—and the abdication of the state in protecting 
critical infrastructure (see Assaf 2009; Dunn Cavelty and Suter 2009). Not-
withstanding, cooperation among both sectors is, as Dunn Cavelty and Suter 
note, “simply essential” when it comes to securing interconnected systems 
(2009, 180). On the one hand, PPPs refer to a particular way of outsourcing 
security services and expertise (also see Berndtsson and Kinsey 2016). On 
the other hand, this particular kind of expertise-driven engagement presents 
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security as a feature—de-politicized, flattened, and technical in nature. Secu-
rity is habitualized (see Berger and Luckman 1987) as an unquestioned set 
of assembled components (e.g., standards, packages, platforms, products) 
and exported as a ready-made product to governments (see Simos 2018). As 
McIntyre8 suggests (2017), “we in the industry can better serve governments 
[. . .] by incentivizing migrations to newer platforms which offer more built-
in security; and that are more securely developed.” In a less visible manner, 
security is shaped through design—for example, through standards for hybrid 
cloud infrastructure, vulnerability management, security development life 
cycle, encryption and communication standards.
Technical PPPs are a fundamental form of engagement between Microsoft 
and local governments. These cooperation mechanisms allow them to social-
ize particular forms of security management and threat assessment, establish 
channels for information sharing, and create new avenues for trust-building. 
That is the case of the Government Security Program, their regional Trans-
parency Centers (United States, Singapore, Belgium, Brazil, and China), 
and the Digital Crimes Unit (DCU) team, where Microsoft provides tailored 
security services and responds to cyberattacks—which includes source code 
sharing, information on malware, threats and vulnerabilities (Microsoft 2014; 
Government, n.d.). The DCU’s Cybercrime Center gathers law enforcement, 
NGOs, academics, and industry in combating different modalities of crime—
cloud crime and malware, misappropriation of Microsoft intellectual prop-
erty, deterring nation-state actors, and online child exploitation—through 
networks of collaboration and by using (and promoting) secure technology 
deployment (e.g., cloud, PhotoDNA) (Digital, n.d.). Moreover, it took down 
six domains of the Russian hacking group accused of having launched a 
phishing campaign in the 2016 U.S. presidential election (Newman 2018). 
Cases such as the GSP and DCU provide a space where governments and 
industry can closely operate in taking down cybercriminal networks. Most 
importantly, the close collaboration between law enforcement and Microsoft 
DCU also relies on the recruitment of investigators and former prosecutors. 
The “revolving door” between both sectors in cases such as this provides a 
rather blurry distinction between public and private as the exchange between 
both (in terms of skills, expertise, and personnel) is a significant factor to 
coordinating responses.9
Second, they engage with policy to establish and/or reinforce specific val-
ues. This is not new. In 2005 Microsoft had advocated for a comprehensive 
privacy legislation in a speech to the Congressional Internet Caucus (see 
Microsoft 2005). Back then there was little response from the government, 
and concerns with privacy were only starting to emerge. Even so, the prac-
tice of prescribing specific principles for specific legislations on data privacy 
was the same then as it is now. In light of the diversification of services and 
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products rooted in cloud computing and artificial intelligence, Microsoft’s 
influence is also characterized by constant attempts at flagging new areas 
for public regulation (e.g., artificial intelligence and facial recognition) and 
greater corporate social responsibility (Smith 2018).10 Though these sugges-
tions are partly directed toward the construction of a narrative around com-
mon goods or shared values across society, government, and industry, there 
is an inherent “causal link” that “protecting consumers promotes commerce, 
and that’s good for everyone” (Microsoft 2005). In the case of facial recogni-
tion, the company, as a leader in the development and application of such a 
technology, holds considerable knowledge and expertise over the technical 
and use-specific requirements—which also serves as leverage on claiming 
their say on how a technology-specific regulation should look like. Within 
this framing, it is not unlikely that this engagement with policy comes as a 
direct action from industry in seeking to influence the principles and legisla-
tion that will regulate the very technologies they work with.
Third, they advocate for international cooperation and cybersecurity 
norms. As previously mentioned, technical expertise and policy engage-
ment at the national level highlight important dimensions of the association 
between the technical and organizational activities within the company. How-
ever, when it comes to international cyber norms, Microsoft faces a greater 
challenge in communicating the importance of including the private sector in 
a (originally conceived as) state-centric realm. Back in 2012, the consolida-
tion of international debates on Internet governance was seen as a fruitful 
starting point for thinking about new PPP models for promoting international 
cybersecurity norms (see Hurel 2016).11 As Matt Thomlinson (2012), former 
VP of Security at Microsoft noted, “global conversations on cybersecurity 
would also benefit from a private sector perspective that can help govern-
ments think through the technical challenges and priorities involved in secur-
ing billions of customers using the Internet around the world.”
After having taken a proactive measure in advocating for a Digital Geneva 
Convention, the company explicitly positioned itself as a quasi-diplomatic 
actor (Hurel and Lobato 2018). Internally, it worked to develop whitepapers 
and policy documents aiming at broadcasting possible consensus areas for 
international cyber-norms development and established a Global Security 
Strategy and Diplomacy Team, which then gradually transformed into the 
Digital Diplomacy Team. States remain reluctant to the idea either because 
they deem private sector norms entrepreneurship illegitimate or due to the 
fact that if an initiative such as the Digital Geneva Convention is recognized, 
it might delegitimize previous government-led efforts to promote interna-
tional norms for cyberspace—in particular, the UNGGE.
Having gone through an extensive list of documents, we were able to 
identify further forms of communication that perhaps set more clearly in the 
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exercise of bringing coherence to the myriad of teams, programs and ser-
vices—which we will explore in the last section. In publishing whitepapers 
and policy papers Microsoft publicizes their positions, provide an organized 
account of their strategy for policy engagement, and circulate their narrative 
for (i) cyber policy development and (ii) private sector inclusion (see Hurel 
and Lobato 2018). While this may be, at first, conceived as a “soft” approach 
to norms and policy making, documents range from general frameworks for 
cloud to frameworks for national cybersecurity strategy development, cyber-
policy toolkits or even “mandatory” incident disclosure models (Microsoft, 
n.d.).
Creating a Narrative: The First Clouds in the Sky
Against this backdrop, virtually every leading tech company found itself on 
the defensive in the summer of 2013. We conveyed our frustration to officials 
in Washington, DC. It was a watershed moment. It surfaced contrasts that 
have contributed to a chasm between governments and the tech sector to this 
day. Governments serve constituents who live in a defined geography, such as 
a state or nation. But tech has gone global, and we have customers virtually 
everywhere. The cloud has not only changed where and to whom we provide 
our services, it has redefined our relationship with customers. It has turned tech 
companies into institutions that in some ways resemble banks. People deposit 
their money in banks, and they store their most personal information—emails, 
photos, documents, and text messages—with tech companies. (Smith and 
Browne 2019, 22)
In 2014, as Satya Nadella took on the role as the CEO of Microsoft, he 
proposed a significant change in how the business operated. Back then he 
announced a new vision of what would promote a company-shift from a 
Windows-centric model to “mobile-first and cloud-first” model: “Microsoft is 
the productivity and platform company for the mobile-first, cloud-first world” 
(Nadella 2017, 54). Such a shift implied and enabled significant organiza-
tional, technological, and political changes—which spanned from diversify-
ing cloud services to negotiating their public and private interests. One of the 
interviewees added that this change is, part and parcel, also a reflection of 
the need to innovate in a context where the company had gone from a global 
monopoly to sharing the stage with emerging technology companies. Accord-
ing to Nadella (2017), disputes such as the Microsoft versus United States, 
where the company challenged a warrant from the federal government to 
hand over e-mails that were originally stored in a server in Ireland, highlight 
the moral challenges that the company faced. Most importantly, it provides 
an interesting case for understanding the materiality of the services and infra-
structures that not only support their operation as a platform and productivity 
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company, but the social tensions and norms that are negotiated within and 
outside the company environment.
Interestingly, the company’s narrative in cases such as this is one of expos-
ing an inherent tension present in negotiating their role in the protection of 
individual “liberties of privacy and free speech and civil society requirements 
like public safety” (Nadella 2017, 112). However, it is also followed and 
informed by the development of strategies to further guide action. In Micro-
soft’s case, this includes but is not restricted to the principle of designing trust 
in products and customers, partners, and governments. The “Redmond-based 
yet globally present” organizational structure is also an important feature to 
understanding how they claim legitimacy over their role in cybersecurity 
governance. As Brad Smith noted, “[t]he products and companies are far 
more global, and the pervasive nature of information and communications 
technology increasingly thrusts the tech sector into the center of foreign 
policy issues.”
A second shift that followed from this “Windows-centric” to “cloud-first” 
model pertains to the relations of the company with governments. As one 
interviewee observed, for some time, some governments in Latin America 
were suspicious of the company for its monopoly on software services (and, 
accordingly, leveling up the pricing due to its comfortable position back then) 
and for its legal allegiance to the U.S. government, due to the fact that Micro-
soft is a U.S. company.12 This has now changed, prompted by an increase 
in market competition, the loss of its monopoly of software production and 
distribution and by the attempts to carve out other market niches for the com-
pany (as the shift promoted by Mr. Nadella indicates). Not only did Microsoft 
need to “reinvent” themselves, they also had to convince governments that 
they could be trusted partners, which also depended on negotiating with their 
government interlocutors the need to establish transparency mechanisms and 
encode values, such as privacy, security, and trust, within their products.13 
This need becomes evident from one interview, held in October 2019, when it 
was said that if [Microsoft] could not show their clients and users (especially 
governments) that their products were safe, they would likely end up losing 
clients.
One such channel for building trust would be the company’s transparency 
centers. Scattered in five different locations in Asia, Latin America, Europe, 
and the United States (there is no transparency center in the African continent 
to date), these centers allow governments access to source code and propri-
etary information from Microsoft’s products and inspect them whenever there 
is suspicion about the products provided by the company. However, when 
we asked one of our interviewees about whether there was someone in the 
government of country A14 that already requested access to the source code, 
the answer was negative (here, we could speculate whether this could be due 
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to significant barriers in terms of availability of technical knowledge/skills to 
do this job within much of the already-short-of-resources branches of local 
and federal governments).
Transparency centers communicate one obvious expectation: that of trust, 
a value which is core to Microsoft’s business model (Nadella 2017). Not only 
would these centers serve to expand dialogue with government interlocutors, 
they would also show the willingness of the company to open up itself to 
their scrutiny—of course, as long as certain requirements of confidentiality 
are met. Furthermore, in addition to being a channel of communication with 
government actors, Transparency Centers mobilize expectations around how 
“trust” with government actors should be practised (e.g., by means of grant-
ing access to—mostly illegible—proprietary information). For suspicious 
governments, in turn, “trust” becomes an important condition that will ulti-
mately lead to either signing a contract or not. Since the shift to a cloud-based 
model and the resignification of its relationship with governments, not only 
is trust of fundamental importance to Microsoft’s business model, its pres-
ence or absence is—at least, logically—core to the construction of spaces of 
negotiation.
As we have sought to show in this section, shared expectations of behavior 
are communicated through a multiplicity of channels—the legal text being 
only one of them, albeit the one that has received far more attention in spe-
cialized literature. In addition, we cannot detach the understanding of how 
these expectations come into being from the practical changes in business 
models and in the strategies that companies adopt to engage with govern-
ments. That is to say, we have emphasized here that through Microsoft’s 
efforts to build themselves a legitimate space within norms-talk internation-
ally, we can think of a different understanding of norm-building and cyber 
norms as part of a continuum in which the organizational and technological 
affordances in place matter as much as the negotiations undertaken to social-
ize the norm. In what follows, we will explore more of Microsoft’s efforts to 
be seen as a “diplomatic” actor.
MICROSOFT, A DIPLOMATIC ACTOR?
As previously noted, private governance encompasses services and products, 
the maintenance of continuous organizational flexibility (new teams, posts) 
and key leadership influence. One dimension that has more recently gained 
considerable attention after the proposal for the Digital Geneva Convention 
is precisely how a global company such as Microsoft positions itself as a 
quasi-diplomatic actor. According to Brad Smith, his push toward diplomacy 
comes as one of the responses to the expansion of the company’s global 
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reach and rising concerns with cybersecurity: “The products and companies 
are far more global, and the pervasive nature of information and communica-
tion technology increasingly thrusts the tech sector into the center of foreign 
policy issues” (Smith and Browne 2019, 80). In order to advance their dip-
lomatic engagement, the company works to influence global cybersecurity 
governance direct and indirectly. Engagement, in this front, relies mostly 
on the mobilization of staff within the company’s Department of Corporate, 
External, and Legal Affairs (CELA)15 and, most importantly, the Digital 
Diplomacy Team.
Microsoft works to advance multistakeholder and multilateral processes 
indirectly, whether through funding cybersecurity conferences,16 participat-
ing in working groups,17 attending international cybersecurity conferences 
or signaling support for norm entrepreneurship by others. When placed in 
a wider horizon on activities (indirect influence), the entrepreneurial efforts 
and cyber-norms documents of the company, the Digital Geneva convention 
is but one public-facing activity within a thread of continuous normative 
arrangements. Most notably, examples such as the Paris Call on Trust and 
Security and the Christchurch Call portray this cross-sector outward-facing 
norms engagement. However, members of the CELA Department also work 
continuously in providing inputs to specific multistakeholder cybersecurity 
processes. That is the case of the Internet Governance Forum,18 where Micro-
soft has been continuously contributing to the work of the Best Practice 
Forum on Cybersecurity providing inputs to annual consultations. Within the 
Global Forum on Cyber Expertise, Microsoft has not only participated but 
also led—alongside government representatives—specific task forces on the 
implementation of cyber norms, Confidence-Building Measures and cyber 
diplomacy (see GFCE 2019).
Direct diplomatic engagement is equally central to the process of influ-
encing the development of cyber norms as well as pushing for the broader 
participation within the private sector in cyber diplomacy. Even though from 
a tech sector standpoint, it might be indisputable that—as infrastructure 
providers and platform developers—a company such as Microsoft holds 
a considerable role in shaping and participating in global cybersecurity 
governance along with other tech giants, that is not necessarily the case 
when it comes to cyber-norms discussions. International processes such 
as the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts (UNGGE), whose 
main objective has been to discuss norms for responsible state behavior in 
cyberspace and, most recently, consider the applicability of international 
law in cyberspace. In light of fundamental immediate implications of 
any international negotiation such as the UNGGE, Microsoft has a direct 
interest mobilizing its resources to promoting norms to help mitigate and 
diminish cyberattacks and conflicts in an interdependent ecosystem such 
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as cyberspace (see McKay et al. 2014; Charney et al. 2016; Nadella 2017; 
McKay 2018; Smith and Browne 2019).
Even though the company has maintained a long-standing relationship 
with different governments as part of their Government Security Programme, 
bilateral agreements or PPP, the international cyber-norms discussions 
presents a slightly different landscape (forums, initiatives) of interaction. 
Though bilateral and closed-meeting interactions are much more challenging 
to take into account in the study of how norms are built in practice, there is 
something to be said about how the company has expanded their engagement 
with governments. Be it on the “techplomacy” side, interacting with tech 
ambassadors from Denmark, Australia, and France, or creating a diplomatic 
cyber norms-oriented agenda to engage with governments bilaterally and 
multilaterally. One example worth noting was the Christchurch call, where 
Brad Smith narrates his encounter with New Zealand prime minister Jacinda 
Arden in March 2019, and how the Paris Call set a precedent back in Decem-
ber 2018 for thinking about a mechanism that could potentially bring gov-
ernments, tech sector, and civil society together (Smith and Browne 2019). 
Cases such as this highlight an important feature of normative cascading 
effects of emerging cross-sector exchange—it also portrays how Microsoft 
diplomatic-focused interaction with governments has opened up avenues for 
their interaction with governments.19
Diplomatic efforts are not limited to strengthening ties with governments 
and/or socializing norms and principles in different multilateral fora, rather 
it entails circulating and developing norms from and for the private sector. 
That is the case of the Cybersecurity Tech Accord (CTA), a private sector-
facing initiative launched in April 2018 that seeks to promote spaces for 
collective action, capacity building, and cooperation among global technol-
ogy companies. The CTA also serves as a platform supporting other industry 
partners to onboard into cyber-norms discussions by (i) providing them the 
opportunity to attend consultations and conferences alongside governments 
and/or civil society and (ii) planning coordinated action and response to 
international processes (see Tech Accord 2019). Another example of peer-
collaboration is the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism (GIF-CT), 
an initiative established in early 2017 by Twitter, Facebook, Microsoft, 
and YouTube to deepen industry collaboration to combat terrorist abuse of 
platforms. Following the Christchurch Call, this group of companies has 
announced the creation of an independent initiative to work in a more struc-
tured setting with government and civil society organizations in prevent-
ing the exploitation of digital platforms by terrorists and violent extremist 
groups. Spaces such as this not only contribute as a coordination point, but 
serve as a knowledge and skills-sharing platform between sectors. However, 
such coordination and interaction contributes to the emergence of hybrid 
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governance models that questions the differentiation between public and 
private roles and responsibilities.
The case of Microsoft’s engagement with international cyber norms sug-
gests that outcomes of corporate practices are not reducible either to the 
intentions of the individual human beings “behind it,” nor do corporations 
act like independent beings with a life of their own. Instead, corporate action 
is more accurately seen as an aggregate of complex associations between 
internal policy and technical teams (which are more situated associations 
themselves), policy documents and initiatives, technologies and organiza-
tional infrastructures that support relations with governments and corporate 
customers, without which that what is called corporate action would look 
entirely otherwise (Latour 1994). This aggregate looks the way it does also 
because of the smaller associations that compose it and it is relevant to point 
out that each more complex association has an ontological status that is dis-
tinguishable from that of less complex ones.
Such a perspective over corporate norm entrepreneurship also allows us 
to bring in the commensurability of profit and rational action and norma-
tive and moral engagement. That is to say: when we look at how the com-
pany engages with governments, that is, through soft recommendations and 
attempts to influence policy making at either local, state, national, or inter-
national instances, or through mechanisms devised to “build trust” with state 
customers, we realize that, at once, companies can promote moral norms and 
seek profit. In Microsoft’s case, what is pictured as norm promotion also has 
to do with what the company sees as an adequate use of for its products and 
services and may at times come as voluntary self-commitments with values—
such as trust—deemed to be core to the reputation and afterlife of commercial 
and government solutions. As the relation between interests and moral values 
becomes more complex, it comes as no surprise then that the misuse of its 
software and hardware products, with attempts to exploit vulnerabilities in 
them, is among one of the company’s primary concerns as it keeps advocating 
for some sort of accord among states.
Whereas there is a comprehensive assessment of how different private 
groups engage with international norms-making (Flohr et al. 2010; Rudder, 
Fritschler and Choi 2016; Strange 1992; Watkins 2007), this is a territory 
that still remains largely unknown to most studies on tech companies. Such 
a lack is nothing but problematic. Tech companies engage quite differently 
in regulating the behavior of its customers and users, and this has to do with 
the very nature of the services and products that are offered by them and how 
they work, are used, exploited, and transformed through practice. Indeed, 
some attention has been paid to how social media create community stan-
dards to bound what is an acceptable conduct on their platforms (Article 19, 
2018) and regulate user behavior through technical (Musiani 2013) as well as 
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legal (Belli and Venturini 2016) architectures. But these approaches remain 
mostly restricted to either self or individual regulation. Whereas they give 
us a hint on how companies—intentionally or not—develop sophisticated 
regulatory mechanisms through their products and services, they are less 
helpful once we try to make sense of the varied, sometimes conflicting or not-
always-coherent-in-practice, organizational architectures underpinning such 
regulatory efforts. They are also not very helpful once we ask why and how 
companies engage with state actors to advocate for moral standards and com-
mon social codes of conduct to other actors beyond its peers in the private 
sector. Without in-depth discussion of why/how this happens, we foreclose 
our own understanding of how legitimacy is built through such efforts, as 
well as debates about how we should be dealing with these kinds of practices.
Adding to the burgeoning literature and policy initiatives to advance cyber 
norms (NATO 2013; McKay et al. 2014; Osula and Rõigas 2016; Finnemore 
and Hollis 2016; Charney et al. 2016; G7 2017; Nye 2018), Microsoft’s call 
for a Digital Geneva Convention has drawn as much attention as suspicion to 
the company, as well as to its intentions and chances of succeeding. Whereas 
attention to corporate cyber-norms promotion and evaluations of its success 
or failure can be useful in assessing the efficacy (or not) of a situated initia-
tive, both miss an important aspect of Microsoft’s efforts: it is not—and, 
possibly, never was—about the Digital Geneva Convention. As our research 
on the company’s organizational structure attempted to show, this is but one 
situated effort in the context of a diversified range of possibilities for political 
articulation undertaken by the company. As we sought to illustrate through-
out this study, each particular relation begs the articulation of distinct policy 
strategies, infrastructures, and narratives that, in turn, constitute a multiplicity 
of associations in themselves—associations composed of people in policy 
teams, lobbying practices, technical systems, pieces of hardware, software, 
codes of conduct, different levels of government (local, state, national, and 
international), policy documents, physical installations, and so on. These 
associations point to the varied ways through which norms are articulated 
through corporate practice, some of them fairly straightforward, such as cre-
ating instruments of “soft influence,” that is, policy papers and whitepapers, 
and producing advisory opinions, while some not so much—here, Transpar-
ency Centers are a case in point.
The empirical research suggests that such organizational complexity plays 
an important role in building legitimacy in private governance. This happens 
in—at least—three different ways. First, in devising strategies to deal with 
technical challenges to cyberspace security. As a platform and productivity 
technology company, Microsoft invests in the development of new technolo-
gies, software, and mitigation of incidents, such as the Conficker worm and 
the WannaCry ransomware, and also engages on combating cybercrime 
304 Louise Marie Hurel and Luisa Cruz Lobato
through its cybercrime unit.20 This shaping of both the economic and tech-
nical dimensions of cybersecurity paves the way for private actors to be 
“recognized as legitimate by some larger public (that often includes states 
themselves) as authors of policies, of practices, of rules, and of norms” (Hall 
and Biersteker 2002, 4).
Second, in taking the lead in the proposal of a tech accord in the private 
sector and entering into cooperation with companies within and outside the 
tech sector, Microsoft has sought to establish itself as a moral leader among 
its peers. As Floh et al. (2010) note, establishing normative standards for its 
peers on the private sector is characteristic of corporate entrepreneurship. 
When engaging with norms promotion, corporations tend to work as meaning 
managers, establishing “new ways of talking about and understanding issues” 
(Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 897). They may also support the setting or 
institutionalization of a new norm “by adopting a unilateral company code 
as best practice, by lobbying for it among its peers and by engaging in the 
creation of a collective self-regulatory initiative” (Flohr et al. 2010, 19) and 
play a role even after the norm has acquired some degree of institutionaliza-
tion, by engaging with organizations supporting the norm and participation in 
revision processes (Flohr et al. 2010).
Third, by actively engaging with norms emergence beyond national 
borders, structuring public policy as well as diplomacy teams, regularly 
publishing policy documents aimed at state actors and getting involved in 
multilateral and multistakeholder policy processes, the company has clearly 
sought to stretch the boundaries of its legitimacy. Such stretching has less to 
do with the proposal of a Digital Geneva Convention in itself than with the 
company’s aforementioned practices and organizational structure. That is to 
say, legitimacy building, at this stage, is better understood in terms of the 
complex associations and relations that follow from Microsoft’s engagement 
with local, state, and national governments and its attempts to build legiti-
macy within the private sector and through its technical expertise.
The implications of this for the study of norms-making and power are man-
ifold. The processual lenses hereto adopted suggest that power can be less 
straightforward than it seems: it can be distributed through internal teams, 
technical and policy considerations, expertise, “high-tech” centers, computa-
tional systems, soft-engagement. Consequently, what we call norms-making 
is equally distributed in these practices, stretching into every direction thanks 
to dynamic architecture of policy engagement. In this sense, norms-making 
cannot be understood as neither a state-only process, nor necessarily an 
actor-only process. By reintroducing private governance to the cyber-norms 
discussions—that is, looking at the strategies and associations involved in the 
establishing of a range of social codes of conduct—our goal was to provide 
an exercise of visualizing and further inquiring of what indeed, can pass as a 
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norm. Initiatives such as a tech accord or a Digital Geneva Convention serve 
as important reminders that future cyber-norms and cybersecurity governance 
research needs requires careful unpacking.
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS ON CONTROVERSIES 
AND FURTHER RESEARCH
In this chapter, we sought to expand our previous research on private 
actor norm entrepreneurship in cybersecurity (Hurel and Lobato 2018) 
by undertaking an empirical analysis of the organizational structure of 
Microsoft. Through the analysis, we illustrated that not only questions of 
who—states? Nongovernmental organizations? Advocacy groups? Corpo-
rations?—produces norms matter, but also issues of how norms are made 
and what should be understood as norm-making processes in these analyses 
in the first place. This is a discreet albeit necessary step in the study of 
private governance in cybersecurity, as it opens up the field for entirely 
different and often extremely complex and messy ways of producing social 
codes of conduct—through technical means, soft influence, direct engage-
ment with actors, and so on. Microsoft’s case also shows that corporations 
can engage meaningfully and voluntarily with promoting and establishing 
socially accepted norms of conduct for both its peers and state actors at 
different levels of government—while also seeking to increase its profits 
and engaging with cost-benefits calculations. Thus, we can identify differ-
ent dimensions stemming from the practices and associations constituted 
in and by corporate action, which include policy making, different degrees 
of advocacy (including lobbying), self-regulation and regulation through 
software and/or hardware.
By looking at the vast possibilities for associations—among documents, 
policies, teams, states, other corporations, high-tech infrastructures, tech-
niques and technologies—we also highlighted three different dimensions of 
legitimacy building: technical/technological, among peers and multilateral/
multistakeholder. Each form comes out of dynamic sets of associations, some 
more rigid, some more weak. What they tell us is that what is pictured as 
norm promotion is in fact a more complicated enterprise. By asking whether 
the Digital Geneva Convention proposal was actually novelty, we sought to 
illustrate that it is actually an actualization of these ever-changing associa-
tions. This is to say, it is a particular mode of producing norms, but not the 
only one, within Microsoft’s organizational complexity.
One question that arises from the analysis is whether—despite the intense 
engagement with international norms promotion and the work of Transpar-
ency Centers as well as regional/national teams—the company still privileges 
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its home country—the United States—as its main locus for policy making. 
Further research is still required about how the company develops relations 
with Global South countries and to what extent it is perceived by them as 
simply reproducing the interests of its “home country” or as something else. 
This could indicate whether the strength of particular associations at the 
expense of others might say something and potentially affect the company’s 
advocacy. Distinctly, it could also shed a more clarifying light onto how local 
politics possibly shape long-term, global policies.
LIST OF INTERVIEWS
 1. Interview, October 2019.
 2. Interview, October 2019.
 3. Interview, September 2019.
 4. Interview, September 2019.
NOTES
1. The authors would like to thank Prof. Dennis Broeders, Prof. Duncan Hollis, 
and Prof. Anna Leader for their support and invaluable comments to the development 
of this chapter. The authors would also thank the panel discussion held on “(Re)
assessing the role of private actors in cybersecurity governance” at the ISA Annual 
Conference 2019, Toronto.
2. In fact, the political role of companies has been widely debated within Inter-
national Political Economy by means of discussions over multinational corporations. 
See: Strange (1991; 1996; 1998); Gill; Cutler (2014); Gilpin (1976); May (2015); 
Babic, Fichtner and Heemskerk (2017).
3. Such as the 2019 Brazil-EU Consultations on Preventing Conflict in Cyber-
space, the 2018 Conference Responsible Behaviour in Cyberspace: Novel Horizons 
and the new European framework for Cyber Sanctions.
4. Notably, they are progressively becoming locus of attention. See, for example, 
Dunn Cavelty (2016) and Carr (2016).
5. In this work, we also consider as IR studies in Global Governance and Inter-
national Political Economy.
6. This has also proven to be a challenge to the development of this chapter. In 
spite of having conducted interviews, analyzed public documentation, and engaged in 
participant observation across different events, the traceability of Microsoft’s engage-
ment and interests was an exercise in itself. The generativity and fast-paced change 
of the company’s organizational structure allowed us to further understand that their 
engagement in diplomacy, policy and product development (enterprise side) is a con-
tinuous process of communication and internal negotiation. Norms are continuously 
challenged, reinforced, maintained, and transformed within complex arrangements 
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that do not necessarily imply in a clear-cut rational and objective response. Rather, 
they rely on internal alignments, leadership, and narrative-building.
7. However, in a far less explicit fashion than its peers (e.g., Facebook or Google) 
also due to different business models.
8. Executive security adviser at Microsoft Enterprise Cybersecurity Group.
9. See Smith and Browne (2019) chapter 5 note 2 for a detailed description of the 
development of the DCU since early 2000s.
10. The Cybersecurity Policy Framework, launched in 2018, holds together 
many of the previous documents directed to capacity building and development of 
national cybersecurity strategies. It serves as an interesting case for understanding 
how Microsoft gradually organized their agenda and positions on this particular area. 
Most importantly, they explicitly state the purpose of the document—and their aim 
in circulating it—that is, to provide “a high-level overview of concepts and priorities 
that must be top of mind when developing an effective and resilient cybersecurity 
policy environment” (McKay 2018).
11. Interestingly, in 2012, Microsoft developed an expected cybersecurity policy 
PPP timeline called “Cybersecurity Policy and Partnership Evolutionary Curve” that 
ranged from their early experiences in working with governments at the national 
level—risk management (2000) and resiliency (2005)—to new avenues for collabo-
ration on cyber norms at the international level—starting from Internet governance 
(2010) to cybersecurity norms development (2015) and finally reaching harmoniza-
tion (2020) (Thomlinson 2012).
12. Curiously, possibly in anticipation to this kind of criticism, one interviewee 
promptly emphasized the legal bond of the subsidiary in which s/he worked with the 
country in which it operated.
13. See Nadella (2017) and Smith (2019) for a detailed account of how both the 
president and CEO of the company portrayed the internal negotiations during the 
Snowden revelations and how they responded deciding to sue the U.S. government 
through the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.
14. Where the subsidiary for which s/he works operates.
15. Regionally, the CELA Departments work to represent global principles and 
advocacy strategies in their respective countries.
16. Such as the Paris Peace Forum in 2018 (see Belin 2018), Global Commission 
on the Stability of Cyberspace, Global Conference on Cyberspace and others.
17. Such as the Best Practice Forum (BPF) on Cybersecurity within the Internet 
Governance Forum, or different Working Groups of the GFCE.
18. A global multistakeholder platform of the United Nations dedicated to facili-
tating the discussion of public policy issues related to the Internet.
19. In cyber norms-discussions (both internationally and regionally), Microsoft 
is perhaps the only industry representative participating in closed-door negotiations 
continuously. Though it is more challenging to generalize when it comes to interac-
tion and influence in concealed environments, through participant observation the 
researchers were able to identify specific occasions where the company was the only 
industry partner represented either in multilateral negotiations or in closed multistake-
holder environments. In early 2019, the EU Cyber Forum was followed by a closed 
civil society side meeting. Participants included civil society organizations, think 
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tanks, academics and Microsoft. Examples such as this illustrate not only the emerg-
ing spaces of interaction resulting from sustained engagement with global cybersecu-
rity and cyber-norms community, but it creates an entry point for them to advocate, 
communicate and bring other industry sectors—such as those that are members of the 
CTA. All of which support the narrative echoed by Brad Smith of industry as technol-
ogy providers and central to the promotion of peace and secure cyberspace.
20. The digital crime unit, in cooperation with academic experts and industry, 
successfully took down the Rustock botnet (Microsoft 2011) and further engaged in 
joint operations with the financial sector and law enforcement agencies—the most 
aggressive operation being Operation b54 (Boscovich 2013).
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